When does proving one's truth claims come to an end?

[Jim B.]

You're failing to make Chalmers' distinction of the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which is what Jim is talking about. Any physical property that can be measured is a 'third person' perspective. Experiencing redness subjectively is a first person experience. Third person measurements are great for certain things like learning how to block pain so surgeons can operate. But third person physical measurements run into a brick wall explanatorily when it gets down to the "what it's like to experience x".

I equate being and existence with information. All empiric information is valid, but that's not all the information there is. The experience of redness provides information to apprehension that leaves third party empiricism out in the cold. So the hardcore empiricists (atheists) have a workaround: Let's only include things that can be measured in our list of what is real. The theist prefers to include more information in his/her epistemic library than only measured information. So be it, but at least be aware that the argument that "only things that are measure are real" is a circular argument. You can ignore non-measured information in public arguments, but you are well aware subjectively of the large amount of qualia information you experience, whether you'll admit it or not shunya.

So much wasted time and energy directed at Shuny or Tassman. If it's not hard empirical data, it bounces off of their impermeable scientismic shield like bb's off of a brick wall.

[Jim B.]

“A certain type of reality” or a “conceptual” notion is meaningless without being empirically tested. It is merely an unsubstantiated belief system e.g. Aristotle’s notion of ‘celestial spheres. This too was a “certain type of reality”, but Aristotle’s conceptual notion of the universe was completely wrong. It took empirical science to understand the reality of a heliocentric solar system.

You seem to have absolutely no idea what I'm talking about. Aristotle's celestial spheres weren't a 'conceptual notion' of reality. For that, you would have to consult his "Metaphysics.' His celestial spheres was an empirical notion which happened to be wrong. Bigfoot is an empirical notion which is (likely) wrong, but the argument for irreducibility is conceptual, like the notion of what the concept of 'physical' entails. That cannot be empirical, because you already have to have some such concept, at least implicitly, in order to be able to conduct an empirical investigation.

No, your 'dual-aspect' theories and 'emergence theory' etc are no more than fanciful guesses on a par with AristotleÂ’s celestial spheres.

You're getting things confused. First of all, those theories are conceptual, not empirical, as I just mentioned. Secondly, they are theories about what the place of consciousness in the natural order might be. They have nothing to do with the argument for irreducibility.

The argument for irreducible complexity is wrong. Just because certain things in nature appear very complicated there is no good reason to assume that the “explanatory gap” will never be bridged.

I'm not sure what the 'argument for irreducible complexity' refers to. This has nothing to do with complexity. It has to do with the nature of the things themselves. To quote Kripke: "Everything is what it is and not something else."

Chalmers' "Hard Problem" states : How and why is the performance of any given function(s) associated with consciousness? No matter how complete the set of physical correlates in the brain and nervous system that neuro-science can identify, the question can still be asked, "Why do those states give rise to conscious experiences?" There is no conceivable theoretical framework using physical concepts that could close that explanatory gap. No other empirical gap in all of science exhibits this explanatory gap. How do you account for consciousness's uniqueness? This uniqueness and its challenge to conceivability strongly points to the need for a new theoretical framework, not more empirical data.

“Conscious states” would be the byproduct of “brain states” NOT the actual brain state itself

Then what ARE conscious states? Are they 'illusions' as you said earlier? Are you an eliminativist?

You do not have a substantive alternative other than wishful-thinking dressed up as an academic argument.

Unless you're challenging me for my alternative.

It is reasonable to assume that such a condition for consciousness would be an essential quality of a robot with “consciousness” – just as it is for all sentient biological life-forms such as us

You're not following the hypothetical. But it seems like you agree anyway that the first-person perspective IS the essential quality of consciousness.

[Jim B.]

Jim where does pain exist apart from a personal subjective experience? How is it a property? The color red would exist in nature even if there were no minds to experience it. How does that work with pain? And yes there could be societies that enslave or exploit the minority without breaking down into incoherence, so coherence or lack of can not be the standard. And moral values are helpful for human flourishing, but that would be just as true if relativism was the case.

I frankly don't see why this is so hard for you to see. 'Where' is pain? Pain is in the world, it's a general property shared by all sentient creatures that experience it, like vision, hearing, digestion, intelligence. Is consciousness a property? No, pain wouldn't exist if there were no minds, but why does that matter? A property does not have to be able to exist mind-independently in order to be a property. Why should it? Again, is consciousness a property? Is thought?

You didn't address my point that there IS at least one moral value for which the standard clearly is coherence, namely truth-telling. And if I can demonstrate that this value is the foundational value on which all the others depend, then my work is done. And I believe I've already done that above. There have been societies that enslave and exploit minorities, just as there are societies like the Mafia that thrive on murder and threats of murder, but those societies are internally unstable and eventually collapse from internal contradiction. Think of a society of thieves in which they were all cheating each other. How long would it last. Its longevity would be directly proportionate to how 'morally' the members treated each other!

My point was that humans have given needs. There's a given human nature, so there are severe constraints on what could count as 'moral' in the normative sense. It would have to fit with what the basic menu of human needs and aspirations. A dictator cannot just impose is own brutal capricious 'moral code' on his subjects. It wouldn't last very long.

We're bogged down here. Why don't we move on to the other stuff?

[Tassman]

You're failing to make Chalmers' distinction of the 'hard problem' of consciousness, which is what Jim is talking about. Any physical property that can be measured is a 'third person' perspective. Experiencing redness subjectively is a first person experience. Third person measurements are great for certain things like learning how to block pain so surgeons can operate. But third person physical measurements run into a brick wall explanatorily when it gets down to the "what it's like to experience x".

I equate being and existence with information. All empiric information is valid, but that's not all the information there is.

But it is the only information that can be tested and shown to be factual. The rest is subjective, i.e. based on personal opinion, religious beliefs, interpretation, emotions and judgment. It is not suitable for fact-gathering. For that you need objective information which is fact-based, measurable and observable. In short scientific methodology.

[Tassman]

You seem to have absolutely no idea what I'm talking about. Aristotle's celestial spheres weren't a 'conceptual notion' of reality. For that, you would have to consult his "Metaphysics.' His celestial spheres was an empirical notion which happened to be wrong. Bigfoot is an empirical notion which is (likely) wrong, but the argument for irreducibility is conceptual, like the notion of what the concept of 'physical' entails. That cannot be empirical, because you already have to have some such concept, at least implicitly, in order to be able to conduct an empirical investigation.

Indeed. Virtually every argument and conclusion Aristotle made about physical science was wrong, because he did not have access to modern scientific methodology and metaphysics was misused repeatedly in lieu thereof. Just as you are misusing it IMHO.

You're getting things confused. First of all, those theories are conceptual, not empirical, as I just mentioned. Secondly, they are theories about what the place of consciousness in the natural order might be.

The place of “consciousness”, like the place for intelligence or any other evolved quality is the same for all evolved phenomena, namely the enhanced survival of the species.

No other empirical gap in all of science exhibits this explanatory gap. How do you account for consciousness's uniqueness? This uniqueness and its challenge to conceivability strongly points to the need for a new theoretical framework, not more empirical data.

No, it does no such thing. One accounts for “consciousness's uniqueness”, the same way one accounts for all physical phenomena – via empirical research. Yes, it is a “hard problem”, to echo Chalmers, but hard problems have been resolved before - by science.

[JonathanL]

God is 'bound' by logic and the parameters of His own nature, but I would prefer to use the word 'defined,' because 'bound' implies force and coercion. God 'cannot' cease to be, become vicious or create a rock so heavy He cannot lift it. But these are not real limitations on His powers or His freedom. They are only logical limits, ie propositional limits. So I would say likewise that with morality it's a logical priority. It's only a conceptual distinction, not an actual one and no actual impediment to His freedom. God's nature has been actually indistinguishable from the morally good for eternity.

Well, I agree with you on the matter of God being bound/defined by logic, in the sense that any statement in which a description of an act that evaluates to literal/actual nonsense (such as the "create a rock so heavy He cannot lift it" phrase you mentioned above) is being presented is clearly something that God is incapable of, not because God creating a rock that is so heavy that He cannot lift it is beyond God's capability, but because the notion of "God creating a rock so heavy that He cannot lift it" is simply not coherent. It's simply not possible to parse such a statement into something meaningful.

So in that sense it makes sense to say that God's nature is "defined" by logic, in the sense that any description of God's nature that is even in the realm of possibility can only be constructed of statements that are meaningful (i.e devoid of internal contradictions) and when joined together do not contradict each other.

Morality however, doesn't seem to be prior to God's nature in the same way logic (which as I see it is in it's basest form simply the distinction between "meaningful" and "nonsensical" states of/statements about existence, or sets of statements about existence) is. It's impossible to me to speak coherently or meaningfully about God's nature in any way that is not logical, or in a way that is contrary to logic, but it does seem to me to be possible to speak about God's nature in a way that is completely devoid of moral language. It is perfectly possible to take any moral statement about God's nature and actions and rewrite them in such a way that they are stripped of any reference or inference to moral value judgements/propositions, and you're still left with a perfectly coherent description of God's nature and dealings with the universe. In short, it doesn't seem to me like moral values/statements/propositions define/bind/constrain (or whatever word you prefer) God's nature in even remotely the same sort of way that logic does.

I don't believe that God has any moral obligation at all, since He is morally perfect. "Ought" does not apply to Him, IMO. It only applies to finite, imperfect beings such as ourselves. God is in perfect alignment with what is good. As for why God mirrors this standard, God is perfection, which would entail moral perfection. Why is God perfection? The "Why's" have to end at some point. The only question is how satisfying is the end-point of the "why-asking process"? I could ask you why is God the good? That is also ultimately inexplicable. All either of us can offer is that God is necessary, and that we can derive goodness somehow from the fact of being or existence. But ultimately, I would submit you have no easier job in terms of the explicability of God's goodness than I do. You might, in fact, have a harder one.

I agree that God doesn't have any moral obligations, but not because He is morally perfect. A created being could theoretically be morally perfect, but still have moral obligations. God doesn't have any moral obligations because He Himself is the source of moral obligations. Humans have moral obligations not because we're finite imperfect beings, but because we are created by and stand in relation to God, and a core component of that relation is moral obligations. Regardless of whether we've attained moral perfection or not, these moral obligations still apply to us. Moral perfection would simply lead to us fulfilling our moral obligations willingly and without feelings of compulsion, but the obligations themselves do not disappear simply because our unwillingness to fulfill them disappears.

As to why God is perfect, I would posit that it is because God is the greatest conceivable Being, or greatest possible Being, and a perfect Being is greater than a being who is not perfect. And as to why what we call God's moral nature consists of the exact attributes that it does (i.e those attributes that make God act in a way that we call moral), I would simply say that it is because a Being who has those attributes is greater than a being who does not have them, or a being that only has them to a certain degree. I.e, God's moral nature is a consequence of Him being the greatest possible Being, and none of his moral attributes need to be explained by reference to a moral standard independent of God. In fact, if such a moral standard does exist (and to me such as standard seems unnecessary to explain any facet of reality), God's nature is perfectly explainable without any inference to such a standard.

Yes, I agree with everything you say about it being part of God's nature, but what I'm wondering is "Does it make sense to wonder WHY is it part of God's nature?" This goes to the discussion I'm having with seer now about the nature of pain.

It makes perfect sense to me to wonder why goodness is a part of God's nature, and I would posit that the answer lies in Perfect Being theology.

I'm not committed to a 'Platonic standard' of the Good. I'm not even sure if 'the good' is a proper noun at all. It may just be a functional noun for whatever is commendable, desirable or praiseworthy. Like saying "the Tall." What's good can only exist with the valuation of a personal entity, I agree. All values have to be realized by valuers. The same is true for numbers, I would argue. Numbers exist only potentially until a person or some personal entity realizes them. Values are synergistic entities, like colors. Values need valuers just as colors need beings with optical systems and the right physical conditions. But that doesn't mean the values or the colors are 'subjective' or just the product of invention. They're really there.

I would assert that moral values are relational in nature. That is, they do not have independent existence apart from the context of persons being in a state of relation with each other. And how exactly these moral values look like is determined by the attributes that determine how God (or rather, the three divine Persons) acts towards other personal beings and each other. God's attributes lead Him to act in ways that we denote as "kind", "just", "merciful", "generous" etc., and that is why being "kind", "just", "merciful", "generous etc. are morally good values. Becoming more moral, or (hopefully) attaining moral perfection is nothing other than conforming to the image of God, or the image of God in us, which was made imperfect in the Fall, being restored.

The Good doesn't have to exist apart as a separate Platonic standard. What is good doesn't have to be different in kind from what makes a triangle or the fact that God 'cannot' cease to exist. They might be logical, propositional limits only. God is still omnipotent even if He 'cannot' commit self-contradiction.

If God's goodness has to be logically prior to anything that could possibly make it good, then that goodness is a blank with no features at all. Here's an article I posted earlier that goes into that:

http://faculty.georgetown.edu/koonsj.../Euthyphro.pdf

As I wrote above, moral statements are different from statements about logic. Illogical statements are illogical because they run into the problem of incoherency/meaninglessness/nonsense. But saying e.g. "It is a moral good to be egoistical and consider your own well-being before anyone else's" doesn't run into any problems of coherency. It's perfectly clear to anyone who's not being intentionally obtuse what that statement is trying to say. If the above statement is false it is not because there's a logical limit that prevents it from being true, but because there's a metaphysical limit (and in order to clarify, by metaphysical limit I mean that it is not possible for the above statement to be true in the current, or actual world, as opposed to a logical limit, which would make it impossible to be true in any possible world) preventing it from being true.

[seer]

I frankly don't see why this is so hard for you to see. 'Where' is pain? Pain is in the world, it's a general property shared by all sentient creatures that experience it, like vision, hearing, digestion, intelligence. Is consciousness a property? No, pain wouldn't exist if there were no minds, but why does that matter? A property does not have to be able to exist mind-independently in order to be a property. Why should it? Again, is consciousness a property? Is thought?

Jim you were comparing pain to things like redness which is not mind dependent. No minds no property of pain.

You didn't address my point that there IS at least one moral value for which the standard clearly is coherence, namely truth-telling. And if I can demonstrate that this value is the foundational value on which all the others depend, then my work is done. And I believe I've already done that above. There have been societies that enslave and exploit minorities, just as there are societies like the Mafia that thrive on murder and threats of murder, but those societies are internally unstable and eventually collapse from internal contradiction. Think of a society of thieves in which they were all cheating each other. How long would it last. Its longevity would be directly proportionate to how 'morally' the members treated each other!

First Jim, even in our culture people lie, about all kinds of things, a lot. Second, incoherence does not equal immoral. Many things are incoherent with no moral question attached. And no Jim, many cultures with slavery thrived. And they necessarily did not fall because of slavery - like the Roman empire.

My point was that humans have given needs. There's a given human nature, so there are severe constraints on what could count as 'moral' in the normative sense. It would have to fit with what the basic menu of human needs and aspirations. A dictator cannot just impose is own brutal capricious 'moral code' on his subjects. It wouldn't last very long.

I generally agree Jim, but this would be just as true if moral relativism was true.

[Anomaly]

But it is the only information that can be tested and shown to be factual. The rest is subjective, i.e. based on personal opinion, religious beliefs, interpretation, emotions and judgment. It is not suitable for fact-gathering. For that you need objective information which is fact-based, measurable and observable. In short scientific methodology.

This is understood, the point is conceded. And by your comments you tacitly affirm that there is non-empiric information available to the intellect. I’ve come to understand that all theist-atheist arguments boil down eventually to this single issue.

You must also concede (if you’re honest) that subjective personal opinions, religious beliefs, interpretations and judgments—though they’re downplayed as secondary, elusive and as not having anything approaching the strength of empiric knowledge—are nonetheless at base unfalsifiable. (Emotions don’t belong in this group; it’s been recognized and held as common knowledge since the early Greeks that emotion often plays against reason and is [or should be considered] essentially a ‘tagalong’ feature of intellectual operation rather than a director of it for empiric and non-empiric thinkers alike.) The empiricist has always played non-empiric information as subordinate to the point of unimportance to provability, despite the truth that it’s actually untouchable in its primary [direct] state of testability. But seems almost everything offers degrees of testable evidence in what I call the secondary empiric sense (if there’s an actual term for this I’m unaware of it) arrived at logically, as for when historic evidence and consistency of prescriptive principles seem to authenticate Biblical norms. Point is, the degree of trust in empirical existence to answer all and every question the secular world has been falling captive to for many centuries is based on an unprovable foundation.

There have been (and are today) many thinkers throughout history considerably smarter than you, I or anyone else posting here who have decided that there are good and solid reasons, despite the downfalls of its lying outside empiric scrutiny (or even because of it), to invest in non-empiric information in confidence that there lies within its admitted mysteries items of great value. I believe there’s a solid Biblical principal by which those who prefer to cling to the seeming comfort of matter won’t be condemned for it: (Father forgive them for they know not what they do.) Maybe in the end the comfortable fortress of empiric matter will be nonetheless torn down—as Christ showed in metaphor: “Then they will begin to say to the mountains, ‘fall on us; and to the hills, ‘cover us.’”—to reveal that the fullness of reality has always been what we currently know as and call the “abstract” realm. (See also Rev 6:16-17) [Organized Christianity tends to literalize this and place it in ‘end times’ categories with them comfortably placed on the outside looking in, cheering while the bad guys ‘get it’. In fact this, in the strength of its highest metaphoric truth, applies to all humans regardless of religious belief.]

Sorry for foray into theology on philosophy thread, will try to keep on track hereafter.

[Jim B.]

Indeed. Virtually every argument and conclusion Aristotle made about physical science was wrong, because he did not have access to modern scientific methodology and metaphysics was misused repeatedly in lieu thereof. Just as you are misusing it IMHO.

Yes, his empirical hypotheses were mainly wrong. I'm not making empirical hypotheses. I'm making a philosophical argument. A philosophical argument cannot be refuted with empirical data. It can only be refuted with another philosophical argument. Your only philosophical argument so far boils down to an argument from authority and prestige, namely that of science. A particularly flimsy argument. You haven't established how that particular argument applies in this case to refute my argument, but I'm beginning to suspect that you don't know how it does because you don't understand my argument, and you don't understand my argument in large part because of your hidden assumption that the only true knowledge results from empirical research, and that assumption blocks you from seriously considering any other way of framing the issue, and basically settles the crucial matter in dispute in your mind from the outset. That's why we cannot have an actual discussion of the argument itself; because you've already decided the matter in advance. So why continue?

The place of “consciousness”, like the place for intelligence or any other evolved quality is the same for all evolved phenomena, namely the enhanced survival of the species.

That would be at most the causal role it plays, not what it is ontologically. The works of Bach and Shakespeare, according to that analysis, would be a tool for the enhanced survival of the species. This is your 'evo psych' bias showing again, which is an extremely reductive and impoverished conception of culture and reality.

No, it does no such thing. One accounts for “consciousness's uniqueness”, the same way one accounts for all physical phenomena – via empirical research. Yes, it is a “hard problem”, to echo Chalmers, but hard problems have been resolved before - by science.

No, like I said, there's been no 'hard problem' before. The conceptual part of the explanatory gap is the key. Every physical phenomenon resolves into physical micro-constituents that explain the macro-properties within a given theoretical structure. Structure and function at the micro scale yield only structure and function at the macro scale and vice versa. There is no conceivable way within the physical theoretical framework that could explain the dependence relation of macro-phenomenal properties on micro-properties analogous to the physical model of reduction.

[Jim B.]

Jim you were comparing pain to things like redness which is not mind dependent. No minds no property of pain.

We're making this much harder than it has to be. Redness as an experience is mind-dependent. Pain as an experience is mind-dependent. Experiences are mind-dependent and thus subjective. But it is a fact that there ARE such things as experiences in the world. There is a real property called consciousness, and a real property called pain, IMO. Something mind-dependent is just as real as something mind-independent. It's an objective fact about the world that there are subjective points of view within it, and that there are experiences, and that some are bad regardless of from which point of view one is viewing the world. Extreme suffering would be an objectively bad thing, regardless of which point of view one adopted. One does not have to be the actual sufferer to acknowledge the badness. This is the foundation of the objectivity of values and what differentiates humans form other species and endows them with the capacity for moral reasoning.

First Jim, even in our culture people lie, about all kinds of things, a lot. Second, incoherence does not equal immoral. Many things are incoherent with no moral question attached. And no Jim, many cultures with slavery thrived. And they necessarily did not fall because of slavery - like the Roman empire.

Yes, people lie a lot. And there are usually bad consequences. If you're extremely powerful and wealthy with authoritarian ambitions and millions of blindly devoted followers, etc, you can buffer yourself for a while from the worst of those consequences. There can always be powerful countervailing forces. Mussolini lasted for 20 years, Stalin for longer... A powerful military and a cowed worshipful public will buy you some time...As for Rome, well, the same thing, the Republic was unstable, and the Empire had to keep stealing more land and taxes, combined with a shrewd tolerance for foreign religions, kept them afloat for awhile. But all that time there was growing moral decay from within. I never said incoherence equals immorality, just that it's a condition of it. A certain kind of incoherence.

I generally agree Jim, but this would be just as true if moral relativism was true.

No, I don't think it would. Relativism supposes that anything a culture or individual decides is right is actually right, but this presupposes that there's no set human nature; that our needs and characteristics can be whatever we decide they should be.

[shunyadragon]

So much wasted time and energy directed at Shuny or Tassman. If it's not hard empirical data, it bounces off of their impermeable scientismic shield like bb's off of a brick wall.

Its your problem trying to use circular 'arguing from ignorance' trying justify a metaphysical argument. Again, I do not agree with Tassman, but he has a more solid view on the science and logic than you do.

[Tassman]

Yes, his empirical hypotheses were mainly wrong. I'm not making empirical hypotheses. I'm making a philosophical argument. A philosophical argument cannot be refuted with empirical data. It can only be refuted with another philosophical argument.

Yes exactly. And given that a philosophical argument has no means to establish a true premise it has no means of establishing a true conclusion – as Aristotle’s successors discovered.

Your only philosophical argument so far boils down to an argument from authority and prestige, namely that of science. A particularly flimsy argument.

A scientific argument “boils down” to established verifiable facts via multiple testing – an option not available to the purely academic argumentation of philosophy.

You haven't established how that particular argument applies in this case to refute my argument,

The only possible refutation for your argument is another philosophical argument – as I’ve said – and philosophical arguments cannot be factually conclusive.

but I'm beginning to suspect that you don't know how it does because you don't understand my argument, and you don't understand my argument in large part because of your hidden assumption that the only true knowledge results from empirical research,

No, my not-so-hidden assumption is that the only FACTUAL knowledge results from empirical research, not from academic metaphysical notions.

That would be at most the causal role it plays, not what it is ontologically. The works of Bach and Shakespeare, according to that analysis, would be a tool for the enhanced survival of the species. This is your 'evo psych' bias showing again, which is an extremely reductive and impoverished conception of culture and reality.

It is only an “impoverished conception of culture and reality” for those who yearn for “reality” to be more than it is in actuality - and this from someone who derives great pleasure from the performing arts.

No, like I said, there's been no 'hard problem' before. The conceptual part of the explanatory gap is the key. Every physical phenomenon resolves into physical micro-constituents that explain the macro-properties within a given theoretical structure. Structure and function at the micro scale yield only structure and function at the macro scale and vice versa. There is no conceivable way within the physical theoretical framework that could explain the dependence relation of macro-phenomenal properties on micro-properties analogous to the physical model of reduction.

So, you like to assume, but the advances of neuroscience in this are (as previously referenced) indicate that this is not the case. Just as we no longer attribute disease to evil demons nor the movement of the sun to Helios driving his chariot across the sky each day and all the other fictions such as an eternal soul, we have devised in our attempts to understand the world we inhabit.

[Jim B.]

Yes exactly. And given that a philosophical argument has no means to establish a true premise it has no means of establishing a true conclusion – as Aristotle’s successors discovered.

Do you claim that what you've just said is true? Is it directly verifiable scientifically? It's a philosophical conclusion drawn in part from observations, but the conclusion itself is not directly empirically verifiable. So your empiricist thesis is self-refuting.

Philosophy can make factual assertions all the time. The one you made above and the one I made in response to it. The argument for irreducibility. The fact that not all paintings can be forgeries. That the empiricist thesis is self-refuting. That logical behaviorism was false. That type-identity was false. That we can never prove the veracity of our senses with absolute certainty. That the experience of pain is first-person access.

A scientific argument “boils down” to established verifiable facts via multiple testing – an option not available to the purely academic argumentation of philosophy.

"Facts" again are not these simple monolithic things. They stand in webs on meaningful relations to lots of other things that we already know. They stand in logical relations to many other facts and to an entire web of background tacit knowledge and capacity. Facts are relational. Logic and semantics and philosophical interpretation must be applied to them before they mean anything.

The only possible refutation for your argument is another philosophical argument – as I’ve said – and philosophical arguments cannot be factually conclusive.

Wrong. You might want to familiarize yourself a little bit more with the thing you so blithely dismiss.

No, my not-so-hidden assumption is that the only FACTUAL knowledge results from empirical research, not from academic metaphysical notions.

Sorry. Not nearly so simple as that. And I know that you use the word "academic" as a smear. Last I checked, science was every bit as "academic as philosophy. Why don't you try to argue the merits of the case and stop the cheap lazy smears?

It is only an “impoverished conception of culture and reality” for those who yearn for “reality” to be more than it is in actuality - and this from someone who derives great pleasure from the performing arts.

So you ARE claiming that the works of Shakespeare and Bach are actually as I characterized them? One doesn't have to believe in a substantial "reality" to believe that those works don't reduce to maximal adaptive advantage. Are you really that simplistic?

So, you like to assume, but the advances of neuroscience in this are (as previously referenced) indicate that this is not the case. Just as we no longer attribute disease to evil demons nor the movement of the sun to Helios driving his chariot across the sky each day and all the other fictions such as an eternal soul, we have devised in our attempts to understand the world we inhabit.

You don't have a clue what I'm talking about, so why don't we drop this part of it? Or try to educate yourself a little bit about the very basics of it.
Nothing to do with an eternal soul. Same old triumphalist scientistic self-congralulations.

[Tassman]

Do you claim that what you've just said is true? Is it directly verifiable scientifically? It's a philosophical conclusion drawn in part from observations, but the conclusion itself is not directly empirically verifiable.

This is not the argument. I’ve already acknowledged the value of metaphysics in science. And acknowledged that scientific methodology is directly dependent upon Metaphysical Naturalism and its correlate of Methodological Naturalism.

So your empiricist thesis is self-refuting.

I'm not making the Logical Positivist argument.

Philosophy can make factual assertions all the time. The one you made above and the one I made in response to it. The argument for irreducibility.

Are you a disciple of Behe? You are assuming for no good reason that consciousness cannot be reduced to the workings of the brain when neuroscience says otherwise. Conscious minds are not separate from the physical world.

That we can never prove the veracity of our senses with absolute certainty. That the experience of pain is first-person access.

Science cannot “prove” anything with “absolute certainty” but, unlike philosophy, it can establish consistent facts via empirical testing which are de facto proven for all practical purposes.

"Facts" again are not these simple monolithic things. They stand in webs on meaningful relations to lots of other things that we already know.

Indeed. As in scientific theories.

Facts are relational. Logic and semantics and philosophical interpretation must be applied to them before they mean anything.

Philosophical interpretations are useful in science only insomuch as they can ensure self-consistency and prevent errors of false inference. But, on its own, philosophical argumentation cannot generate new factual truths about the real world. Only science can do that.

Sorry. Not nearly so simple as that. And I know that you use the word "academic" as a smear.

Not a “smear”, merely a recognition of the limitations of purely “academic” argumentation

Last I checked, science was every bit as "academic" as philosophy.

Unlike science, philosophy does not have the wherewithal to test its academic conclusions. They remain academic conclusions until another academic philosophical argument comes along.

So you ARE claiming that the works of Shakespeare and Bach are actually as I characterized them? One doesn't have to believe in a substantial "reality" to believe that those works don't reduce to maximal adaptive advantage.

There are no new Bach oratorios floating around in the ether subsequent to Bach’s death or prior to his birth. All we have in existence are a direct consequence of Bach’s physical brain and social conditioning whilst he was alive and composing. Neither his conscious mind nor his art was separate from the physical world.

You don't have a clue what I'm talking about, so why don't we drop this part of it? Or try to educate yourself a little bit about the very basics of it.
Nothing to do with an eternal soul.

Your arguments seem to function on the assumption that there exists something other than the material, physical world, to which this “other” cannot be reduced. What is this “other” – surely you are not going all Thomistic on us with: “and this we call god”.

[Jim B.]

This is not the argument. IÂ’ve already acknowledged the value of metaphysics in science. And acknowledged that scientific methodology is directly dependent upon Metaphysical Naturalism and its correlate of Methodological Naturalism.

In the previous post, you wrote the following:

No, my not-so-hidden assumption is that the only FACTUAL knowledge results from empirical research.

This claim is a philosophical conclusion. It is actually a conclusion to an implicit philosophical argument. It is not a scientific finding or the direct result of empirical research. Therefore, according to you, it is not true because it is not factual and I must therefore disregard it. Do you see the problem here with such a narrow and dogmatic view of knowledge?

We are both making philosophical points constantly, points that we each assume to be trueand factual, otherwise we wouldn't be making them. They cannot be 'proven' to be true with absolute certainty, just as you say that no scientific claim can be. But there are degrees of justifiability with philosophical conclusions just as there are with scientific conclusions. The most certain claims are not available to science but are directly present to the subject, such as "I am conscious," "I exist" "I experience pain." Science depends on a whole raft of assumptions about reality already having to be true whereas the claims I mention do not. They are directly present and irrefutable.

I'm not making the Logical Positivist argument.

Please tell me precisely how you are not making that argument, given the above quote.

Are you a disciple of Behe? You are assuming for no good reason that consciousness cannot be reduced to the workings of the brain when neuroscience says otherwise. Conscious minds are not separate from the physical world.

More mere philosophical a-factual musings...

The problem we are having is that, ironically, as far as this question, you really don't seem to be 'scientific' in the broad sense of the term, ie in the sense of really being open to wanting to know new things, to try to look at things form a new perspective. You've never exhibited the slightest curiosity about my position. You seem to exhibit such easy confidence in your understanding of the terms you're using, such as 'reduced' and 'separate from,' 'dependent on,' etc. Your attitude has struck me as "This is anti-science, thus it equals witchcraft and astrology! I must squash and defend! It's not worthy of my efforts to even try to understand it!"

Science cannot “prove” anything with “absolute certainty” but, unlike philosophy, it can establish consistent facts via empirical testing which are de facto proven for all practical purposes.

Again, you've just made another philosophical argument which I can disregard as not being factual.

Indeed. As in scientific theories.

It either applies to the points you're making on here, in which case you contradict yourself, or it doesn't, and what you write can be disregarded. In either case, what you write is self-negating.

Philosophical interpretations are useful in science only insomuch as they can ensure self-consistency and prevent errors of false inference. But, on its own, philosophical argumentation cannot generate new factual truths about the real world. Only science can do that.

Same as above. Logical positivism was discredited with the Model T. This is 2020!

Not a “smear”, merely a recognition of the limitations of purely “academic” argumentation

I don't know what you mean by 'academic,' other than "what I don't like,' or more likely "what I don't understand." Reason, logic, and philosophical interpretation are endemic, and essential, to all of human thought, whether you like it, acknowledge it, or not. And BTW, I'm not an academic. I've taken exactly ONE philosophy course for credit in my life and audited two more. I'm self-edumacated beyond that.

Why not try to argue the actual merits of the case rather than focus on extraneous issues? Could it be because you can't?

Unlike science, philosophy does not have the wherewithal to test its academic conclusions. They remain academic conclusions until another academic philosophical argument comes along.

But there you go begging the question again. "Academic" to you just means "Not-like Science." "Like-Science" is definitionally good and "Not-Like Science" is definitionally bad. These are your working axioms. This is not science, but the mystique of science, the ideology of science. Actual working scientists (and not ideologues ) do not necessarily have to be acolytes of science, such as Einstein, who saw the danger inherent in instrumental reason absolutizing itself.

There are no new Bach oratorios floating around in the ether subsequent to BachÂ’s death or prior to his birth. All we have in existence are a direct consequence of BachÂ’s physical brain and social conditioning whilst he was alive and composing. Neither his conscious mind nor his art was separate from the physical world.

No, I was referring to the worth of Bach's music itself. Of course he cannot compose any more oratorios, but again that's merely the necessary conditions. Bach's music would not exist without his conception but his conception doesn't = his music.

Your arguments seem to function on the assumption that there exists something other than the material, physical world, to which this “other” cannot be reduced. What is this “other” – surely you are not going all Thomistic on us with: “and this we call god”.

My argument functions on the assumption that phenomenal concepts don't reduce to physical concepts. there are many possible implications of that. Some physicalists like Galen Strawson accept that argument.