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Cogito ergo sum

Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!

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Determinism And Rationality.

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  • #16
    Originally posted by seer View Post
    I'm not sure that isn't merely semantics.
    It's not. The former asks, "What does truth mean?" The latter asks, "How does one determine if a proposition is true?"

    What determines this? The non-reasoning forces of nature?
    I've been trying to avoid using the phrases "forces" or "forces of nature," because there is quite a bit more to the physical cosmos than just the forces, and it becomes too easy to fall into equivocations. Unfortunately, the simplest answer that I can give to this would be something along the lines of, "The sum total state space which describes the particular system in question."

    How? If the non-reasoning forces of nature cannot evaluate the truth of a proposition?
    The fact that the things which compose a system each lack a particular power does not imply that the system as a whole lacks such a power. Atoms cannot type on a keyboard. So how is it that hands, which are entirely composed of nothing but atoms, can type on a keyboard? I see absolutely no reason to think that a physical system would unable to evaluate the truth of a proposition, even if every component of that system is individually unable to do so.

    Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
    What's your definition of truth as a concept?
    I mentioned it earlier, but it may have gotten lost in the shuffle: that which corresponds to reality.

    Reasons are normative and purposive; causes are not.
    I see absolutely no need to invoke purpose in understanding a reason for some particular action. If I were to ask, "What is the reason that a tree fell in my backyard?" one would not respond by saying that the strong winds are a cause but a reason needs purpose.

    And even if that were somehow the case, which I doubt, it's operating at the wrong level of description. Imagine if you were to ask me why I decided to do something and I said "Because I'm determined to." The explanatory answer is to cite the reasons why I chose to do that thing. If I'm determined to do whatever I choose to do, then my determinism drops out as an illuminating explanation for my choices.
    Again, the answers are not mutually exclusive. When the tree falls in my yard, it may have been due to entirely deterministic processes. However, answering "Why did the tree fall?" by saying "It was determined that it would" is no less unsatisfying, here. That doesn't mean that the strong winds which blew the tree over are therefore non-deterministic.
    "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
    --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

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    • #17
      Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
      It's not. The former asks, "What does truth mean?" The latter asks, "How does one determine if a proposition is true?"
      OK...

      I've been trying to avoid using the phrases "forces" or "forces of nature," because there is quite a bit more to the physical cosmos than just the forces, and it becomes too easy to fall into equivocations. Unfortunately, the simplest answer that I can give to this would be something along the lines of, "The sum total state space which describes the particular system in question."

      The fact that the things which compose a system each lack a particular power does not imply that the system as a whole lacks such a power. Atoms cannot type on a keyboard. So how is it that hands, which are entirely composed of nothing but atoms, can type on a keyboard? I see absolutely no reason to think that a physical system would unable to evaluate the truth of a proposition, even if every component of that system is individually unable to do so.
      I'm not sure how atoms, not matter how they are arranged, could evaluate the truth of a proposition. That would take a mind as far as I know. But if we are speaking of minds such as ours then they are determined to evaluate such propositions. But by what?
      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

      Comment


      • #18
        Originally posted by seer View Post
        I'm not sure how atoms, not matter how they are arranged, could evaluate the truth of a proposition.
        The fact that you are unsure how it could be does not imply that it could not be.

        That would take a mind as far as I know. But if we are speaking of minds such as ours then they are determined to evaluate such propositions. But by what?
        By the configuration of the system and its interaction with other systems. Do you know of any reason to think that there cannot be such an arrangement? Why should I think that a mind assigning truth values to statements cannot be the product of deterministic processes?
        "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
        --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
          The fact that you are unsure how it could be does not imply that it could not be.

          By the configuration of the system and its interaction with other systems. Do you know of any reason to think that there cannot be such an arrangement? Why should I think that a mind assigning truth values to statements cannot be the product of deterministic processes?
          But the mind is not, at bottom, assigning truth values to statements, the antecedent forces of nature are. And again these forces have no conceptual ability (no matter how complicated).
          Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by seer View Post
            But the mind is not, at bottom, assigning truth values to statements, the antecedent forces of nature are. And again these forces have no conceptual ability (no matter how complicated).
            How do you figure that "the mind is not, at bottom, assigning truth values to statements?" This is a bit like saying that water cannot be wet because it is the product of the antecedent forces of nature and none of those are wet.
            "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
            --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
              How do you figure that "the mind is not, at bottom, assigning truth values to statements?" This is a bit like saying that water cannot be wet because it is the product of the antecedent forces of nature and none of those are wet.
              BP, because if determinism it true the antecedent forces of nature create the concept in the mind. Yes water is wet, but that wetness was dictated. And that is different from conceptual truths or beliefs. I mean what do these forces know of the law of excluded middle for instance?
              Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

              https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by seer View Post
                BP, because if determinism it true the antecedent forces of nature create the concept in the mind. Yes water is wet, but that wetness was dictated. And that is different from conceptual truths or beliefs. I mean what do these forces know of the law of excluded middle for instance?
                What do they know of wetness? I'm honestly not seeing why you think "the antecedent forces" need to be cognitive in order to underlie cognition any more than they need to be wet in order to underlie wetness.
                "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post

                  The fact that the things which compose a system each lack a particular power does not imply that the system as a whole lacks such a power. Atoms cannot type on a keyboard. So how is it that hands, which are entirely composed of nothing but atoms, can type on a keyboard? I see absolutely no reason to think that a physical system would unable to evaluate the truth of a proposition, even if every component of that system is individually unable to do so.
                  For a similar reason that atoms cannot type on a keyboard, a compositionally physical system cannot evaluate the truth of a proposition. As atoms are not typing, but rather a conscious agent thinking about reasons and thoughts is typing, so the physical structures and functions composing my body are not evaluating the truth of the propositions I am typing.



                  I mentioned it earlier, but it may have gotten lost in the shuffle: that which corresponds to reality.
                  Okay. I wasn't sure if you were defining it as the thing that corresponds, as in a proposition, or as the correspondence relation itself. So we can agree then that a truth is or usually is linguistic in form?

                  I see absolutely no need to invoke purpose in understanding a reason for some particular action. If I were to ask, "What is the reason that a tree fell in my backyard?" one would not respond by saying that the strong winds are a cause but a reason needs purpose.
                  How do you explain human actions without invoking purpose? By dismissing all of 'purpose-talk' as folk psychology? To ask for the 'reason' for the tree's falling is to actually ask for the 'cause' of the tree's falling. You can argue, ala Dennett, that these purposes get discharged ultimately onto sub-personal processes, but that's a hard row to hoe and i think begs the crucial question.

                  Again, the answers are not mutually exclusive. When the tree falls in my yard, it may have been due to entirely deterministic processes. However, answering "Why did the tree fall?" by saying "It was determined that it would" is no less unsatisfying, here. That doesn't mean that the strong winds which blew the tree over are therefore non-deterministic.
                  I agree, and many, if not most human behaviors are equally determined as the tree falling. My point is that there is a crucial conceptual distinction between reasons for action and causes for physical processes that might be getting lost here.

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                  • #24
                    Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                    For a similar reason that atoms cannot type on a keyboard, a compositionally physical system cannot evaluate the truth of a proposition. As atoms are not typing, but rather a conscious agent thinking about reasons and thoughts is typing, so the physical structures and functions composing my body are not evaluating the truth of the propositions I am typing.
                    How does conscious agency make a difference? Atoms cannot type on a keyboard. Even if a conscious agent were somehow able to control the momentum of a single atom, that atom would be unable to type on a keyboard. So, either we must admit that interacting systems of things can display powers which are not displayed in their individual constituent parts or else there does not seem to be any answer to the question.

                    Okay. I wasn't sure if you were defining it as the thing that corresponds, as in a proposition, or as the correspondence relation itself. So we can agree then that a truth is or usually is linguistic in form?
                    When I say "truth is that which corresponds to reality," I mean that "the concept 'truth' is a shorthand reference for 'the sum total of all that which corresponds to reality.'" When you say "a truth," what you seem to mean is "a particular proposition which describes reality." These are not the same thing.

                    How do you explain human actions without invoking purpose? By dismissing all of 'purpose-talk' as folk psychology?
                    Absolutely not! I just see no reason to think that purpose and intent in human faculty cannot be the result of deterministic processes.

                    To ask for the 'reason' for the tree's falling is to actually ask for the 'cause' of the tree's falling. You can argue, ala Dennett, that these purposes get discharged ultimately onto sub-personal processes, but that's a hard row to hoe and i think begs the crucial question.
                    I don't think it begs the question any more than the idea that these purposes cannot be discharged onto sub-personal processes. Again, I see no reason to think that it is impossible for intent and purpose to arise from deterministic processes.

                    I am not convinced of determinism because I have a complete deterministic model of human cognition. I am convinced of determinism for other reasons and I have not been convinced that determinism stands in contradiction with anything else which I know or believe about the world.

                    I agree, and many, if not most human behaviors are equally determined as the tree falling. My point is that there is a crucial conceptual distinction between reasons for action and causes for physical processes that might be getting lost here.
                    I could just as easily turn this very same question around, though. If an anatomist asks, "Why does Mr. Smith's arm move?" he may be completely unsatisfied with the answer, "Because Mr. Smith intends to throw a baseball." Rather, the anatomist might want to know that some stimulus caused the contraction of muscle cells which pulled ligaments that are attached to the bones in Mr. Smith's arm. That doesn't invalidate Mr. Smith's intentions as being a true reason for the movement of his arm. It is simply that such an answer would be unsatisfying in this context.

                    Yes, human intention is a fascinating thing and well worth attempting to understand. But-- at the risk of repeating myself-- I simply don't see any reason to think that human intention cannot arise from deterministic processes.
                    "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                    --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                      What do they know of wetness? I'm honestly not seeing why you think "the antecedent forces" need to be cognitive in order to underlie cognition any more than they need to be wet in order to underlie wetness.
                      BP, I'm not just talking about deterministic natural forces underlying cognition, no, these non-reasoning forces dictate everything we think feel or believe. We are sock puppets, mere receivers of what these forces decide to implant. And how these non-reasoning forces come up with conceptual truths to implant into our brains is beyond me. Concepts are not even on their radar or part of their make up.
                      Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                        How does conscious agency make a difference? Atoms cannot type on a keyboard. Even if a conscious agent were somehow able to control the momentum of a single atom, that atom would be unable to type on a keyboard. So, either we must admit that interacting systems of things can display powers which are not displayed in their individual constituent parts or else there does not seem to be any answer to the question.
                        Interacting systems can display properties not present in their micro-constituents. You mentioned the liquidity of water not being present in H2O molecules. But this property is completely unsurprising because it supervenes on the properties of the molecules that compose it. If contentful understanding requires consciousness, and if consciousness does NOT logically supervene on physical facts, then conscious agency is different from the usual kind of higher level supervenient properties like liquidity which you refer to.

                        When I say "truth is that which corresponds to reality," I mean that "the concept 'truth' is a shorthand reference for 'the sum total of all that which corresponds to reality.'" When you say "a truth," what you seem to mean is "a particular proposition which describes reality." These are not the same thing.
                        "Truth as a concept" is just an abstraction for what all individual truths would have in common, afaict. If "Truth" is linguistic in nature, then the "sum total of truth" would be a linguistic abstraction. It seems like you're drawing a distinction without a difference.

                        Absolutely not! I just see no reason to think that purpose and intent in human faculty cannot be the result of deterministic processes.
                        Yes, I'm beginning to pick up on that :) What I'm not picking up on so clearly is an actual argument in support of your conviction.

                        I don't think it begs the question any more than the idea that these purposes cannot be discharged onto sub-personal processes. Again, I see no reason to think that it is impossible for intent and purpose to arise from deterministic processes.
                        Well, as I said, if you accept the logical non-supervenience of conscious understanding and the conceptual distinction between reasons for action and causes for physical events, then there may be reasons to believe that intent and purpose cannot arise from deterministic processes.

                        I am not convinced of determinism because I have a complete deterministic model of human cognition. I am convinced of determinism for other reasons and I have not been convinced that determinism stands in contradiction with anything else which I know or believe about the world.
                        But could something about human cognition and consciousness themselves persuade you differently?

                        Hasn't physics itself largely abandoned a purely deterministic model of the physical world?

                        I could just as easily turn this very same question around, though. If an anatomist asks, "Why does Mr. Smith's arm move?" he may be completely unsatisfied with the answer, "Because Mr. Smith intends to throw a baseball." Rather, the anatomist might want to know that some stimulus caused the contraction of muscle cells which pulled ligaments that are attached to the bones in Mr. Smith's arm. That doesn't invalidate Mr. Smith's intentions as being a true reason for the movement of his arm. It is simply that such an answer would be unsatisfying in this context.
                        Of course the anatomist would be unsatisfied with the reasons-answer for why Smith's arm moved, because that answer is not in line with his discipline, just as a bio-chemist would not be satisfied with the anatomist's answer and a quantum physicist would be dissatisfied with all of the above answers. It all depends on what level of description we are seeking. All of the answers are 'right' depending on the question posed. My point though is that none of these disciplines address the core problematic of human actions qua human actions but reduce them to physical events, in the same way that conscious experiences are reduced to physical events.

                        Yes, human intention is a fascinating thing and well worth attempting to understand. But-- at the risk of repeating myself-- I simply don't see any reason to think that human intention cannot arise from deterministic processes.
                        Data collated

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                        • #27
                          Originally posted by seer View Post
                          BP, I'm not just talking about deterministic natural forces underlying cognition, no, these non-reasoning forces dictate everything we think feel or believe. We are sock puppets, mere receivers of what these forces decide to implant. And how these non-reasoning forces come up with conceptual truths to implant into our brains is beyond me. Concepts are not even on their radar or part of their make up.
                          These "non-reasoning forces" do not "dictate" anything. They do not "decide" or "implant" anything. They do not "come up with conceptual truths." You're utilizing phrases which describe conscious, thinking entities as a description of entities which we both agree are neither conscious nor thinking. Obviously, that is going to generate a contradiction.

                          I am just talking about deterministic natural forces underlying cognition. So, if you are talking about something else then you are not describing the position to which I hold.

                          Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                          Interacting systems can display properties not present in their micro-constituents. You mentioned the liquidity of water not being present in H2O molecules. But this property is completely unsurprising because it supervenes on the properties of the molecules that compose it. If contentful understanding requires consciousness, and if consciousness does NOT logically supervene on physical facts, then conscious agency is different from the usual kind of higher level supervenient properties like liquidity which you refer to.
                          So what reason should I have to think that consciousness cannot supervene on its basal physical constituents?

                          "Truth as a concept" is just an abstraction for what all individual truths would have in common, afaict. If "Truth" is linguistic in nature, then the "sum total of truth" would be a linguistic abstraction. It seems like you're drawing a distinction without a difference.
                          It's not just an abstraction for what all individual truths have in common. Individual truths are all propositions, but "truth" as a concept is not the idea of "proposition," despite this commonality. The concept of "truth" is the standard by which we attempt to evaluate a given proposition. The phrase "a truth," as you have been using it, is a proposition which has been evaluated. Again, these are two entirely different things.

                          Yes, I'm beginning to pick up on that :) What I'm not picking up on so clearly is an actual argument in support of your conviction.
                          You are responding to my saying "I am not convinced." I didn't actually mention anything, in that sentence, of which I am convinced. So which of my convictions were you expecting me to support? If you would like me to explain why I am convinced of Determinism, in general, that's all well and good. However, the original question of this thread didn't ask Determinists to support Determinism. It asked Determinists if they agreed with a particular statement. That's what I've been responding to, throughout.

                          Well, as I said, if you accept the logical non-supervenience of conscious understanding and the conceptual distinction between reasons for action and causes for physical events, then there may be reasons to believe that intent and purpose cannot arise from deterministic processes.
                          Yes, if you believe that consciousness cannot arise from underlying deterministic processes then you may have reason to believe that intent and purpose cannot arise from underlying deterministic processes. I thought that I had made it fairly clear that I do not see any reason to believe either of these statements.

                          But could something about human cognition and consciousness themselves persuade you differently?
                          I don't know. That would depend on the argument made to support such a position.

                          Hasn't physics itself largely abandoned a purely deterministic model of the physical world?
                          Certainly not! Even if one ascribes to a stochastic interpretation of quantum mechanics-- which I most certainly do not-- the overwhelmingly vast majority of the physical models which we utilize are still completely deterministic. And since I actually subscribe to a completely deterministic interpretation of QM, even that would not be an abandonment of determinism.

                          Of course the anatomist would be unsatisfied with the reasons-answer for why Smith's arm moved, because that answer is not in line with his discipline, just as a bio-chemist would not be satisfied with the anatomist's answer and a quantum physicist would be dissatisfied with all of the above answers. It all depends on what level of description we are seeking. All of the answers are 'right' depending on the question posed. My point though is that none of these disciplines address the core problematic of human actions qua human actions but reduce them to physical events, in the same way that conscious experiences are reduced to physical events.
                          So, if we agree that it is not incompatible to discuss single events at different levels of description, all I am lacking is an argument which shows that it is impossible for consciousness to be described at any of these other levels of description.
                          "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                          --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                            These "non-reasoning forces" do not "dictate" anything. They do not "decide" or "implant" anything. They do not "come up with conceptual truths." You're utilizing phrases which describe conscious, thinking entities as a description of entities which we both agree are neither conscious nor thinking. Obviously, that is going to generate a contradiction.

                            I am just talking about deterministic natural forces underlying cognition. So, if you are talking about something else then you are not describing the position to which I hold.


                            Exactly BP, that is my point, they do not come up with conceptual truths. Then what does? If you say our reasoning, fine, but that too is determined by these non-reasoning forces. If not what determines our reasoning? It is turtles all the way down as far as I can see.
                            Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                            https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by seer View Post
                              Exactly BP, that is my point, they do not come up with conceptual truths. Then what does? If you say our reasoning, fine, but that too is determined by these non-reasoning forces. If not what determines our reasoning? It is turtles all the way down as far as I can see.
                              I'm unclear as to the dilemma, here. You already know that I believe conceptualization to be a part of cognition; and you already know that I believe that there are deterministic principles underlying cognition. If that is "fine," then we don't seem to have any problems. If that is not "fine," then we are back to the place where I ask why I should think that deterministic principles cannot possibly underlie cognition.
                              "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                              --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                                I'm unclear as to the dilemma, here. You already know that I believe conceptualization to be a part of cognition; and you already know that I believe that there are deterministic principles underlying cognition. If that is "fine," then we don't seem to have any problems. If that is not "fine," then we are back to the place where I ask why I should think that deterministic principles cannot possibly underlie cognition.
                                BP, are your thoughts and beliefs determined or not? And if yes, determined by what?
                                Atheism is the cult of death, the death of hope. The universe is doomed, you are doomed, the only thing that remains is to await your execution...

                                https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jbnueb2OI4o&t=3s

                                Comment

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