Does an Omniscient Creator Lead to Fatalism?

[carpedm9587]

Or they're both making a choice. God decided to create the reality where the actor freely chose to act in a certain way.

But God didn't create a universe where the actor wasn't free to choose otherwise, He created a universe where the actor was free to choose otherwise, but decided not to.

You're not really expounding on the argument in the OP at all, you're simply expressing it in different words. I'm assuming there's some hidden premise in the argument that you and mythas are making that would make it a valid argument, but as it is the premises (God is all-knowing and God decided to create a universe with specific outcomes) does not lead to the conclusion that free-will is illusory.

Unfortunately, Crawnus, it does. I'm not sure why you don't see it, but there is no free will if god creates a universe that has a specific outcome. There is no actual freedom - it was eliminated when god chose the universe that unfoded as he willed it. As I noted, the person cannot actually choose differently, because that would not be the universe god created. The freedom is entirely illusory as a function of god's creative will and prescience.

There is a common thread that theists want things "both ways" for a lot of these themes. They want to preserve free will, and also preserve omniscience. But the slight-of-hand being used here simply doesn't work. It is not merely that the person doesn't choose differently - they cannot choose differently; it would defy the choice god made in creating the universe. They may "feel" as if they are freely choosing, but the choice was made for them by the creative choice of god.

I'm not sure how you're not seeing why this is so. As I said, you only need to hypothesize that the person actually DOES choose differently to see the source of the contradiction. You also merely need to note that god's choice is effectively prior to the choice of the individual, so essentially chooses which "free choice" the person will make. If you don't see how that nullifies actual free choice, I'm not sure what else there is to say.

[Tassman]

Or they're both making a choice. God decided to create the reality where the actor freely chose to act in a certain way.

If God already knows the outcome then what one will “freely decide” has already been determined. The only “freedom of choice” is the illusion of freedom.

But God didn't create a universe where the actor wasn't free to choose otherwise, He created a universe where the actor was free to choose otherwise, but decided not to.

What God created was a universe wherein he knew, even before he created the individual, what decisions that individual would make. If the individual made a decision contrary to what God “knew” then God would not be omniscient.

You're not really expounding on the argument in the OP at all, you're simply expressing it in different words. I'm assuming there's some hidden premise in the argument that you and mythas are making that would make it a valid argument, but as it is the premises (God is all-knowing and God decided to create a universe with specific outcomes) does not lead to the conclusion that free-will is illusory.

Well yes it does.

[JonathanL]

God decided, and they freely chose.

I'm generally okay with whatever folks want to believe about the creator of the universe until they insist their gods are immune from contradiction. Personally, I think you get more mileage out of a god that can actually exist.

I'll concede there's a contradiction there when you actually show it instead of just asserting it.

[JonathanL]

Unfortunately, Crawnus, it does. I'm not sure why you don't see it, but there is no free will if god creates a universe that has a specific outcome. There is no actual freedom - it was eliminated when god chose the universe that unfoded as he willed it. As I noted, the person cannot actually choose differently, because that would not be the universe god created. The freedom is entirely illusory as a function of god's creative will and prescience.

There is a common thread that theists want things "both ways" for a lot of these themes. They want to preserve free will, and also preserve omniscience. But the slight-of-hand being used here simply doesn't work. It is not merely that the person doesn't choose differently - they cannot choose differently; it would defy the choice god made in creating the universe. They may "feel" as if they are freely choosing, but the choice was made for them by the creative choice of god.

How exactly is free will illusory in this scenario? Or, to be more exact, what about God's prescience and creative will nullifies free will exactly? Let's say we have two almost identical universes, with the exact same starting conditions, whose history unfolded in the exact same way, the only difference being that one of them was created by an omniscient/prescient God and the other arose randomly out of impersonal forces. Presumably both universes will have an identical population of persons whose lives mirror each other exactly, down to the most minute detail. In what way is the free choices of the persons living in the theistic universe nullified by virtue of their God choosing to create that specific universe and how is it that the persons living in the atheistic universe do not have their free will nullified?


The truth of course, is that free will isn't nullified by God's creative choices or prescience at all. If free will is an illusion, or an impossibility, it is so because of completely unrelated reasons.

I'm not sure how you're not seeing why this is so. As I said, you only need to hypothesize that the person actually DOES choose differently to see the source of the contradiction. You also merely need to note that god's choice is effectively prior to the choice of the individual, so essentially chooses which "free choice" the person will make. If you don't see how that nullifies actual free choice, I'm not sure what else there is to say.

The contradiction can't lie in God's foreknowledge, because He only foreknew what the person would freely choose to do, his prescience didn't decide the persons choices. Neither can it lie in the fact that He decided to create a universe where He knew that the person would make the specific choices that he did, because we can imagine an atheistic universe that unfolds in the exact same way as a theistic one, where the persons living in each universe make the same exact choices as their counterparts in the other universe. If the persons living in the theistic universe do not have free will, then neither does the ones living in the atheistic universe, so again, whether or not the people living in these universes have free will or not comes down to something other than God's foreknowledge and creative will/choices.

[carpedm9587]

How exactly is free will illusory in this scenario? Or, to be more exact, what about God's prescience and creative will nullifies free will exactly?

Prescience does not. Creative will does not (if I understand you correctly). The act of selecting the universe in which the individual makes the selection god wishes to be made is what constrains free will. God's choice isontologically prior to the choice of the individual, and governs which choice is being made. The individual cannot choose otherwise without contradiction, ergo, there is no actual free will.

Let's say we have two almost identical universes, with the exact same starting conditions, whose history unfolded in the exact same way, the only difference being that one of them was created by an omniscient/prescient God and the other arose randomly out of impersonal forces. Presumably both universes will have an identical population of persons whose lives mirror each other exactly, down to the most minute detail. In what way is the free choices of the persons living in the theistic universe nullified by virtue of their God choosing to create that specific universe and how is it that the persons living in the atheistic universe do not have their free will nullified?

Your choice is a non-choice. You are arvbitrarily constraining the second universe to match the one that was created, rendering the comparison moot.

The truth of course, is that free will isn't nullified by God's creative choices or prescience at all. If free will is an illusion, or an impossibility, it is so because of completely unrelated reasons.

Yes - it is not aboive choices or prescience. It is about the creative act itself. Only an act (AFAIK) can constrain an act.

The contradiction can't lie in God's foreknowledge, because He only foreknew what the person would freely choose to do, his prescience didn't decide the persons choices. Neither can it lie in the fact that He decided to create a universe where He knew that the person would make the specific choices that he did, because we can imagine an atheistic universe that unfolds in the exact same way as a theistic one, where the persons living in each universe make the same exact choices as their counterparts in the other universe. If the persons living in the theistic universe do not have free will, then neither does the ones living in the atheistic universe, so again, whether or not the people living in these universes have free will or not comes down to something other than God's foreknowledge and creative will/choices.

Answered above.

[JonathanL]

Your choice is a non-choice. You are arvbitrarily constraining the second universe to match the one that was created, rendering the comparison moot.

It's not arbitrary at all. I'm constraining the godless universe to be the same as the created one to show that God's act of prescient creation isn't what makes free will impossible, if free will is indeed impossible. The point is that if the people in universe 1 do not have free will, then neither do the people in universe 2. Or alternatively, if people in U1 have free-will then so do people in U2. Whether the universes were created by God or not simply does not play into it at all.

[carpedm9587]

It's not arbitrary at all. I'm constraining the godless universe to be the same as the created one to show that God's act of prescient creation isn't what makes free will impossible, if free will is indeed impossible. The point is that if the people in universe 1 do not have free will, then neither do the people in universe 2. Or alternatively, if people in U1 have free-will then so do people in U2. Whether the universes were created by God or not simply does not play into it at all.

You are essentially creating an identical universe with the identical limits, producing the identical problem. The people in your hypothetical universe cannot choose otherwise without rendering it NOT the universe you are arguing for. You haven't addressed the problem.

[One Bad Pig]

God decided, and they freely chose.

I'm generally okay with whatever folks want to believe about the creator of the universe until they insist their gods are immune from contradiction. Personally, I think you get more mileage out of a god that can actually exist.

That would hinge on God's intent, would it not? If God's intent is "create universe such that these particular people choose x" then I agree. If God's intent is different, say, "create universe such that the most people freely choose" then I'm not seeing a necessary contradiction.

[Juvenal]

That would hinge on God's intent, would it not? If God's intent is "create universe such that these particular people choose x" then I agree. If God's intent is different, say, "create universe such that the most people freely choose" then I'm not seeing a necessary contradiction.

I suggested as much, earlier.

As an actor as well, with sufficient power, even short of omnipotence, I'd think a god would be able to direct events to a desired outcome without foreknowledge of other actors' actions. I don't need to know the future behavior of every molecule in the pot to know if I keep adding heat, it's going to boil.

I remember open theism discussions at the other location where Christians, self-identified in any case, argued that not even the outcome was fixed. It was a decent argument, with ironic support stemming from the observation no god would choose to associate with Enyartians.

[JimL]

That would hinge on God's intent, would it not? If God's intent is "create universe such that these particular people choose x" then I agree. If God's intent is different, say, "create universe such that the most people freely choose" then I'm not seeing a necessary contradiction.

Same problem in both cases. If god knows, if he knows he created a world in which the most people would choose x and that the minority of people will choose y, then he is the cause in both cases. If they have free will, then he couldn't know that, he couldn't know what their future choices will be nor what the ratio between the those choosing x and y would be. Answer for yourself, how would god know this?

[Tassman]

That would hinge on God's intent, would it not? If God's intent is "create universe such that these particular people choose x" then I agree. If God's intent is different, say, "create universe such that the most people freely choose" then I'm not seeing a necessary contradiction.

It’s not that God necessarily intends “these particular people to choose X” it’s just that, as an omniscient god, he knows they will. Hence, what has been “freely decided” has already been determined...the only “freedom of choice” is the illusion of freedom of choice. If a decision is made contrary to what God “knew” then God would not be omniscient.

[One Bad Pig]

It’s not that God necessarily intends “these particular people to choose X” it’s just that, as an omniscient god, he knows they will. Hence, what has been “freely decided” has already been determined...the only “freedom of choice” is the illusion of freedom of choice. If a decision is made contrary to what God “knew” then God would not be omniscient.

I recognize that that's your assertion. You don't need to repeat it every time someone says something different.

[JimL]

I recognize that that's your assertion. You don't need to repeat it every time someone says something different.

It's a logical argument, not a mere assertion. If you didn't continue to make mere assertions, we wouldn't have to keep correcting you with logical arguments.

[One Bad Pig]

It's a logical argument, not a mere assertion.

That you think so gives me sufficient notice of your capabilities in this area, thanks.

[JimL]

That you think so gives me sufficient notice of your capabilities in this area, thanks.

That you think not gives me sufficient notice of your lack of capabilities in this area, thanks.