Is God Designed?

[JimL]

God is pure actuality, He is existence. Asking what he's made of makes about as much sense as asking how many bricks you need in the number 2.

Sure Leonard, but as i'm sure you know, that's just philosophical gobbledegook.

[JimL]

That is not an assumption, all classical theistic arguments argue by logical demonstration that God exists.

That god exists isn't exactly what's at issue here, Leonard. The issue is whether the eternal need have a "reason" for its being.

[Juvenal]

Always good to see you're still writing, Nick, even if I don't have time to read you regularly.

I think you might want to reconsider the "plunge into" hook in the introduction. At the very least it needs a refresh, and conceivably, doesn't need to be continued at all. Or save it for posts that aren't directly linked to the name of your blog.

This is why atheists "make this argument": to defeat the argument from design.

The premise that a "who" made us, and the deployment of that premise in design arguments from tradents of creator gods, is why the design argument attracts interest among atheists. We don't need to know who made your god to know your god needs a creator. That's a direct consequence of the premise.

Or two creators. There's no bar to creation by committee, and indeed, the biblical elohim was such a committee before evolving over time and across cultures into your singular god.

The argument from complexity is more particular to the Intelligent Design community, and attracts further issues. We have endless examples of complex things that were not designed, from tidal ripples in the sand to, well, us. We don't say complex things need designers, you do. And in doing so, you create a premise to be examined.

If complex things need designers, then either a creator god is more complex than us, and hence needs a creator of its own, or it is less complex than us, and hence not capable of creating us by design. In either case, the intelligent design argument fails.

Once we've established that complex things don't need designers, the design argument has been defeated. For us, there's no further point in speaking of the complexity of any god. For you, it's time to move on to other arguments.

At some point, your immaterial hence simple creator has to make changes to the material world, or cease making claims to being our creator. Or we can accept that, like angels, such a god exists only as an idea, and like any other idea, acts principally on creation by motivating the thoughts of less simple beings who can think for themselves.

You'll have noted that I've referred to you when speaking of positions you do not personally hold.

Being an atheist means understanding the nature of many gods, including both the simple god of the Christian philosopher and the less simple god of the next Paley argument. By their properties, they are distinguishable as different gods. What ecumenism disguises among fellow tradents is endlessly displayed for us each time a tradent, such as yourself, insists that the god posited by one of your fellows is not your god.

Who made God?

While it's not attractive to tradents, there's a reasonably simple answer to that question. You did. And I did. All of us who have engaged on the topic of the numinous and the eternal have together created your gods. And having created them, philosophically, we have no need for further arguments.

God is an idea.

Ideas exist.

[Apologiaphoenix]

Always good to see you're still writing, Nick, even if I don't have time to read you regularly.

I think you might want to reconsider the "plunge into" hook in the introduction. At the very least it needs a refresh, and conceivably, doesn't need to be continued at all. Or save it for posts that aren't directly linked to the name of your blog.



This is why atheists "make this argument": to defeat the argument from design.

The premise that a "who" made us, and the deployment of that premise in design arguments from tradents of creator gods, is why the design argument attracts interest among atheists. We don't need to know who made your god to know your god needs a creator. That's a direct consequence of the premise.

Or two creators. There's no bar to creation by committee, and indeed, the biblical elohim was such a committee before evolving over time and across cultures into your singular god.

The argument from complexity is more particular to the Intelligent Design community, and attracts further issues. We have endless examples of complex things that were not designed, from tidal ripples in the sand to, well, us. We don't say complex things need designers, you do. And in doing so, you create a premise to be examined.

If complex things need designers, then either a creator god is more complex than us, and hence needs a creator of its own, or it is less complex than us, and hence not capable of creating us by design. In either case, the intelligent design argument fails.



Once we've established that complex things don't need designers, the design argument has been defeated. For us, there's no further point in speaking of the complexity of any god. For you, it's time to move on to other arguments.



At some point, your immaterial hence simple creator has to make changes to the material world, or cease making claims to being our creator. Or we can accept that, like angels, such a god exists only as an idea, and like any other idea, acts principally on creation by motivating the thoughts of less simple beings who can think for themselves.



You'll have noted that I've referred to you when speaking of positions you do not personally hold.

Being an atheist means understanding the nature of many gods, including both the simple god of the Christian philosopher and the less simple god of the next Paley argument. By their properties, they are distinguishable as different gods. What ecumenism disguises among fellow tradents is endlessly displayed for us each time a tradent, such as yourself, insists that the god posited by one of your fellows is not your god.

Who made God?

While it's not attractive to tradents, there's a reasonably simple answer to that question. You did. And I did. All of us who have engaged on the topic of the numinous and the eternal have together created your gods. And having created them, philosophically, we have no need for further arguments.

God is an idea.

Ideas exist.

I know you know I don't make the argument so you can shoot a thousand holes through ID and I won't really care a bit. I think some things in science do lead me to theism, but it can never establish it nor can it ever disestablish it.

I don't get what you're saying about a simple being at some point has to interact with the world. It's a vague statement because in my thinking, God is eternally interacting with the world. He is not moving on the timeline.

I am also not sure if Paley would disagree with divine simplicity. I haven't looked at that. I don't think the watchmaker argument is necessarily the same as the ID argument however.

We can all agree some complex things don't require creators, but the universe doesn't seem to be just some complex thing. The human brain doesn't just seem to be some complex thing. That doesn't mean ID is true. I'm fine with God using processes we would call materialistic to make such things.

[Juvenal]

I know you know I don't make the argument so you can shoot a thousand holes through ID and I won't really care a bit. I think some things in science do lead me to theism, but it can never establish it nor can it ever disestablish it.

While nothing defeats solipsism, assuming what we see has a real existence outside of ourselves, there are any number of theisms that can be defeated by science. There are, for instance, the gods of the young earthers and the gods of the biblical creationists, the former of which cannot exist because the earth is billions of years old and the latter of which cannot exist because species did not originate altogether at any one time.

I don't get what you're saying about a simple being at some point has to interact with the world. It's a vague statement because in my thinking, God is eternally interacting with the world. He is not moving on the timeline.

The eternal nature of your god is not at issue. It is its creative nature that's problematic. That is, the requirement that it interact in the material world. There's a Y-chromosome that needs to be accounted for in Jesus' conception. To create a fish, or make water into wine, or to reanimate a human, in our world, requires physical forces acting on physical materials, at which point divine simplicity becomes untenable. At that point, a creator god needs physical "hands," and can no longer be thought of as philosophically simple.

I am also not sure if Paley would disagree with divine simplicity. I haven't looked at that. I don't think the watchmaker argument is necessarily the same as the ID argument however.

Paley's example was memorable, but his philosophy was less so. ID is his watchmaker's second or at most third generation descendant.

We can all agree some complex things don't require creators, but the universe doesn't seem to be just some complex thing. The human brain doesn't just seem to be some complex thing. That doesn't mean ID is true. I'm fine with God using processes we would call materialistic to make such things.

Between brains and universes, there is a vast divide, enough to question the wisdom of arguments for your god from a mere resurrection. The universe is some fifty orders of magnitude larger than a typical human. An ant can move a grain of sand, but it can't sculpt a beach, let alone create it ex nihilo.

We have far more information about the origins of the human brain because its forebears were abundant enough to leave a fossil record. Certainly it's complex, but no more so than can be accounted for by the standard processes of evolution.

We have one universe, and in that universe, in the thoughts and writings of our species, we have abundant examples of gods, almost all of which we'd both agree do not exist, except as ideas.

[Jim B.]

Yes, but the so called ontological requirements of this concept we call god are just that, requirements of a concept we call god. The concept is just a concept. But nothing that exists eternally has anything to do with the fact that it exists, that it exists would just be a brute fact and so would it's reason, if indeed it has a reason for being, be a brute fact. No?

But, at any rate, why should we assume that the eternal has a reason for being anyway?

Necessity is the opposite of bruteness. To say that something has to be is the opposite of saying that it just happens to be.

Mortimer Adler made the following argument:

The cosmos as a whole, even if it's eternal, would be radically contingent because if it ceased to be, it would be entirely annihilated, not just transformed into another cosmos, whereas individual entities are superficially contingent, because if they cease to be, they're just transformed into something else. No individual entity is totally annihilated.

If this is so, the cause needed to sustain the cosmos in existence would act to prevent it from being reduced to nothingness. It would require an exnihilating cause that preserves the cosmos in its being and from being reduced to pure nothingness. This would require an agency acting from outside the physical universe. Radical contingency needs a supernatural cause to sustain it in its existence.

To say that a cosmos is radically contingent is to say that its ceasing to be would not be its transmutation into something else but its replacement by absolutely nothing. Only the abysmal power of being (the power of being over against nothingness) could exert this preservative force. Only a supernatural cause could prevent total annihilation.

[Jim B.]

That god exists isn't exactly what's at issue here, Leonard. The issue is whether the eternal need have a "reason" for its being.

It's not whether the eternal "need" have a reason for its being, but which hypothesis is more compelling in light of everything else we know?

[JimL]

Necessity is the opposite of bruteness. To say that something has to be is the opposite of saying that it just happens to be.

Not sure how that distinction can be made. You can say the same about any eternally existing thing or substance, i.e. that because it is eternal, it has to be.

Mortimer Adler made the following argument:

The cosmos as a whole, even if it's eternal, would be radically contingent because if it ceased to be, it would be entirely annihilated, not just transformed into another cosmos, whereas individual entities are superficially contingent, because if they cease to be, they're just transformed into something else. No individual entity is totally annihilated.

Not sure I quite follow that. If a god ceased to be it would be entirely annihilated, No? Besides that, how do we determine what is and what is not an individual entity?

If this is so, the cause needed to sustain the cosmos in existence would act to prevent it from being reduced to nothingness. It would require an exnihilating cause that preserves the cosmos in its being and from being reduced to pure nothingness.This would require an agency acting from outside the physical universe. Radical contingency needs a supernatural cause to sustain it in its existence.

Personally I don't believe that the substance of anything that exists becomes non-existent, ceases to be, though the forms that it takes do as you say, transform. I think it was Spinoza who said that finite things are temporal with respect to themselves but eternal with respect to their cause.

To say that a cosmos is radically contingent is to say that its ceasing to be would not be its transmutation into something else but its replacement by absolutely nothing. Only the abysmal power of being (the power of being over against nothingness) could exert this preservative force. Only a supernatural cause could prevent total annihilation.

Well as above, I don't think that something that has existence can become non-existent, nor that the non-existent can become existent.

I somewhat comprehend the argument you make though, I think I need to mull it over for awhile.

[Apologiaphoenix]

While nothing defeats solipsism, assuming what we see has a real existence outside of ourselves, there are any number of theisms that can be defeated by science. There are, for instance, the gods of the young earthers and the gods of the biblical creationists, the former of which cannot exist because the earth is billions of years old and the latter of which cannot exist because species did not originate altogether at any one time.

Sure, but as someone who sticks to classical theism as is, that cannot be defeated by science. Certain theisms might be defeated that can fall under that rubric, but not classical theism itself.

The eternal nature of your god is not at issue. It is its creative nature that's problematic. That is, the requirement that it interact in the material world. There's a Y-chromosome that needs to be accounted for in Jesus' conception. To create a fish, or make water into wine, or to reanimate a human, in our world, requires physical forces acting on physical materials, at which point divine simplicity becomes untenable. At that point, a creator god needs physical "hands," and can no longer be thought of as philosophically simple.

Because?

Paley's example was memorable, but his philosophy was less so. ID is his watchmaker's second or at most third generation descendant.

Still doesn't say what he'd say about simplicity.

Between brains and universes, there is a vast divide, enough to question the wisdom of arguments for your god from a mere resurrection. The universe is some fifty orders of magnitude larger than a typical human. An ant can move a grain of sand, but it can't sculpt a beach, let alone create it ex nihilo.

We have far more information about the origins of the human brain because its forebears were abundant enough to leave a fossil record. Certainly it's complex, but no more so than can be accounted for by the standard processes of evolution.

We have one universe, and in that universe, in the thoughts and writings of our species, we have abundant examples of gods, almost all of which we'd both agree do not exist, except as ideas.

I would hardly call the resurrection mere, and I would say many gods are just ideas. That's why many of them have died out. I also have no problem with evolution. I don't officially say yea or nay because I have never sat down to really study the science and since we all have our own interests, I have no interest in doing so.

[Leonhard]

Sure Leonard, but as i'm sure you know, that's just philosophical gobbledegook.

No, it is not "philosophical gobbledegook", now JimL stop trying to win an argument by trying to offend the one you're arguing against. You've tried that recipe here for the past several years to no success.

Honestly why don't you just learn from the arguement. If you don't understand a phrase, why not investigate its meaning?

The issue is whether the eternal need have a "reason" for its being.

In that cause it depends. I can imagine eternal things that requires reasons for existing, and those that don't.

God doesn't for instance.

[Jim B.]

Not sure how that distinction can be made. You can say the same about any eternally existing thing or substance, i.e. that because it is eternal, it has to be.

We're not talking about how the distinction can be made. That's confusing how we come to know something (epistemology) with what something is (metaphysics or ontology).

Not sure I quite follow that. If a god ceased to be it would be entirely annihilated, No? Besides that, how do we determine what is and what is not an individual entity?

I would think the god would be resolved into its constituent parts, whether ideational, cultural, or absorbed into some spiritual aether or greater godhead, etc. It could never be as if the god had never been. An individual entity I would think is an individual substance, a bearer of predicates.

Personally I don't believe that the substance of anything that exists becomes non-existent, ceases to be, though the forms that it takes do as you say, transform. I think it was Spinoza who said that finite things are temporal with respect to themselves but eternal with respect to their cause.

What Adler is saying is that if everything that exists, ie the universe, ceased to exist, then it would "be" replaced by nothingness. I put quotes around "be" because of the necessary limits of language.

Well as above, I don't think that something that has existence can become non-existent, nor that the non-existent can become existent.

It depends on what you mean. Now that I think about it, I disagree with Adler if you define entities in an emergent or holistic way.

[Juvenal]

Sure, but as someone who sticks to classical theism as is, that cannot be defeated by science. Certain theisms might be defeated that can fall under that rubric, but not classical theism itself.

The explanatory regime of the scientific revolution has methodically whittled away the ambit of classical theism. If it's not defeated by science, it's because it fails to engage, leaving the ever-widening sphere of human knowledge to secularism. Classical theism cannot tell us where, or when, or how we became a species that worships gods across the millions of years since we shared a common ancestor with our nearest cousins. It can't speak of the supernova that gave birth to the elements that make up our solar system or the isotopes that point at its explosion five billion years ago.

Classical theism is unsatisfying.

Because?

Because making changes in the real world requires parts.

Still doesn't say what he'd say about simplicity.

No one cares what Paley thought about divine simplicity.

I would hardly call the resurrection mere, and I would say many gods are just ideas. That's why many of them have died out. I also have no problem with evolution. I don't officially say yea or nay because I have never sat down to really study the science and since we all have our own interests, I have no interest in doing so.

Fifty orders of magnitude say that a resurrected human is properly described as mere in comparison to the creation of the universe.

Moreover, evolution is by no means something that requires deep study. It's enough to note that if we inherit traits that make reproduction more successful, those traits will become more prevalent. That's evolution. Everything else is details.

As it turns out, those traits are inherited in our DNA, and DNA is subject to sufficient diversification to encompass all life on Earth. Some of the diversification on our branch is exceptionally apparent. The fusion region on our second chromosome separates homologues present in chimp chromosomes 2A and 2B, explaining why we have 23 chromosomes to their 24 like the rest of the great apes.

Those are interesting details, secularly acquired, leaving classical theism, again, unsatisfying. At best, we're looking at an organizing principle that, in comparison, doesn't organize much.

[JimL]

No, it is not "philosophical gobbledegook", now JimL stop trying to win an argument by trying to offend the one you're arguing against. You've tried that recipe here for the past several years to no success.

Pure actuality simply means perfection, so all you're doing is defining god as perfect existence, which doesn't really say anything about god other than he's perfect. It does't explain what you mean by pure actuality . In and of itself, defining god as pure actuality is philosophical gobbledygook. It says nothing. In other words it amounts to a circular argument. Perfection= pure actuality - pure actuality= perfection. What?

Honestly why don't you just learn from the arguement. If you don't understand a phrase, why not investigate its meaning?

Well perhaps you can better explain it to me. I'd appreciate it.

In that cause it depends. I can imagine eternal things that requires reasons for existing, and those that don't.

God doesn't for instance.

I think what Jim meant by that was that, with respect to an eternal God, as opposed to say an eternal universe, the reason for its being, is inherent. I think that would be true of any eternally existing thing, be it god or universe. Perhaps I misunderstood what he meant.

[JimL]

We're not talking about how the distinction can be made. That's confusing how we come to know something (epistemology) with what something is (metaphysics or ontology).

Well regardless of what the thing is, whether a god or a universe, if it's eternal, it has to be. Hope I'm not getting lost in the discussion here.

I would think the god would be resolved into its constituent parts, whether ideational, cultural, or absorbed into some spiritual aether or greater godhead, etc. It could never be as if the god had never been. An individual entity I would think is an individual substance, a bearer of predicates.

I believe the philosophical notion of god is that of an entity not made up of parts, but what you describe is how i think about the universe, its form can change but its substance could never be as if it had never been. That is what I meant when previously I quoted Spinoza. The finite forms are temporal with respect to themselves, but eternal with respect to their cause. Though he believed in god, I could never understand Spinoza's conception of god. He seemed to equate god with the universe.

What Adler is saying is that if everything that exists, ie the universe, ceased to exist, then it would "be" replaced by nothingness. I put quotes around "be" because of the necessary limits of language.

Sure, that I think is just common sense, but I think god would be any different in that respect. I just don't believe that anything that does exists, ceases to exist, excepting the forms that it takes of course.

It depends on what you mean. Now that I think about it, I disagree with Adler if you define entities in an emergent or holistic way.

What I mean is that just like ex nihilo nihil fit, "nothing can come from nothing" I believe that nothing(ness) can not come from something.

[Apologiaphoenix]

The explanatory regime of the scientific revolution has methodically whittled away the ambit of classical theism. If it's not defeated by science, it's because it fails to engage, leaving the ever-widening sphere of human knowledge to secularism. Classical theism cannot tell us where, or when, or how we became a species that worships gods across the millions of years since we shared a common ancestor with our nearest cousins. It can't speak of the supernova that gave birth to the elements that make up our solar system or the isotopes that point at its explosion five billion years ago.

Classical theism is unsatisfying.

So classical theism, which is meant to tell us about metaphysics and theism, is a problem because it doesn't tell us about areas that it was never meant to tell us about but falls to other bodies of knowledge.....

That makes sense.

Because making changes in the real world requires parts.

That's a nice assertion. Do you have a reason why I should believe it?

No one cares what Paley thought about divine simplicity.

You brought up Paley. Not me.

Fifty orders of magnitude say that a resurrected human is properly described as mere in comparison to the creation of the universe.

Perhaps if you take the universe for granted. I don't. If I also see the nature of who this man was and how He rose again as very different, then yeah, it's a big deal.

Moreover, evolution is by no means something that requires deep study. It's enough to note that if we inherit traits that make reproduction more successful, those traits will become more prevalent. That's evolution. Everything else is details.

As it turns out, those traits are inherited in our DNA, and DNA is subject to sufficient diversification to encompass all life on Earth. Some of the diversification on our branch is exceptionally apparent. The fusion region on our second chromosome separates homologues present in chimp chromosomes 2A and 2B, explaining why we have 23 chromosomes to their 24 like the rest of the great apes.

Those are interesting details, secularly acquired, leaving classical theism, again, unsatisfying. At best, we're looking at an organizing principle that, in comparison, doesn't organize much.

So once again, classical theism doesn't do what it was never meant to do and therefore is falling short?