Originally posted by Jim B.
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Cogito ergo sum
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!
Forum Rules: Here
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostNo, you don't need metaphysics to do the things you cite, because those things only require a methodological commitment. The problem is that you are making a metaphysical commitment when you say that you are a physicalist and that physicalism requires no arguments to justify it.
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Once again, scientific method is warranted by methodological naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is not required for instrumental, methodological success. A metaphysical thesis requires a metaphysical argument for its justification.
We have gone over the issue concerning mental events many times. I can conclude only two things:
You are either intellectually incapable or ideologically unwilling to grasp the point I've made again and again. And to be clear: I am not asking you to agree with my point; only to make some indication that you have comprehended it, which you have, up to now, made no indication of.
With that, I leave this thread to you.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostOnce again, scientific method is warranted by methodological naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is not required for instrumental, methodological success. A metaphysical thesis requires a metaphysical argument for its justification.
We have gone over the issue concerning mental events many times. I can conclude only two things:
You are either intellectually incapable or ideologically unwilling to grasp the point I've made again and again. And to be clear: I am not asking you to agree with my point; only to make some indication that you have comprehended it, which you have, up to now, made no indication of.
With that, I leave this thread to you.
I believe in God, and I believe the nature of consciousness, and human 'thought and intellect' and the chains causes and reasons can be understood through science and neuro chemistry with out any alternative explanation'Last edited by shunyadragon; 06-03-2020, 05:42 PM.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostOnce again, scientific method is warranted by methodological naturalism. Metaphysical naturalism is not required for instrumental, methodological success. A metaphysical thesis requires a metaphysical argument for its justification.
I am not asking you to agree with my point; only to make some indication that you have comprehended it,
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Originally posted by Tassman View PostWeve already been through this: In response to the charge that methodological naturalism in science logically requires the a priori adoption of a naturalistic metaphysics, I examine the question whether methodological naturalism entails philosophical (ontological or metaphysical) naturalism. I conclude that the relationship between methodological and philosophical naturalism, while not one of logical entailment, is the only reasonable metaphysical conclusion
https://infidels.org/library/modern/...aturalism.html
This is from a Wikipedia article on Naturalism:
According to Stephen Jay Gould, "You cannot go to a rocky outcrop and observe either the constancy of nature's laws or the working of unknown processes. It works the other way around. You first assume these propositions and "then you go to the outcrop of rock."[10][11] "The assumption of spatial and temporal invariance of natural laws is by no means unique to geology since it amounts to a warrant for inductive inference which, as Bacon showed nearly four hundred years ago, is the basic mode of reasoning in empirical science. Without assuming this spatial and temporal invariance, we have no basis for extrapolating from the known to the unknown and, therefore, no way of reaching general conclusions from a finite number of observations. (Since the assumption is itself vindicated by induction, it can in no way "prove" the validity of inductionan endeavor virtually abandoned after Hume demonstrated its futility two centuries ago)."[12] Gould also notes that natural processes such as Lyell's "uniformity of process" are an assumption: "As such, it is another a priori assumption shared by all scientists and not a statement about the empirical world."[13] Such assumptions across time and space are needed for scientists to extrapolate into the unobservable past, according to G.G. Simpson: "Uniformity is an unprovable postulate justified, or indeed required, on two grounds. First, nothing in our incomplete but extensive knowledge of history disagrees with it. Second, only with this postulate is a rational interpretation of history possible, and we are justified in seekingas scientists we must seeksuch a rational interpretation."[14] and according to R. Hooykaas: "The principle of uniformity is not a law, not a rule established after comparison of facts, but a principle, preceding the observation of facts ... It is the logical principle of parsimony of causes and of economy of scientific notions. By explaining past changes by analogy with present phenomena, a limit is set to conjecture, for there is only one way in which two things are equal, but there are an infinity of ways in which they could be supposed different."[15]
We have ALL comprehended it - as was stated above. Your problem is that whilst scientific methodology has the ability to empirically examine its predictions and arrive at objective conclusions, metaphysical solutions do not have that ability. They merely have competing academic arguments with which to make their case.
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Originally posted by Jim B. View PostRecall that you said that it requires no philosophical argument?
This is from a Wikipedia article on Naturalism:
You have it fixed in your head that this is a matter of two competing empirical hypotheses, yours, which is science-based, and mine which is mired in medieval superstition.
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Originally posted by seer View PostWhat are you talking about? You can not logically justify the idea that the future will look like the past.
You can only deal with probability.
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Donal Davidson started this and it's dependent on his anomolous monism. Reasons are final causes, not efficient causes. Davidson illicitly reified belief-desire states and called them reasons; the states can be subsumed under a law of nature, but their description (which is anomolous) can't be. Anscombe and C.S. Lewis are right here. Reasons aren't causes. They can't be. Unless you're a compatibilist, which I think is highly implausible.Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne
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Originally posted by Teallaura View PostOkay, I get it.
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Originally posted by shunyadragon View PostWhat Jim B posted is a false notion of what determinism in science means. IT is not rigid mechanical determinism, and does not completely negate limited Free Will as in compatabilism. It is not a Mechanistic Neutonian Determinism. The universe is not a 'mechanical clock.'
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Originally posted by JimL View PostThen in what sense is it determinism?
[cite-https://www.google.com/search?q=determinism+definition&oq=Determinism&aqs =chrome.1.0l8.10953j1j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8]
the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions. [/cite]
I prefer Karl Poppers view of determinism:
There are other views of Determinism which are described here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/Last edited by shunyadragon; 08-29-2020, 03:57 PM.
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Popper wasn't a determinist.Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne
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Originally posted by mattbballman31 View PostPopper wasn't a determinist.
Theory and reality
Popper, in the following, describes the relationship between a theory and the reality the theory is supposed to explain. In particular, not all properties of the theory, however successful, should be taken as a property of the world. I think that, however, it is not unreasonable to accept such inference, by default and until it is proven incorrect, as long as we do not claim this inference absolutely true.
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