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Cogito ergo sum

Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!

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Atheism And Moral Progress

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  • Originally posted by seer View Post
    That doesn't make sense, you are just using the fallacy an appeal to the majority. That because the majority believes A makes them happy, then A is good. And the fact that A does not make everyone happy.
    It’s simply a statement of fact: Certain societies (mostly secular ones) top The World Happiness Report and The Human Development Index. It does not mean that everyone is necessarily happy.

    Nonsense Tass, first my moral beliefs are the same as I find in the New Testament. Second, in my world there is the possibility of finding objective moral truth in your world that possibility does not exist.
    New Testament moral beliefs are not fixed, they have demonstrably changed over time. The New Testament moral beliefs of many Christians once disenfranchised women, discriminated against blacks and homosexuals and saw nothing wrong with depriving millions of indigenous peoples of their land and culture. But, overall, this is not the position nowadays.

    Right, and Europe under sharia law is objectively no better or worse than liberal democracy.
    As always, morality reflects the values of the people.

    No it is a fact Tass, look at the abolition movement in New England - the Churches were the driving force.

    Right, the country was split, as were the churches. You just conveniently leave out all the Christians who were against slavery. Bad form...
    And yet slavery and racial discrimination was initiated and accepted in America for over two hundred years with the latter being enforced until 1964 in the Southern States…and even then, being practiced in many instances.

    That is just silly, some western countries believe that, yet slavery is growing world wide and genocide still happens - just ask the Tutsi.
    Nevertheless, the social mores of our current society value ALL human life equally. Hence “slavery or genocide” are considered an abomination. The Israelites under Moses felt differently, but moral values have changed over time.

    I'm not sure how you know a house fly cares about his survival. Did he tell you?
    The resistance to being swatted is indicative of a house-fly’s survival instinct.

    I'm saying the government has no right to force a man to violate his religious beliefs.
    So, you agree that you have no right to discriminate against those you dislike on the basis of personal prejudice.
    “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by seer View Post
      So like with the unicorn when you speak of values you are speaking of something that doesn't exist. There is no subject matter as Heumer states...
      No - if someone is making a claim about unicorns objectively existing, then the claim is (as far as we know) false, because they do not exist objectively (or at least have never been shown to). They DO exist in the minds and ideas and fantasies of humans, so they have a subjective reality.

      Likewise, if someone makes a claim that morality exists objectively, then the claim is (as far as I can tell) false, because they do not exist objectively (or at least have never been shown to). Moral principles DO exist in the minds and ideas (and even fantasies) of humans (or any sapient species), so they have a subjective reality. And many moral principles are held in common by many people - even whole societies - so they have an inter-subjective reality (much like language) as well.

      Your suggestion that only objective things are "real" flies in the face of how you function every day. Subjective realities exist differently than objective ones - but that does not mean they do not exist.
      The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

      I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

      Comment


      • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
        Since rational judgement presupposes some ground apart from the judgement on which for it to be based, the denial of objectivism implies the intrinsic impossibility of rational moral judgement,since said denial means that moral values cannot have any independent existence apart from the mind.


        Huemer's error is in his first sentence, and involves two things. First, he is assuming that morality exists apart from the mind. That is pretty much the entire point: morality is strictly a function of the mind. It does not have an independent reality separate from sapient minds. No one has ever shown morality to have such a separate existence - it is merely assumed. Moral principles are not "out there to be found" but rather "in here to be defined." The only moral principles that are "out there to be found" are the generalized principles that govern the operation of societies - but those principles are nothing more than the collective principles of the members of that society, typically as expressed by the majority. When a principle is very widely held (i.e., prohibitions against random killing or forced sexual activity), those who do not agree are seen as outliers and generally shunned in one form or another. When the moral principle is NOT widely held, but held by a substantial part of the society, the society is in conflict and there is no clear "social moral principle."
        He's not assuming it. He's making an actual argument for it. You assume your position because you merely stipulate it over and over without argument. All you're doing is listing some lazy descriptive pop-anthropological banalities as a placeholder for something resembling an 'argument'. The fact is neither of us have the right to be dogmatic, but I've never seen anything remotely approaching humility from your side.
        Heumer makes another error in that very first sentence: he assumes "rational judgement" requires objective premises, thereby assuming his conclusion. Rationality is not limited to objective premises. Rational arguments are arguments that are valid and sound. A valid argument takes the form:




        P1) If a then b
        P2) a
        C) Therefore b
        I think you're getting confused by the word "ground." He makes absolutely no reference to premises having to be objective in nature. He is saying that there must be a rational foundation or set of reasons for my belief apart from the mere act of the propositional state of my believing it in order for my belief to be rationally held or defensible. That seems like a given.

        The conclusion of a valid argument is true if the premises are true. A valid argument with true premises is called a sound argument. You will find this definition in pretty much every Logic 101 textbook. Notice that the definition says nothing about the premises of a sound argument being objectively true. They merely must be true.

        P1) If that restaurant services pizza, I want to eat there
        P2) That restaurant serves pizza
        C) I want to eat there.

        Perfectly valid structure, and the conclusion is true if P1 and P2 are true. P2 is objectively true, P1 is subjectively true. Perfectly rational. We make decisions like this all the time. Rationality is not constrained to the world of the objectively true. However, there is a constraint here: there is no mechanism I know of by which a subjectively true premise can be PROVEN to be true by rational means. We are dependent on the report of the subject in question.

        At the end of the day, morality is a specific form of preference. Each of us roots our morality in a variety of things. Personal experience is key, but it includes experiences of society, religion, family, local community, friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. We are influenced by these sources via personal contact, social media, media in general, education systems, books, movies, etc. But morality is rooted in the individual, and the individual always has primacy. Short of some form of mind-control (which strips an individual of moral agency, negating the concept of morality completely), there is no means by which one individual can impose or force their moral agency on another because morality is a function of the mind. We can and do control behavior - but not the underlying moral principles. At best we can attempt to influence them, and will be more or less successful depending on a variety of circumstances.
        You miss the point. It's not and never has been about "mind control." It's about autonomy, the polar opposite. Of course, it's "rooted in" personal experience, just as everything we do is, but again, that's kind of beside the point. What I've been suggesting is for you to shift your focus, that maybe you're looking at the wrong explanatory/descriptive level, that everything you say is "right," but that it doesn't have the greatest explanatory power.
        Last edited by Jim B.; 09-21-2019, 09:46 PM.

        Comment


        • A fairly quick, easy overview in a Reddit article:

          Are there good arguments for objective morality? What do philosophers think about moral realism?
          Answer

          What do philosophers think about moral realism?

          Surprisingly, a slim majority of philosophers are “moral realists”: they think that there are some objective moral facts. The 2009 PhilPapers survey asked just under a thousand philosophers and philosophy graduate students about moral realism, and discovered that 56.4% were moral realists, 27.7% weren’t, and 15.9% held some other position. Isn’t 56.4% a pretty small majority? Well, among philosophers it’s actually quite significant. Only about eighty percent of philosophers were prepared to say that they believed in the existence of the external world, for instance: ten percent denied it, and ten percent held some other position. In any case, for every philosopher who thinks there aren’t any objective moral facts, two philosophers think there are. This result isn’t indicative of philosophers being religious, either. The same survey found that just under fifteen percent of philosophers accepted or leaned towards theism. Over seventy percent were atheists, and twelve percent held some other position. So quite a lot of philosophers think that there are moral facts but don’t think that God exists.

          Does this represent a worrying consensus for the person who thinks there aren’t any objective moral facts? Yes, it does, and it’s worse than it initially appears. The skeptic thinks that there obviously aren’t any objective moral facts. But even philosophers who are committed to moral anti-realism think that there are some good reasons to be a moral realist. They don’t think that proponents of objective morality are just confused, rhetorically sneaky, or crypto-theists. Unfortunately, there is no study on whether philosophers think that moral realism is obviously false - in part because many philosophers would find the question too silly to answer. But if the question was not “is moral realism true” but “is there a good case to be made for moral realism”, I suspect the percentage would jump from 56.4% to somewhere in the high nineties. The moral skeptic will certainly be able to find philosophers who agree with him that there aren’t any objective moral facts. However, he won’t be able to find many philosophers who agree with him that moral realists are all horribly confused. He might not be able to find any.

          Arguments for moral realism

          I’m going to quickly run through short versions of two standard arguments for moral realism, and some standard responses to common arguments that skeptics put against moral realism. Let’s start with some arguments for moral realism.

          Argument from taste: Even if we call ourselves moral anti-realists, our attitude to moral preferences is significantly different from our attitude to ordinary preferences. If I don’t like noodles, it doesn’t make much sense for me to say “I’m glad I wasn’t born in China, because then I would probably like noodles”. But it makes perfect sense to say “I’m glad I wasn’t born in the Middle Ages, because then I would think the sun revolved around the earth.” And it makes perfect sense to say “I’m glad I wasn’t born in antebellum America, because then I would probably support slavery”. So it looks like we treat our attitude towards slavery more like a matter of empirical fact than a matter of mere preference. This argument is lifted wholesale from David Enoch, who calls it the “spinach test”. Given that, our intuitive starting point seems to be some kind of moral realism. Of course, our intuitive starting point might be wrong! But if it is, we’ll need to be persuaded to abandon it. We shouldn’t assume that moral anti-realism is the default view and expect moral realists to convince us otherwise.

          Argument from plausibility: When we’re deciding what to believe, we should try to only start with the premises we’re most confident in. If a premise seems a bit dubious, we should take a step back to a safer one. But our confidence in at least one moral proposition seems to be greater than our confidence in any of the arguments for moral anti-realism. Take the claim “it is objectively wrong to torture your infant son to death for fun”. To me, this claim seems to be as secure as what I can see with my own eyes. In fact, it seems more so: if I somehow became convinced that either I was hallucinating or torturing my infant son to death for fun was right, I would immediately assume I was hallucinating. This claim certainly seems more secure than claims like “moral realism is a bit weird”, or “if people disagree about morality, there might be no right answer”. This is a gloss on arguments made by G.E. Moore and Michael Huemer. Of course, a knock-down proof of moral anti-realism should give me pause. But if there’s no knock-down proof available, I’ve got no reason to abandon a premise I’m very secure in for a premise that just seems plausible.

          Note that neither of these arguments depend on God. So far we’ve established that moral realism is an attractive position, and that we need some actual reasons against it if we’re to reject it.

          But what about...?

          Let’s address some common reasons against moral realism now. As we’ll see, none of these reasons are strong enough to rule out moral-realism.

          The evolution objection: We can explain our moral intuitions by evolution. Given that, isn’t it silly to think that they’re connected to the truth? Note that we can explain our intuitions about physics by evolution too, and we all agree that they’re loosely connected to the truth: objects fall down, throwing something hard makes it move quickly, and so on. The fact that our moral intuitions evolved doesn't automatically mean that moral realism must be false, or that our moral intuitions can’t be connected to the truth.

          The disagreement objection: People disagree a lot about morality, and different cultures have very different ideas about what’s morally acceptable. Given that, isn’t it silly to think that there’s one moral truth? First, disagreement about morality is a bit overblown. Pretty much everyone agrees that there’s something morally wrong with torturing children for fun, that we ought to keep promises, that being kind is usually better than being cruel, and so on. Second, areas of apparent moral disagreement, such as the arguments over gay marriage, often rest on a disagreement about non-moral matters: for instance, whether same-sex parenting causes children psychological distress. Third, disagreement about a topic isn’t itself a reason to think that there’s no truth there. People disagree about physics, especially between cultures, but nobody takes that to be a reason to doubt physics. Most people - or everyone - could just be wrong.

          The strangeness objection: It makes sense to say that we should eat if we don’t want to be hungry, or that we should be kind if we want to be liked. But it’s very weird to say that we should be kind to people full stop. This looks like a different, strange sense of the word “should”. Isn’t it a bit too strange to be plausible? Note that there’s one other area in which this unconditional sense of “should” gets used: talking about truth and evidence. It’s natural to say that we should only believe what we’ve got evidence for, or that we should try to believe true things even if we’d be happier believing false ones. If these statements aren’t too strange, then saying “we should be kind to people” isn’t too strange either.

          TL;DR

          People who think there aren’t any objective moral facts ought to admit that they’re holding a position that a (slim) majority of experts disagree with. They shouldn’t treat moral realism as if it were obviously wrong, or as if it were already settled to be false. Most philosophers are moral realists, and there are good responses to the standard arguments many people give against objective moral facts.


          It should probably be noted somewhere that the average person asking about "objective morality" isn't using the term to mean mind independent, but universal. And if you're asking about a universal morality, the amount is even higher than 56.4%, because many anti realists still believe it exists via mind dependence. And this is something that someone unfamiliar with ethics asking the question will get confused by since they don't understand all the terms involved.


          Third, disagreement about a topic isn’t itself a reason to think that there’s no truth there. People disagree about physics, especially between cultures, but nobody takes that to be a reason to doubt physics. Most people - or everyone - could just be wrong.

          People disagree in physics about things that they can't observe easily. What makes physics possible at all is that we mostly agree about what we observe.

          When people disagree about morality, they are relating how they feel about something. It is analogous to an observation in physics. People are disagreeing about something that is immediate to them. It is like if in physics people had different opinions on whether things fall up or down. That kind of disagreement would make physics as on objective study impossible. That is the kind of disagreement that exists in morality and is indeed fatal to moral realism.

          Comment


          • From Michael Huemer's "Moral Objectivism":


            4.1. Value judgements as universally false

            This theory is really quite outrageous. It implies, among other things, that it is not the case that people generally ought to eat when hungry; that Hitler was not a bad person; that happiness is not good; and so on. I submit that this is simply absurd. I feel much more confidence in those denied judgements, as I think nearly everybody does, than I can imagine feeling in any philosophical arguments for relativism. At least, I think it would take an extremely strong argument to shake my confidence that happiness is preferable to misery, or the like. And there does not seem to be any argument at all with that import. It is hard to see how there could be.

            This discussion makes me feel like G.E. Moore, who refuted skepticism about the existence of external objects by making a certain gesture and observing, "Here is one hand," and, making another gesture, "and here is another." For just as Moore pointed out that no premises of any philosophical argument could possibly strike him as more obvious and certain than the proposition that "Here is a hand," I find it inconceivable how any philosophical premises could be more obvious and certain than the judgement that happiness is desirable, or numerous other similar value judgements I might make.

            I doubt that anybody actually holds this view. Even arch-subjectivist David Hume remarked that "those who have denied the reality of moral distinctions, may be ranked among the disingenuous disputants."(3)(4)


            4.3. "x is good" as synonymous with "I like x"

            This theory would have to be expanded to include (re-)definitions of all other evaluative terms as well, of course; however, we can refute this line of approach already.

            It makes sense to say, "I like it, but is it really good?" but it does not make sense to say "I like it, but do I like it?" nor "It's good, but is it really good?"

            One often thinks that one likes something because it is good, but one does not think it is good because one likes it (unless one is very egocentric).



            Therefore, some thing's being good must be different from its being liked. More simply, though, this should be immediately evident, since the statement that any given person has any given psychological state is a descriptive statement, whereas the statement that some thing is good is, of course, normative. The former denotes an empirical matter of psychology. The latter expresses a value judgement. In short, this theory is a simple instance of the naturalistic fallacy. I would lump together with this view any view that identifies good, virtue, and other moral qualities with the tendency to cause some psychological state.

            4.7


            Most versions of relativism involve a reinterpretation or redefinition of moral judgements. What is common to all of the redefinitions of moral concepts is that they leave out everything moral. The very essence of the concept of rightness is that something's being right is a reason to do it. But to say that I like something is not to give a reason for doing it - if somebody said, "Why should we do A?" and I said, "Because I like it," this would not give him a reason. To say that my society approves of something is not yet to give a reason for it either. To express one's emotions does not give anyone a reason for action. Et cetera. But something's being good or right is a reason for doing it (indeed, in the latter case, an absolutely compelling reason).


            5


            .....Finally, recall that I argued that the acceptance of relativism would undermine all morality. Although the apparent undesirability of this consequence does not prove the theory to be false, if our initial, intuitive confidence in our moral theories is greater than the prima facie plausibility of the arguments offered on behalf of relativism, as certainly seems to be the case, then it would be irrational to reject to former in deference to the latter.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
              He's not assuming it. He's making an actual argument for it. You assume your position because you merely stipulate it over and over without argument. All you're doing is listing some lazy descriptive pop-anthropological banalities as a placeholder for something resembling an 'argument'. The fact is neither of us have the right to be dogmatic, but I've never seen anything remotely approaching humility from your side.


              I think you're getting confused by the word "ground." He makes absolutely no reference to premises having to be objective in nature. He is saying that there must be a rational foundation or set of reasons for my belief apart from the mere act of the propositional state of my believing it in order for my belief to be rationally held or defensible. That seems like a given.



              You miss the point. It's not and never has been about "mind control." It's about autonomy, the polar opposite. Of course, it's "rooted in" personal experience, just as everything we do is, but again, that's kind of beside the point. What I've been suggesting is for you to shift your focus, that maybe you're looking at the wrong explanatory/descriptive level, that everything you say is "right," but that it doesn't have the greatest explanatory power.
              I have not encountered anything with a better "explanatory" power, Jim. If I had, I would believe/think differently. As I have noted, the arguments for morality as an exercise rooted in objective moral principles and against it as an exercise in subjectivity tends to be circular - or a non-argument. The former is demonstrated by the many, many ways arguments begin by assuming that morality must have some attribute that is uniquely associated with the subjective, and then showing that a subjective moral framework lacks this attribute. This is what I refer to when I use the (unpopular) expression, "it cannot be subjective because then it would not be objective."

              I've outlined why it is subjective multiple times. And I've even noted that there is a pathway to demonstrating that the position I have put forward is wrong: simply take any moral principle and trace it to its foundations without resorting to any subjective valuing. ONE example will destroy my position. In 30+ years, not a single person has taken me up on it in and done so. No one has even tried. That includes the current discussion. Coupled with the various points I have put forward, I find that highly compelling.

              I'm not sure what "humility" has to do with anything. I someone believes X and has reasons why they believe X, does staying with X until there is an adequate argument to show otherwise demonstrate "a lack of humility?" If that is so, it is an odd definition of "humility." And if it is so, I'm not sure you would qualify for a claim of "humility" any more than I. You seem equally devoted to your existing position. I conclude that "humility" is yet another red herring introduced to distract the discussion from the matter at hand.
              The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

              I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                From Michael Huemer's "Moral Objectivism":
                So an interesting question:

                Each person has emotions that we enjoy - and emotions we do not enjoy. The ones we enjoy we call "pleasurable" and the ones we do not we call "displeasing" or "unpleasurable." This is how we use words and describe our experiences.

                The vast majority of us enjoy and are attracted to "happiness." So many of us, that we've even enshrined "the pursuit of happiness" into our Declaration of Independence. But is "pursuit of happiness" universal?

                I wonder...
                The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

                Comment


                • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                  I have not encountered anything with a better "explanatory" power, Jim. If I had, I would believe/think differently. As I have noted, the arguments for morality as an exercise rooted in objective moral principles and against it as an exercise in subjectivity tends to be circular - or a non-argument. The former is demonstrated by the many, many ways arguments begin by assuming that morality must have some attribute that is uniquely associated with the subjective, and then showing that a subjective moral framework lacks this attribute. This is what I refer to when I use the (unpopular) expression, "it cannot be subjective because then it would not be objective."
                  One of the problems, I think, is your reliance on the phrase "rooted in," without clarifying your concepts or meanings. When I referred to 'humility,' I meant it in an intellectual, not an emotional or personal or character sense. I meant it as an openness or willingness to look into one's pre-suppositions and previously unchallenged assumptions. We are all challenged in these areas, but when I've challenged you multiple times, I hear nothing in response. So it's not a 'red herring' but is central to the problem we're having, IMO. "Rooted in" in what sense: as in "Caused by"? "Begins in?" "Is justified by""Is motivated by?" "Arises out of"?

                  The arguments are not necessarily circular if there are some attributes of morality that are 'topic neutral,' that is, that all disputants tacitly agree to, at least in practice. If the subjectivist is calling for revisionism, then s/he has to be able to put such a program forward coherently and to be able to live it.
                  One of the most telling criticisms of skepticism is that it can't be consistently lived. When you responded to the "Fallibility Argument" you said that you could actually be wrong, or you gave that impression, in light of reason and rationality. This is a perfect example of how a proposed revisionism cannot be consistently followed.

                  I've outlined why it is subjective multiple times. And I've even noted that there is a pathway to demonstrating that the position I have put forward is wrong: simply take any moral principle and trace it to its foundations without resorting to any subjective valuing. ONE example will destroy my position. In 30+ years, not a single person has taken me up on it in and done so. No one has even tried. That includes the current discussion. Coupled with the various points I have put forward, I find that highly compelling.
                  But what you are saying is unclear. That's what I keep trying to tell you. Someone who is a skeptic about a mind-independent world could make the same exact argument. Take any belief or item of knowledge and trace it back to its foundations without resorting to sensory impressions. You cannot. We have no way of stepping outside of our sensory impressions to check their veracity. Therefore we have no way of knowing there is any mind-independent reality that our sense impressions refer to. The same arguemtn could also be made about skepticism regarding other minds as well.

                  All scientific and mathematical knowledge begins in, ie is 'rooted in,' immediate sense impressions; sense impressions are the necessary conditions for all scientific and mathematical knowledge but that fact tells us nothing about the nature of the knowledge ultimately derived from that source. What some type of knowledge is 'rooted in' is an interesting genealogical fact, but much more has to be known about the kind of origin, derivation, and knowledge. I am not drawing a parallel between morality and math and science beyond the analogical point that origin alone is not necessarily explanatory.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                    So an interesting question:

                    Each person has emotions that we enjoy - and emotions we do not enjoy. The ones we enjoy we call "pleasurable" and the ones we do not we call "displeasing" or "unpleasurable." This is how we use words and describe our experiences.

                    The vast majority of us enjoy and are attracted to "happiness." So many of us, that we've even enshrined "the pursuit of happiness" into our Declaration of Independence. But is "pursuit of happiness" universal?

                    I wonder...
                    I wouldn't necessarily call "happiness" an emotion. I guess it depends on how you define happiness. I'm sure some people want to be miserable; they find some perverse pleasure in it.

                    BTW, you never really responded to that article I posted,

                    https://secularhumanism.org/2014/07/...rswithout-god/

                    you responded but you didn't really answer the central point, which was that if morality has an 'aim,' if it has a 'target' that can be more or less identified, and if this target is embeddded in a background set of facts about the human condition, then there would be actual facts of the matter about morality, 'soft constraints' on what could count as a 'legitimate' moral principle, and that it would not be entirely a matter of individual choice.

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                      One of the problems, I think, is your reliance on the phrase "rooted in," without clarifying your concepts or meanings. When I referred to 'humility,' I meant it in an intellectual, not an emotional or personal or character sense. I meant it as an openness or willingness to look into one's pre-suppositions and previously unchallenged assumptions. We are all challenged in these areas, but when I've challenged you multiple times, I hear nothing in response. So it's not a 'red herring' but is central to the problem we're having, IMO. "Rooted in" in what sense: as in "Caused by"? "Begins in?" "Is justified by""Is motivated by?" "Arises out of"?
                      I'm going to leave "humility aside" as a continued red herring. I will look at any presupposition if someone gives me cause to. When someone presents a new piece of information, or a new way of looking at an old one, I will consider it. That you think I do not is, frankly, not my concern. I'll leave you to your own conclusions about my person. I'm interested in the arguments and the topic - not the personal observations.

                      Concerning the rest of your points/questions, moral reasoning is a subset of reasoning in general. Not only is the ability to reason a necessary condition - but moral reasoning is, in essence, caused by the combination of the ability to reason and the natural function of the sapient mind to sort things. We sort species into families and genus. We sort investment types that we created. We sort into communities. The sapient mind recognizes patterns and associates things that have common patterns. It is natural that, in the wide array of possible choices of action, the mind will sort actions into "ought do" and "ought not do." It is from this reality that our moral reasoning springs. It natural follows that we will then ask "on what basis do we make this distinction." The answer is, "we sort actions on the basis of how they impact (or are intended to impact) those things we most value/cherish. Those things that positively impact (or are intended to positively impact) what we most value/cherish we classify as "ought do" and those things that negatively impact (or are intended to negatively impact) what we most value/cherish we classify as "immoral." Everything we value/cherish falls on a continuum from "most" to "least." We do not tend to use the word "moral" for actions related to those things low down on that continuum; only for things high on that continuum. There is no specific cut-off between the two that I have ever detected. All that can be described is the general dynamic. There are no rules for what will be high and what will be low on that continuum. The order of things on that continuum is determined by the individual, and influenced by a wide variety of factors previously listed.

                      Why this is confusing, I am not sure. It describes exactly how morality unfolds throughout the world and all sapient beings I know.

                      Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                      The arguments are not necessarily circular if there are some attributes of morality that are 'topic neutral,' that is, that all disputants tacitly agree to, at least in practice. If the subjectivist is calling for revisionism, then s/he has to be able to put such a program forward coherently and to be able to live it.
                      One of the most telling criticisms of skepticism is that it can't be consistently lived. When you responded to the "Fallibility Argument" you said that you could actually be wrong, or you gave that impression, in light of reason and rationality. This is a perfect example of how a proposed revisionism cannot be consistently followed.
                      Jim, whether morality is subjective or objective is not something you can hold a vote on and decide "that's the way it will be." That would be the equivalent of trying to hold a vote to determine if general relativity and special relativity are "true." General relatively and special relativity are either a correct description of how the cosmos functions, or they are not. Morality is either based on objective principles, or it is not. You believe it is. I believe you are wrong and that morality is rooted in the subjective. One of us is wrong, and each of us thinks it is the other. SO far, I have not heard an argument from you that compels me to re-evaluate my conclusion.

                      Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                      But what you are saying is unclear. That's what I keep trying to tell you. Someone who is a skeptic about a mind-independent world could make the same exact argument. Take any belief or item of knowledge and trace it back to its foundations without resorting to sensory impressions. You cannot. We have no way of stepping outside of our sensory impressions to check their veracity. Therefore we have no way of knowing there is any mind-independent reality that our sense impressions refer to. The same arguemtn could also be made about skepticism regarding other minds as well.

                      All scientific and mathematical knowledge begins in, ie is 'rooted in,' immediate sense impressions; sense impressions are the necessary conditions for all scientific and mathematical knowledge but that fact tells us nothing about the nature of the knowledge ultimately derived from that source. What some type of knowledge is 'rooted in' is an interesting genealogical fact, but much more has to be known about the kind of origin, derivation, and knowledge. I am not drawing a parallel between morality and math and science beyond the analogical point that origin alone is not necessarily explanatory.
                      I think you are comparing apples and oranges. There is profound difference between the observation that we can only experience the mind-independent universe through our senses (so it is essentially "filtered" or "interpreted," and the partitioning of reality into that which is objectively real and not based in our ideas, opinions, and feelings - and that which is based on our ideas opinions, and feelings. The latter does not create a filter - it simply partitions reality into two groups.

                      So I don't understand why you are finding it "unclear." You propose that morality is based on objective truths. Fine. Take a moral principle - and defend it using only objective truths. This is not a difficult concept. As soon as you require a subjective truth in order to defend your moral principle, the jig is up. Personally, I don't think you can. I don't think I can. I don't think anyone can. That is why I am a moral subjectivist. But you are adamant that morality is based on objective truths. So...show this to be true with so much as ONE moral principle.

                      ETA: as for "rooted in," I mean that no moral principle can be defended or explained without ultimately having to appeal to one or more subjective truths. Are there "matters of fact?" Of course there are. How societies work is a related matter of fact. Human psychological principles are related matters of fact. The basic laws of physics are related matters of fact. But they provide context and limits. In formulating actual moral principles, the sapient being operates within those boundaries but formulates moral principles on the basis of what they subjectively cherish/value. It is, as best I can tell, inescapable.
                      Last edited by carpedm9587; 09-22-2019, 06:23 PM.
                      The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                      I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

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                      • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                        I wouldn't necessarily call "happiness" an emotion. I guess it depends on how you define happiness. I'm sure some people want to be miserable; they find some perverse pleasure in it.

                        BTW, you never really responded to that article I posted,

                        https://secularhumanism.org/2014/07/...rswithout-god/

                        you responded but you didn't really answer the central point, which was that if morality has an 'aim,' if it has a 'target' that can be more or less identified, and if this target is embeddded in a background set of facts about the human condition, then there would be actual facts of the matter about morality, 'soft constraints' on what could count as a 'legitimate' moral principle, and that it would not be entirely a matter of individual choice.
                        All human reasoning has an "aim." Few (if any?) of us just randomly "think." Indeed - that might actually be an oxymoron. When we moralize, our "aim" is to sort actions into "ought" and "ought not" so as to protect what we value/cherish. That is the general aim of morality. But that does not make it an objective exercise. It is the objective "aim" of "eating" to sustain ourselves with nourishment. That does not make our selection of food or likes for one type of food over another any less subjective.
                        The ultimate weakness of violence is that it is a descending spiral begetting the very thing it seeks to destroy...returning violence for violence multiplies violence, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness; only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate; only love can do that. Martin Luther King

                        I would unite with anybody to do right and with nobody to do wrong. Frederick Douglas

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by carpedm9587 View Post
                          Concerning the rest of your points/questions, moral reasoning is a subset of reasoning in general. Not only is the ability to reason a necessary condition - but moral reasoning is, in essence, caused by the combination of the ability to reason and the natural function of the sapient mind to sort things. We sort species into families and genus. We sort investment types that we created. We sort into communities. The sapient mind recognizes patterns and associates things that have common patterns. It is natural that, in the wide array of possible choices of action, the mind will sort actions into "ought do" and "ought not do." It is from this reality that our moral reasoning springs. It natural follows that we will then ask "on what basis do we make this distinction." The answer is, "we sort actions on the basis of how they impact (or are intended to impact) those things we most value/cherish. Those things that positively impact (or are intended to positively impact) what we most value/cherish we classify as "ought do" and those things that negatively impact (or are intended to negatively impact) what we most value/cherish we classify as "immoral." Everything we value/cherish falls on a continuum from "most" to "least." We do not tend to use the word "moral" for actions related to those things low down on that continuum; only for things high on that continuum. There is no specific cut-off between the two that I have ever detected. All that can be described is the general dynamic. There are no rules for what will be high and what will be low on that continuum. The order of things on that continuum is determined by the individual, and influenced by a wide variety of factors previously listed.
                          So, as was mentioned before - doesn't this exercise require an objective moral reality at bottom? Honesty? Honesty concerning what we value/cherish? Honesty as we formulate supporting arguments or reasons for our positions? Or is honesty too relative?
                          Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

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                          • Originally posted by seer View Post
                            So, as was mentioned before - doesn't this exercise require an objective moral reality at bottom? Honesty? Honesty concerning what we value/cherish? Honesty as we formulate supporting arguments or reasons for our positions? Or is honesty too relative?
                            Did Stone Age Man have an “objective moral reality at bottom”, or Neanderthal Man, with whom we interbred? Evolutionary biologists tell us they exercised rules of behavior, i.e. what we nowadays would call morality. Did this come from divine revelation from holy books or, as is most likely, was this a product of the evolution of necessary social behavior to survive as cooperative intelligent social animals?
                            “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

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                            • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                              Did Stone Age Man have an “objective moral reality at bottom”, or Neanderthal Man, with whom we interbred? Evolutionary biologists tell us they exercised rules of behavior, i.e. what we nowadays would call morality. Did this come from divine revelation from holy books or, as is most likely, was this a product of the evolution of necessary social behavior to survive as cooperative intelligent social animals?
                              Are you stalking me?
                              Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                                Did Stone Age Man have an “objective moral reality at bottom”, or Neanderthal Man, with whom we interbred? Evolutionary biologists tell us they exercised rules of behavior, i.e. what we nowadays would call morality. Did this come from divine revelation from holy books or, as is most likely, was this a product of the evolution of necessary social behavior to survive as cooperative intelligent social animals?
                                Why are those the only two possible alternatives?

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