Moral vs. Factual Belief

[Anomaly]

Why do moral and ethical thoughts, beliefs, propositions, motivations, etc. seem different than purely descriptive or factual ones? Consider the following statements:
1. It is okay to rape someone as long as this is done as part of a study to determine first hand the psychological effects the act has on victims.
2. There is nothing wrong with believing 40 + 16 sometimes equals 55.

My point is that Q1 draws a stronger inner response than Q2. I see this in qualitative terms; falsity in purely descriptive propositions raises only a mild tension, but moral proposals produce a more robust resistance"In Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, clearly cognizant of what he himself had said about the character of descriptive truth, declared that what he called practical judgments (i.e., prescriptive or normative judgments with respect to action) had truth of a different sort. Later philosophers, except for Aristotle's medieval disciples, have shown no awareness whatsoever of this brief but crucially important passage in his writings."

[Roy]

Why do moral and ethical thoughts, beliefs, propositions, motivations, etc. seem different than purely descriptive or factual ones?

They seem different because they are different.

[Anomaly]

They seem different because they are different.

Okay, I see a lot of room was left open in the OP. I maintain that:

1. truth or any concept of value requires a mind of at least intellectual or higher caliber

2. truth either
a. preexists or
b is a product of human minds or
c has some other natural explanation for its existence

Thoughts on the OP plus this?

[siam]

Okay, I see a lot of room was left open in the OP. I maintain that:

1. truth or any concept of value requires a mind of at least intellectual or higher caliber

2. truth either
a. preexists or
b is a product of human minds or
c has some other natural explanation for its existence

Thoughts on the OP plus this?

are you saying "truth" is synonymous with (ethical/moral) "value"?...are the terms interchangeable?

[Tassman]

Why do moral and ethical thoughts, beliefs, propositions, motivations, etc. seem different than purely descriptive or factual ones?

They don't. Morality and ethics developed for the same reason, i.e. they are a product of evolution as it lends itself to our survival as a species. In short, they are an instinctive survival mechanism.

[Anomaly]

are you saying "truth" is synonymous with (ethical/moral) "value"?...are the terms interchangeable?

Yes. I take the position that value has exactly two denominations, true and false. Prescriptive truth is synonymous with normative value (though there's room for debate here) generally and moral/ethical in particular.

[Anomaly]

They don't. Morality and ethics developed for the same reason, i.e. they are a product of evolution as it lends itself to our survival as a species. In short, they are an instinctive survival mechanism.

This is the normal answer from atheists; I was surprised when Roy agreed. Do you believe this because evidence leads to this conclusion or because it fits into a preexistent worldview?

[Tassman]

This is the normal answer from atheists;

[JonathanL]

That was an unnecessarily wordy way of saying "because it fits into [my] preexistent worldview."

[Anomaly]

[JimL]

The problem I have is that evolution began its life as a descriptor of mechanistic biological systems. At some point the pursuit of naturalistic explanations had to bring morality into its cupboards in order to preserve epistemic and ontic consistency within a the naturalist framework. But morality, because it’s categorically separate from mechanistic/empirical systems places “evolutionary morality” in the same boat as supernatural claims for morality—i.e., from a naturalist’s POV, pure speculation. Will you concede this point?

I’m not dismissing evolutionary morality on this point, mind you, just calling it what it is in light of your stating morality’s dependence on evolution as a foregone conclusion as if it’s knowledge any intelligent person should know. A fundamental component of my own view of reality and existence consists in a similar marriage of categorical disassociates; I hold that value [abstract quality] inheres both abstract and material existents and this produces, among other things, moral judgments, propositions and motives resulting in primarily value-based behaviors. One reason for the op is to see if reasonable accounts can be given for the existence of value apart from minds….what is your position on this?

Given that both your and my beliefs about morality necessarily tread the rim of the speculative, what remains seems to be whether either view has a reasonable mechanism in place sufficient to grant warrant for belief. Speculative is okay if there’s enough logical evidence to connect that logic to behavior and states of affairs in the ‘real’ world (whatever that is).

For instance, Greene and Haidt made a splash a few years ago correlating normative judgments with neuroimaging in efforts to establish evolutionary causes for morality. Their work has since been criticized by others in the field citing the imprecision of neuroimaging to allow assignment of specific patterns of thought to local areas of the brain beyond the most general of senses, and other logical problems with the presentation. Of course every view is going to have faults. At the end of the day the best we have are the formations of worldviews as far removed from reasonable doubt as we can get.

I’m curious, how would you respond to the points in my second post?

In what sense would you suggest that morals have existence outside of minds?

[shunyadragon]

Why do moral and ethical thoughts, beliefs, propositions, motivations, etc. seem different than purely descriptive or factual ones? Consider the following statements:
1. It is okay to rape someone as long as this is done as part of a study to determine first hand the psychological effects the act has on victims.
2. There is nothing wrong with believing 40 + 16 sometimes equals 55.

My point is that Q1 draws a stronger inner response than Q2. I see this in qualitative terms; falsity in purely descriptive propositions raises only a mild tension, but moral proposals produce a more robust resistance"In Book VI of his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle, clearly cognizant of what he himself had said about the character of descriptive truth, declared that what he called practical judgments (i.e., prescriptive or normative judgments with respect to action) had truth of a different sort. Later philosophers, except for Aristotle's medieval disciples, have shown no awareness whatsoever of this brief but crucially important passage in his writings."

Not sure what the point is, but on the surface not meaningful. They are of course different regardless of what we personally believe.

[Tassman]

No. I will not concede this point. There is no good reason for anything but a naturalistic explanation to explain the origins of morality and ethics. They are products of evolution inasmuch as they promote our survival as a social species. We see the precursors of such behavior among other social species such as the great apes. And there is evidence of similar codes of behavior among our hominid predecessors such as Homo erectus and Neanderthal man and other archaic humans.

[Anomaly]

In what sense would you suggest that morals have existence outside of minds?

I have a hypothesis that value (admixture of truth and falsity which creates moral mutability) is a non-empiric dynamic within

[Anomaly]

No. I will not concede this point. There is no good reason for anything but a naturalistic explanation to explain the origins of morality and ethics. They are products of evolution inasmuch as they promote our survival as a social species. We see the precursors of such behavior among other social species such as the great apes. And there is evidence of similar codes of behavior among our hominid predecessors such as Homo erectus and Neanderthal man and other archaic humans.

The atheist circularity is similar: "Come, let's argue together; the only rule is that only things in time and space are real. Now then, come tell me all about your God!"

I understand...everyone wants to hang on to their own worldview. It's a human thang.