Are Thoughts Causal?

[Tassman]

This is a philosophical argument which purports to be true and factual. It can be tested by reason and shown to be "true", Thus reason and not science CAN be the criterion for judging and testing the truth of statements,

These again are all philosophical conclusions, can be tested by reason and logic, and are all purportedly true and factual.)[/I][/U]

A philosophical argument cannot be shown to be “true and factual” at all unless it is a “sound argument”. But to be shown as true such an argument must have a true premise in order to arrive at a “true conclusion”; philosophy is not equipped to arrive at a true, testable premise – only science can do this.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

[Tassman]

No, there's no analogy to the 'hard problem' Before lightning was understood, a PHYSICAL explanation was perfectly conceivable,

This is the point you keep missing. Before lightning was understood, a “PHYSICAL explanation” was NOT perfectly conceivable at all, which explains why lightening was attributed to a god. The whole existence of electricity and electrostatic discharges was utterly inconceivable until it was discovered by science. And the same argument will very probably apply to ‘consciousness’ arising from the physical functioning of the material brain.

[JimL]

You seem to have missed my post, Jim. So I'llm ask again. What exactly do you think thoughts are? Are they products of the physical brain, or products of an immaterial mind?

[Jim B.]

A philosophical argument cannot be shown to be “true and factual” at all unless it is a “sound argument”. But to be shown as true such an argument must have a true premise in order to arrive at a “true conclusion”; philosophy is not equipped to arrive at a true, testable premise – only science can do this.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

But you have an extremely restrictive, dogmatic view of what is required to qualify as a "true" premise. There are "true" premises that refer to private, experiential states which have not been established to be within the scientific purview, such as "I am conscious" "I am in pain," which you cannot assume to be within the scientific domain without begging the crucial question. There are also "true" premises which refer to value statements, such as "Torturing toddlers for fun is wrong," and "Happiness is intrinsically good." And there are the metaphysical assumptions upon which science itself depends, and so logically science could not be equipped to arrive at these premises, and yet these premises must be "true" if science is to function.

But setting the matter of premises aside, I was referring to philosophical conclusions, which is what you and I are drawing constantly. A conclusion of one chain of inference becomes a premise for another and so on. Philosophical inference, observation, intuition, etc are inextricably interwoven except when laid out formally as argumentation. Once again, 'philosophy'is an integral part of 'science' and vice versa.

[Jim B.]

This is the point you keep missing. Before lightning was understood, a “PHYSICAL explanation” was NOT perfectly conceivable at all, which explains why lightening was attributed to a god. The whole existence of electricity and electrostatic discharges was utterly inconceivable until it was discovered by science. And the same argument will very probably apply to ‘consciousness’ arising from the physical functioning of the material brain.

That's just silly. Because one kind of explanation was arrived at is no reason to assume that an alternative explanation was absolutely inconceivable. "Physical" understood as "causal dispositions" was perfectly conceivable to people before electrostatic discharge was understood, "physical" in the sense of the way they would have understood a ball bouncing or a rock falling to the ground. Even though the correct physical explanation might not have been filled in, a physical explanation of some sort was conceivable. And again, it's not a question of consciousness 'arising' from the physical functioning of the material brain, which indicates to me that you still don't understand the rudiments of the concept. Please try to learn it or let's move on.

[Jim B.]

You seem to have missed my post, Jim. So I'llm ask again. What exactly do you think thoughts are? Are they products of the physical brain, or products of an immaterial mind?

I'm not sure. My main point is that consciousness is not reducible to physical concepts. So I would tend to say that thoughts have an immaterial aspect, the aspect that's involved with conscious experience, and a material aspect, the aspect that's involved with the brain and neuronal activity. And maybe an ideal, normative aspect, that's involved with their content.

[JimL]

I'm not sure. My main point is that consciousness is not reducible to physical concepts. So I would tend to say that thoughts have an immaterial aspect, the aspect that's involved with conscious experience, and a material aspect, the aspect that's involved with the brain and neuronal activity. And maybe an ideal, normative aspect, that's involved with their content.

But when you say that thoughts are involved with the brain and neuronal activity, do you mean to say that they are the effects of neuronal activity? Or would you say that the neuronal activity is the effect of thoughts? What comes first, the chicken, or the egg, the thought, or the neuronal activity?

[Tassman]

"Physical" understood as "causal dispositions" was perfectly conceivable to people before electrostatic discharge was understood, "physical" in the sense of the way they would have understood a ball bouncing or a rock falling to the ground.

Except that lightning wasn’t “perfectly conceivable” in practice, which is why it was attributed to a god. Just as illness was attributed to 'divine wrath' or demons before germ theory was developed and etc. etc. etc.

Even though the correct physical explanation might not have been filled in, a physical explanation of some sort was conceivable.

Indeed, it was. You are arguing against yourself. You said above (#201): “consciousness is not reducible to physical concepts. So, I would tend to say that thoughts have an immaterial aspect”. But this is an assumption. There is no evidence of consciousness except for the activity of the brain and this is being investigated by the neurosciences currently. Science does not deal with “immaterial reality” and philosophy is not equipped to test such assumptions.

[Jim B.]

Except that lightning wasn’t “perfectly conceivable” in practice, which is why it was attributed to a god. Just as illness was attributed to 'divine wrath' or demons before germ theory was developed and etc. etc. etc.

Of course it wasn't "perfectly conceivable in practice." That has nothing to do with what we're discussing. "Perfectly conceivable" and "practice" have nothing to do with each other! What occurs in practice is only one alternative of what can be conceived. Physical explanations for phenomena such as lightning were perfectly conceivable as well as actually occurring in the eighteenth century, which is when the underlying physical mechanism of lightning was discovered. You're hopelessly confused.

Indeed, it was. You are arguing against yourself. You said above (#201): “consciousness is not reducible to physical concepts. So, I would tend to say that thoughts have an immaterial aspect”. But this is an assumption. There is no evidence of consciousness except for the activity of the brain and this is being investigated by the neurosciences currently. Science does not deal with “immaterial reality” and philosophy is not equipped to test such assumptions.

Again, this is all simply dogmatic, self-ratifying circular reasoning, and most importantly, a philosophical argument supporting a philosophical position. Philosophy can test its results through reason and logic. You are a logical positivist. It has been consistently demonstrated that logical positivism is logically incoherent and fails to meet its own criterion of truth. There is more than one standard of knowledge and truth. Thoughts have content. Some thought content is demonstrably "immaterial" such as "1+1=2". The "same thought" can be instantiated in more than one material brain at the same time.The "same thought" is capable in principle of "multiple realizability." These are all philosophical conclusions. They all support the position that thoughts, in some respect, are "immaterial".


Once again, please try to learn about the "Hard Problem" or admit that you will not or that you cannot.

[Jim B.]

But when you say that thoughts are involved with the brain and neuronal activity, do you mean to say that they are the effects of neuronal activity? Or would you say that the neuronal activity is the effect of thoughts? What comes first, the chicken, or the egg, the thought, or the neuronal activity?

There are various possibilities. Radical emergence. Neutral monism. Substance dualism.

[JimL]

There are various possibilities. Radical emergence. Neutral monism. Substance dualism.

And have you tested, by reason and logic, and come to a conclusion? Would you also argue that memories, which are thoughts stored in the physical brain are immaterial?

[Tassman]

Physical explanations for phenomena such as lightning were perfectly conceivable as well as actually occurring in the eighteenth century, which is when the underlying physical mechanism of lightning was discovered.

Just as neuroscience is currently searching for physical explanations for phenomena such as consciousness in sentient creatures like us.

Philosophy can test its results through reason and logic.

But philosophy cannot arrive at testable new conclusions about the natural world; its conclusions are merely restatements of existing knowledge.

Some thought content is demonstrably "immaterial" such as "1+1=2". They all support the position that thoughts, in some respect, are "immaterial".

Not so. Numbers represent a physical reality; they are the language in which physical reality can be described.

[Once again, please try to learn about the "Hard Problem"

Your “hard problem” is merely an unresolved scientific problem; it will never be satisfactorily resolved by academic philosophical argument.

[Jim B.]

Just as neuroscience is currently searching for physical explanations for phenomena such as consciousness in sentient creatures like us.

You're just repeating over and over your rosary of scientistic faith-claims without apparently even trying to comprehend or address what I am writing. If it makes you feel better, by all means...

But philosophy cannot arrive at testable new conclusions about the natural world; its conclusions are merely restatements of existing knowledge.

Not so. As I've said, your unexamined logical positivist and verificationist assumptions were quaintly amusing at first, but reading them for the umpteenth time tends to get tedious...

Not so. Numbers represent a physical reality; they are the language in which physical reality can be described.

Interesting philosophical point. Even if numbers represent a physical reality, and that point is far from uncontroversially accepted, the representations themselves would be the ideas in our minds, and "1+1=2" is a proposition which is true, and propositions do not exist in mind-independent reality, nor do truth and falsity being properties of propositions.

Your “hard problem” is merely an unresolved scientific problem; it will never be satisfactorily resolved by academic philosophical argument.

Once more, I don't think it will be resolved by philosophical argument ALONE. The strict demarcation of science from philosophy is somewhat simplistic and artificial, as I've said repeatedly. But the "hard problem" is not a strictly empirical problem; it is stating in effect that no matter what structure(s), function(s), and physical correlations are investigated in association with conscious experience, there is no conceivable answer to the question "Why is this physical phenomenon associated with conscious experience?" No other scientific explanation exhibits such a conceivability gap, eg, "Why is H2O associated with water?" "Why is DNA associated with life?"

[metacrock]

And have you tested, by reason and logic, and come to a conclusion? Would you also argue that memories, which are thoughts stored in the physical brain are immaterial?

Of course they are, Even if they the product of a physical process that does not make them physical,I can remember my whole life without having a physical Dallas Texas in my head, Your

argument is like saying images on a movie are made of film because the recorded on film.

quote: Brad Peters, Modern Psychologist, “the Mind Does not Reduce to the Brain.” On line resource, blog, 2/4/12

URL: http://modernpsychologist.ca/the-min...-to-the-brain/ visited 5/3/12

Brad Peters, M.Sc. Psychologist (Cand. Reg.) • Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada

"But while it may be true that certain psychological processes are contingent on some neurophysiological activity, we cannot necessarily say that psychological processes reduce to ‘nothing but’ that activity. Why not? – Because much of the time we are not dealing with cause and effect, as many neuroscientists seem to think, but rather two different and non-equivalent kinds of description. One describes mechanism, the other contains meaning. Understanding the physical mechanisms of a clock, for example, tells us nothing about the culturally constructed meaning of time. In a similar vein, understanding the physiological mechanisms underlying the human blink, tells us nothing about the meaning inherent in a human wink (Gergen, 2010). Human meaning often transcends its underlying mechanisms. But how does it do this?"

[Jim B.]

And have you tested, by reason and logic, and come to a conclusion? Would you also argue that memories, which are thoughts stored in the physical brain are immaterial?

The phenomenal memory, as conscious experience, is immaterial. And yes, it's been tested by arguments. No argument is a defeater. The memory in its psychological and neurological aspects is material.