When does proving one's truth claims come to an end?

[Jim B.]

Decisive? Like what?!?!?!

That's already been addressed more than once on here. Is this the thread you were banned from?!

[shunyadragon]

That's already been addressed more than once on here. Is this the thread you were banned from?!

Actually no this is not seer's thread. I do not believe I am banned from this thread.

No. I do not believe you have determined anything whatsoever as decisive in this case. Your truth calims come to end before anything decisive

[shunyadragon]

That's already been addressed more than once on here.

I reviewed the thread, and found the opening proposal problematic. Also I found several 'circular arguments' proposed in the first several pages of the thread.

When does proving one's truth claims come to an end?

Suppose you make a truth claim and someone else asks you to prove it. If you prove it, he can ask you to give a proof for that proof. When does proving one's truth claims come to an end? Are there any beliefs that do not have to be proven?

The more logical conclusion of the skeptic here is to reject the premises of the argument therefore reject the argument. and not to ask for another proof for that proof, which in and of itself is isillogical. The route would be to request an arguement. that has premises that the skeptic would accept. The conclusions of subjective logical arguments are not decisive.' because they are not generally accepted outside those that accept the premises.

Logical argumentsare dependent on the premises being accepted for the logical argument to be accepted. Only those that accept the premises of the argument would believe that the arguments conclusions are 'decisive' and generally accepted because they are consistently predictable.

Unless of course . . .

The logical argument with premises that is a hypothesis with objective verifiable evidence would then be falsifiable and therefore the conclusion would be 'descisive.' Example: Einstein's Theory of Relativity is almost universally accepted, because over time th eobjective verifiable evidence and the predicability of the evidence over time repeated confirmed the theory and the conclusion is 'decisive.'

[Jim B.]

The more logical conclusion of the skeptic here is to reject the premises of the argument therefore reject the argument. and not to ask for another proof for that proof, which in and of itself is isillogical. The route would be to request an arguement. that has premises that the skeptic would accept. The conclusions of subjective logical arguments are not decisive.' because they are not generally accepted outside those that accept the premises.

Logical argumentsare dependent on the premises being accepted for the logical argument to be accepted. Only those that accept the premises of the argument would believe that the arguments conclusions are 'decisive' and generally accepted because they are consistently predictable.

Unless of course . . .

The logical argument with premises that is a hypothesis with objective verifiable evidence would then be falsifiable and therefore the conclusion would be 'descisive.' Example: Einstein's Theory of Relativity is almost universally accepted, because over time th eobjective verifiable evidence and the predicability of the evidence over time repeated confirmed the theory and the conclusion is 'decisive.'

Your assumption that scientific "objective" knowledge is the only 'decisive' knowledge is itself the result of circular reasoning. To accept Einstein's Theory of Relativity as 'decisive' we first have to accept the objective validity of our sense impressions, and that assumption can only be based upon their internal (logical) consistency, since there is no way to get outside of our sense impressions to check their validity against a greater reality. Indeed, all of human thought is based on logical axioms and assumptions of consistency and coherence, even the assumptions and arguments upon which empiricism are based.

Einstein himself wrote in his Ideas and Opinions, p. 307:

There is no inductive method which could lead to the fundamental concepts of physics. Failure to understand this fact constituted the basic philosophical error of so many investigators of the nineteenth century.

Several times Einstein referred to Hume's attack on induction, showing that

concepts which we must regard as essential, such as, for example, causal connection, cannot be gained from material given to us by the senses.

(Ibid, 307)

[Tassman]

Your assumption that scientific "objective" knowledge is the only 'decisive' knowledge is itself the result of circular reasoning.

No, it is "decisive" because the objective verifiable evidence and the predictability of the evidence over time has repeatedly confirmed the theory and the conclusion. This is sufficiently “decisive” to make further predictions which in turn can be repeatedly confirmed and result in scientific advancement.

Conversely, a purely ‘Logical Argument’ is dependent on the premises being shown to be true and generally accepted for it to be considered a sound, valid argument.

[shunyadragon]

No, it is "decisive" because the objective verifiable evidence and the predictability of the evidence over time has repeatedly confirmed the theory and the conclusion. This is sufficiently “decisive” to make further predictions which in turn can be repeatedly confirmed and result in scientific advancement.

Conversely, a purely ‘Logical Argument’ is dependent on the premises being shown to be true and generally accepted for it to be considered a sound, valid argument.

Even then when it is a valid argument the acceptance of being 'decisive' is only by those who accept the premises and conclusion of the argument.

[shunyadragon]

Your assumption that scientific "objective" knowledge is the only 'decisive' knowledge is itself the result of circular reasoning. To accept Einstein's Theory of Relativity as 'decisive' we first have to accept the objective validity of our sense impressions, and that assumption can only be based upon their internal (logical) consistency, since there is no way to get outside of our sense impressions to check their validity against a greater reality. Indeed, all of human thought is based on logical axioms and assumptions of consistency and coherence, even the assumptions and arguments upon which empiricism are based.

Einstein himself wrote in his Ideas and Opinions, p. 307:


Several times Einstein referred to Hume's attack on induction, showing that
(Ibid, 307)

You still have failed to present anything from the philosophical/theological logical arguments that would be considered 'decisive' beyond those that accept the premises and the argument as sound.

Acknowledgement of Einstein concerning Hume's attack on induction, does not change anything. Kant responded to Hume's argument, and it does not change anything. Both are philosophical arguments concerning induction. So what?!?!?!?!

Acutally I prefer Popper's works that lead to our current standard for induction in science and Methodological Naturalism. The ability to make and confirm predictions is an important issue that scientific methodology that the logic of philosophy/theology fails to provide. To provide grounds for predictability and convincing acceptance is lacking in logical arguments based on subjective assumptions.

Still waiting . . .

[Jim B.]

You still have failed to present anything from the philosophical/theological logical arguments that would be considered 'decisive' beyond those that accept the premises and the argument as sound.

Acknowledgement of Einstein concerning Hume's attack on induction, does not change anything. Kant responded to Hume's argument, and it does not change anything. Both are philosophical arguments concerning induction. So what?!?!?!?!

Acutally I prefer Popper's works that lead to our current standard for induction in science and Methodological Naturalism. The ability to make and confirm predictions is an important issue that scientific methodology that the logic of philosophy/theology fails to provide. To provide grounds for predictability and convincing acceptance is lacking in logical arguments based on subjective assumptions.

Still waiting . . .

What you both continually fail to realize is that your position, i.e. that only scientific conclusions can constitute 'decisive' knowledge, aka "scientism", is a philosophical, specifically an epistemological, argument. As a philosophical, epistemological argument, it is not and cannot be a 'scientific' or empirical finding. So it fails to meet its own criterion of knowledge. It makes a claim which is literally incoherent.

It is further made incoherent by the fact that science is dependent on assumptions which cannot be scientifically verified, such as the assumption that there is a sense-independent world that corresponds to our senses, the past-future thesis (induction), that the mind is reliable and can make sense of the world, and so forth.

All you have left is predictability, but all that this yields is the reliability of a certain method in revealing regularities in aspects of the natural world, not in the universal nature of knowledge itself. There is no scientific warrant for such a leap from the reliability of a certain method to a sweeping generalization about the nature of all knowledge, especially when the quantificational method clearly leaves out much of reality. If I wore infrared night-vision goggles and they helped me to see certain aspects of the environment more clearly, that doesn't justify my assuming that this is the only way to see the 'true' environment. Russell talked about this type of naive, uncritical science-worship as being like the drunk who has lost his car keys but insists in looking for them only under the streetlamp. Bertrand Russell wrote about how physics can only refer to abstractions, but that there are clearly concrete realities to which the abstractions point but which they can never fully capture. Physics, he wrote, can refer to these realities quantitatively but not qualitatively, therefore it is constitutionally limited as to what aspects of reality it can encompass.

At most one is justified in methodological naturalism, not metaphysical naturalism; but making a metaphysics out of one's method, of absolutizing one's method, is what such scientific expansionism would entail.

You misunderstood the quotes from Einstein. He was warning against this kind of ideology. He was saying that science is grounded in concepts and principles that cannot be scientifically or empirically verified.

You write that logical arguments cannot be accepted beyond those who accept the premises and argument as sound. But I'm referring to logical consistency itself which is assumed every time you or I or anyone engages in rational discourse. Your posts on here implicitly assume the canons of rational discourse which are grounded in logical laws. science itself is likewise grounded and would be impossible without such a grounding.

[shunyadragon]

What you both continually fail to realize is that your position, i.e. that only scientific conclusions can constitute 'decisive' knowledge, aka "scientism", is a philosophical, specifically an epistemological, argument. As a philosophical, epistemological argument, it is not and cannot be a 'scientific' or empirical finding. So it fails to meet its own criterion of knowledge. It makes a claim which is literally incoherent.

It is further made incoherent by the fact that science is dependent on assumptions which cannot be scientifically verified, such as the assumption that there is a sense-independent world that corresponds to our senses, the past-future thesis (induction), that the mind is reliable and can make sense of the world, and so forth.

All you have left is predictability, but all that this yields is the reliability of a certain method in revealing regularities in aspects of the natural world, not in the universal nature of knowledge itself. There is no scientific warrant for such a leap from the reliability of a certain method to a sweeping generalization about the nature of all knowledge, especially when the quantificational method clearly leaves out much of reality. If I wore infrared night-vision goggles and they helped me to see certain aspects of the environment more clearly, that doesn't justify my assuming that this is the only way to see the 'true' environment. Russell talked about this type of naive, uncritical science-worship as being like the drunk who has lost his car keys but insists in looking for them only under the streetlamp. Bertrand Russell wrote about how physics can only refer to abstractions, but that there are clearly concrete realities to which the abstractions point but which they can never fully capture. Physics, he wrote, can refer to these realities quantitatively but not qualitatively, therefore it is constitutionally limited as to what aspects of reality it can encompass.

At most one is justified in methodological naturalism, not metaphysical naturalism; but making a metaphysics out of one's method, of absolutizing one's method, is what such scientific expansionism would entail.

You misunderstood the quotes from Einstein. He was warning against this kind of ideology. He was saying that science is grounded in concepts and principles that cannot be scientifically or empirically verified.

You write that logical arguments cannot be accepted beyond those who accept the premises and argument as sound. But I'm referring to logical consistency itself which is assumed every time you or I or anyone engages in rational discourse. Your posts on here implicitly assume the canons of rational discourse which are grounded in logical laws. science itself is likewise grounded and would be impossible without such a grounding.

Very very wordy of no account. You still have not provided anything that would be 'decisive' as you claim.

Still waiting . . .

[Tassman]

What you both continually fail to realize is that your position, i.e. that only scientific conclusions can constitute 'decisive' knowledge, aka "scientism", is a philosophical, specifically an epistemological, argument. As a philosophical, epistemological argument, it is not and cannot be a 'scientific' or empirical finding. So it fails to meet its own criterion of knowledge. It makes a claim which is literally incoherent.

It is further made incoherent by the fact that science is dependent on assumptions which cannot be scientifically verified, such as the assumption that there is a sense-independent world that corresponds to our senses, the past-future thesis (induction), that the mind is reliable and can make sense of the world, and so forth.

All you have left is predictability, but all that this yields is the reliability of a certain method in revealing regularities in aspects of the natural world, not in the universal nature of knowledge itself. There is no scientific warrant for such a leap from the reliability of a certain method to a sweeping generalization about the nature of all knowledge, especially when the quantificational method clearly leaves out much of reality. If I wore infrared night-vision goggles and they helped me to see certain aspects of the environment more clearly, that doesn't justify my assuming that this is the only way to see the 'true' environment. Russell talked about this type of naive, uncritical science-worship as being like the drunk who has lost his car keys but insists in looking for them only under the streetlamp. Bertrand Russell wrote about how physics can only refer to abstractions, but that there are clearly concrete realities to which the abstractions point but which they can never fully capture. Physics, he wrote, can refer to these realities quantitatively but not qualitatively, therefore it is constitutionally limited as to what aspects of reality it can encompass.

At most one is justified in methodological naturalism, not metaphysical naturalism; but making a metaphysics out of one's method, of absolutizing one's method, is what such scientific expansionism would entail.

You misunderstood the quotes from Einstein. He was warning against this kind of ideology. He was saying that science is grounded in concepts and principles that cannot be scientifically or empirically verified.

You write that logical arguments cannot be accepted beyond those who accept the premises and argument as sound. But I'm referring to logical consistency itself which is assumed every time you or I or anyone engages in rational discourse. Your posts on here implicitly assume the canons of rational discourse which are grounded in logical laws. science itself is likewise grounded and would be impossible without such a grounding.

Yet, despite your convoluted wordiness, scientific arguments DO produce verifiable decisive conclusions, whereas philosophical arguments do not – they remain purely academic. Scientific arguments are decisive in that their objective verifiable evidence and predictability over time has repeatedly confirmed its theories and the conclusions. Science may not be able to prove that the accepted natural laws and constants of the universe are true, but it productively functions on the basis that they are true. And it has transformed the world as a consequence. This includes the very computer you are using to make your argument against the "decisive conclusions of science". Computers are one of the more decisive advances in scientific technology.

[Jim B.]

Very very wordy of no account. You still have not provided anything that would be 'decisive' as you claim.

Still waiting . . .

You're still waiting because you're confused, as usual. Anything I cite as a decisive claim from philosophy, such as the refutations of logical behaviorism, logical positivism, and type identity theory, or even the common sense conclusions that not all paintings cannot be forgeries or that I am conscious, or ethical statements such as torturing small children for fun is morally wrong, you would circularly and pre-emptively dismiss because they do not (surprise!) fit your already decided upon criterion for knowledge. That criterion, as I've stated numerous times, is not itself empirically verifiable, so by your own standards, does not qualify as truly reliable knowledge. So we can hereby dismiss it!

And if I say that I am conscious or that torturing small kids for fun is wrong, those statements cannot be 'falsifiable' in Popper's sense. And if you come back by saying that they are only 'subjective', this will only once again betray your confusion between the different meanings of the word 'subjective'. The statement "I am conscious" is subjective ontologically but not epistemically, ie it does not depend upon anyone's personal opinions or attitudes.

How about responding to the rest of my last post? If you can, that is?

[Tassman]

That criterion, as I've stated numerous times, is not itself empirically verifiable, so by your own standards, does not qualify as truly reliable knowledge. So we can hereby dismiss it!

[/U][/I]And if I say that I am conscious or that torturing small kids for fun is wrong, those statements cannot be 'falsifiable' in Popper's sense. And if you come back by saying that they are only 'subjective', this will only once again betray your confusion between the different meanings of the word 'subjective'. The statement "I am conscious" is subjective ontologically but not epistemically, ie it does not depend upon anyone's personal opinions or attitudes.

Was it “wrong” for Mayan priests to sacrifice children to petition the gods for rain and fertile fields? Was it “wrong” for Dominican priests to torture heretics for the good of their souls in earlier times? Or to kill witches in Salem?

This is reliable knowledge according to the subjective moral standards of the culture of the day. But you are erroneously conflating decisive, falsifiable empirical knowledge with subjective, changeable moral standards. The latter are simply how humans behave under particular circumstances at specific periods of history, not decisive, objective knowledge.

[shunyadragon]

You're still waiting because you're confused, as usual. Anything I cite as a decisive claim from philosophy, such as the refutations of logical behaviorism, logical positivism, and type identity theory, or even the common sense conclusions that not all paintings cannot be forgeries or that I am conscious, or ethical statements such as torturing small children for fun is morally wrong, you would circularly and pre-emptively dismiss because they do not (surprise!) fit your already decided upon criterion for knowledge. That criterion, as I've stated numerous times, is not itself empirically verifiable, so by your own standards, does not qualify as truly reliable knowledge. So we can hereby dismiss it!

And if I say that I am conscious or that torturing small kids for fun is wrong, those statements cannot be 'falsifiable' in Popper's sense. And if you come back by saying that they are only 'subjective', this will only once again betray your confusion between the different meanings of the word 'subjective'. The statement "I am conscious" is subjective ontologically but not epistemically, ie it does not depend upon anyone's personal opinions or attitudes.

How about responding to the rest of my last post? If you can, that is?

Actually Tassman and I have responded to this many times, no problem.

Arguing from ignorance, subjective propositions and negative hypothesis cannot demonstrate anything decisive.

[Jim B.]

Was it “wrong” for Mayan priests to sacrifice children to petition the gods for rain and fertile fields? Was it “wrong” for Dominican priests to torture heretics for the good of their souls in earlier times? Or to kill witches in Salem?

Yes. Certain moral duties would supersede certain religious claims.

This is reliable knowledge according to the subjective moral standards of the culture of the day. But you are erroneously conflating decisive, falsifiable empirical knowledge with subjective, changeable moral standards. The latter are simply how humans behave under particular circumstances at specific periods of history, not decisive, objective knowledge.

You're begging the question again. Is that basically all you do on here? You're assuming the very point at issue, which is not rational. The rational approach is to attempt to make an argument which does not implicitly embed the conclusion in one of the premises.

I've gone to great lengths on other threads, such as the one with with Carpe Diem, to demonstrate why moral relativism is mistaken. And no knowledge is 'decisive' in the sense that it could not conceivably be overturned or radically re-contextualized by future paradigm shifts, including scientific knowledge.

It's curious why neither one of you will ever respond to my central point that your claim contradicts itself. You either don't understand it or you have no response.

[Jim B.]

Actually Tassman and I have responded to this many times, no problem.

Arguing from ignorance, subjective propositions and negative hypothesis cannot demonstrate anything decisive.

I must have missed it when either one of you responded to it in anything other than a "But gee, science works for x; therefore science must work for a through zed!" case of begging the question.

And no, this is not "Argument from Ignorance." Argument from ignorance is assuming that a proposition is true because it's not yet been proven false or false because it's not yet been proven true. I am giving positive reasons for why your position is self-contradictory and incoherent, reasons to which you never respond.