Can Atheism Account For Rationality

[Tassman]

There is every reason to believe that intangible thoughts/sensations/feelings are simply the brain in action,

Good. Then we agree. The mind is the product of brain activity.

but for some reason we've spent several pages of this thread on the discussion about how the mind relates to the brain with no one listing even a single one of these reasons?

Are you kidding me? Our own minds are literally the only single things in existence to which we have direct access. There is not one other thing in existence that we are aware of that is accessible to us except in the form of sensations filtered through the mind. If we're not justified in believing in the existence of our own minds then we are not justified in believing in anything at all.

Of course, we are justified in believing in the existence of our own minds. What we are NOT justified in is thinking we understand how our minds function. Because, as I said, our minds have been programmed by genes and environmental pressures of which we cannot necessarily be aware or understand.

I would say that it's completely irrelevant to the discussion at hand.

[Zara]

Good. Then we agree. The mind is the product of brain activity.

The relation between brain activity and phenomenal consciousness is not understood. It is not clear that we will ever be able to understand that relation. That is why it is the hard problem: http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/..._consciousness . And while I'm going to hear all about how in principle Science, no doubt capitalised, will be able to find the answer - this is not certain. There is disagreement about foundational issues, and even about our epistemic access, which you have to acknowledge without becoming dogmatic. There are also competing theories, some of which do not fit into your methodological framework. Which, as it turns out, no one actually needs to agree to - unless Science becomes imperialist.

No, what we have been discussing is your bald assertion that the mind/soul is a separate entity from the brain. It’s not, e.g. we know that damage to the frontal lobe in the brain can cause major changes to behavior and our state of mind. As for “how the mind relates to the brain”, this is the ongoing study of neurologists and the related sciences...iMRI is proving a useful tool in this area.

This is about phenomenal consciousness, and its complete distinction from electrical activity seen on any way of representing the brain that we have. It is not clear what phenomenal consciousness is, why it is or, frankly, where it is. See the link above.

Yes, brain damage can affect our experience, however, it is the distinction between the brain on one side and the phenomenal experience on the other that is at issue.

Of course, we are justified in believing in the existence of our own minds. What we are NOT justified in is thinking we understand how our minds function. Because, as I said, our minds have been programmed by genes and environmental pressures of which we cannot necessarily be aware or understand.

You're confusing us with something you believe we are. Any existentialist will point out that I do not have to commit to your assertion about what matters, and why it matters. Existence precedes essence. Your whole Natural Selection story, ironic capitalisation, then, becomes irrelevant as anything more than an indication of our capabilities, not how we use them.

[seer]

There is no

And there is no evidence that this universe came about by natural causes, as a matter of fact there is no reason to even call this universe natural. Or is it a simulation? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgSZA3NPpBs

[shunyadragon]

Are you enjoying your cherries? He said the vast majority of creatures, and, given that most creatures are not self-conscious, since they are mainly beetles, I think you need to concede this point. He readily admits that some higher animals show some degree of self-consciousness. So, even your cherries are accounted for.

This did not reflect at all the content of my post. English comprehension? Please respond coherently in a way that actually reflects what I wrote..

[Zara]

This did not reflect at all the content of my post. English comprehension? Please respond coherently in a way that actually reflects what I wrote..

Ok, well, I guess I would attribute consciousness to more creatures than self-awareness. However, the claim that the vast majority do not have consciousness as far as we know, is true, since the vast majority are insects.

[shunyadragon]

Ok, well, I guess I would attribute consciousness to more creatures than self-awareness. However, the claim that the vast majority do not have consciousness as far as we know, is true, since the vast majority are insects.

"More mammals show self-awareness than you 'think.' Also consciousness is pretty much universal with mammals and possibly other animals."

This what I wrote in plain English respond to that.

[JimL]

I hadn't, so thanks for broadening my world a little bit more!

Me neither, I just went looking to see if anything supported my position and that's what I came up with.

I will readily admit that I have only quickly skimmed some material. What jumps out at me is, over and over, "cannot be empirically tested." At first blush, it appears to be of a kind with "intelligent design." It seems to be more religion than science.

Conscious phenomena, qualia, cannot be empirically tested for either and after all, that is the perspective you take.

But I have to admit I have only skimmed the material and that is only a first impression. That being said, it aligns with my impression of your arguments.

That's fine, I have only just skimmed the material on pansychism myself and though this idea I've gotten isn't part of the theory, as far as I know, but while musing about it all, I got the idea that perhaps consciousness itself is an illussion, perhaps the reason there is no empirical evidence of consciousness, is because in reality, like the immaterial mind, consciousness doesn't exist. I know, it's sounds a bit crazy, but no more so than immaterial thoughts, immaterial minds, or qualia. We see with our brains, there is no light in there, only a pitch black cavity buzzing with electrical activity, the only thing coming in from the outside is more electrical activity and yet within that complete blackness we somehow see the world of color and light. Perhaps the qualia don't exist at all, perhaps there is only the real, the external world, and what we see is it's illusion as interpreted by our brain through electrical activity. Just a thought, but I still don't believe in substance dualism.

[carpedm9587]

Well, I appear unable to drag myself away just yet.

I tried to argue this point with Shunya, however, I gave up in the end as you probably noticed. The point is that we do not know what it is about the human brain that allows it to give rise to a mind. John Searle's Chinese room argument goes some way towards showing that current forms of computers are not sufficient to result in a sentient mind - this is in principle, even a super complex form would be insufficient. While future computers could, possibly do so, the issue is that without an understanding of the causal power that results in our mindedness, we do not have grounds to believe that even a "complex" computer that appears to act like it is sentient is sentient. While you say it is complexity, it might simply be a quantum mechanical effect dependent on our type of synapses and the neurotransmitter soup in which they are supported.

We could be completely wrong also, a sceptical argument could just run a matrix type theory and say that to be minded we need to be in the real world - where the 'brain' we see in our perception, and all our science, are mere programmed illusions with no bearing on the actual causal power (whatever it is about the real world) that results in a minded experience. I'm not arguing that this is the case, however, the absolute certainty displayed by a few people here needs some softening.

We do not have sufficient evidence to say "we know it is due to complexity with certainty." But we do have evidence that complexity and emergent properties are associated with one another, so there is cause to think this may be the case with brain and mind. Is it enough to make a certain claim? Absolutely not. As you note, other factors may be (and quite probably are) also at play.

And I suspect that, if a computer ever achieved actual sentience, there would remain a body of humans who would reject it as such. They would forever claim that it is merely "acting sentient" and not "actually sentient." Qualia prevents any such proof. The opposite is true. Those who believe it is possible will assert sentience even when there is little or no evidence it has been achieved.

It's an interesting conundrum. Do I think sentient machines as possible? Yep. I do. Not only possible, but ultimately inevitable - if we do not destroy ourselves as a species before reaching that level of technology. If I am right, what will lie beyond that "singularity?" That is going to be very interesting. It may well make Pandora look like a girl scout!

[carpedm9587]

How is that saying anything?

Think about it...

[carpedm9587]

You are missing my point Carp, I posted a link about animals being self aware (before Shuny see post 538). We know of a handful. Shuny wanted to expand that to other creatures where we really have no good evidence. That was what my above quote was about. As far as we know the vast majority of creature are not self aware. Shuny took exception to that.

When scientists begin to find evidence of memory in slime molds, I find myself wondering just where the cut-off for sentience and self-awareness will actually be. My suspicion is that we are looking at yet another continuum, with rudimentary instinct and memory at one end (slime molds) and full blown sentience and reasoning at the other. I doubt we are even at the end of that continuum, although we appear to be the furthest along that end on this planet.

[carpedm9587]

Me neither, I just went looking to see if anything supported my position and that's what I came up with.

Conscious phenomena, qualia, cannot be empirically tested for either and after all, that is the perspective you take.

With this I have to disagree. Conscious phenomena CAN be empirically tested. The entire field of fMRI is part of that. Then there are all the adjoining disciplines. Qualia does not mean "not empirically testable." It simply means one person can never experience as another person does. Experience is always subjective to the individual. It does not mean that there are no ways to do empirical testing and evaluation. We have learned a great deal from fMRIs.

That's fine, I have only just skimmed the material on pansychism myself and though this idea I've gotten isn't part of the theory, as far as I know, but while musing about it all, I got the idea that perhaps consciousness itself is an illussion, perhaps the reason there is no empirical evidence of consciousness, is because in reality, like the immaterial mind, consciousness doesn't exist. I know, it's sounds a bit crazy, but no more so than immaterial thoughts, immaterial minds, or qualia. We see with our brains, there is no light in there, only a pitch black cavity buzzing with electrical activity, the only thing coming in from the outside is more electrical activity and yet within that complete blackness we somehow see the world of color and light. Perhaps the qualia don't exist at all, perhaps there is only the real, the external world, and what we see is it's illusion as interpreted by our brain through electrical activity. Just a thought, but I still don't believe in substance dualism.

So first, I think your "no empirical evidence" is simply not sustainable. But for the rest, there are some interesting philosophical positions these days - but many of them boil down to "you cannot prove you're not a brain in a vat." I agree. Some things we accept as self-evident because we have no choice but to do so - a conversation I had earlier with Seer. I assume that my perception of the universe is "workingly accurate." I cannot prove any of you actually exist outside of my imagination. Or that we aren't all part of a gynormous computer simulation. I take it prima facie that you all actually do exist, and go from there.

But there is a marvelous novel in that concept...and I'm coupling it with my theology/scriptology background to create a series I hope will be interesting. Now that I am moving to semi-retirement, I hope to devote more time to it.

[Tassman]

And there is no evidence that this universe came about by natural causes,

There is no viable alternative. The universe coming about via natural causes is only verifiable evidence we have.

as a matter of fact there is no reason to even call this universe natural. Or is it a simulation? https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wgSZA3NPpBs

https://www.simulation-argument.com/

[JonathanL]

I think you have to ignore a LOT of science to make this statement. I'm not even sure how you can hold this position. I'd be curious to know how you get there.

Well, I might have missed some of the evidence, but none of the evidence I know of personally supports anything more than some sort of relation of dependence between the mind and the brain. There's no reason what so ever to try and get the evidence to support the notion that the brain is the cause of the mind, unless one is already pre-disposed to believe in it because of some prior assumption(s). By itself the evidence does not point that way.

Again, I have no idea where you get this. The entire world of FMRI has shown clear links between brain activity and thoughts. Electrical stimulation in the brain has been shown to not only be capable of moving body parts, but of inducing feelings and changing thought patterns and behavior, as reported by those undergoing the treatments. What do you do with all of this evidence?

I do nothing with it, because nothing you stated here is a challenge to what I stated. The link between thoughts and the mind is intimate and immediate. Thoughts literally exist in the mind. It is nigh impossible to have a stronger connection between two phenomena than the connection that exists between your thoughts and your mind. If the association was any stronger they might just as well be considered the same thing. The connection between brain activity and thoughts is strong, but compared to the connection between the mind and thoughts it's properly called a secondary connection.

So identify one element of "mind" that is not "thought."

I can do two, and probably more if I'd bother to think about it some more, namely your will and your focus/concentration.

First, your use of language is pretty spot on for someone who is not versed in computer science. Second, I don't disagree with anything you've said, largely because the computer is not (yet) a sentient machine. However, what you are describing is not dissimilar from how the brain functions. The computer is digital, specifically binary (until we have quantum computers) so it does indeed represent everything a 0's and 1's. The human brain is better described as an analog computer, so it can store information in a virtually infinite number of states. It also has the marvelous ability to form new connections between cells (synapses) and it appears to be the patterns of these connections and the ways in which they are activated that give rise to memory and thought. A computer has a fixed architecture that doesn't change unless someone changes the CPU, and then they are simply substituting one fixed architecture for another. A computer compared to the brain of pretty much ANY animal is a very crude tool. If sentience is a function of complexity, as many believe it is, the modern computer is simply nowhere near complex enough.

So, right now, the information a computer is so marvelously good at processing is intended for the most self-reflective mind we know to exist - the human brain. That does not, however, lead to the belief that the computer cannot become sentient if it could ever be designed to be sufficiently complex.

Well, this is all well and good, and for the most part (except for some obvious parts) I don't really disagree with much here. The only problem is that it doesn't answer the problem I mentioned, namely the one about "aboutness". Unlike my thoughts, neither the activity in the computer, nor the brain is obviously about anything at all. The activity in the computer gives rise to visual phenomena on the screen that we have decided mean certain things, while the activity in the brain is associated with certain thoughts. But in both cases it's our thoughts, both when we interpret what's happening on the screen and when the thoughts that are associated with certain brain activity arise, that are about the things that we think about, not the brain activity, or the activity/states of the computer.

We'll have to agree to disagree on that one. I will give you that it has some very pleasant attributes missing in the direction I am going. But the direction I'm going has a significant advantage...

Sweet ignorance?

[JonathanL]

Good. Then we agree. The mind is the product of brain activity.

Very funny.

So, your counter to my "bald assertions" (which they are clearly not, as anyone can see that I've listed some of my reasons for believing that the mind is separate from the brain in this thread) is to throw out bald assertions of your own (and in your case they actually are bald assertions) and when asked to back them up you refuse to do it, and instead simply list some information that is no bigger a challenge for the belief that the mind is distinct from the brain than it is for the belief that the mind is simply "the brain in action"?

Of course, we are justified in believing in the existence of our own minds. What we are NOT justified in is thinking we understand how our minds function. Because, as I said, our minds have been programmed by genes and environmental pressures of which we cannot necessarily be aware or understand.

I agree that we are not justified in thinking we have a COMPLETE understanding about how our minds function. When it comes to the things I've listed however, like intangibility and intentionality/"aboutness", there is no reason to doubt that these are legitimate attributes of our mind and thoughts, but not attributes of the brain or it's associated neurological activity, and the chance that any new discovery will give us cause to change opinion about this matter is slim to none.

I think you'll find I have done none of the sort in this thread. At the very least I haven't tried arguing for it.

[JonathanL]

Conscious phenomena, qualia, cannot be empirically tested for either and after all, that is the perspective you take.

The difference is that unlike pansychism, qualia is readily apparent to every single human in existence, except if you lack literally every single one of the normal human senses. It is possible to deny pansychism without being deluded, but if you deny completely (obviously it's possible to lack the experience of some of these senses) having the experience of seeing colors and shapes, hearing sounds, feeling things as they touch your body, and tasting and smelling things, then everyone is pretty much justified in believing you to be either a nutcase or a liar.

That's fine, I have only just skimmed the material on pansychism myself and though this idea I've gotten isn't part of the theory, as far as I know, but while musing about it all, I got the idea that perhaps consciousness itself is an illussion, perhaps the reason there is no empirical evidence of consciousness, is because in reality, like the immaterial mind, consciousness doesn't exist. I know, it's sounds a bit crazy, but no more so than immaterial thoughts, immaterial minds, or qualia. We see with our brains, there is no light in there, only a pitch black cavity buzzing with electrical activity, the only thing coming in from the outside is more electrical activity and yet within that complete blackness we somehow see the world of color and light. Perhaps the qualia don't exist at all, perhaps there is only the real, the external world, and what we see is it's illusion as interpreted by our brain through electrical activity. Just a thought, but I still don't believe in substance dualism.

There's just one big glaring problem with this theory of yours that the mind/consciousness is an illusion, namely the fact that illusions do not exist anywhere but in the conscious mind. In order for consciousness to be an illusion there already has to exist a mind in which this illusion can arise. Illusions are essentially qualia that do not accurately correspond to things in the physical world, and for qualia to exist you need a mind.