The More We Evolve, the Less We Need God

[Mountain Man]

Just making sure we're on the same page. It's frustrating when I respond to something and then my interlocutor says “That was not my argument.”


This objection is either irrelevant or question-begging. It is not necessary for any moral principle to be objectively true in order to be rationally defensible. Craig obviously believes that it does, but until he proves it, his argument in effect assumes its conclusion.


Who says they are special? This is a straw man.

If we are going to apply moral standards to ourselves and not to other animals, then we need only identify some characteristic that makes us relevantly different. While it is true that some people are inclined to suppose that whatever makes them different must also make them special, that is an inclination we should all be trying hard to resist.


I reject Craig’s apparent assumption that the only important consequences are eternal consequences.

Let's start with this first: try to rationally defend why you prefer one flavor of ice cream to another. You can't and will eventually have to settle with "It's just what I happen to prefer." That's the same thing that happens if you assert that objective mortality doesn't exist. Any attempt to defend any particular behavior will inevitably end with "It's just what I happen to prefer."

You've missed the point about eternal consequences. If this life is all we have, and consequences are only temporary, then why should I do good instead of doing evil in such a way that I avoid any negative consequences for myself? If I were to accumulate enough wealth and power then I could do whatever I want without fear. And why shouldn't I, if atheism is true? Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.

[Doug Shaver]

Let's start with this first: try to rationally defend why you prefer one flavor of ice cream to another.

Sure, as soon as you demonstrate the relevance of my ice cream preferences to my moral philosophy.

Any attempt to defend any particular behavior will inevitably end with "It's just what I happen to prefer."

I know how I defend my behavior, and I don't do it like that.

You've missed the point about eternal consequences. If this life is all we have, and consequences are only temporary, then why should I do good instead of doing evil in such a way that I avoid any negative consequences for myself?

I don't believe you can avoid negative consequences for yourself.

If I were to accumulate enough wealth and power then I could do whatever I want without fear.

Just because you would not fear the consequences doesn't mean you would like them. I'm not afraid of anchovies, but I don't want them on my pizzas.

[seer]

Sure, as soon as you demonstrate the relevance of my ice cream preferences to my moral philosophy.

He did, both are reduced to personal or collective preference.

[Charles]

I'm impressed to see you respond with something more substantive than your usual impotent one-liners, so I applaud you for that. Unfortunately, despite your many words, you are leaning heavily on the classic "is-ought" fallacy. If you don't believe me then try connecting the dots from "It is a fact that humans have evolved with the ability to feel compassion" to "Therefore, we ought to be compassionate." Going further, consider the fact that humans have evolved to feel a wide range of emotions including contempt and wrath, so if atheism is true, why ought we not be contemptible and wrathful?

Where most people get tripped up in this particular discussion is that they really don't understand the meaning of "ought", so make sure you have a good handle on that before responding.

If you could point to any place where I show a lack of that understanding I would be happy to confront it. You asked us to adress the argument and I did by showing that the premises do not really work and cannot be supported. You need to show those points wrong and you have completely failed to do so but just make a claim about an error without showing where, how or why it occurs. Are you ready for a real debate, MM?

This is basically a classic MM response in which a huge amount of points are left unanswered and then he is pointing to a new problem hoping he can remove focus from all the points already given that he has left unanswered. So looking forward to seeing you answer the points, including the points about how the argument is basically based on a misunderstanding or at least a straw man presentation of the history of philosophy. This actually relates to the point of where we arrive at the "ought" (which by the way you have given no account of in the argument and numerous times I have shown you how God cannot establish one). So time to actually make points, MM. You see, the funny thing is, there is no way you can account for how God could establish it but yet it seems you simply imply it with no reason at all. That is very bad philosophy. Or rather, it is actually not philosophy at all.

Look at the biased presentation in the argument. It talks about "the herd morality evolved by homo sapiens". This is not what the great philosophers in history were talking about. They are - in a lot of different forms - talking about different facts that actually does establish an ought. You can agree or disagree with them but if you are not able to describe it below the level of "herd morality" you have basically missed the point whether we are talking about Kant, Mill, Aristotle or whomever worth mentioning. So, basically, like I wrote, a straw man argument. There really is no grasp of the ideas it tries to confront.

You never adressed it when I showed a premis for "your" argument wrong so unfortunately I have to repeat:

I also cannot help but note the fact the expression of "accidental by-products of nature" is a rather narrow minded understanding of what a human being ultimately is. It should not be necessary to remind anyone about it but human beings are in fact reflecting. They have a mind, a conscience, feelings, reason and the potential to love each other. To think of human beings as a "thing" or something that just "is" or is some sort of "accidental by-product" is extremely narrow minded with regard to the existential perspectives of lives that we are all perfectly aware of as human beings. As persons capable af acting, reflecting and having knowledge of ourselves there is no way in which we simply "are". Or if we "are" in any way we "are" aware of ourselves as individuals capable of shaping and changing ourselves. We are not just following the built in software or following instinct. We are agents, reflective persons with a mind. To the regard reflecting human beings or their mind as an "accidental by product" is to presuppose an understanding of reality that denies the reality of the human mind (whatever its metaphysical status may be).

I hope you are starting to understand that what this shows is that we are not in a condition in which what we need to discuss is "the herd morality evolved by homo sapiens" and we do not need to start from wrong premises that do not take reality into account.

[Charles]

You've missed the point about eternal consequences. If this life is all we have, and consequences are only temporary, then why should I do good instead of doing evil in such a way that I avoid any negative consequences for myself? If I were to accumulate enough wealth and power then I could do whatever I want without fear. And why shouldn't I, if atheism is true? Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.

It is a little ironic that some Christians are so attracted to the idea of only caring about themselves and having no worries about doing evil to others while those whom they try to convince to join their "ethical higher ground" find the examples and ideas absurd and distastesful. You start to wonder who needs to repent... If this is your perspective on temporary existence I am afraid eternal existence is going to be equally void of meaning only for an endles amount of time which would not make it much better...

[Mountain Man]

Sure, as soon as you demonstrate the relevance of my ice cream preferences to my moral philosophy.



I know how I defend my behavior, and I don't do it like that.



I don't believe you can avoid negative consequences for yourself.


Just because you would not fear the consequences doesn't mean you would like them. I'm not afraid of anchovies, but I don't want them on my pizzas.

Wonderful, you've perfected the "slice and dice" rebuttal tactic where you respond to individual sentences taken out of context to give the appearance of answering an argument without actually answering it.

[Mountain Man]

If you could point to any place where I show a lack of that understanding I would be happy to confront it. You asked us to adress the argument and I did by showing that the premises do not really work and cannot be supported. You need to show those points wrong and you have completely failed to do so but just make a claim about an error without showing where, how or why it occurs. Are you ready for a real debate, MM?

This is basically a classic MM response in which a huge amount of points are left unanswered and then he is pointing to a new problem hoping he can remove focus from all the points already given that he has left unanswered. So looking forward to seeing you answer the points, including the points about how the argument is basically based on a misunderstanding or at least a straw man presentation of the history of philosophy. This actually relates to the point of where we arrive at the "ought" (which by the way you have given no account of in the argument and numerous times I have shown you how God cannot establish one). So time to actually make points, MM. You see, the funny thing is, there is no way you can account for how God could establish it but yet it seems you simply imply it with no reason at all. That is very bad philosophy. Or rather, it is actually not philosophy at all.

Look at the biased presentation in the argument. It talks about "the herd morality evolved by homo sapiens". This is not what the great philosophers in history were talking about. They are - in a lot of different forms - talking about different facts that actually does establish an ought. You can agree or disagree with them but if you are not able to describe it below the level of "herd morality" you have basically missed the point whether we are talking about Kant, Mill, Aristotle or whomever worth mentioning. So, basically, like I wrote, a straw man argument. There really is no grasp of the ideas it tries to confront.

You never adressed it when I showed a premis for "your" argument wrong so unfortunately I have to repeat:



I hope you are starting to understand that what this shows is that we are not in a condition in which what we need to discuss is "the herd morality evolved by homo sapiens" and we do not need to start from wrong premises that do not take reality into account.

The fact that your entire argument is one big "is-ought" fallacy means that a detailed point-by-point rebuttal is unnecessary. Like I said, try connecting the dots from "It is a fact that humans have evolved with the ability to feel compassion" to "Therefore, we ought to be compassionate." Or if you like, take us from "It is a fact that humans are aware of ourselves as individuals capable of shaping and changing ourselves" to "Therefore, we ought to act morally." You'll find it impossible to formulate an argument that can't also be used to defend what you might irrationally consider to be "immoral" behavior.

And I'm sorry you have such an irrational abhorrence to the idea that if atheism is true then we are nothing more than an accident of evolution, but if you're right then that's all we are. There's nothing inherently special about us. The universe is no better because we exist, and it would be no worse if evolution went a different path and we never existed at all. An asteroid could wipe us all out tomorrow, and it literally wouldn't matter if you had lived like a saint or like the devil himself.

Theism doesn't have this problem:

Source: Does Theistic Ethics Derive an “Ought” from an “Is”?

The theory that I have defended is a form of Divine Command Theory. According to this view our moral duties are constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. It seems to me that this theory does derive an “ought” from an “is,” and justifiably so—though not in the way you imagine. The theory does, as you say, ground moral values in God's unchanging nature. God is the paradigm of goodness. But that is not to say that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.” No, our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness—while God’s commands establish moral duties—what we ought or ought not to do. Grounding moral values in God no more derives an “ought” from an “is” than does Plato’s grounding values in the form of the Good (indeed, one of my critiques of moral platonism is precisely its failure to provide any basis for moral duty). The theist and Plato just have a different ontological ultimate.

So how does Divine Command Theory derive an “ought” from an “is”? Well, it says that we ought to do something because it is commanded by God. That is deriving an “ought” from an “is.” Someone might demand, “Why are we obligated to do something just because it is commanded by God?” The answer to that question comes, I think, by reflecting on the nature of moral duty. Duty arises in response to an imperative from a competent authority. For example, if some random person were to tell me to pull my car over, I would have absolutely no legal obligation to do so. But if a policeman were to issue such a command, I’d have a legal obligation to obey. The difference in the two cases lies in the persons who issued the commands: one is qualified to do so, while the other is not.

Now, similarly, in the case of moral obligations, these arise as a result of imperatives issued by a competent authority. And in virtue of being the Good, God is uniquely qualified to issues such commands as expressions of His nature. What is deficient in Plato’s theory is a person who can issue moral imperatives as an expression of the Good; but that want is supplied by theism. So it seems to me that Divine Command Theory’s derivation of an “ought” from an “is,” far from being objectionable, captures a central feature of moral duty and plausibly grounds it.

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writ...ght-from-an-is

© Copyright Original Source

[Charles]

The fact that your entire argument is one big "is-ought" fallacy means that a detailed point-by-point rebuttal is unnecessary. Like I said, try connecting the dots from "It is a fact that humans have evolved with the ability to feel compassion" to "Therefore, we ought to be compassionate." Or if you like, take us from "It is a fact that humans are aware of ourselves as individuals capable of shaping and changing ourselves" to "Therefore, we ought to act morally." You'll find it impossible to formulate an argument that can't also be used to defend what you might irrationally consider to be "immoral" behavior.

And I'm sorry you have such an irrational abhorrence to the idea that if atheism is true then we are nothing more than an accident of evolution, but if you're right then that's all we are. There's nothing inherently special about us. The universe is no better because we exist, and it would be no worse if evolution went a different path and we never existed at all. An asteroid could wipe us all out tomorrow, and it literally wouldn't matter if you had lived like a saint or like the devil himself.

Theism doesn't have this problem:

Source: Does Theistic Ethics Derive an “Ought” from an “Is”?

The theory that I have defended is a form of Divine Command Theory. According to this view our moral duties are constituted by the commands of an essentially just and loving God. It seems to me that this theory does derive an “ought” from an “is,” and justifiably so—though not in the way you imagine. The theory does, as you say, ground moral values in God's unchanging nature. God is the paradigm of goodness. But that is not to say that “because God is a certain way we ought to behave in certain ways.” No, our moral obligations and prohibitions arise as a result of God’s commands to us. God’s nature serves to establish values—goodness and badness—while God’s commands establish moral duties—what we ought or ought not to do. Grounding moral values in God no more derives an “ought” from an “is” than does Plato’s grounding values in the form of the Good (indeed, one of my critiques of moral platonism is precisely its failure to provide any basis for moral duty). The theist and Plato just have a different ontological ultimate.

So how does Divine Command Theory derive an “ought” from an “is”? Well, it says that we ought to do something because it is commanded by God. That is deriving an “ought” from an “is.” Someone might demand, “Why are we obligated to do something just because it is commanded by God?” The answer to that question comes, I think, by reflecting on the nature of moral duty. Duty arises in response to an imperative from a competent authority. For example, if some random person were to tell me to pull my car over, I would have absolutely no legal obligation to do so. But if a policeman were to issue such a command, I’d have a legal obligation to obey. The difference in the two cases lies in the persons who issued the commands: one is qualified to do so, while the other is not.

Now, similarly, in the case of moral obligations, these arise as a result of imperatives issued by a competent authority. And in virtue of being the Good, God is uniquely qualified to issues such commands as expressions of His nature. What is deficient in Plato’s theory is a person who can issue moral imperatives as an expression of the Good; but that want is supplied by theism. So it seems to me that Divine Command Theory’s derivation of an “ought” from an “is,” far from being objectionable, captures a central feature of moral duty and plausibly grounds it.

https://www.reasonablefaith.org/writ...ght-from-an-is

© Copyright Original Source

I simply note you could not point to a single example of the fallacy, not a single one.

And furthermore for the second time you failed to adress my points. Are you ready for a real debate in which you need to support your claims with actual evidence and cannot walk along with straw men?

[Mountain Man]

It is a little ironic that some Christians are so attracted to the idea of only caring about themselves and having no worries about doing evil to others while those whom they try to convince to join their "ethical higher ground" find the examples and ideas absurd and distastesful. You start to wonder who needs to repent... If this is your perspective on temporary existence I am afraid eternal existence is going to be equally void of meaning only for an endles amount of time which would not make it much better...

The real irony is the fact that you instinctively rejecting the logical implications of atheism is good evidence that theism is true.

[Mountain Man]

I simply note you could not point to a single example of the fallacy, not a single one.

And furthermore for the second time you failed to adress my points. Are you ready for a real debate in which you need to support your claims with actual evidence and cannot walk along with straw men?

I'll simply note that I confronted your argument head-on, and the best you can is drunkenly stagger around and claim I didn't answer your argument.

Stick with the "Big Dig and Me Too" routine, Chuck. It's what you're good at.

[Charles]

The real irony is the fact that you instinctively rejecting the logical implications of atheism is good evidence that theism is true.

You are yet to show what the logical implications of atheism are. So far you have not come very far.

[Charles]

I'll simply note that I confronted your argument head-on, and the best you can is drunkenly stagger around and claim I didn't answer your argument.

Stick with the "Big Dig and Me Too" routine, Chuck. It's what you're good at.

So even when asked for a single example you cannot provide it? This is the third time I ask.

Does your God provide justification for personal attacks when you run out of real arguments?

[Doug Shaver]

Wonderful, you've perfected the "slice and dice" rebuttal tactic where you respond to individual sentences taken out of context to give the appearance of answering an argument without actually answering it.

I take you don't like my answer. And, I can well understand why you don't like it. That doesn't mean I didn't answer your argument.

[Doug Shaver]

He did, both are reduced to personal or collective preference.

To merely assert a proposition is not to demonstrate it.

[Doug Shaver]

Wonderful, you've perfected the "slice and dice" rebuttal tactic where you respond to individual sentences taken out of context to give the appearance of answering an argument without actually answering it.

OK. Context restored:

Let's start with this first: try to rationally defend why you prefer one flavor of ice cream to another. You can't and will eventually have to settle with "It's just what I happen to prefer." That's the same thing that happens if you assert that objective mortality doesn't exist. Any attempt to defend any particular behavior will inevitably end with "It's just what I happen to prefer."

You've missed the point about eternal consequences. If this life is all we have, and consequences are only temporary, then why should I do good instead of doing evil in such a way that I avoid any negative consequences for myself? If I were to accumulate enough wealth and power then I could do whatever I want without fear. And why shouldn't I, if atheism is true? Eat, drink, and be merry, for tomorrow we die.

And my answer:

As soon as you demonstrate the relevance of my ice cream preferences to my moral philosophy, I will attempt to defend my preference for some flavors over others.

I know how I defend my behavior, and I do not defend it the way you say I defend it.

I don't believe you can avoid negative consequences for yourself of your evil behavior. And, just because you would not fear the consequences doesn't mean you would like them. I'm not afraid of anchovies, but I don't want them on my pizzas.