Florida School Shooting

[Mountain Man]

If the limitations on our right to bear arms are explicitly defined, then lets hear from you what those limitations are?

"Whatever limits might be placed on our right to weapons of self-defense are extremely narrow and explicitly defined in the decision itself."

Have you bothered looking at the decision beyond the out-of-context pull-quote you lifted from some anti-gun nutter's blog?

[JimL]

"Whatever limits might be placed on our right to weapons of self-defense are extremely narrow and explicitly defined in the decision itself."

Have you bothered looking at the decision beyond the out-of-context pull-quote you lifted from some anti-gun nutter's blog?

I'm asking you what the extremely narrow, explicitly defined limitations are MM? If you don't know specifics, then at least tell us what you think that phrase means in general. Does it mean that assault weapons can not be banned or what exactly?

[Mountain Man]

I'm asking you what the extremely narrow, explicitly defined limitations are MM? If you don't know specifics, then at least tell us what you think that phrase means in general. Does it mean that assault weapons can not be banned or what exactly?

Translation: "No, I have not bothered to read the decision for myself."

First if all, your question was already answered in a previous post. And second, I refuse to engage any further with someone who is so wilfully and aggressively uninformed.

[demi-conservative]

Oh, he's just out there indicting people for money laundering, identity theft, wire fraud, bankruptcy fraud, violations of FEC and FARA, perjury and obstruction of justice.

So sweet of you to ask.

What happened to Don Jr and meeting with lawyer? You should get off Trump-Russia conspiracy theory already!

[JimL]

Translation: "No, I have not bothered to read the decision for myself."

First if all, your question was already answered in a previous post. And second, I refuse to engage any further with someone who is so wilfully and aggressively uninformed.

Translation: You can't answer because you have no idea what you are talking about.

[JimL]

What happened to Don Jr and meeting with lawyer? You should get off Trump-Russia conspiracy theory already!

There are none so blind as they who will not see. Although in your case Demi, I understand the criminality of the Trump administration is exactly what you had hoped for when interfering with U.S. election.

[Mountain Man]

Translation: You can't answer because you have no idea what you are talking about.

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...l=1#post523158

[Cow Poke]

There are none so blind as they who will not see.

gottalovit

[Sparko]

http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...l=1#post523158

Yeah that's what I have to do with JimL too. He just pretends you never answered him and keeps repeating himself. Everyday is Groundhog Day with Jiml. Either he is just trolling or he has alzheimer's. I just link him back to the start of the loop and leave it at that.

[Adrift]

I'm asking you what the extremely narrow, explicitly defined limitations are MM? If you don't know specifics, then at least tell us what you think that phrase means in general. Does it mean that assault weapons can not be banned or what exactly?

Jim, MM answered this a few days ago. It's in his post #1050 where he highlighted the wording he thought important. Here it is again,

"Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”

So, what he's saying is that he believes the explicitly defined limitations include prohibitions on possession by felons, and the mentally ill, and on laws concerning the carrying of firearms in sensitive places like schools and government buildings, and on laws that impose conditions/qualifications on commercial sales, and on dangerous and unusual weapons.


Now, that last one is a bit confusing, because I can't tell if Miller is saying that any gun outside of those “in common use at the time” refers to anything outside of, say, muskets and black powder pistols (which were in common use at the time) would be considered "dangerous and unusual”, but I'm assuming MM isn't reading it that way, or else he wouldn't have highlighted the last bit.

To add some context to the issue, here's the relevant bit from District of Columbia v. Heller. This comes entirely from part III of the decision,

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.26

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment ’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-290.ZO.html

[JimL]

Jim, MM answered this a few days ago. It's in his post #1050 where he highlighted the wording he thought important. Here it is again,

"Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”

So, what he's saying is that he believes the explicitly defined limitations include prohibitions on possession by felons, and the mentally ill, and on laws concerning the carrying of firearms in sensitive places like schools and government buildings, and on laws that impose conditions/qualifications on commercial sales, and on dangerous and unusual weapons.


Now, that last one is a bit confusing, because I can't tell if Miller is saying that any gun outside of those “in common use at the time” refers to anything outside of, say, muskets and black powder pistols (which were in common use at the time) would be considered "dangerous and unusual”, but I'm assuming MM isn't reading it that way, or else he wouldn't have highlighted the last bit.

To add some context to the issue, here's the relevant bit from District of Columbia v. Heller. This comes entirely from part III of the decision,

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott333. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues. See, e.g., State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490; Nunn v. State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.26

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U. S., at 179. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148–149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271–272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N. C. 381, 383–384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N. C. 288, 289 (1874).

It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military service—M-16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amendment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause. But as we have said, the conception of the militia at the time of the Second Amendment ’s ratification was the body of all citizens capable of military service, who would bring the sorts of lawful weapons that they possessed at home to militia duty. It may well be true today that a militia, to be as effective as militias in the 18th century, would require sophisticated arms that are highly unusual in society at large. Indeed, it may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day bombers and tanks. But the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpretation of the right.

https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/07-290.ZO.html

Yes, I read it. I asked MM to tell us in his own words what it means because he, like CP and Sparko, obviously doesn't understand it. That's why Tweb disallows arguing by link. It's fine to cite it, but if it doesn't explicitly support your argument, and you can't explain in what sense that it does, then it's a meaningless post.

[Adrift]

Yes, I read it. I asked MM to tell us in his own words what it means because he, like CP and Sparko, obviously doesn't understand it. That's why Tweb disallows arguing by link. It's fine to cite it, but if it doesn't explicitly support your argument, and you can't explain in what sense that it does, then it's a meaningless post.

I don't really see how MM could get much more explicit (except maybe explaining what he thinks the second paragraph means), or why he should. His bolding of the sentences that he thought defined the limitation, do, in fact, define the limitation. There's not much more to add.

[Cow Poke]

Yes, I read it. I asked MM to tell us in his own words what it means because he, like CP and Sparko, obviously doesn't understand it.

Looks like you're the only struggling with this, Jim.

[JimL]

I don't really see how MM could get much more explicit (except maybe explaining what he thinks the second paragraph means), or why he should. His bolding of the sentences that he thought defined the limitation, do, in fact, define the limitation. There's not much more to add.

Here's the part MM neglected to bold:

Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those in common use at the time. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.

[Jedidiah]

Yes, I read it. I asked MM to tell us in his own words what it means because he, like CP and Sparko, obviously doesn't understand it. That's why Tweb disallows arguing by link. It's fine to cite it, but if it doesn't explicitly support your argument, and you can't explain in what sense that it does, then it's a meaningless post.

Goal post . . . .