Announcement

Collapse

Philosophy 201 Guidelines

Cogito ergo sum

Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!

Forum Rules: Here
See more
See less

When does proving one's truth claims come to an end?

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
    So you dismiss all of moral realism as irrational?
    Irrational? No, just lacking.

    I know that suffering is bad for me but I'm not an animal. I can abstract to the fact that suffering itself is a bad thing. I can view myself and properties like suffering independent of my fears and desires. Anyone viewing the world objectively has reason to stop it. We don't just formulate fears and desires like rats, but formulate reasons so they can be viewed objectively, independent of the desires we actually have, which enables us to say what others have reasons to do and what we would have reasons to do if our desires were different. This is what sets us apart from dogs and rats.

    If I'm severely burned, there's a reason for me to be given morphine independent of the fact that the pain is mine - namely that such burn pain itself is dreadful.

    That pleasures are impersonally good and dreadful pains are impersonally bad are statement s that you'd have to have strong reasons to doubt.
    Jim I'm not saying that pain is necessarily good. I certainly believe that pain hurts, that is an is. That however does not mean that I ought not cause pain to others especially if I gain, in some form, by their pain. You are taking a physical event and importing a moral ought. And I don't see how to bridge that gap apart from assertion.

    You're assuming once again that God IS the good, which is the point we're debating. If the statement 'God is the Good' isn't intelligible, then there is good reason to think it isn't so, as that article indicated that I posted a link to and that you never bothered to read.
    I read all your posts, but the bottom line is if God is not the source of good then He must be judged by our standards. Standards that are not in the least clear and are often relative. In other words, how do we know this standard we seek to judge God by is actually good? Without begging the question?
    Last edited by seer; 02-06-2020, 08:25 AM.
    Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

    Comment


    • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
      If God does not arbitrarily call something good, then the good must be based upon something logically independent of God's nature. If God is His own standard, then you're expressing a tautology, ie something to the effect of "God is as God is." There would be no way to independently evaluate the meaning of the expression "God is the Good."
      First Jim, you agreed that God's moral nature was immutable, so He could not arbitrarily call something good. And that does not need an independent standard. Second, when we say that God is good, good is not identical to God, it is simply a moral characteristic, one attribute. So it is not tautology.
      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

      Comment


      • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
        If God does not arbitrarily call something good, then the good must be based upon something logically independent of God's nature. If God is His own standard, then you're expressing a tautology, ie something to the effect of "God is as God is." There would be no way to independently evaluate the meaning of the expression "God is the Good."
        This objection doesn't hold at all. If God's nature is immutable and unchanging then it clearly follows that any morality/standard of morality based upon the nature of God is fixed and consistent. Your insistence on it being a tautology isn't nearly as big of a problem as you're making it out to be either. We have no way to independently evaluating the expression "The color red is the experience of redness" either, instead we have to experience "redness" in order to understand the expression. In the same way, if the good is grounded in God's nature the way we are able to meaningfully understand that expression is by experiencing God's nature, either directly or indirectly, through His words and actions.

        In short, you're making a mountain out of a molehill.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by seer View Post
          Jim I'm not saying that pain is necessarily good. I certainly believe that pain hurts, that is an is. That however does not mean that I ought not cause pain to others especially if I gain, in some form, by their pain. You are taking a physical event and importing a moral ought. And I don't see how to bridge that gap apart from assertion.
          I don't think you're following my point. First off, pain isn't a 'physical event.' It's a 'mental event.' But I'm referring to 'the badness of pain' which is 'an evaluative event.' When I experience dreadful pain, I think to myself, "I ought to stop this pain." So there is an ought already that I am applying to my pain. I don't have to import it. It's already there. All that we're haggling over now is the scope of the conditional to the 'ought.' The scope is my pain. "If I want to avoid my pain, I ought not to place my hand on this hot stove." The scope of the conditional consists of things that immediately impact my senses and ability to feel pain.

          My point is that when we think about goodness and badness, pains and pleasures and so forth, we can abstract these properties from the fact that they are happening immediately to ME or to YOU. They become generalized. They can happen to anyone, even to an animal. We can see the world from no particular point of view from within the world, such as mine or yours, but from a more or less objective point of view. When we do this, the scope of the 'ought' generalizes to any subject that can feel dreadful pain or suffering, or whatever the case might be. Morality arises when we can understand and formulate principles that are generalizable at this sort of level of abstraction.



          I read all your posts, but the bottom line is if God is not the source of good then He must be judged by our standards. Standards that are not in the least clear and are often relative. In other words, how do we know this standard we seek to judge God by is actually good? Without begging the question?
          That's the 'pathetic fallacy' again. That's like saying that if God isn't the source of math, then He must be judged by OUR standards of math. That's a false dichotomy. To say that moral standards are relative descriptively is not to say that they are relative normatively. Why do you assume that the good or mathematical truths have to be authored by subjects of any kind? Maybe "the Good" isn't a proper noun at all naming a discrete entity, but a functional noun?

          We would have to know this standard we seek to judge God by is actually good because when we use language, we have to be able to fix the meanings of the words we use. Otherwise, why not say "God is fxbgisidr?" Of course, there's the apophatic approach which speaks of God only in terms of what He is not, but you're not doing that. You're making positive assertions about Him and His nature.
          Last edited by Jim B.; 02-07-2020, 03:22 PM.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
            This objection doesn't hold at all. If God's nature is immutable and unchanging then it clearly follows that any morality/standard of morality based upon the nature of God is fixed and consistent. Your insistence on it being a tautology isn't nearly as big of a problem as you're making it out to be either. We have no way to independently evaluating the expression "The color red is the experience of redness" either, instead we have to experience "redness" in order to understand the expression. In the same way, if the good is grounded in God's nature the way we are able to meaningfully understand that expression is by experiencing God's nature, either directly or indirectly, through His words and actions.

            In short, you're making a mountain out of a molehill.
            The fact that God in his essence is immutable and the fact that the moral law is immutable don't indicate any necessary dependence between them. Why should it? It could just as likely be that God is like an immutable mirror reflecting the immutable sun of morality. Immutability alone isn't decisive.

            You make a good point about experience. You're right that some things can only be known through experience and not discursively. But if we experience God's goodness, don't we experience things like His mercy, compassion, His love? We wouldn't tend to experience this undifferentiated featureless quality known as "Goodness." But if things like His love make up His goodness, then that means there are qualities that are logically prior to His goodness that contribute to it.

            Comment


            • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
              It's not "begging the question". My argument is that there is “no good reason to think that our knowledge about the natural world, including subjective experiences, cannot ultimately be explained via scientific methodology”. How is metaphysics a viable alternative - especially given that empirical science always overturns metaphysical concepts when they conflict.
              I'm not making a "metaphysical argument." I'm saying there ARE good reasons to think that our knowledge of the natural world, including subjective experiences, cannot be explained via scientific methodology. I'm blocking you're positive assertion. I'm not making a positive assertion of my own.



              There’s no “confusion”. Science and metaphysics are not mutually exclusive. The latter informs the former in many areas. This includes the notion of ‘metaphysical naturalism’ whereby that there is nothing but natural elements, principles, and relations of the kind studied by the natural sciences.
              I'm saying that physicalism and naturalism do not apply to conscious experiences.



              Does metaphysics have “a concept for the quale of "red" or of "now" or the smell of coffee”? Science is already making advances in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness and subjective experiences of all kinds including the perception of color and the function of the frontal lobe in awareness.
              The conscious experience itself drops out of any physical description, no matter how exhaustive the set of correlates. There isn't even a theoretical framework in place to begin to understand how something physical can also be something experiential. The macro upon micro dependence relation that applies elsewhere in the sciences doesn't apply here. The nature of the dependence relation itself no one even has a clue about. It's a conceptual, not an empirical problem.



              And how exactly does metaphysics deal with “the seemings” in a way that neuroscience cannot – at least potentially?
              I'm not making a metaphysical argument. You seem to be. You tell me how seemings fit into a strictly physicalist picture.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                The fact that God in his essence is immutable and the fact that the moral law is immutable don't indicate any necessary dependence between them. Why should it? It could just as likely be that God is like an immutable mirror reflecting the immutable sun of morality. Immutability alone isn't decisive.
                Your point was that in order for God's calling something good not being arbitrary, the reason it is good must be logically independent of God's nature. I showed how this is not true being that God's nature is immutable. Your assertion is defeated regardless of whether I can show a necessary dependence or not, the mere hypothetical/theoretical possibility is already enough to sink this particular part of your argument.

                But if we're going to start talking about necessary dependence I would argue that it's far more parsimonious for a Christian to believe that morality is grounded in God's nature rather than God's moral character being a reflection of a platonic standard outside of Himself. The only thing it seems to me to do is add needless complexity to your worldview without explaining any aspect of moral reality better than the alternative.

                Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                You make a good point about experience. You're right that some things can only be known through experience and not discursively. But if we experience God's goodness, don't we experience things like His mercy, compassion, His love? We wouldn't tend to experience this undifferentiated featureless quality known as "Goodness." But if things like His love make up His goodness, then that means there are qualities that are logically prior to His goodness that contribute to it.
                But they're not logically prior to, or independent of, God Himself. God's nature isn't good because he is loving, merciful and compassionate, love, mercy and compassion are goods because they are part of God's nature. And because God's nature is immutable and unchanging it follows that what is good is also immutable and unchanging, and not arbitrary.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                  I'm not making a "metaphysical argument." I'm saying there ARE good reasons to think that our knowledge of the natural world, including subjective experiences, cannot be explained via scientific methodology. I'm blocking you're positive assertion. I'm not making a positive assertion of my own.
                  Well you are making a “positive assertion”. Namely that “that our knowledge of the natural world, including subjective experiences, cannot be explained via scientific methodology”. By ruling out “scientific methodology” what are you left with if not a metaphysical argument?

                  I'm saying that physicalism and naturalism do not apply to conscious experiences.
                  Neuroscience and fMRI are used to determine objective brain activity and consciousness and to identify correlations between consciousness and the physical world. Hence, whilst the science is still in its infancy, there is no reason to suppose that "physicalism and naturalism" cannot apply to conscious experiences.

                  The conscious experience itself drops out of any physical description, no matter how exhaustive the set of correlates. There isn't even a theoretical framework in place to begin to understand how something physical can also be something experiential. The macro upon micro dependence relation that applies elsewhere in the sciences doesn't apply here. The nature of the dependence relation itself no one even has a clue about. It's a conceptual, not an empirical problem.
                  Not necessarily so. See above.

                  I'm not making a metaphysical argument. You seem to be. You tell me how seemings fit into a strictly physicalist picture.
                  If you are not making a “metaphysical argument” and you’re not accepting a “strictly physicalist picture” what are you arguing for?
                  “He felt that his whole life was a kind of dream and he sometimes wondered whose it was and whether they were enjoying it.” - Douglas Adams.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                    I don't think you're following my point. First off, pain isn't a 'physical event.' It's a 'mental event.' But I'm referring to 'the badness of pain' which is 'an evaluative event.' When I experience dreadful pain, I think to myself, "I ought to stop this pain." So there is an ought already that I am applying to my pain. I don't have to import it. It's already there. All that we're haggling over now is the scope of the conditional to the 'ought.' The scope is my pain. "If I want to avoid my pain, I ought not to place my hand on this hot stove." The scope of the conditional consists of things that immediately impact my senses and ability to feel pain.

                    My point is that when we think about goodness and badness, pains and pleasures and so forth, we can abstract these properties from the fact that they are happening immediately to ME or to YOU. They become generalized. They can happen to anyone, even to an animal. We can see the world from no particular point of view from within the world, such as mine or yours, but from a more or less objective point of view. When we do this, the scope of the 'ought' generalizes to any subject that can feel dreadful pain or suffering, or whatever the case might be. Morality arises when we can understand and formulate principles that are generalizable at this sort of level of abstraction.
                    First yes, even animals seek to avoid pain - no ought involved. Second, the ought I was speaking of was about applying it to others. I experience pain therefore it would be immoral for me to cause others pain, buy why - especially if their pain causes me gain or pleasure. In other words why is their avoidance of pain a greater moral good than my pleasure or gain? No abstraction or generalization can bridge that leap. It always comes back to opinion.
                    Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                      Your point was that in order for God's calling something good not being arbitrary, the reason it is good must be logically independent of God's nature. I showed how this is not true being that God's nature is immutable. Your assertion is defeated regardless of whether I can show a necessary dependence or not, the mere hypothetical/theoretical possibility is already enough to sink this particular part of your argument.
                      God's immutability has nothing to do with my argument. It has to do with the nature of properties like goodness. There's no reason that God can't be immutably good and that His goodness be logically dependent on good-making features. God necessarily and immutably is, and He necessarily and immutably is good, but that doesn't necessarily entail that He is identical to the good. God is necessarily and immutably free but is He freedom itself? I'm not even sure what that means.



                      But if we're going to start talking about necessary dependence I would argue that it's far more parsimonious for a Christian to believe that morality is grounded in God's nature rather than God's moral character being a reflection of a platonic standard outside of Himself. The only thing it seems to me to do is add needless complexity to your worldview without explaining any aspect of moral reality better than the alternative.
                      I would argue that making the statement 'God is the Good' into a strict identity statement and then having to become some sort of Divine Command Theorist actually complicates the situation even more, because then there would be no good connection between reasons and the wrongness of clearly wrong actions. It makes the nature of the good less easy to understand, in which God's goodness is good simply because He is God, than the alternative in which there are clearly and self-evidently reasons for goodness and rightness.



                      But they're not logically prior to, or independent of, God Himself. God's nature isn't good because he is loving, merciful and compassionate, love, mercy and compassion are goods because they are part of God's nature. And because God's nature is immutable and unchanging it follows that what is good is also immutable and unchanging, and not arbitrary.
                      But God's goodness isn't intelligible then. Why call it good? Why not call it some other arbitrary word? It would be simply what God immutably is. You're positing two separate immutable things: God's nature and what is good. It's not evident simply from the fact of their immutability what the relation between them is. You have to argue for why you think one is prior to the other.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by Tassman View Post
                        Well you are making a “positive assertion”. Namely that “that our knowledge of the natural world, including subjective experiences, cannot be explained via scientific methodology”. By ruling out “scientific methodology” what are you left with if not a metaphysical argument?
                        I'm blocking an account form the current physicalist paradigm. If what is understood as 'physical' changes sufficiently to account for conscious experiences, then my argument would change. Current physical concepts can't account for consciousness, IMO.



                        Neuroscience and fMRI are used to determine objective brain activity and consciousness and to identify correlations between consciousness and the physical world. Hence, whilst the science is still in its infancy, there is no reason to suppose that "physicalism and naturalism" cannot apply to conscious experiences.
                        It's a different ontology. Science deals with third-person ontology. Consciousness is essentially rooted in first-person ontology.







                        If you are not making a “metaphysical argument” and you’re not accepting a “strictly physicalist picture” what are you arguing for?
                        The essential incompleteness of physicalism.

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by seer View Post
                          First yes, even animals seek to avoid pain - no ought involved. Second, the ought I was speaking of was about applying it to others. I experience pain therefore it would be immoral for me to cause others pain, buy why - especially if their pain causes me gain or pleasure. In other words why is their avoidance of pain a greater moral good than my pleasure or gain? No abstraction or generalization can bridge that leap. It always comes back to opinion.
                          There's no ought involved with animals because animals aren't rational; they're not moral agents. The same holds true with infants. They're moral patients, that is, they are morally considerable beings who aren't agents, ie aren't morally responsible themselves. So it's wrong to torture an infant or animal even though they lack moral responsibilities themselves.

                          I thought I already answered your second question. It's not opinion that we can view the world from no particular point of view from within it. If that is 'opinion,' then all of science, math and logic are opinion as well. I am one person among many and even though my needs are most important to me subjectively and instinctively, they ought not be in terms of the truth that what I need and feel are just particular instances of universal realities, and that dreadful pain is not bad because I myself happen to feel it but because such pain itself is a bad thing. I can revert to self-centered care taking most of the time and it has no moral repercussions, but when a moral dilemma arises, I can align myself with the truth or with falsehood.

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                            God's immutability has nothing to do with my argument. It has to do with the nature of properties like goodness. There's no reason that God can't be immutably good and that His goodness be logically dependent on good-making features. God necessarily and immutably is, and He necessarily and immutably is good, but that doesn't necessarily entail that He is identical to the good. God is necessarily and immutably free but is He freedom itself? I'm not even sure what that means.
                            Well, you already gave a reason in this very paragraph for why God cannot be immutably good and that His goodness be logically dependent on good-making features external to Himself. If God is necessarily and immutably free then it follows that His actions and nature cannot be bound factors outside of Himself, because freedom implies being unbound by external factors. If there is a standard of goodness outside of God then it means God's moral actions and nature is bound by a factor beside Himself, in which case you either have to posit that the reason for God's goodness is found in His own nature, or that God is not necessarily and immutably free.

                            But even without that problem there's the problem of no problem of moral imperative (which I'm going to repeat further down since it has bearing on multiple parts of the discussion.) Even if an external standard of morality independent of God existed there would exist no reason or obligation for God to conform to this external standard at all. And the reason for why God's nature mirrored this standard would be similarly inexplicable. This standard that you posit to exist would be, for lack of a better phrase, imperatively impotent.


                            Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                            I would argue that making the statement 'God is the Good' into a strict identity statement and then having to become some sort of Divine Command Theorist actually complicates the situation even more, because then there would be no good connection between reasons and the wrongness of clearly wrong actions. It makes the nature of the good less easy to understand, in which God's goodness is good simply because He is God, than the alternative in which there are clearly and self-evidently reasons for goodness and rightness.
                            Well, it's not a strict identity statement. It's a shorthand for "That which is good stems from God's nature". And the connection between reasons and the wrongness of clearly wrong actions are pretty clear to me. As humans we are created in God's image, which means that we are to reflect, as mirrors, God's moral nature. All thoughts, behaviors and actions that lead us closer to mirroring God's moral perfection are properly called morally good, and all thoughts, behaviors and actions that lead us further away from mirroring God's moral perfection are properly called morally bad, or evil.

                            With regards to your comment about God's goodness is good simply because He is God, you could also put it this way: That which is good is good because it's a part of God's nature, or derived from God's nature. But to be perfectly honest I fail to see the problematic nature of the statement.

                            I also fail to see why a moral standard outside of God gives you "clear and self-evident reasons for goodness and rightness". In fact, I would argue that the very fact that you're here arguing about it is clear indication that it's not "clear and self-evident" at all. Not only that, but a platonic idea such as an external standard of morality is utterly incapable of imposing the slightest moral imperative of any sort what so ever. Even if there existed such an external standard (and there are no good reasons to think there are) nobody would have the slightest obligation to conform themselves according to that standard.


                            Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                            But God's goodness isn't intelligible then. Why call it good? Why not call it some other arbitrary word? It would be simply what God immutably is. You're positing two separate immutable things: God's nature and what is good. It's not evident simply from the fact of their immutability what the relation between them is. You have to argue for why you think one is prior to the other.
                            1. Goodness as a separate platonic entity apart from a personal subject or consciousness, or as separate from the relation or interaction between two personal entities makes no sense what so ever. Goodness is never found as a feature or quality in interactions between two non-personal entities, or between a personal entity and a non-personal entity. Goodness is always found in interactions between two or more personal entities. To posit that something which by it's very nature is personal and relational in nature finds it's ultimate source in some non-personal platonic standard of morality which is incapable of standing in a personal relationship with other subjects is something I'm not willing to do unless someone gives me a very convincing reason why. You simply will not find the source for something personal/relational in the impersonal.

                            2. Goodness is immutable not because of any quality it has by itself, but because it's derived from God's immutable nature. If that which is good is necessarily and immutably good then it is so for no other reason than because God's nature is necessarily and immutably that which it is. There are no possible worlds in which God's nature could have been different from His nature in the actual world, and there is no possibility of God's nature ever changing into something different than the nature He has from eternity and will continue to have for an eternity into the future. And so it follows that that which is good will always be good not for any reason intrinsic to itself, but solely for the reason that goodness is derived from the necessary and immutable nature of God.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                              I'm saying that physicalism and naturalism do not apply to conscious experiences.
                              You are making a metaphysical argument here that is a claim of arguing from ignorance in that apparently claiming science at present cannot explain conscious experiences, which to a large extent is simply not true. Science can to a degree explain conscious experiences.




                              The conscious experience itself drops out of any physical description, no matter how exhaustive the set of correlates. There isn't even a theoretical framework in place to begin to understand how something physical can also be something experiential. The macro upon micro dependence relation that applies elsewhere in the sciences doesn't apply here. The nature of the dependence relation itself no one even has a clue about. It's a conceptual, not an empirical problem.
                              Arguing from ignorance for what you claim is not known does not support a metaphysical conclusion.
                              Last edited by shunyadragon; 02-09-2020, 06:42 PM.
                              Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                              Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                              But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                              go with the flow the river knows . . .

                              Frank

                              I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                                I'm blocking an account form the current physicalist paradigm. If what is understood as 'physical' changes sufficiently to account for conscious experiences, then my argument would change. Current physical concepts can't account for consciousness, IMO.

                                It's a different ontology. Science deals with third-person ontology. Consciousness is essentially rooted in first-person ontology.

                                The essential incompleteness of physicalism.
                                Again I will assert you are making a metaphysical argument from ignorance. I will make some references that science does know a great deal about consciousness without first-person ontology.

                                First and foremost science is learning a great deal through brain scans showing a one to one to relationship from brain activity to emotions, thoughts and actions. Second, consciousness is pretty much universal with mammals, and they're finding in most if not all animals with complex brains and nervous systems. Third, we have no other hypothesis for any other source of consciousness than natural evolved brains and nervous systems.
                                Last edited by shunyadragon; 02-09-2020, 07:42 PM.
                                Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                                Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                                But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                                go with the flow the river knows . . .

                                Frank

                                I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                                Comment

                                Related Threads

                                Collapse

                                Topics Statistics Last Post
                                Started by shunyadragon, 03-01-2024, 09:40 AM
                                160 responses
                                508 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post JimL
                                by JimL
                                 
                                Started by seer, 02-15-2024, 11:24 AM
                                88 responses
                                354 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post shunyadragon  
                                Started by Diogenes, 01-22-2024, 07:37 PM
                                21 responses
                                133 views
                                0 likes
                                Last Post shunyadragon  
                                Working...
                                X