Determinism And Rationality.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Let's try it this way: There have been periodic paradigm shifts in physics. The shift from the universe of Newton to the universe of Maxwell required a whole new set of concepts and theories -- new kinds of concepts. But the underlying concepts of what it means for something to be regarded as 'physical' ie to be analyzable in terms of extrinsic, relational, quantitative structure and function, in terms of causal dispositions, remains constant through paradigm shifts.

I think I can agree to this. Still, phrased in this manner, I see no reason to think that mental events cannot possibly be analyzable in terms of extrinsic, relational, quantitative structure and function, in terms of causal dispositions.

Just as action-at-a-distance was entirely inconceivable. I agree that conceivability alone is a poor predictor, but as I said, it depends on the role that conceivability plays in the particular context in question. If the nature and scope of empirical knowledge itself is at issue rather than an empirical truth, then conceivability is a surer guide.

I'm not so sure it is. We are not talking about a completely unqualified idea of conceivability-- that is to say, whether it is logically possible to conceive of a thing. Rather, we're discussing the conceivability of a notion within a particular framework of thought-- that is to say, can I imagine a way in which this idea accords with my other beliefs. There is a big difference between conceivability and coherence.

I'm not even clear on what you mean by your Concept of Truth, so I can't say much about it yet. I just haven't come across many naturalists who put so much emphasis on 'Concepts.' You do come across as a bit coy. Why not just tell us what these things are?

I certainly don't intend to come off as coy. Nor do I know why you haven't met many Naturalists who discuss the concepts of things-- they seem to be fairly common in my experience.

As for what I mean by the concept of Truth, I haven't been avoiding talking about it. Indeed, I've already explicitly stated it a few times throughout this thread, as well as discussing how I believe it differs from particular propositions which one might evaluate to be true. So, to reiterate again, when I am talking about Truth, I am referring to "that which corresponds to reality." Now I realize that this is a fairly quick, short, and imprecise way of phrasing it, but most of the people with whom I normally discuss the notion either also assent to the Correspondence Theory or else they are familiar with the Correspondence Theory; so I am unused to having to explicate much more on the topic. However, rather than re-invent the wheel and flood this thread with yet another side topic, I'll just point you towards this article on this subject: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/t...orrespondence/

I think action would be difficult to understand on the B-Theory. But more to come.

Well, if you are interested, my thread on the B-Theory is up, now. I'll be interested to hear your thoughts: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...ry-vs-B-Theory

[Jim B.]

I think I can agree to this. Still, phrased in this manner, I see no reason to think that mental events cannot possibly be analyzable in terms of extrinsic, relational, quantitative structure and function, in terms of causal dispositions.

The intrinsicness, the qualia would be lost. Intrinsic properties do not present in a relational manner. Anything is possible, certainly, but the most plausible scenario for me is that you can't get there from here, and the assumption that you can is only premised on a prior commitment to naturalism.

I'm not so sure it is. We are not talking about a completely unqualified idea of conceivability-- that is to say, whether it is logically possible to conceive of a thing. Rather, we're discussing the conceivability of a notion within a particular framework of thought-- that is to say, can I imagine a way in which this idea accords with my other beliefs. There is a big difference between conceivability and coherence.

It's the "Hard Problem", a conundrum that really is sui generis in the sciences. I am talking about logical possibility. Perhaps not epistemic conceivability. I just don't see how it's logically possible to make one kind of ontology fit into another without an essential reduction.

I certainly don't intend to come off as coy. Nor do I know why you haven't met many Naturalists who discuss the concepts of things-- they seem to be fairly common in my experience.

The naturalists on here are obsessed with hard empirical data.

As for what I mean by the concept of Truth, I haven't been avoiding talking about it. Indeed, I've already explicitly stated it a few times throughout this thread, as well as discussing how I believe it differs from particular propositions which one might evaluate to be true. So, to reiterate again, when I am talking about Truth, I am referring to "that which corresponds to reality." Now I realize that this is a fairly quick, short, and imprecise way of phrasing it, but most of the people with whom I normally discuss the notion either also assent to the Correspondence Theory or else they are familiar with the Correspondence Theory; so I am unused to having to explicate much more on the topic. However, rather than re-invent the wheel and flood this thread with yet another side topic, I'll just point you towards this article on this subject: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/t...orrespondence/

Yes, I'm familiar with the Correspondence Theory. I was wondering about your own "Concept of Truth" :)

Well, if you are interested, my thread on the B-Theory is up, now. I'll be interested to hear your thoughts: http://www.theologyweb.com/campus/sh...ry-vs-B-Theory

Okay. Can't guarantee I'll have a lot of time to devote to it but I'll have a look.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The intrinsicness, the qualia would be lost. Intrinsic properties do not present in a relational manner.

I just don't see why one should think that the intrinsicness or qualia would necessarily be lost.

Anything is possible, certainly, but the most plausible scenario for me is that you can't get there from here, and the assumption that you can is only premised on a prior commitment to naturalism.

Well, no, it's not only premised on a prior commitment to Naturalism. It is also premised on the observable fact that structural, chemical, and altogether physical changes to the brain can result in predictable changes to the mind, which suggests quite strongly that physical neurology must play at least some role in any theory of mind. Given that I am a Naturalist, that it seems neurology plays at least some role in the theory, and that there is no reason to reject neurology as the sole basis for a theory of mind, it seems like a perfect plausible thing to believe.

In contrast, before I could even consider a non-physical theory of mind, I would need to understand what it means for a thing to be non-physical, I would need to know how it is that the non-physical is supposed to be able to exert causal power over the physical, and I would similarly need to understand how the physical is supposed to exert causal power over the non-physical.

It's the "Hard Problem", a conundrum that really is sui generis in the sciences. I am talking about logical possibility. Perhaps not epistemic conceivability. I just don't see how it's logically possible to make one kind of ontology fit into another without an essential reduction.

Well that would be another essential difference in our approaches, then: I see no reason to think that there are two different kinds of ontology at play, in the first place.

The naturalists on here are obsessed with hard empirical data.

Gotcha. Nah, I've got a thorough love for philosophy and abstraction. Don't get me wrong, I am absolutely fascinated by physics and the fascinating confirmation that data have provided for strange and wondrous theories. I'm simply more interested in the theories, themselves. I'm the type of nerd who would much rather read a calculus textbook or argue about the metaphysics of infinity than talk about the latest data collected from the LHC.

Yes, I'm familiar with the Correspondence Theory. I was wondering about your own "Concept of Truth" :)

So you did have some idea of my meaning, then. Now who's being coy, you little minx, you

Okay. Can't guarantee I'll have a lot of time to devote to it but I'll have a look.

That's all I ask!

[JonathanL]

I would need to know how it is that the non-physical is supposed to be able to exert causal power over the physical, and I would similarly need to understand how the physical is supposed to exert causal power over the non-physical.

I'm going to try and not get into this discussion, but I just wanted to comment on this. I can kind of understand how these two considerations would give someone pause when it comes to accepting a worldview where the material/physical is not the only thing that makes up reality, but I don't see why someone would absolutely have to have answers to these two question before they can adopt a worldview that is not solely material. It would seem to me like if you have good enough reasons to believe in something non-physical, you would be justified in believing that it exists, even if you're unable to explain the exact mechanics of it's influence on the material, and vice versa, the influence of the physical on the non-material.

To me it just seems like these are considerations that would be nice to have answers to, but not necessarily something you would need to have answers on, before you could adopt something other than a materialist worldview.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'm going to try and not get into this discussion, but I just wanted to comment on this. I can kind of understand how these two considerations would give someone pause when it comes to accepting a worldview where the material/physical is not the only thing that makes up reality, but I don't see why someone would absolutely have to have answers to these two question before they can adopt a worldview that is not solely material. It would seem to me like if you have good enough reasons to believe in something non-physical, you would be justified in believing that it exists, even if you're unable to explain the exact mechanics of it's influence on the material, and vice versa, the influence of the physical on the non-material.

To me it just seems like these are considerations that would be nice to have answers to, but not necessarily something you would need to have answers on, before you could adopt something other than a materialist worldview.

That's definitely a reasonable question! To say that a thing is non-physical is to imply that it is not spatiotemporal. However, to say that a thing can exert causal power upon something physical would seem to imply that it is, at the very least, temporal. I'm looking for an answer to these questions because the very notion of causation seems to be contradictory to the notion of a non-physical entity.

Even if I were to accept that non-physical objects might exist, that doesn't imply that the mind is therefore a non-physical object. For example, someone who believes that the Platonic universals exist might still be unconvinced that the mind is non-physical. Since it seems that the mind stands in some causal relation to the physical and similarly that the physical stands in some causal relation to the mind, I would need answers as to how this is even possible before I could assent to the notion that the mind even could be non-physical in some way.

[JonathanL]

That's definitely a reasonable question! To say that a thing is non-physical is to imply that it is not spatiotemporal. However, to say that a thing can exert causal power upon something physical would seem to imply that it is, at the very least, temporal. I'm looking for an answer to these questions because the very notion of causation seems to be contradictory to the notion of a non-physical entity.

Even if I were to accept that non-physical objects might exist, that doesn't imply that the mind is therefore a non-physical object. For example, someone who believes that the Platonic universals exist might still be unconvinced that the mind is non-physical. Since it seems that the mind stands in some causal relation to the physical and similarly that the physical stands in some causal relation to the mind, I would need answers as to how this is even possible before I could assent to the notion that the mind even could be non-physical in some way.

Well, I said I was going to try and not involve myself in this discussion, but I just couldn't help it.

I would question your statement that non-physical entities are necessarily spatiotemporal. It would seem to me that the only thing that is necessary for an entity to be non-physical would be for it to lack spatial attributes. Even if time is bound to space in our physical universe it doesn't necessitate that there couldn't be entities that have temporal attributes, without having spatial ones, outside of our universe.

I have similar problems with your statement that the notion of causation is contradictory to the notion of a non-physical entity. I'm assuming you infer that from the way you defined non-physical as lacking spatiotemporal attributes, and (you can correct me on this if I'm wrong, I have a feeling the following might be considerations a B-theorist doesn't necessarily have to worry about) causation usually seen as something inherently temporal (the cause being earlier in time than it's effect) but it seems to me that causally dependent entities doesn't necessarily have to be in an "earlier and later than"-relation than with each other to stand in a causal relation to each other. Even if we don't see any such examples in the physical world, I would suggest that the classical Christian notion of the Father begetting the Son in eternity, even if it turned out to be false, at least seems to fulfill the criteria of causation (i.e the cause being the reason for the effects existence), in which the cause (the Father) and effect (the Son) are not being bound in an "earlier and later than"-relation to each other.

And with that said, I don't really see how it's so hard to swallow how a non-physical entity can stand in a causal relation to a physical entity. To me it seems like causation necessitates neither spatiality, nor temporality. At least to me it seems like the concept of causation can minimally be defined (a bit crudely) as "the notion that entities/events can depend on the existence of other entities/events for their own existence" and it seems to me that nothing in that definition necessitates any sort of spatial or temporal attributes for the entities/events that stand in a causal relation to each other, if causation is defined this way.

[Jim B.]

I just don't see why one should think that the intrinsicness or qualia would necessarily be lost.

Conscious phenomena are essentially subjective, ie one can come into direct contact with a conscious phenomenon only by having it. So they are essentially first-person in nature. Science deals with third-person phenomena. They are two different kinds of ontology.

Well, no, it's not only premised on a prior commitment to Naturalism. It is also premised on the observable fact that structural, chemical, and altogether physical changes to the brain can result in predictable changes to the mind, which suggests quite strongly that physical neurology must play at least some role in any theory of mind. Given that I am a Naturalist, that it seems neurology plays at least some role in the theory, and that there is no reason to reject neurology as the sole basis for a theory of mind, it seems like a perfect plausible thing to believe.

It plays some role, but why "sole basis"? As I said, you seem to be making the leap from "some" to "sole" primarily due to a prior commitment to naturalism, such commitment enabling you to ignore the anomalies I've been pointing out with such a project.

In contrast, before I could even consider a non-physical theory of mind, I would need to understand what it means for a thing to be non-physical, I would need to know how it is that the non-physical is supposed to be able to exert causal power over the physical, and I would similarly need to understand how the physical is supposed to exert causal power over the non-physical.

But as Chrawnus has said, if you have otherwise good overriding reasons to believe something, you're not required to supply a detailed account of how that thing occurs. Working scientists have a methodological grasp on physical theory but that working grasp doesn't mean they are required to know in a metaphysical sense what the groundwork of physicalism is. I can know that I decided to eat a ham sandwich rather than a salad without having the foggiest idea how I brought that decision about.

Well that would be another essential difference in our approaches, then: I see no reason to think that there are two different kinds of ontology at play, in the first place.

Subjective vs. objective. First-person vs. third-person. Dennett et al approach the subject as "third person absolutists," assuming from the outset that the third-person perspective just must subsume the first, but this surely is begging the crucial question in play.

Gotcha. Nah, I've got a thorough love for philosophy and abstraction. Don't get me wrong, I am absolutely fascinated by physics and the fascinating confirmation that data have provided for strange and wondrous theories. I'm simply more interested in the theories, themselves. I'm the type of nerd who would much rather read a calculus textbook or argue about the metaphysics of infinity than talk about the latest data collected from the LHC.

Yes, I've picked up on that. I appreciate the fact that you understand and value philosophy as much as science.

So you did have some idea of my meaning, then. Now who's being coy, you little minx, you

Awww, but I'm a naughty one, I am!!! But seriously, i was asking about your understanding of this Concept and how it plays into your philosophy.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Well, I said I was going to try and not involve myself in this discussion, but I just couldn't help it.

It just draws us in!

I would question your statement that non-physical entities are necessarily spatiotemporal. It would seem to me that the only thing that is necessary for an entity to be non-physical would be for it to lack spatial attributes. Even if time is bound to space in our physical universe it doesn't necessitate that there couldn't be entities that have temporal attributes, without having spatial ones, outside of our universe.

I could understand positing the existence of something which is temporal but non-spatial, but Time has usually been considered to be a part of physical reality, both in philosophy and in science. As such, when someone tells me a thing is non-physical, I tend to think of something which has absolutely no physical qualities, and temporal attributes would seem to be physical qualities, in my understanding. Again, I'll point to my usual go-to example of non-physical entities, the Platonic universals.

I have similar problems with your statement that the notion of causation is contradictory to the notion of a non-physical entity. I'm assuming you infer that from the way you defined non-physical as lacking spatiotemporal attributes, and (you can correct me on this if I'm wrong, I have a feeling the following might be considerations a B-theorist doesn't necessarily have to worry about) causation usually seen as something inherently temporal (the cause being earlier in time than it's effect) but it seems to me that causally dependent entities doesn't necessarily have to be in an "earlier and later than"-relation than with each other to stand in a causal relation to each other. Even if we don't see any such examples in the physical world, I would suggest that the classical Christian notion of the Father begetting the Son in eternity, even if it turned out to be false, at least seems to fulfill the criteria of causation (i.e the cause being the reason for the effects existence), in which the cause (the Father) and effect (the Son) are not being bound in an "earlier and later than"-relation to each other.

I do, indeed, tend to view causation as a temporal process. The whole notion of causation seems to be an analysis of change. If nothing is changing, I'm honestly unsure as to what "causation" is supposed to mean.

So, in your example of the Father begetting the Son in eternity, I don't know what it means to refer to the Father as a cause and the Son as an effect. If both are eternal, and nothing about them is actually changing, what does it even mean to be an effect? How would we differentiate this from, say, two persons of a triune deity which do not stand in causal relation to one another?

And with that said, I don't really see how it's so hard to swallow how a non-physical entity can stand in a causal relation to a physical entity. To me it seems like causation necessitates neither spatiality, nor temporality. At least to me it seems like the concept of causation can minimally be defined (a bit crudely) as "the notion that entities/events can depend on the existence of other entities/events for their own existence" and it seems to me that nothing in that definition necessitates any sort of spatial or temporal attributes for the entities/events that stand in a causal relation to each other, if causation is defined this way.

I probably should have read the whole reply before beginning to respond, since this answers my above question...

However, this seems to be a wholly different usage of the notion of "causation" than was meant in my earlier questions. Here, you are talking about a notion of existential dependence whereas I was earlier talking about the explanation for an entity changing over time. It's not at all clear to me that the two can be thought equivalent.

I'm asking how a non-physical entity could, say, cause a hand to close into a fist. This isn't a matter of existential dependence. The hand doesn't depend on the non-physical entity to exist. It is, however, a question of temporal change-- first the hand was open, then it was closed, and something effected this change. If we agree that the mind stands in causal relation to this change, and if we posit that the mind is non-spatiotemporal, then I think it is reasonable to ask how it could possibly stand in causal relation to a temporal change.

Now, if we are talking about something temporal but non-spatial, I'll agree that this alleviates my concerns about causation. As I mentioned, I would just be curious as to why someone would label anything which is temporal as being non-physical.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Conscious phenomena are essentially subjective, ie one can come into direct contact with a conscious phenomenon only by having it. So they are essentially first-person in nature. Science deals with third-person phenomena. They are two different kinds of ontology.

To claim that conscious phenomena are essentially subjective is to beg the entire question under discussion, though. That is claiming that there is no possible way that conscious experience can be disassembled into physical constituents and recreated. This is exactly what I have been saying I am not convinced is the case.

It plays some role, but why "sole basis"? As I said, you seem to be making the leap from "some" to "sole" primarily due to a prior commitment to naturalism, such commitment enabling you to ignore the anomalies I've been pointing out with such a project.

It is certainly not an unwarranted leap. When I find a cat toy in my shoe while getting ready for work in the morning, it's perfectly reasonable to believe that one of my cats put it their on their own. I'm not making an unwarranted leap by not considering the possibility that they were aided in this task by some non-physical entity. In exactly the same way, all of my experience with minds seems to be physical, I have direct evidence that the mind affects physical things, and I have direct evidence that the mind is affected by physical things. However, I have zero experience with, understanding of, or evidence for non-physical aspects of mind. So why should I entertain such notions without placing a considerable burden of proof on someone trying to convince me of such a theory?

And, again, I'm not ignoring any anomalies. You have pointed to things which you think are almost insurmountable hurdles for a physical theory of mind, but I don't agree with those assertions. You've said that you think mental events have a wholly different ontology than do physical events, but that is just another way of saying that mental events are not physical which is the proposition I doubted in the first place. I've asked you if you think there is anything inherently contradictory or incoherent about physical processes underlying mental events, and unless I'm misremembering, you didn't illustrate any such incoherencies. It's not as if you've given a knock-down argument that I've just hand-waived away.

But as Chrawnus has said, if you have otherwise good overriding reasons to believe something, you're not required to supply a detailed account of how that thing occurs. Working scientists have a methodological grasp on physical theory but that working grasp doesn't mean they are required to know in a metaphysical sense what the groundwork of physicalism is. I can know that I decided to eat a ham sandwich rather than a salad without having the foggiest idea how I brought that decision about.

Certainly! As I said in my reply to Chrawnus, the problem I see is that it seems entirely incoherent, to me, to assert that a non-physical thing could cause anything, let alone that it could cause physical changes.

Subjective vs. objective. First-person vs. third-person. Dennett et al approach the subject as "third person absolutists," assuming from the outset that the third-person perspective just must subsume the first, but this surely is begging the crucial question in play.

How is it not question begging to simply assert that there must exist two separate ontologies, here?

Yes, I've picked up on that. I appreciate the fact that you understand and value philosophy as much as science.

I get particularly jazzed for the philosophy of math. There may have been occasions where I've gotten drunk and ended up teaching strangers in the bar the basics of Set Theory...

Awww, but I'm a naughty one, I am!!! But seriously, i was asking about your understanding of this Concept and how it plays into your philosophy.

What about it would you like to know? Presuming you have no issue with the definition I've given, are you asking me how much access I think we have to Truth or similar questions? I'm honestly not understanding what it is that you would like to know.

[JonathanL]

It just draws us in!

I could understand positing the existence of something which is temporal but non-spatial, but Time has usually been considered to be a part of physical reality, both in philosophy and in science. As such, when someone tells me a thing is non-physical, I tend to think of something which has absolutely no physical qualities, and temporal attributes would seem to be physical qualities, in my understanding. Again, I'll point to my usual go-to example of non-physical entities, the Platonic universals.

Well, if the human (or any other creaturely) mind is non-physical, then we would have such an example of a non-physical thing with temporal qualities, no? Even if you disagree that the mind is non-physical, the idea is at least conceivable to you, right? It's perfectly possible to envision a consciousness (or being a consciousness) that is not bound to physical matter in any way, but which still undergoes changes in it's conscious states, or at least it seems that way to me.

I do, indeed, tend to view causation as a temporal process. The whole notion of causation seems to be an analysis of change. If nothing is changing, I'm honestly unsure as to what "causation" is supposed to mean.

So, in your example of the Father begetting the Son in eternity, I don't know what it means to refer to the Father as a cause and the Son as an effect. If both are eternal, and nothing about them is actually changing, what does it even mean to be an effect? How would we differentiate this from, say, two persons of a triune deity which do not stand in causal relation to one another?

I probably should have read the whole reply before beginning to respond, since this answers my above question...

However, this seems to be a wholly different usage of the notion of "causation" than was meant in my earlier questions. Here, you are talking about a notion of existential dependence whereas I was earlier talking about the explanation for an entity changing over time. It's not at all clear to me that the two can be thought equivalent.

I would say my definition is more general, and your notion of causation as an analysis of change is subsumed under my minimally defined notion. The kind of causation that is temporal and involves change (i.e the one you're talking about) is still perfectly in line with the definition I gave, since we're still talking about the fact that the existence of an event (i.e someone kicking a rock) still gives rise to the existence of another event (the rock being sent flying) the difference between the kind of causation that is involved in the begetting of the Son and temporal causation being that in the latter cause and effect follow each other in a temporal chain, while in the former cause and effect are simultaneous.

What I'm trying to say here is basically that my notion of causation allows for both temporal, and atemporal causation.

I'm asking how a non-physical entity could, say, cause a hand to close into a fist. This isn't a matter of existential dependence. The hand doesn't depend on the non-physical entity to exist. It is, however, a question of temporal change-- first the hand was open, then it was closed, and something effected this change. If we agree that the mind stands in causal relation to this change, and if we posit that the mind is non-spatiotemporal, then I think it is reasonable to ask how it could possibly stand in causal relation to a temporal change.

Now, if we are talking about something temporal but non-spatial, I'll agree that this alleviates my concerns about causation. As I mentioned, I would just be curious as to why someone would label anything which is temporal as being non-physical.

My answer to that would be that it seems to me like my mind (obviously I can't speak for anyone else, not having access to anyone elses first person experiences) shares absolutely none of the qualities that are fundamental to matter/the physical (like tangibility, visibility, locality, taking up space etc...) except for the quality of being temporal. That indicates to me that:

1) Mind is fundamentally different from matter.

2) The quality of being temporal might be a necessary condition for being physical, but it's not a sufficient condition.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Well, if the human (or any other creaturely) mind is non-physical, then we would have such an example of a non-physical thing with temporal qualities, no? Even if you disagree that the mind is non-physical, the idea is at least conceivable to you, right? It's perfectly possible to envision a consciousness (or being a consciousness) that is not bound to physical matter in any way, but which still undergoes changes in it's conscious states, or at least it seems that way to me.

Again, I'm just not understanding why we would label something which is temporal as "non-physical." Time is a physical thing. For example, even if a mind is in some way non-spatial, surely you agree that the mind's experience of time accords with physical laws such as Special and General Relativity, right?

I would say my definition is more general, and your notion of causation as an analysis of change is subsumed under my minimally defined notion. The kind of causation that is temporal and involves change (i.e the one you're talking about) is still perfectly in line with the definition I gave, since we're still talking about the fact that the existence of an event (i.e someone kicking a rock) still gives rise to the existence of another event (the rock being sent flying) the difference between the kind of causation that is involved in the begetting of the Son and temporal causation being that in the latter cause and effect follow each other in a temporal chain, while in the former cause and effect are simultaneous.

This still seems peculiar, to me. In the case of the Father and Son, we have a dependence relation which does not describe any change in either Father or Son. In the case of a mind causing the body to kick a rock, it would seem that there is a temporal change effected in both the mind and the body. The mind goes from not willing the body to move, to willing the body to move, and back to not willing the body to move, over a given interval of time. That's not simply an atemporal dependence relation.

Incidentally, I believe this is actually precisely the reason that William Lane Craig deviates from the usual notions of Classical Theology and asserts that God is "temporal with creation."

My answer to that would be that it seems to me like my mind (obviously I can't speak for anyone else, not having access to anyone elses first person experiences) shares absolutely none of the qualities that are fundamental to matter/the physical (like tangibility, visibility, locality, taking up space etc...) except for the quality of being temporal.

Surely you have the sense that your mind also has the quality of being spatially located, even if you don't feel like your mind has any spatial volume, don't you?

The quality of being temporal might be a necessary condition for being physical, but it's not a sufficient condition.

I'm not trying to be obtuse, here, but this honestly makes as little sense to me as someone saying, "The quality of being spatial might be a necessary condition for being physical, but it's not a sufficient condition." Again, the common line of thought throughout Western philosophy for millennia has been that Time, itself, is physical; and this position is heavily supported by modern physics.

[JonathanL]

Again, I'm just not understanding why we would label something which is temporal as "non-physical." Time is a physical thing. For example, even if a mind is in some way non-spatial, surely you agree that the mind's experience of time accords with physical laws such as Special and General Relativity, right?

But time being bound to the physical doesn't necessitate that time itself is physical. Time itself is the unidirectional ordering (or coming into being if you're an A-theorist) of events/changes in existence, and I don't see anything in that which shows that simply being temporal in and of itself is sufficient to define something as physical.

This still seems peculiar, to me. In the case of the Father and Son, we have a dependence relation which does not describe any change in either Father or Son. In the case of a mind causing the body to kick a rock, it would seem that there is a temporal change effected in both the mind and the body. The mind goes from not willing the body to move, to willing the body to move, and back to not willing the body to move, over a given interval of time. That's not simply an atemporal dependence relation.

You're correct, it is not an atemporal dependence relation. I'm saying that the way I'm defining causation it allows for both the notion of atemporal dependence relation, and the kind of temporal causation that describes the kind of change that happens when the mind goes from not willing the body to move, to willing the body to move, and so on... The definition of causation I gave would be agnostic (not sure if agnostic is the right word in this context or not, but I'll use it in want of a more fitting term) in regards to the question of whether temporality is involved in a certain cause-and-effect relationship or not.

Incidentally, I believe this is actually precisely the reason that William Lane Craig deviates from the usual notions of Classical Theology and asserts that God is "temporal with creation."

It definitely seems like that would be the logical outcome if God creates the universe if A-theory is true.

Surely you have the sense that your mind also has the quality of being spatially located, even if you don't feel like your mind has any spatial volume, don't you?

I think that is an effect of having awareness only of a specific spatial location, but I'm less sure if the mind only being aware of the spatial location in which the body/brain is present is necessarily the same thing as the mind actually being spatially located in the body. It might be that it is the case, but it's definitely not a logical necessity. I can easily come up with thought experiments where the mind would be aware of a singular spatial location, while in itself it's not anywhere near that location itself, and the step from that to "not spatially located anywhere at all" doesn't seem that big of a step to me.

I'm not trying to be obtuse, here, but this honestly makes as little sense to me as someone saying, "The quality of being spatial might be a necessary condition for being physical, but it's not a sufficient condition." Again, the common line of thought throughout Western philosophy for millennia has been that Time, itself, is physical; and this position is heavily supported by modern physics.

Well, to me it just seems much more reasonable to posit that the physical is temporal, but not necessarily the other way around. At least for me it seems logically possible for temporal things that are not physical to exist.

[Jim B.]

To claim that conscious phenomena are essentially subjective is to beg the entire question under discussion, though. That is claiming that there is no possible way that conscious experience can be disassembled into physical constituents and recreated. This is exactly what I have been saying I am not convinced is the case.

Without the phenomenal, experiential aspects of consciousness, then conscious events are bundles of dispositions. The seemings are lost, which is what semantically and conceptually pick out the events as conscious events in the first place. They are the rigid designators for such events. Without being tied to a particular point of view, what would a conscious event be like? How would it be differentiatable from a disposition of some sort or other neural state? It can't be 'begging the question' if there have been physicalist responses to the above definition.

It is certainly not an unwarranted leap. When I find a cat toy in my shoe while getting ready for work in the morning, it's perfectly reasonable to believe that one of my cats put it their on their own. I'm not making an unwarranted leap by not considering the possibility that they were aided in this task by some non-physical entity. In exactly the same way, all of my experience with minds seems to be physical, I have direct evidence that the mind affects physical things, and I have direct evidence that the mind is affected by physical things. However, I have zero experience with, understanding of, or evidence for non-physical aspects of mind. So why should I entertain such notions without placing a considerable burden of proof on someone trying to convince me of such a theory?

But you may be in the grip of a theory. (I may be too.)You're primed and predisposed to seeing things as constituted causally and dispositionally. You were asking for specific mechanical details of HOW it could be. I was responding by saying that if we have compelling evidence for something, we may have solid justification THAT it happens but not HOW it happens. I have evidence that my experiences, although causally related to physical reality, by the nature of the things that they are, are not constituted physically, and that my thought processes, using reasons, are not physically, causally constituted. My thought occurs in a reasons-space, not cranial-neural space. And as far as causation, no one is really sure what causation is, or what exactly is meant by the word 'physical.'

And, again, I'm not ignoring any anomalies. You have pointed to things which you think are almost insurmountable hurdles for a physical theory of mind, but I don't agree with those assertions. You've said that you think mental events have a wholly different ontology than do physical events, but that is just another way of saying that mental events are not physical which is the proposition I doubted in the first place. I've asked you if you think there is anything inherently contradictory or incoherent about physical processes underlying mental events, and unless I'm misremembering, you didn't illustrate any such incoherencies. It's not as if you've given a knock-down argument that I've just hand-waived away.

Of course physical processes 'underlie' mental events in some sense. I think that again betrays the 'causal-dispositional bias' of physicalism to assume that this equals constitution. And I have pointed out inconsistencies. I'll go over them again, trying a different approach.

Certainly! As I said in my reply to Chrawnus, the problem I see is that it seems entirely incoherent, to me, to assert that a non-physical thing could cause anything, let alone that it could cause physical changes.

Be careful, again, conflating "that" and "how." And as you've said, difficulty in imagining something, used alone, is a poor predictor of the truth, especially in areas that are so metaphysically vexed, such as concepts like 'physical' and 'cause.'

How is it not question begging to simply assert that there must exist two separate ontologies, here?

I dunno, cause of the meanings of the words and concepts involved, maybe?

What about it would you like to know? Presuming you have no issue with the definition I've given, are you asking me how much access I think we have to Truth or similar questions? I'm honestly not understanding what it is that you would like to know.

Wow. This is like pulling teeth. WHAT IS YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE 'CONCEPT OF TRUTH' AND WHAT ROLE DOES IT PLAY IN YOUR OVERALL PHILOSOPHY?

[Jim B.]

So now God is bi-polar!

That might explain some things!

[seer]

That might explain some things!

On judgement day could you not stand next to me?