Wigner's friend, the existence of the Immaterial soul, and death of materialism

[grmorton]

I wasn't claiming that it does. If you'd read my post carefully, i was arguing that it explains why, contra one of your statements, the interaction of a quantum system with another object does not necessarily result in the two becoming entangled.

As far as i can tell, your argument here is that decoherence doesn't explain why we get a single measurement result when we do measure. Decoherence would seem to provide a tidy solution, given that we know decoherence exists, but I'm more than happy to acknowledge we don't have any evidence that it is involved at all. More generally, I'll happily admit that nobody knows scientifically what's involved with a wavefunction collapse other than in terms of phenomenology - because that's been my point the whole time.

But: none of that means that decoherence does not exist as a phenomenon, or that it doesn't explain other quantum behaviors. We'd all have quantum computers now if it didn't exist, after all. And one of the things it explains is why simple interactions don't end up with everything being entangled with everything else.

When you look at Phillip Ball's description of decoherence, it is nothing but the von Neuman chain in action. Except the point of decoherence is to say if you are entangled with everything, you are not entangled at all and are found in one state or the other. Decoherence has some real problems. With quantum computers, one must realize that the conscious scientist doesn't know the qubit has collapsed without looking at his instruments. At least I can agree with you on this, Nobody can prove decoherence did it vs the observer looking at his instruments.


Let me ask this, do humans have free will? That means a choice that is not bound by the laws of physics? If so, what do you see as the consequences of Free Will? What I am thinking of comes from quantum but I want to know your view of these questions.

[JimL]

that is what I am claiming, that consciousness is the only thing that can collapse the wavelet. Today I posted a reasons why the decoherence view is totally misunderstood and doesn't allow a naturalistic collapse of the wavelet. And if consciousness is the only thing that can cause collapse, then consciousness is apart from and something different than matter. i.e. doesn't arise from matter.

What I am asking, or rather suggesting, is that there is no such thing as wave collapse. It seems more reasonable to me from my laymans perspective that consciousness simply evolves along with everything else. The objects of observation exist before we observe them because we don't actually see them until the light reflecting from them reaches our eyes. How can our consciousness be the cause of that which exists if we are not conscious of those things until the light image of them registers in our brains.

[grmorton]

What I am asking, or rather suggesting, is that there is no such thing as wave collapse. It seems more reasonable to me from my laymans perspective that consciousness simply evolves along with everything else. The objects of observation exist before we observe them because we don't actually see them until the light reflecting from them reaches our eyes. How can our consciousness be the cause of that which exists if we are not conscious of those things until the light image of them registers in our brains.

No wavelet collapse is what Hugh Everett proposed in 1957. It is called the many worlds view.

The problem with your suggestion is that the Schrodinger equation consists of TWO different realities--one where the electron has spin up and the other where the electron has spin down. They can't coexist in the same universe, so this isn't just a matter of light reaching our eyes and in quantum it is certainly arguable whether objects exist before we look at them.


No one said we were conscious of the options prior to observation. The math says they both exist, but we eventually, when we look, see only one of them never both.

[TheLurch]

At least I can agree with you on this, Nobody can prove decoherence did it vs the observer looking at his instruments.

We're definitely agreed then.

Let me ask this, do humans have free will? That means a choice that is not bound by the laws of physics?

I honestly have no idea how to answer that question (though i don't feel bad about that, because neither does anybody else).

[grmorton]

"If you really accept evolution by natural selection, Provine says, you soon find yourself face to face with a set of implications that undermine the fundamental assumptions of Western civilization:
o There are no gods or purposive forces in nature.
o There are no inherent moral or ethical laws to guide human society
o Human beings are complex machines that become ethical beings by way of heredity and environmental influences, with environment playing a somewhat smaller role than is commonly supposed.
o There is no free will in the traditional sense of being able to make unpredictable choices.
o When we die, we die _ finally and completely and forever .

https://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0701097.pdf

"But this was only one of the remarkable reversals produced by the quantum revolution. In the opinion of many physicists-including such great figures in twentieth-century physics as Eugene Wigner and Rudolf Peierls-the fundamental principles of quantum theory are inconsistent with the materialist view of the human mind. Quantum theory, in its traditional, or "standard," or "orthodox" formulation, treats "observers" as being on a different plane from the physical systems that they observe . A careful analysis of the logical structure of quantum theory suggests that for quantum theory to make sense it has to posit the existence of observers who lie, at least in part, outside of the description provided by physics. This claim is controversial. There have been various attempts made to avoid this conclusion, either by radical reinterpretations of quantum theory (such as the so-called "many-worlds interpretation") or by changing quantum theory in some way. But the argument against materialism based on quantum theory is a strong one, and has certainly not been refuted. The line" of argument is rather subtle. It is also not well- known, even among most practicing physicists. But, if it is correct, it would be the most important philosophical implication to come from any scientific discovery."

https://www.physicsforums.com/thread...e-will.731617/

https://www.visualexpert.com/Resourc...ctiontime.html

[JimL]

No wavelet collapse is what Hugh Everett proposed in 1957. It is called the many worlds view.

The problem with your suggestion is that the Schrodinger equation consists of TWO different realities--one where the electron has spin up and the other where the electron has spin down. They can't coexist in the same universe, so this isn't just a matter of light reaching our eyes and in quantum it is certainly arguable whether objects exist before we look at them.


No one said we were conscious of the options prior to observation. The math says they both exist, but we eventually, when we look, see only one of them never both.

Well, observation is only observation if it is conscious observation, no? So, if it takes time for light to travel from the object to the surface of our eyes and then on into our brains wherein we then become conscious of it, how can it be that our observation is the cause of said objects existence? Doesn't the time lapse between the two events, the object existing and the observation of it, contradict the notion that observation is the cause said object?

[grmorton]

We're definitely agreed then.


I honestly have no idea how to answer that question (though i don't feel bad about that, because neither does anybody else).

We are not quite agreed. I posted a detailed analysis of the mathematics of decoherence. If that is the math for decoherence they depend on, then there is no way decoherence can collapse the wavefunction. My comment was meant to say that decoherence advocates cant prove that decoherence collapsed the wavefunction BECAUSE they only know the collapse happened AFTER they observe it. From their perspective they can't know if decoherence collapsed it or their observation collapsed it. If decoherence advocates can come up with math that actually collapses the wavefunction, then they might have a case to make.

[TheLurch]

To begin with, i don't think the t'Hooft manuscript is as favorable to your argument as you think it is. I'm going to quote the abstract in full:

So, t'Hooft is arguing that you can define free will in a way that "does not clash with determinism" and yet still gives you quantum behavior. And the exact consequences of free will depend on whether there is deterministic physics underlying quantum mechanics (something t'Hooft personally believes).

(For those following this thread, please also note that this isn't free will as commonly understood, but free will as defined relative to some specific physics behaviors.)

The second issue i have with the claim is an experiment done relatively recently to close one of the loopholes in tests of Bell's inequalities. Like other tests of the sort, it used a delayed choice setup, where the behavior of particles depends on how you choose to measure it. Except nobody was choosing anything. Instead, they set it up so that the measurement choice was made based on whether a sensor pointed at a distant quasar was detecting photons at the moment the decision had to be made.

Now, if we assume humans have free will, then there was free will involved in the decision to make the measurement dependent upon events that happened a billion years ago. But there was, as far as i can see, no possibility that the actual measurement choice was made using free will - instead it relied on an unconstrained variable that the universe had already determined.

If anybody's curious, they can read more about the experiment here:
http://news.mit.edu/2018/light-ancie...anglement-0820

[grmorton]

To begin with, i don't think the t'Hooft manuscript is as favorable to your argument as you think it is. I'm going to quote the abstract in full:


So, t'Hooft is arguing that you can define free will in a way that "does not clash with determinism" and yet still gives you quantum behavior. And the exact consequences of free will depend on whether there is deterministic physics underlying quantum mechanics (something t'Hooft personally believes).

(For those following this thread, please also note that this isn't free will as commonly understood, but free will as defined relative to some specific physics behaviors.)

The second issue i have with the claim is an experiment done relatively recently to close one of the loopholes in tests of Bell's inequalities. Like other tests of the sort, it used a delayed choice setup, where the behavior of particles depends on how you choose to measure it. Except nobody was choosing anything. Instead, they set it up so that the measurement choice was made based on whether a sensor pointed at a distant quasar was detecting photons at the moment the decision had to be made.

Now, if we assume humans have free will, then there was free will involved in the decision to make the measurement dependent upon events that happened a billion years ago. But there was, as far as i can see, no possibility that the actual measurement choice was made using free will - instead it relied on an unconstrained variable that the universe had already determined.

If anybody's curious, they can read more about the experiment here:
http://news.mit.edu/2018/light-ancie...anglement-0820

I know t'hooft is a deterministic guy and believes that the universe is in cahoots and conspiracy to make us think we have free will. And that is why I didn't mention that particular view. Most people don't want to go to superdeterminism because it means that knowledge, science religion, absolutely NOTHING means anything. Your current belief that I am wrong in this matter was determined to be the case at the Big Bang. Your MYOB faith was determined at the Big Bang--you had no choice in deciding to put that on your profile. The name Lurch was decided at the Big bang. If that is the view you think helps your case, fine, I think it means the results of all our experiments were determined at the Big Bang so science doesn't actually tell us anything new.This is from Wiki on superdeterminism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
Thus, it is conceivable that freedom of choice has been restricted since the beginning of the universe in the Big Bang, with every future measurement predetermined by correlations established at the Big Bang[citation needed]. This would make superdeterminism untestable, since experimenters would never be able to eliminate correlations that were created at the beginning of the universe: the freedom-of-choice loophole could never be completely eliminated.[1]


A hypothetical depiction of superdeterminism in which photons from the distant galaxies Sb and Sc are used to control the orientation of the polarization detectors α and β just prior to the arrival of entangled photons Alice and Bob.
In the 1980s, John Bell discussed superdeterminism in a BBC interview:[2][3]
There is a way to escape the inference of superluminal speeds and spooky action at a distance. But it involves absolute determinism in the universe, the complete absence of free will. Suppose the world is super-deterministic, with not just inanimate nature running on behind-the-scenes clockwork, but with our behavior, including our belief that we are free to choose to do one experiment rather than another, absolutely predetermined, including the "decision" by the experimenter to carry out one set of measurements rather than another, the difficulty disappears. There is no need for a faster than light signal to tell particle A what measurement has been carried out on particle B, because the universe, including particle A, already "knows" what that measurement, and its outcome, will be.
Although he acknowledged the loophole, he also argued that it was implausible. Even if the measurements performed are chosen by deterministic random number generators, the choices can be assumed to be "effectively free for the purpose at hand," because the machine's choice is altered by a large number of very small effects. It is unlikely for the hidden variable to be sensitive to all of the same small influences that the random number generator was.[4]


You may have that superdeterminism position as your defence against the immateriality of the soul. But since it was determined at the Big Bang that you would take that position and I would take mine, does any of this debate mean anything?

Edited to add: from the above wiki link By taking this approach you destroy science and scientific knowledge. I didn't think anyone in their right mind would take this, but since it was determined at the big bang that you might hold this view, then maybe you are in your right mind, meaning the one the universe determined for you. lol:

The implications of superdeterminism, if it is true, would bring into question the value of science itself by destroying falsifiability, as Anton Zeilinger has commented:
[W]e always implicitly assume the freedom of the experimentalist... This fundamental assumption is essential to doing science. If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are, and that could guide our questions such that we arrive at a false picture of nature.[6]

[TheLurch]

I know t'hooft is a deterministic guy and believes that the universe is in cahoots and conspiracy to make us think we have free will. And that is why I didn't mention that particular view. Most people don't want to go to superdeterminism because it means that knowledge, science religion, absolutely NOTHING means anything. Your current belief that I am wrong in this matter was determined to be the case at the Big Bang. Your MYOB faith was determined at the Big Bang--you had no choice in deciding to put that on your profile. The name Lurch was decided at the Big bang. If that is the view you think helps your case, fine, I think it means the results of all our experiments were determined at the Big Bang so science doesn't actually tell us anything new.

I'm not using it to argue for superdeterminism. (To be clear, I'm not arguing against superdeterminism either - the universe is on record as obviously indifferent to how we'd prefer the world to work). I'm just pointing out that "free will" has a very specific meaning and context in the t'Hooft piece, and so i think the quote you've used from that has a somewhat different meaning from the way you'd like to use that quote.

And I think the experiment i described poses problems for free will as you'd like to define it regardless of whether the universe is superdeterministic or not. Specifically, even in a non-superdeterministic universe, some things can be determined without conscious choice, and the results of that experiment would seem to fit that description.

[JimL]

Hello Mr. Morton and Lurch. I don't know if you missed my post, #36, but I would greatly appreciate it if one or both of you could give answer to it. I only know the subject from a laymans pperspective, but this Copenhagen Interpretation of the observer being the creator of the reality he observes doesn't make sense to me. Am I missing something with respect to my suggestion in post #36? Thanks.

[grmorton]

I'm not using it to argue for superdeterminism. (To be clear, I'm not arguing against superdeterminism either - the universe is on record as obviously indifferent to how we'd prefer the world to work). I'm just pointing out that "free will" has a very specific meaning and context in the t'Hooft piece, and so i think the quote you've used from that has a somewhat different meaning from the way you'd like to use that quote.

And I think the experiment i described poses problems for free will as you'd like to define it regardless of whether the universe is superdeterministic or not. Specifically, even in a non-superdeterministic universe, some things can be determined without conscious choice, and the results of that experiment would seem to fit that description.

In fairness Lurch, t'hooft is the only one I know of who holds that definition of free will, and t'Hoofts view IS superdeterminism. Most everyone else seems to think the experimenter is a free agent.

[grmorton]

Well, observation is only observation if it is conscious observation, no? So, if it takes time for light to travel from the object to the surface of our eyes and then on into our brains wherein we then become conscious of it, how can it be that our observation is the cause of said objects existence? Doesn't the time lapse between the two events, the object existing and the observation of it, contradict the notion that observation is the cause said object?

I must not have hit send, I thought I answsered this and can't find it now. lol

The problem is not one of travel time, the problem is that the Schrodinger equation contains multiple realities as if they are equally real, but when we observe we only observe one of those possible realities. All these realities require that 'travel time you mention' so they are not distinguished by that. We see one of the possible outcomes not all of them which are described by Schrodinger's equation. The question is why do we only see one, not all of them, which in some circumstances can be hundreds of possible realities.

[TheLurch]

Hello Mr. Morton and Lurch. I don't know if you missed my post, #36, but I would greatly appreciate it if one or both of you could give answer to it. I only know the subject from a laymans pperspective, but this Copenhagen Interpretation of the observer being the creator of the reality he observes doesn't make sense to me. Am I missing something with respect to my suggestion in post #36? Thanks.

Sorry, you were replying to grmorton, so I didn't realize you wanted my input as well.

Well, observation is only observation if it is conscious observation, no?

That's the issue grmorton and I have been going back and forth on. So, while "reasonable" may be giving both of us too much credit, i think it's clear that reasonable people can disagree.

All of the experiments that describe this behavior takes place far too fast for human intervention, so the observations are done via electronics, and recorded on computers. Humans only get involved in "observing" the results much later, and then probably don't even look at most individual results, and simply examine the bulk behavior of the system across many individual measurements. (Meaning they "observe" at the level of "28% of the time it did this, 47% of the time it did that, etc.")

So, when does observing take place? I'd argue that it's before there's conscious involvement - the electronics did the observing. grmorton would say a conscious observer is required, and all the computer equipment its in an indeterminate state until a human starts looking over the results. Right now, there's no way to scientifically distinguish between the two possibilities.

So, if it takes time for light to travel from the object to the surface of our eyes and then on into our brains wherein we then become conscious of it, how can it be that our observation is the cause of said objects existence? Doesn't the time lapse between the two events, the object existing and the observation of it, contradict the notion that observation is the cause said object?

We know quantum mechanics isn't causal in the traditional sense of the word (in technical language, it doesn't obey local realism). So you're trying to apply rules that we know are invalid here.

[TheLurch]

In fairness Lurch, t'hooft is the only one I know of who holds that definition of free will, and t'Hoofts view IS superdeterminism. Most everyone else seems to think the experimenter is a free agent.

Right. t'Hooft is an incredibly smart guy, but he's pretty much wandered off on his own in most of the work he's done post-Nobel. But my point is that the paper he's writing is from his deterministic viewpoint on free will, so when it's used in a sentence in that paper, it has a meaning that's distinct from how most people would define it. It appeared to me that you were quoting a paragraph from that paper to make an argument in favor of a different definition of free will - one that's not t'Hooft's.

I'm trying to think of a good analogy to explain what i'm saying better and failing pretty miserably. Maybe something will come to me later.