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The Nature of Time: A-Theory vs. B-Theory

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  • #16
    Originally posted by JimL View Post
    Sure, but all of those things would be just as determined as the choices we make. I don't see how that supports compatibalism within the deterministic B-theory of time.
    As far as whether there is support for some form of compatabilism or not. I do not believe there is support for hard determinism except for the assertion that it is true. The only one that fails completely is libertarian free will.

    I do not like categorizing time according to A nor B theory. In my view time simply exists in a time space universe. I will object to the description of time in terms of moments or any other human construct of divisions of time. As far as free will I do not believe in the extremes of libertarian nor Mechanistic hard determinism where we do not have any free will. I acknowledge that our choices are influenced and determined by many factors, but I believe over time we do have a range of possible choices in many situations that can change the course of future cause and effect outcomes. I believe the fact that we have a range of possible choices in many different situations that there is a possibility of limited free will.
    Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
    Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
    But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

    go with the flow the river knows . . .

    Frank

    I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

    Comment


    • #17
      Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
      As far as whether there is support for some form of compatabilism or not. I do not believe there is support for hard determinism except for the assertion that it is true. The only one that fails completely is libertarian free will.
      The evidence, from a laymans perspective, I believe goes like this. All of the atoms that make up the world, at the beginning of time, the Big Bang, began their journey through the universe, and from that beginning they are fated, determined to go wherever it is they end up. They don't have free will. Well, those atoms are the building blocks, so to speak, of you and me, of our nervous systems, are brains. Therefore, we, who are composed of these determined atoms, must also be determined. It's physics.
      I do not like categorizing time according to A nor B theory.
      Okay.
      In my view time simply exists in a time space universe.
      Right, but the question is, is the universe, are we, determined. And those are the only 2 theories of time I can think of. The future is either open or closed. Do you have another theory?
      I will object to the description of time in terms of moments or any other human construct of divisions of time.
      Okay, object away my friend.

      As far as free will I do not believe in the extremes of libertarian nor Mechanistic hard determinism where we do not have any free will. I acknowledge that our choices are influenced and determined by many factors, but I believe over time we do have a range of possible choices in many situations that can change the course of future cause and effect outcomes. I believe the fact that we have a range of possible choices in many different situations that there is a possibility of limited free will.
      But having a range of possible choices isn't the same thing as having the will to freely choose either one of those possible choices. We always feel as though we are freely choosing, but, we can never know whether we freely chose it, or if we were determined to choose it. I haven't accepted the B-theory because that feeling of free will is so strong, it's difficult to accept. But the only evidence I'm aware of, seems to point to it.
      Last edited by JimL; 05-16-2020, 09:52 PM.

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      • #18
        [QUOTE=JimL;738712]The evidence, from a laymans perspective, I believe goes like this. All of the atoms that make up the world, at the beginning of time, the Big Bang, began their journey through the universe, and from that beginning they are fated, determined to go wherever it is they end up. They don't have free will. Well, those atoms are the building blocks, so to speak, of you and me, of our nervous systems, are brains. Therefore, we, who are composed of these determined atoms, must also be determined. It's physics.

        Okay.

        Right, but the question is, is the universe, are we, determined. And those are the only 2 theories of time I can think of. The future is either open or closed. Do you have another theory?

        Okay, object away my friend.


        But having a range of possible choices isn't the same thing as having the will to freely choose either one of those possible choices.
        No, but it does not negate the possibility of limited free will.

        We always feel as though we are freely choosing, but, we can never know whether we freely chose it, or if we were determined to choose it. I haven't excepted the B-theory because that feeling of free will is so strong, it's difficult to accept. But the only evidence I'm aware of, seems to point to it.
        True, but I am not relying on that to justify an argument for limited free will. It does not necessarily point to anything.
        Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
        Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
        But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

        go with the flow the river knows . . .

        Frank

        I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

        Comment


        • #19
          Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
          No, but it does not negate the possibility of limited free will.
          True, it doesn't negate the possibility, but it isn't eveidence of free will either. Of course there are a range of possible choices, otherwise there'd be nothing to discuss. If there weren't a range of posssible choices, we'd already know the answer, there'd be no free will.


          True, but I am not relying on that to justify an argument for limited free will.
          What are you relying on? The range of possible choices idea alone does nothing ton support your argument for free will. Don't get me wrong, I hope you're right, but you haven't supported compatibilsm by positing "a range of possible choices."

          It does not necessarily point to anything.
          Physics doesn't point to determinism?

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
            What is Time?






            DETERMINISM
            The nature of the B-Theory seems to entail that some form of Determinism must also be true. Those who are committed to the Libertarian notion of free-will are therefore likely to find B-Theory understandings of Time to be entirely unpalatable.

            I am not a Libertarian, with regards to free-will, so this objection doesn't really exert much power, in my eyes. However, I can certainly understand how it might be much more concerning to other people.
            Excellent post, BP. I'll have more to say about it later, but one point in passing: If I recall, Boethius, in his "Consolation of Philosophy" argued that basically the B-Theory (from a theist perspective) is compatible with libertarian free will. He wrote that all moments of time are equally present to God and that God eternally knows everything that we have ever done and will ever do, but that this knowledge doesn't mean that we are determined to do those things. (Knowledge doesn't = metaphysical determinism.) Polkinghorne makes the same point that the nature of time is logically distinct from questions of what happens within that frame of reference. Intuitively it seems that the B-Theory entails determinism, but I'm not sure if it really does.

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by JimL View Post
              Sure, but all of those things would be just as determined as the choices we make. I don't see how that supports compatibalism within the deterministic B-theory of time.
              Compatibilism actually is a form of metaphysical determinism. Compatibilists believe that all of our actions are determined by the past but that we have circumstantial freedom, ie we are free to act on our wills and desires. They believe we have the kind of freedom that makes us fit subjects for moral responsibility, but they don't think we are really free, that we could have done otherwise. So it could be a clockwork universe as BP is saying and one could still be a compatibilist.

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by JimL View Post
                True, it doesn't negate the possibility, but it isn't eveidence of free will either. Of course there are a range of possible choices, otherwise there'd be nothing to discuss. If there weren't a range of possible choices, we'd already know the answer, there'd be no free will.
                That's a huge IF not substantiated by the evidence.

                What are you relying on? The range of possible choices idea alone does nothing ton support your argument for free will. Don't get me wrong, I hope you're right, but you haven't supported compatibilsm by positing "a range of possible choices."
                Relying on? Neither side of the argument has that firm of ground to rely on at present. The variability of the decision among possible choices given any possible outcome allows for the possibility of a limited free will in any given situation. The variation in the outcome of the choices is not explained by hard determinism


                Physics doesn't point to determinism?
                Yes physics points to determinism, but not the hard determinism to the point of negating a degree of free will.
                Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                go with the flow the river knows . . .

                Frank

                I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                  Compatibilism actually is a form of metaphysical determinism. Compatibilists believe that all of our actions are determined by the past but that we have circumstantial freedom, ie we are free to act on our wills and desires. They believe we have the kind of freedom that makes us fit subjects for moral responsibility, but they don't think we are really free, that we could have done otherwise. So it could be a clockwork universe as BP is saying and one could still be a compatibilist.
                  That sounds like a contradiction to me, Jim. Determined but free? How does that work? But, as far as the B-theory of time is concerned, there can be no freedom because each moment in time is real, the past, present and future are all just as real. We don't make choices, we just somehow experience them like we experience the illusion of time passing.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                    That's a huge IF not substantiated by the evidence.
                    No, it's just that a variety of options tells us nothing about whether the option chosen is freely chosen or not.


                    Relying on? Neither side of the argument has that firm of ground to rely on at present. The variability of the decision among possible choices given any possible outcome allows for the possibility of a limited free will in any given situation. The variation in the outcome of the choices is not explained by hard determinism
                    Why call it limited then, what's the limiting factor? I don't see how the variability of decisions/choices available says anything about whether the decsion/choice made is a free one. But the B-theory doesn't allow for any decision/choices because the future is fixed, it's as real as the past and not open to change. How do you fit free will of any sort into a closed future.



                    Yes physics points to determinism, but not the hard determinism to the point of negating a degree of free will.
                    And how do you get around the physics?

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by Jim B. View Post
                      Compatibilism actually is a form of metaphysical determinism. Compatibilists believe that all of our actions are determined by the past but that we have circumstantial freedom, ie we are free to act on our wills and desires. They believe we have the kind of freedom that makes us fit subjects for moral responsibility, but they don't think we are really free, that we could have done otherwise. So it could be a clockwork universe as BP is saying and one could still be a compatibilist.
                      I do not consider most compatibilists making metaphysical claims.
                      Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                      Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                      But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                      go with the flow the river knows . . .

                      Frank

                      I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                        I do not consider most compatibilists making metaphysical claims.
                        What do you mean by that statement? Do you mean you don't take most compatibilists seriously when they make metaphysical claims, or do you mean you don't consider most compatibilists to be making metaphysical claims?

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by Chrawnus View Post
                          What do you mean by that statement? Do you mean you don't take most compatibilists seriously when they make metaphysical claims, or do you mean you don't consider most compatibilists to be making metaphysical claims?
                          I do not consider most compatibilists to be making metaphysical claims.
                          Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                          Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                          But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                          go with the flow the river knows . . .

                          Frank

                          I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                            I do not consider most compatibilists to be making metaphysical claims.
                            That sounds strange to me. The very statement that free will is compatible with determinism is a metaphysical claim.

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                              I do not consider most compatibilists making metaphysical claims.
                              They're saying that the past plus the laws of nature necessitate the future, but even so, we are still "free" to act on our wills and desires. So they are metaphysical determinists.

                              Comment


                              • #30
                                Originally posted by JimL View Post
                                That sounds like a contradiction to me, Jim. Determined but free? How does that work? But, as far as the B-theory of time is concerned, there can be no freedom because each moment in time is real, the past, present and future are all just as real. We don't make choices, we just somehow experience them like we experience the illusion of time passing.
                                Yeah, I don't think compatibilism makes much sense. That's why I'm an INcompatibilist. They define 'freedom' as 'lack of constraints.' As long as no one and nothing is externally coercing me against my will and desires, then I am 'free,' even though my will and desires are ultimately necessitated by the past and the laws of nature. For an incompatibilist, even though I could not have done otherwise than to choose vanilla, as long as choosing vanilla arose from 'inside me,' ie from my own will and desires, then it is my own 'free' decision and I am morally responsible for it. I don't think it makes that much sense.

                                As far as determinism and the B-Series, imagine for a moment that God knows timelessly every moment and every event in space-time. He timelessly knows everything that you will ever do. So God exists in the B-Series, because "Now" holds no special priority for Him. All moments are tenselessly equal. But the mere fact that He knows all events doesn't mean that He necessitates all events. He could very well have known for all eternity that I would freely choose vanilla. It's like if you watch a video of a news event. In a crude sense, you are in the B-Series relative to the recorded events; there's no absolute 'now' for you within those events. But the mere fact that you are in that position relative to those events doesn't mean that there is any necessitation within those events. There may be, but that's logically another question.

                                If the past necessitates the present/future, that seems to assume that the past has priority over the future, that it is exerting causal necessity over it, which is a tensed understanding. But tenselessness would have to remain agnostic, it seems, on what happens within the series. Within time, there may be freedom, indeterminacy, or hard determinacy, but that may be a different question.

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