Trump's Christian supporters are unchristian

[Sparko]

Egad! Sparko, you are so confused. Simple question. In what way does god know the future from your point of view? Is it your idea that god knows the future because he is outside of time and can therefore see it all at once, past, present, and future?

I was commenting that you seem to think there is some time outside of time. When God is outside of time, he is not subject to time at all. He lives in Eternity. There was no "before" time when he created the universe. You can argue he is logically prior to the universe because he created it, but there was no existing time until he created it along with the universe so there is no "before he created the universe" like he was just floating around for a while then said "Hey! I think I will create a universe today!"

[Sparko]

No, it doesn't. That which is foreknown by its creator can not be other than what is foreknown by its creator. That you can't see the logic in that is not surprising to me, like I said, no logic will ever get through your defenses, MM.

You still haven't shown that what he knows isn't caused by the freewill actions of his creation. Just because they can't be other than what he knows doesn't mean they aren't from free will actions which is why he knows it.

You skipped that step.

[Sparko]

Going back to my hypothetical:

If God simply (2) knows the future but does not define it, then if I could gain access to God's knowledge. I could in fact change its outcome. (e.g. God would know x, and then I would chose instead to do y). I have free will.

Except then God would know that you knew what he knew and were going to do Y so when you looked at what he knew you would see that you chose Y instead of X. If you then chose to do X, he would have known that and you would have seen that you chose X.

God's knowledge is based on what you DID choose. So if you could see the future, you would still chose what he knew otherwise you would be stuck in an oscillating loop. But your choice would still be your free will choice and his knowledge is based on what you actually chose to do.

[oxmixmudd]

Except then God would know that you knew what he knew and were going to do Y so when you looked at what he knew you would see that you chose Y instead of X. If you then chose to do X, he would have known that and you would have seen that you chose X.

God's knowledge is based on what you DID choose. So if you could see the future, you would still chose what he knew otherwise you would be stuck in an oscillating loop. But your choice would still be your free will choice and his knowledge is based on what you actually chose to do.

I'm not speculating on how God knows since He is not like us and any such speculation is probably wrong.

But I agree with you that my free will is not violated by God's foreknowledge.

Jim

[oxmixmudd]

But those premises lead to a contradiction, so one of them must be wrong, or one of the inferences must be wrong.*

P0: God is omniscient
P1: God is never wrong
P2: God knows you will choose X
C2a: You will choose X
C2b: You will not choose Y

P3: You can know what God knows
C3: You can know God knows you will choose X

P4: You have free will
C4: You can choose to do something other than what God knows you will choose

P5: You want to prove that you have free will
C5a: You will choose to do something other than what God knows you will choose
C5b: You will choose Y

C2b and C5b are contradictory.

So which premise or inference is wrong?

Or, much shorter:

P0: God knows you will do X
C0a: You do X
C0b: You do not do Y
P1: You have free will
C1a: You can do Y
C1b: You do Y

Knowledge of the future plus free will leads to a contradiction.

P3 (first list) is the issue that leads to the contradiction and is more than necessary, and why you get the contradiction. My capacity to exercise my free will is not dependent upon my capacity to know what the future will be so I can arbitrarily chose not to do something I otherwise would do just to spite the fact God knows what I will do.

If you'll look back at my post, P3 is not a premise in my formulation, it is a testing factor - say T3. T3 in my formulation is how you or I could prove* I have free will, But it is not a necessary condition for having free will**.



Jim

*remember Godel, that there are some things that are true that can't be proven true within a given logical system. In this case, It can be true that I have free will, but it is not possible to prove I have free will from within the logical system.

**free will being the capacity to chose without outside influence.

[JimL]

Don't know JimL. I also proposed a retrocausal feedback look so that God's 'knowledge' is always correct. I also included the fact that ascribing to God 'knowledge' is an anthropomorphism. What does it mean for God to 'know'. I doubt very much is means the same thing for Him as for us to 'know'. If time past present and future are unresolved in the present where I am making a choice, and God is outside of time, or 'at all times at once', 'knowledge' as it relates to God is indeed a very different thing than 'knowledge' as it relates to us. I've tried to point this out several times now and it seems to have slipped your notice.

Jim, a retrocausal feedback doesn't make any more sense than God being outside of time and so able to observe the whole of it at once because in either case the future has to exist in order that it be perceived/known. That isn't foreknowledge, Jim. Foreknowledge is knowing the future before the future occurs. Time would be no different in that respect for god than it is for us, it would in either case be static, except the fact that for us the experience of time would be an illusion. The nature of time can not be dependent upon the perspective of the observer. If time exists in it's entirety from an external perspective, then it exists in its entirety period. It's a contradiction to say that the future is closed from gods external perspective, but that it is open from our internal perspective. No, the future can only be one or the other, the future is either opened or it is closed. Therefore if the future is closed, i.e. if all of time exists from an external perspective, akin to Einsteins "block universe," then it is closed period and free will is logically impossible. And if the future is opened, then for one thing and it could no more be observed from an external perspective than from an internal perspective, it isn't there to be observed. Now, if it isn't there, if the future is open, then there is only one other logical way that it could be foreknown and that is if it were created to unfold according to the specifications of the creator. In other words the creator would know the future of his creation because he engineered it to unfold that way. But again, that would omit too the possibility of free will.

So, if you know of another logical way to refute that logic, or if you can make a logical positive argument in support of your own contention that omniscience and free will can co-exist, then I would love to see it, otherwise you are free to believe that our logic is meaningless when it comes to god and there is no sense in concerning yourself with trying to convince others.

[JimL]

I have presented a number of positive arguments throughout this thread, including in the post that you previously responded to. Maybe if you pulled your head out of your backside long enough to take a breath of fresh air then you might have noticed it.

No, you haven't given a positive logical argument, and you refuse to answer relevant questions, because you have no answers. Basically your only argument is to assert that "I can't prove mine."

[JimL]

I was commenting that you seem to think there is some time outside of time.

Don't know where you got that impression. Your own assumption I guess.

When God is outside of time, he is not subject to time at all. He lives in Eternity. There was no "before" time when he created the universe. You can argue he is logically prior to the universe because he created it, but there was no existing time until he created it along with the universe so there is no "before he created the universe" like he was just floating around for a while then said "Hey! I think I will create a universe today!"

Yes, well, that really doesn't make a whole lot of sense either when you think about it, but that wasn't my argument. It would be rather silly to argue that god didn't exist before he created. But at any rate, my argument was in refutation of the argument that god can know the future of the universe because he exists outside of it, and so can observe it all at once, past, present, and future and yet we have free will. That is an obvious contradiction on its face. If the future exists from an external perspective then the future exist from all perspectives.

[Roy]

P3 (first list) is the issue that leads to the contradiction and is more than necessary, and why you get the contradiction.

But P3 is not necessary to get the contradiction, as shown in the shorter version which doesn't include it.

My capacity to exercise my free will is not dependent upon my capacity to know what the future will be so I can arbitrarily chose not to do something I otherwise would do just to spite the fact God knows what I will do.

If you have the free will to do something other than what God knows you will do, then God does not know what you will do.

[oxmixmudd]

But P3 is not necessary to get the contradiction, as shown in the shorter version which doesn't include it. If you have the free will to do something other than what God knows you will do, then God does not know what you will do.

I never postulated

(1) that I had free will to do other than what God knows I will do.

I postulated that

(2) I have free will to do what I want to do, that God has no part in causing me to do what I choose to do unless I choose to let Him.

The first formulation implies the capacity to know what God knows and thus choose to go against it, it involves the capacity to test the premise from within the logical system, which leads to a contradiction, the second does not. Your second formulation effectively assumes the provability postulate which is why it also leads to a contradiction. A more formal statement of the difference would be:

P1 God knows what I will choose
P2 I am free to choose what I wish
P3 there is no correlation or communication between the elements of P1 and P2 over the content of the future.

i.e. God does not interfere with my free will, neither does he allow me to interfere with my own free will (I can't know what God knows about my future choices).

C: the only way I can choose other than what God knows is to determine what God knows without Him knowing and purposfully react contrary to his knowledge (i.e. contrary to my own free will which according to P2 is the thing I would choose that according to P1 God already knows I will choose).

In setting up the logical premises so as to allow proof of free will, the premises are compromised, a contradiction results. In effect freewill is damaged and infallibility is destroyed.

A) the 'outside the system' information of what God knows about what I will choose interferes with what I would otherwise freely choose in the uncompromised system (sort of like measuring a system changes it)
B) by God allowing me to know what He knows without Him knowing I know it, He compromises His own infallibility.



Ergo: There is no contradiction between infallibility and free will as long as the system playing out the two elements is not constructed so as to allow proof of whether or not I have free will. The formulations of the problem I have seen that leads to a contradiction effectively assume a flawed form of infallibility or a coupling between God's foreknowledge and my free will. And that is why they lead to contradictions. If my choices in the universe are my own without any interference from God, then those choices are my free will choices. If God knows what they are infallibly, that knowledge in and of itself has no bearing on what my choices will be. There is no correlation. The reality is, I won't ever choose other than what God knows I will choose unless I somehow find out what God knows and either by mistake or on purpose that knowledge changes my choice.



Jim

[oxmixmudd]

Jim, a retrocausal feedback doesn't make any more sense than God being outside of time and so able to observe the whole of it at once because in either case the future has to exist in order that it be perceived/known. That isn't foreknowledge, Jim. Foreknowledge is knowing the future before the future occurs. Time would be no different in that respect for god than it is for us, it would in either case be static, except the fact that for us the experience of time would be an illusion. The nature of time can not be dependent upon the perspective of the observer. If time exists in it's entirety from an external perspective, then it exists in its entirety period. It's a contradiction to say that the future is closed from gods external perspective, but that it is open from our internal perspective. No, the future can only be one or the other, the future is either opened or it is closed. Therefore if the future is closed, i.e. if all of time exists from an external perspective, akin to Einsteins "block universe," then it is closed period and free will is logically impossible. And if the future is opened, then for one thing and it could no more be observed from an external perspective than from an internal perspective, it isn't there to be observed. Now, if it isn't there, if the future is open, then there is only one other logical way that it could be foreknown and that is if it were created to unfold according to the specifications of the creator. In other words the creator would know the future of his creation because he engineered it to unfold that way. But again, that would omit too the possibility of free will.

So, if you know of another logical way to refute that logic, or if you can make a logical positive argument in support of your own contention that omniscience and free will can co-exist, then I would love to see it, otherwise you are free to believe that our logic is meaningless when it comes to god and there is no sense in concerning yourself with trying to convince others.

JimL, I'm sorry but again, this conversation can go nowhere. You are giving me no evidence you are open to ideas other than your own. For example:

consider the bold statement above: I know you have at least a cursory understanding of Relativity. That being the case, one of its conclusions is that two observers in two different inertial frames can have different views of whether or not an event is in their future, or in their past (that is really, not just visually due to light transmission delay). In fact, if we could devise a way to communicate instantly, it would be possible for me to tell you about an event in my past but yet in your future. Your past and my past are not the same, your future and my future are not the same. Just knowing that simple conclusion from Einstein now over 100 years ago will tell you that it is in fact possible to have differing views of past present and future, and that a being such as God is can in fact have all possible views of past present and future simultaneously, and so God being outside time or God being 'everytime at once' does indeed make sense. Your refusal to admit that fact does not come from any problems with logic or our knowledge, it comes from your stubborn refusal to think along lines that might lead to a contradiction with what you already would prefer to believe.



Jim

[Roy]

P1 God knows what I will choose
P2 I am free to choose what I wish
P3 there is no correlation or communication between the elements of P1 and P2 over the content of the future.

I think if P3 is correct, then either P1 or P2 is incorrect.

P1: For this coin-toss, God knows before I choose that I will choose "heads"
P2: For this coin-toss, I may choose "heads" or "tails".
If I choose "heads", God is right.
If I choose "tails", God is wrong. But this contradicts P1, so either P1 is wrong (God doesn't know), or P2 is wrong (I may not choose "tails").

Ergo: There is no contradiction between infallibility and free will as long as the system playing out the two elements is not constructed so as to allow proof of whether or not I have free will.

So there is no contradiction only if you can't check whether there is a contradiction? And if you can check whether there is a contradiction, there may be a contradiction?

I think there is no contradiction between infallible knowledge and free will if either
- the infallible knowledge only pertains to the past and present, and doesn't include the future, or
- the being with infallible knowledge is sufficiently outside of time that every choice can be considered to have already happened - rather like us watching a DVD and being able to look at the frames/sections in any order, including fast-forward/skipping/rewinding/repeating/reversing/restarting.

[oxmixmudd]

I think if P3 is correct, then either P1 or P2 is incorrect.

P1: For this coin-toss, God knows before I choose that I will choose "heads"
P2: For this coin-toss, I may choose "heads" or "tails".
If I choose "heads", God is right.
If I choose "tails", God is wrong. But this contradicts P1, so either P1 is wrong (God doesn't know), or P2 is wrong (I may not choose "tails").So there is no contradiction only if you can't check whether there is a contradiction? And if you can check whether there is a contradiction, there may be a contradiction?

Free will isn't about making 'random' or inherently unpredictable choices. It is about making choices freely, i.e. without being forced. If God can know the outcome of random events, then it is impossible to choose contrary what he knows without knowing securely what he knows and reacting to that knowledge (knowing what he knows without Him knowing we know). That was kind of a key observation. That is, for God to allow us to truly have free will, He can't allow us to get access to what He knows about what we will do. If he does that, our capacity for free will is itself compromised.

You last comment sort of sums of the typical skeptic response to faith. But think about it, here we have shown logically that free will and infallibility can co-exist ONLY if we by accept that we have free will without being able to prove it. The minute God allows for a proof of free will, infallibility itself must be sacrificed. I don't see it with the skepticism you show here. It is a valid logical result, and consistent with logical system incompleteness.

I think there is no contradiction between infallible knowledge and free will if either
- the infallible knowledge only pertains to the past and present, and doesn't include the future, or
- the being with infallible knowledge is sufficiently outside of time that every choice can be considered to have already happened - rather like us watching a DVD and being able to look at the frames/sections in any order, including fast-forward/skipping/rewinding/repeating/reversing/restarting.

I think the first is a 'greater than necessary' constraint. It accomplishes the same as p3 in:

P1 God knows what I will choose
P2 I am free to choose what I wish
P3 there is no correlation or communication between the elements of P1 and P2 over the content of the future.

by eliminating the future aspect of P1 (P3 concerns communication about future events, if there is no knowledge about the future, P3 is satisfied)

The second is roughly equivalent to P3, in that it prevents communication of the foreknowledge to the free-will agent.

Jim

[Mountain Man]

It's a question of necessity.

P1: God foreknows that I will choose X.
P2: If there are no possible worlds where I could choose not-X then it is necessary that I choose X.
P3: If it is necessary that I choose X then I have no freewill.
P4: There are possible worlds where I could choose not-X.
C1: Therefore, it is not necessary that I choose X.
C2: Therefore, I have freewill.

[oxmixmudd]

It's a question of necessity.

P1: God foreknows that I will choose X.
P2: If there are no possible worlds where I could choose not-X then it is necessary that I choose X.
P3: If it is necessary that I choose X then I have no freewill.
P4: There are a possible worlds where I could choose not-X.
C1: Therefore, it is not necessary that I choose X.
C2: Therefore, I have freewill.

I think that works too

Jim