
When does proving one's truth claims come to an end?
Suppose you make a truth claim and someone else asks you to prove it. If you prove it, he can ask you to give a proof for that proof. When does proving one's truth claims come to an end? Are there any beliefs that do not have to be proven?

tWebber
Originally Posted by
Hornet
Suppose you make a truth claim and someone else asks you to prove it. If you prove it, he can ask you to give a proof for that proof. When does proving one's truth claims come to an end? Are there any beliefs that do not have to be proven?
I think every truth claim ends on one of the horns of the Munchausen Trilemma:
The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition is supported only by that proposition
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather than defended
None of these are rationally acceptable but I think it is all we have. I lead towards the axiomatic position.
Here is another view of the problem:
An infinite regression, which appears because of the necessity to go ever further back, but is not practically feasible and does not, therefore, provide a certain foundation.
A logical circle in the deduction, which is caused by the fact that one, in the need to found, falls back on statements which had already appeared before as requiring a foundation, and which circle does not lead to any certain foundation either.
A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.

tWebber
Originally Posted by
seer
I think every truth claim ends on one of the horns of the Munchausen Trilemma:
I've never been convinced by this. It may apply to discursive claims, but not nondiscursive ones. Not all knowledge is inferential, thank goodness. And if the axiomatic option relies on stuff I'm just asserting, that sounds epistemically annoying, haha. Discursively, I like an aspect pressed by revelational epistemologists that (per a soft foundationalism perhaps) it's not an axiom at the fundament of my epistemic structure, but a person (or, more precisely, a trinity of persons). But I digress.
A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.
[/I]
It depends on why it's broken, maybe. As long as there's a nonarbitrary, nonquestionbegging reason why it's broken, you're good to go. In that case, PSR wouldn't be arbitrarily suspended.
Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne

tWebber
Originally Posted by
mattbballman31
I've never been convinced by this. It may apply to discursive claims, but not nondiscursive ones. Not all knowledge is inferential, thank goodness. And if the axiomatic option relies on stuff I'm just asserting, that sounds epistemically annoying, haha. Discursively, I like an aspect pressed by revelational epistemologists that (per a soft foundationalism perhaps) it's not an axiom at the fundament of my epistemic structure, but a person (or, more precisely, a trinity of persons). But I digress.
It depends on why it's broken, maybe. As long as there's a nonarbitrary, nonquestionbegging reason why it's broken, you're good to go. In that case, PSR wouldn't be arbitrarily suspended.
Hey Matt, long time no see. If I understood what you just said I could respond.

Post Thanks / Like  1 Amen
JimL amen'd this post.

tWebber
Originally Posted by
seer
Hey Matt, long time no see. If I understood what you just said I could respond.
Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne

tWebber
Originally Posted by
mattbballman31

tWebber
Originally Posted by
mattbballman31
It depends on why it's broken, maybe. As long as there's a nonarbitrary, nonquestionbegging reason why it's broken, you're good to go. In that case, PSR wouldn't be arbitrarily suspended.
Can you give an example of a nonarbitrary, nonquestionbegging stop (in English)?

Post Thanks / Like  1 Amen

Originally Posted by
seer
I think every truth claim ends on one of the horns of the Munchausen Trilemma:
The circular argument, in which the proof of some proposition is supported only by that proposition
The regressive argument, in which each proof requires a further proof, ad infinitum
The axiomatic argument, which rests on accepted precepts which are merely asserted rather than defended
None of these are rationally acceptable but I think it is all we have. I lead towards the axiomatic position.
Here is another view of the problem:
An infinite regression, which appears because of the necessity to go ever further back, but is not practically feasible and does not, therefore, provide a certain foundation.
A logical circle in the deduction, which is caused by the fact that one, in the need to found, falls back on statements which had already appeared before as requiring a foundation, and which circle does not lead to any certain foundation either.
A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.
What do you think of these propositions? Would they require either a circular, regressive, or axiomatic argument to prove them?
1. Contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time.
2. I am feeling pain.
What do you think of statements where if one denies them, then one contradicts himself? For example, suppose someone makes the statement, "I exist." If he denies it, wouldn't he be contradicting himself? One would have to exist in order for him to deny it.
Is the Munchausen Trilemma stating all of the possible options? What do you think of the idea where a proposition is proven true by the fact that if one denies the proposition, then one contradicts himself?
Norman Geisler in his book, Christian Apologetics, teaches that undeniability is a test of truth. Something is true if it cannot be denied. What do you think of this?
Last edited by Hornet; 01022020 at 11:30 AM.

tWebber
Originally Posted by
Hornet
What do you think of these propositions? Would they require either a circular, regressive, or axiomatic argument to prove them?
1. Contradictory propositions cannot both be true in the same sense at the same time.
2. I am feeling pain.
With the first, I think, we would have to assume that the laws of logic are universal and absolute (axiomatic). The second would be circular. How could you logically demonstrate that you are actually feeling pain to anyone but yourself with out begging the question?
What do you think of statements where if one denies them, then one contradicts himself? For example, suppose someone makes the statement, "I exist." If he denies it, wouldn't he be contradicting himself? One would have to exist in order for him to deny it.
Even if that is valid, that is where it ends. You could not logically move to anything else  for instance that what goes on in your mind actually corresponds to reality (the Matrix thing).
Is the Munchausen Trilemma stating all of the possible options? What do you think of the idea where a proposition is proven true by the fact that if one denies the proposition, then one contradicts himself?
Norman Geisler in his book,
Christian Apologetics, teaches that undeniability is a test of truth. Something is true if it cannot be denied. What do you think of this?
Again, wouldn't both require that we assume that the laws of logic are universal and absolute (axiomatic)?

tWebber
Originally Posted by
seer
Can you give an example of a nonarbitrary, nonquestionbegging stop (in English)?
Sure! I was responding to this:
A break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.
Maybe it depends on what 'principally feasible' means. I took it to mean 'feasible' based on 'principle'. The only kind of feasible break from searching, based on principle, which would be a random suspension of PSR, would be an irrational or arational suspension, depending on whether the randomness of the suspension violated rational norms or was such that it was without any norms at all.
Examples of these kinds of violations or these kinds of breaks would be any kind of fallacy or form of unjustified reasoning or any kind of metaphysically incomplete explanation. Fallacies are obvious enough: they violate rational norms. But perhaps you might flout epistemic norms in toto: perhaps you're a postmodernist. Norms are phallic hangovers of a bygone logocentrism, an idiotic sublimation bubbling up into a European, colonial mindset that invented truth as a powerstructure to subjugate other ideologies, etc., etc., and on and on. In this case, you have an instance of flouting epistemic norms, of it being such that you don't have any norms at all. IF the norms were real, this definitely would be an example of a random suspension of PSR.
Okay, when I refered to a break that would be nonarbitrary or nonquestionbegging, what I was trying to say was that you could have a feasible break, based on principle, that would NOT be a random suspension of PSR in the ways I just specified. That is, it wouldn't involve fallacies, instances of unjustified reasoning, being such as to flout all epistemic norms, or being such that it is a metaphysically incomplete explanation (or being such as to include commitments with incompatible entailments). If it isn't any of these things, there doesn't seem to me to be any possibility of randomly suspensing PSR, even if you "break searching at a certain point".
Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
George Horne