B Theory Of Time...

[Jim B.]

That's a logical contradiction.

How so?

[JimL]

How so?

Because if a god could see all of time from the outside, then all of time has to exist. You can't say that all of time exists from any perspective, unless all of time exist from any perspective. If god can see the future, then the future must exist.

[Jim B.]

Then Time is actually B-theory and you just think it is A-theory.

Why? Perspectives are real. God would have created a real "inside" to His creation including real subjective points of view. The most "objective" point of view is not the only one that's 'real'.

[Jim B.]

That doesn't make sense to me.

Imagine if I look at a film of an actual event. Every frame of that film is equally real to me. That film exists as the B-Series for me. But my B-relation to it does not have any bearing on the nature of the actions depicted in the film. (Granted it's not a great analogy because it's a recording.) Every micro-event recorded on the film is fixed, but the fact that it's fixed seems independent of what's going on inside the film. It can always be the fact that Mary freely lifts her arm or that she determinedly lifts her arm.

[Jim B.]

Because if a god could see all of time from the outside, then all of time has to exist. You can't say that all of time exists from any perspective, unless all of time exist from any perspective. If god can see the future, then the future must exist.

All of time exists from God's perspective, but an 'inside' of time exists from God's perspective as well. Just like a 'spatial aspect' to the idea of space, and a qualitative aspect to consciousness. What if a 'creaturely inside perspective' were just as real for God as any other perspective?

[JimL]

All of time exists from God's perspective, but an 'inside' of time exists from God's perspective as well. Just like a 'spatial aspect' to the idea of space, and a qualitative aspect to consciousness. What if a 'creaturely inside perspective' were just as real for God as any other perspective?

The point is that the future can not both exist and not exist. If it exists from one perspective, then it exist even if from another perspective it can't be seen.

[Jim B.]

The point is that the future can not both exist and not exist. If it exists from one perspective, then it exist even if from another perspective it can't be seen.

Yes, it would exist, but that doesn't mean the A-perspective would necessarily be less real. It would be like saying that subjectivity is less real than objectivity just because the latter perspective can know things the former perspective doesn't have access to.

[JimL]

Yes, it would exist, but that doesn't mean the A-perspective would necessarily be less real. It would be like saying that subjectivity is less real than objectivity just because the latter perspective can know things the former perspective doesn't have access to.

I think you're misunderstanding, Jim. Only one of the theories can be actually true. If B-theory, which posits that all of time is real, is true, then A-theory, which posits the idea that the future is open, can't also be true.
If one is true, then the other must needs be false. The future can not be both open and closed, thus the logical contradiction. That's the mistake that Sparko is making, trying to fit the one theory, an open future, into the other, a closed future.

[Sparko]

I think you're misunderstanding, Jim. Only one of the theories can be actually true. If B-theory, which posits that all of time is real, is true, then A-theory, which posits the idea that the future is open, can't also be true.
If one is true, then the other must needs be false. The future can not be both open and closed, thus the logical contradiction. That's the mistake that Sparko is making, trying to fit the one theory, an open future, into the other, a closed future.

no. actually I agree with you. If the future exists, then the A-theory is false. I was just showing how free will could be part of the B-theory.

[JimL]

no. actually I agree with you. If the future exists, then the A-theory is false.

I think you probably mean that if the future is open, then B-theory is false

I was just showing how free will could be part of the B-theory.

I undertstand that's what you were trying to do, but if the future is closed, as in B-theory, then I don't see any way in which the present you can effect change by freely choosing a differnt future. Perhaps there is a way, but I have yet to see one.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

My apologies, guys! I've been away from a proper computer for a few days, so I haven't had a chance to weigh in. Hope you guys don't mind my catching up, a tad.

well, every moment or "slice" of your timeline all think they are in "Now" and they are as far as they are concerned. Right now you think "this is now!" and in two seconds you will think the same thing. So "both of you", the one right now reading this, and the one from two seconds ago, both thought that they were in "now" but look, another few seconds have passed and the you of right now thinks it is now.

The reason you have access to the past but not the future is because of the way our memories work, they are additive and the way time works. It is one way.

Entropy. Time only works in one direction. Each frame of you is created from an addition of all previous frames, so your brain contains all of the past memories, but that frame is still "behind" the future frames of you, so it can't have the memories of the future. Time is a dimension which has directions, back and forward. Like a ruler, each line is higher than the ones to the left, but lower than the ones to the right. 1...2...3...4...5... - It all exists at the same time, but 2 is always lower than 3 but higher than 1, etc.

This is precisely the way I understand it.

I used this example in another thread, but I'll say it again, here:

You know that old thought experiment about a guy created 5 seconds ago with 30 years worth of memories? On the basis of his memory, that man would be convinced that he had lived all of those 30 years and would not be able to discern simply from his own psychological state that he hadn't lived those 30 years. This would be true for him even if we looked only at a freeze-frame of his psychological state solely in the exact moment of his creation, right? Now, imagine if, one second after that man was created he is destroyed; and imagine a second man is created at that exact moment in the exact same spatial position with all the same memories which the first had been given at creation PLUS the memory of what Man #1 experienced prior to being destroyed. Man #2 would be convinced that he was, indeed, the same person as Man #1 and would be unable to tell that there was any sort of disjunction. Another second passes and Man #2 is destroyed while Man #3 is created with the original memories plus memory of Man #1's experience prior to destruction plus memory of Man #2's experience prior to destruction. Man #3 would be convinced he had experienced all of the things in his memory despite the fact that he had only just been created. This process could be repeated indefinitely with each newly created Man being truly convinced that he had been having continuous experiences the entire time.

Compressing the amount of time from a full second down to half a second, or a tenth, or a Planck second, or even to a single indivisible moment (if one believes Time to be continuous) wouldn't alter this. Each Man in the chain would still be convinced that he had experienced everything in the chain prior to his existence and would have the impression of a continuous, changing existence leading up to that moment.

A B-Theory chain of temporally ordered psychological states would be exactly the same, except without all the messiness of ontological creation and destruction. Each psychological state would be convinced it had arrived at that moment through a continuous flow of moments in time.

[JimL]

My apologies, guys! I've been away from a proper computer for a few days, so I haven't had a chance to weigh in. Hope you guys don't mind my catching up, a tad.


This is precisely the way I understand it.

I used this example in another thread, but I'll say it again, here:

You know that old thought experiment about a guy created 5 seconds ago with 30 years worth of memories? On the basis of his memory, that man would be convinced that he had lived all of those 30 years and would not be able to discern simply from his own psychological state that he hadn't lived those 30 years. This would be true for him even if we looked only at a freeze-frame of his psychological state solely in the exact moment of his creation, right? Now, imagine if, one second after that man was created he is destroyed; and imagine a second man is created at that exact moment in the exact same spatial position with all the same memories which the first had been given at creation PLUS the memory of what Man #1 experienced prior to being destroyed. Man #2 would be convinced that he was, indeed, the same person as Man #1 and would be unable to tell that there was any sort of disjunction. Another second passes and Man #2 is destroyed while Man #3 is created with the original memories plus memory of Man #1's experience prior to destruction plus memory of Man #2's experience prior to destruction. Man #3 would be convinced he had experienced all of the things in his memory despite the fact that he had only just been created. This process could be repeated indefinitely with each newly created Man being truly convinced that he had been having continuous experiences the entire time.

Compressing the amount of time from a full second down to half a second, or a tenth, or a Planck second, or even to a single indivisible moment (if one believes Time to be continuous) wouldn't alter this. Each Man in the chain would still be convinced that he had experienced everything in the chain prior to his existence and would have the impression of a continuous, changing existence leading up to that moment.

A B-Theory chain of temporally ordered psychological states would be exactly the same, except without all the messiness of ontological creation and destruction. Each psychological state would be convinced it had arrived at that moment through a continuous flow of moments in time.

The illusion of memory would be real, but free will wouldn't enter the picture, right?

[seer]

My apologies, guys! I've been away from a proper computer for a few days, so I haven't had a chance to weigh in. Hope you guys don't mind my catching up, a tad.


This is precisely the way I understand it.

But Sparko's point relies on the idea that time only works in one direction. But there is no direction of time in B Theory, and that is a point that has not been answered. Why do we only have knowledge of past and present events but not future events? Why are they privileged? If the 1968 me exist, the 2020 me exist and the 2026 me exist why don't I have knowledge of the 2026 me?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But Sparko's point relies on the idea that time only works in one direction. But there is no direction of time in B Theory, and that is a point that has not been answered. Why do we only have knowledge of past and present events but not future events? Why are they privileged? If the 1968 me exist, the 2020 me exist and the 2026 me exist why don't I have knowledge of the 2026 me?

There is absolutely a direction of Time on the B-Theory! As Sparko noted, that Arrow of Time seems to be a function of entropy, with rising entropic states of a system being that which defines the progression from earlier-than to later-than. In a purely physical theory of mind, it would seem reasonable to think that the neurology underlying psychological states follows this same entropic pattern.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The illusion of memory would be real, but free will wouldn't enter the picture, right?

I'm a Compatibilist. I see nothing in this which would negate the idea of free-will, in general. It would stand in contraposition to Libertarian notions of free-will, but I'm not really convinced that these latter are cogent in the first place.