Are Thoughts Causal?

[metacrock]

Just as neuroscience is currently searching for physical explanations for phenomena such as consciousness in sentient creatures like us.

searching doesn't mean it exists

But philosophy cannot arrive at testable new conclusions about the natural world; its conclusions are merely restatements of existing knowledge.

We don't have to prove anything. you have have the burden of proof You are asserting the truth of your reductionist ideology. We are merely questioning it.

Not so. Numbers represent a physical reality; they are the language in which physical reality can be described.

ridiculous, numbers are not physical, show me where they keep the positive numbers! they are abstract and mental.

Your “hard problem” is merely an unresolved scientific problem; it will never be satisfactorily resolved by academic philosophical argument.

You are just rationalizing not being able to answer it. The hard problem is the crux of the inability of reductionist to answer anything. you are merely trying to rationalize that inability.

[JimL]

The phenomenal memory, as conscious experience, is immaterial.

So, stored memories go from being material to immaterial when brought to consciousness? And by immaterial you mean what exactly? A distinct kind of existence?

And yes, it's been tested by arguments. No argument is a defeater.

Can you summarize the logic arguments?

The memory in its psychological and neurological aspects is material.

So, are you suggesting that the material memories are products, created by, and stored in the physical brain, by an immaterial consciousness?

[Tassman]

But the "hard problem" is not a strictly empirical problem; it is stating in effect that no matter what structure(s), function(s), and physical correlations are investigated in association with conscious experience, there is no conceivable answer to the question "Why is this physical phenomenon associated with conscious experience?" No other scientific explanation exhibits such a conceivability gap,

Again: philosophical arguments, unlike scientific hypotheses, have no means to test the conclusions of its arguments hence it is probable that your “no conceivable answer” is wrong. Neurologists certainly think so. They are investigating task-specific and unspecific aspects of brain activity using modern methods such as EEG, fMRI and NIRS in relation to what we consider to be the mind and consciousness experience. It is very likely that in due course they will discover the direct connection between consciousness and the physical activity of the brain that logically must exist.

[Tassman]

The phenomenal memory, as conscious experience, is immaterial. And yes, it's been tested by arguments. No argument is a defeater. The memory in its psychological and neurological aspects is material.

Please explain how the immaterial “conscious experience” connects with its “psychological and neurological” material brain. Where’s the nexus?

[metacrock]

So, stored memories go from being material to immaterial when brought to consciousness? And by immaterial you mean what exactly? A distinct kind of existence?



Can you summarize the logic arguments?


So, are you suggesting that the material memories are products, created by, and stored in the physical brain, by an immaterial consciousness?

Make your argument, It;s your burden of proof

[metacrock]

Please explain how the immaterial “conscious experience” connects with its “psychological and neurological” material brain. Where’s the nexus?

That's the assumption we all make. we don;t need to explain it. you must prove your argent, you seek the change. your burden to prove. I've already quoted evidence that disproves your point.

[metacrock]

Again: philosophical arguments, unlike scientific hypotheses, have no means to test the conclusions of its arguments hence it is probable that your “no conceivable answer” is wrong. Neurologists certainly think so. They are investigating task-specific and unspecific aspects of brain activity using modern methods such as EEG, fMRI and NIRS in relation to what we consider to be the mind and consciousness experience. It is very likely that in due course they will discover the direct connection between consciousness and the physical activity of the brain that logically must exist.

That is not proof you are merely simpering that your argument must be right because authority fugues hold it.

[metacrock]

Again: philosophical arguments, unlike scientific hypotheses, have no means to test the conclusions of its arguments hence it is probable that your “no conceivable answer” is wrong. Neurologists certainly think so. They are investigating task-specific and unspecific aspects of brain activity using modern methods such as EEG, fMRI and NIRS in relation to what we consider to be the mind and consciousness experience. It is very likely that in due course they will discover the direct connection between consciousness and the physical activity of the brain that logically must exist.

In other words you have no evidence, you are merry placing faith in science to save you someday, you need to face facts, Jim B has torn your arguments to peices.

[JimL]

Make your argument, It;s your burden of proof

Being that there is no empirical evidence of your immaterial spirit world, it is your burden to prove. I'm simply asking for your proof.

[metacrock]

Being that there is no empirical evidence of your immaterial spirit world, it is your burden to prove. I'm simply asking for your proof.

Not at all. I', not trying to prove it to you, You are trying to impose your view as though its a fact so you have the burden to prove it.


Now there may be no empirical evidence of "spirit" but there sure as hell is empirical evidence of immaterial consciousnesses. You have o evidence that consciousness reduces to brain chemistry.

[Jim B.]

Again: philosophical arguments, unlike scientific hypotheses, have no means to test the conclusions of its arguments hence it is probable that your “no conceivable answer” is wrong. Neurologists certainly think so. They are investigating task-specific and unspecific aspects of brain activity using modern methods such as EEG, fMRI and NIRS in relation to what we consider to be the mind and consciousness experience. It is very likely that in due course they will discover the direct connection between consciousness and the physical activity of the brain that logically must exist.

Again: the theoretical framework for scientific explanations works for a dependence-relation of macro-properties upon micro-properties. Every scientific explanation, even those not currently understood or clearly formulated, is resolvable in principle under this type of dependence-relation. No one currently has a clue how consciousness could be explained under this scheme. You say that in due course, there will be discovered a "direct connection between consciounsess and physical activity in the brain." But what do you mean by that? Do you mean a causal explanation, like a "consciousness engine" in the brain? But even if that were discovered, how would that close the explanatory gap I'm referring to? What conceivable fact or set of facts could there be about that engine that could carry within it the answer to why it causes conscious experience? What, in logical or physical or mental space, could there be about such a phenomenon that could be decisive in closure of this gap, unlike, again, every other scientific unknown. The burden is upon you, since you are the one so confidently proclaiming the likely success of science in this field, to tell us, at least in broad strokes, in terms of conceivability, what such a solution might be like.

[Jim B.]

So, stored memories go from being material to immaterial when brought to consciousness? And by immaterial you mean what exactly? A distinct kind of existence?

The burden is not on me. The burden is on the reductionist. I am arguing against reductionism.


Being immaterial doesn't necessarily mean being part of "the spirit world." Thoughts have an immaterial aspect for all the reasons I've cited. "Freedom is a good thing" is a thought but not a material thing as far as its content.

Can you summarize the logic arguments?

We've already been through those several times. I will when I have more time.

So, are you suggesting that the material memories are products, created by, and stored in the physical brain, by an immaterial consciousness?

The mind performs many functions sub- and unconsciously. Most of it never comes to full consciousness .

[Jim B.]

Please explain how the immaterial “conscious experience” connects with its “psychological and neurological” material brain. Where’s the nexus?

The burden is on YOU, the reductionist. I am arguing against reductionism. Jim L keeps asking me questions I am only speculating about. You are the one with the case to prove up.

[JimL]

Not at all. I', not trying to prove it to you, You are trying to impose your view as though its a fact so you have the burden to prove it.


Now there may be no empirical evidence of "spirit" but there sure as hell is empirical evidence of immaterial consciousnesses. You have o evidence that consciousness reduces to brain chemistry.

Okay, so what is the empirical evidence of immaterial consciousness?

[JimL]

The burden is not on me. The burden is on the reductionist. I am arguing against reductionism.


Being immaterial doesn't necessarily mean being part of "the spirit world." Thoughts have an immaterial aspect for all the reasons I've cited. "Freedom is a good thing" is a thought but not a material thing as far as its content.




We've already been through those several times. I will when I have more time.






The mind performs many functions sub- and unconsciously. Most of it never comes to full consciousness .

So, would you say that the sub- or unconscious functions of the brain, lets say dreams, exist as immaterial things as well? And how would you define memories that are unconsciously stored in the brain?