Reasons and Causes

[shunyadragon]

What I was asking was whether or not reasons and rationality are subject to the laws of causality, minus indeterminacy. It's related to the free will question. If the reasons that motivate my actions are all the effects of prior physical events, and if they become causes, like extremely complex billiard ball causation, then what sense does free will make? Even if you allow for indeterminacy of various kinds, that still doesn't allow for free will which would have to include purposeful action done for reasons but that are not necessitated by the past.

The determinist nature of our physical existence is not mechanistic and simple as billiard balls, because firs, the outcome of all cause and effect relationships are fractal in a complex world. This complicates the the world of the human mind, which though subject the deterministic series of cause and effect, because of the complexity we most often make choices in a limited range of possibilities. The degree of our choices being deterministic is at present unknown. I believe it is known that the range of possibilities is limited in any cause and effect choice.

It is unlikely that the deterministic reason of the chain of cause and effect are reasons for making our choice 'completely' necessitated by the past

[Jim B.]

The determinist nature of our physical existence is not mechanistic and simple as billiard balls, because firs, the outcome of all cause and effect relationships are fractal in a complex world. This complicates the the world of the human mind, which though subject the deterministic series of cause and effect, because of the complexity we most often make choices in a limited range of possibilities. The degree of our choices being deterministic is at present unknown. I believe it is known that the range of possibilities is limited in any cause and effect choice.

It is unlikely that the deterministic reason of the chain of cause and effect are reasons for making our choice 'completely' necessitated by the past

I know. I was saying something different. I was saying that metaphysical free will would require that my action be done for the purposes and reasons I think I'm doing it for AND that the action not be necessitated by the past.

[Teallaura]

I know. I was saying something different. I was saying that metaphysical free will would require that my action be done for the purposes and reasons I think I'm doing it for AND that the action not be necessitated by the past.

I wish some of the old crew were still around - I'm still having trouble working out your framework. That's not a criticism - it just means I'm unfamiliar with it and I can think of at least three of the guys that used to hang around here that could tackle it with no problem.


Still thinking...



One question - why the caveat about the action not being necessitated by the past? I'm unclear why that should be included.

[Jim B.]

Well, we kind of got on a slightly different but related topic, the free will topic. If I do something, say raise my left index finger, and if it's necessitated by the past, by all the states in my brain and nervous system leading up to it, then it was determined. I couldn't have done otherwise than raise my left index finger.

[Teallaura]

Well, we kind of got on a slightly different but related topic, the free will topic. If I do something, say raise my left index finger, and if it's necessitated by the past, by all the states in my brain and nervous system leading up to it, then it was determined. I couldn't have done otherwise than raise my left index finger.

So your using necessitated such that a person cannot do something contrary to their best interests?

[shunyadragon]

I know. I was saying something different. I was saying that metaphysical free will would require that my action be done for the purposes and reasons I think I'm doing it for AND that the action not be necessitated by the past.

well, I believe the cause and effect decision making metaphysical free will would still apply as I described. All cause and effect choices have purposes and reasons from the individual perspective, and cultural foundation. It is a fact that by far the majority of people make their decisions based in the framework for the purposes and reasons of what they traditionally believe handed down by their ancestors. Are exceptions with conversions and paradigm shifts, but I believe there is an element of free will and determinism in this process whether natural or metaphysical. Human nature id if course human nature regardless

[Jim B.]

So your using necessitated such that a person cannot do something contrary to their best interests?

No, the idea is determinism, that a person can't do something contrary to what the past determines that they do.

[Jim B.]

well, I believe the cause and effect decision making metaphysical free will would still apply as I described. All cause and effect choices have purposes and reasons from the individual perspective, and cultural foundation. It is a fact that by far the majority of people make their decisions based in the framework for the purposes and reasons of what they traditionally believe handed down by their ancestors. Are exceptions with conversions and paradigm shifts, but I believe there is an element of free will and determinism in this process whether natural or metaphysical. Human nature id if course human nature regardless

The question is whether indeterminacies at the micro-level can scale up to affect macro-level events like humans actions. It's more likely that all the countless indeterminate events at the micro-level cancel themselves out at the macro-level so that there is still probably macro-level determinism...but I'm not sure.

[shunyadragon]

No, the idea is determinism, that a person can't do something contrary to what the past determines that they do.

This is not correct, and incomplete. There are different views of determinism. Various types of compatibilism allow for a range of choice outcomes from a range of possible choices that are limited by determinism.

It is the fractal nature, and complexity of the human brain and mind concerning cause and effect outcomes that makes a rigid mechanistic determinism realistic. The degree of possible free will choices would arise from the deterministic nature of our physical existence, but the deterministic view would allow a range of possible choices.

[shunyadragon]

The question is whether indeterminacies at the micro-level can scale up to affect macro-level events like humans actions. It's more likely that all the countless indeterminate events at the micro-level cancel themselves out at the macro-level so that there is still probably macro-level determinism...but I'm not sure.

Indeterminism at the micro level (Quantum Mechanics) has no known effect on the determinism at the macro level. Indeterminism at the Quantum level actually follows a predictable pattern.

[Teallaura]

No, the idea is determinism, that a person can't do something contrary to what the past determines that they do.

Okay, I get it.

[Anomaly]

What I was asking was whether or not reasons and rationality are subject to the laws of causality, minus indeterminacy. It's related to the free will question. If the reasons that motivate my actions are all the effects of prior physical events, and if they become causes, like extremely complex billiard ball causation, then what sense does free will make? Even if you allow for indeterminacy of various kinds, that still doesn't allow for free will which would have to include purposeful action done for reasons but that are not necessitated by the past.

descriptive (factual) and prescriptiveprescriptivethe power of making free choices unconstrained by external agencies

[37818]

Are reasons the same as causes? Let's say the door to my bedroom closes because I don't want to wake up my wife. Let's say the door to my bedroom closes because the wind blows it shut. Are they really the same thing? Physics can study the second case but can it study the first? Reductionists might say that ultimately both scenarios reduce to the same kind of explanation, even though the first explanation is much more complex and sophisticated and involves neuro-chemistry, but can it ultimately be explained in the same way? I tend to say "No" but I'm eager to hear the other side.

They can be about the very same thing.
Who? Person.
What? Thing.
When? Time.
Where? Place.
How? Cause.
Why? Reason.

[shunyadragon]

Are reasons the same as causes? Let's say the door to my bedroom closes because I don't want to wake up my wife. Let's say the door to my bedroom closes because the wind blows it shut. Are they really the same thing? Physics can study the second case but can it study the first? Reductionists might say that ultimately both scenarios reduce to the same kind of explanation, even though the first explanation is much more complex and sophisticated and involves neuro-chemistry, but can it ultimately be explained in the same way? I tend to say "No" but I'm eager to hear the other side.

Yes, reductionists can explains both, but they are not necessarily the same(?) kind of reason (?) for a cause and effect event. There is an interwoven series of cause and effect outcomes that cannot be easily separated. Both scenarios involve a more complex series of cause and effect outcomes than you present simplistically.

[Jim B.]

Yes, reductionists can explains both, but they are not necessarily the same(?) kind of reason (?) for a cause and effect event. There is an interwoven series of cause and effect outcomes that cannot be easily separated. Both scenarios involve a more complex series of cause and effect outcomes than you present simplistically.

Okay. I'm waiting for a non-simplistic explanation in your own words (not copied and pasted).