B Theory Of Time...

[JimL]

No. I literally stated in the very post which you quoted that entropy does not rely on the passage of time, and that it is a perfectly cogent concept even when talking about a single moment. Change is not necessary for entropy.

I think seer is refering to the fact that the entropyof a system is only highly ordered, relatively speaking, in one direction of time, the past.

[Change over time refers to the fact that a thing has different properties at one moment of time than it does at some other. Nothing about this requires the notion of temporal becoming.

But the thing itself is not changing, the thing itself is just there at that point in time, in its "now."

We are talking about the state of a thing at time A compared to the state of a thing at time B. This is perfectly cogent even when times A and B are entirely coextant.

No, I don't think we are, BP. We're talking about free will at each point in time along a static time dimension. The particular state at any point thereon doesn't speak to that.

Who has ever said that moments don't exist? That's exactly the opposite of the B-Theory. In fact, that smacks of Presentism of the sort professed by William Lane Craig. On the B-Theory, there are a multitude of moments of time which are all coextant with one another, in exactly the same way that there are multiple positions space which are all coextant with one another.

I believe seer is refering to moments as applied to a flowing time as in A-theory, as opposed to points along a static time, as applied to B-theory. Nothing flows from point A to point B in B-theory, the moments/points are as you say, coextant.

[JimL]

Yes there are. Time exists as a continuum. Think of it as a line stretching back and forth. Each point along that line is a moment. But just like a film, each frame is not the same. It builds on the frame before. So your brain has all of the memories it has accumulated from past moments, but none of the future ones.

Or if you want to think of it as a film, what you perceive as "now", your consciousness, is where the light is shining through the frame as each frame passes by. You have already seen the past frames so you know what was in them, but you haven't seen the future ones yet, even though they exist.

And the future of the film, the future frames that have not yet run through the projector, even though you haven't experienced them yet, they already exists, correct? If that's what your saying, then you're not choosing the actions you take, you're only experiencing each future moment as it already exists, like the future frames of a film already exist.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I think seer is refering to the fact that the entropyof a system is only highly ordered, relatively speaking, in one direction of time, the past.

I don't think he is, since that is precisely what I was attempting to describe in the first place.

But the thing itself is not changing, the thing itself is just there at that point in time, in its "now."

The thing persists across a multitude of points in time, in just the same way as a thing persists across multiple points in space. The fact that the thing has different properties at different points in time is no less curious than the fact that it has different properties at different points in space.

No, I don't think we are, BP. We're talking about free will at each point in time along a static time dimension. The particular state at any point thereon doesn't speak to that.

Why wouldn't it?

I believe seer is refering to moments as applied to a flowing time as in A-theory, as opposed to points along a static time, as applied to B-theory. Nothing flows from point A to point B in B-theory, the moments/points are as you say, coextant.

I don't believe he is. He seems to think that the B-Theory implies that there is only one moment of time-- which is precisely the opposite of what the B-Theory says.

[JimL]

I don't think he is, since that is precisely what I was attempting to describe in the first place.

I think he was suggesting how entropy increases in the direction of time, but that if time is static the increase in entropy isn't really changing as if flowing from one state to another, there just happens to be a more highly disordered state at each point along the time line on into the future. As you have pointed out, time doesn't flow in B-theory, each point in time is extant.

The thing persists across a multitude of points in time, in just the same way as a thing persists across multiple points in space. The fact that the thing has different properties at different points in time is no less curious than the fact that it has different properties at different points in space

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Right, like time itself persists across every point in time, but time itself doesn't change. The thing that is in time, persists just like time persists, nothing changes, because the things that are in time are extant with the static unchanging time itself, and just like all of time has always been, just like all of the points in time have always been, the things in time have always been.

Why wouldn't it?

Because, that point in time never changes, and neither does what happens in that point of time ever change. Wouldn't you agree that Abraham Lincoln, according to B-theory still exists in his "now"? In B-theory the whole shebang is real, so how can it be said to actually change?

I don't believe he is. He seems to think that the B-Theory implies that there is only one moment of time-- which is precisely the opposite of what the B-Theory says.

Well, kinda, because there has never been a time, for lack of a better term, in which any particular point in time, was not real. Past, present and future, all of time, from beginning to end, all real.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I think he was suggesting how entropy increases in the direction of time, but that if time is static the increase in entropy isn't really changing as if flowing from one state to another, there just happens to be a more highly disordered state at each point along the time line on into the future. As you have pointed out, time doesn't flow in B-theory, each point in time is extant.

Again, since this is precisely what I was describing in the first place, and since Seer seems to have some misunderstanding about entropy which he thinks entails change, I really don't think that this is what Seer meant. I'll wait for him to clarify his own meaning before responding to things he may or may not have actually meant.

Right, like time itself persists across every point in time, but time itself doesn't change. The thing that is in time, persists just like time persists, nothing changes, because the things that are in time are extant with the static unchanging time itself, and just like all of time has always been, just like all of the points in time have always been, the things in time have always been.

Because, that point in time never changes, and neither does what happens in that point of time ever change. Wouldn't you agree that Abraham Lincoln, according to B-theory still exists in his "now"? In B-theory the whole shebang is real, so how can it be said to actually change?

In exactly the same way that a ruler changes from its first inch to its last inch, despite both still being a part of the ruler as a whole. That is a change with respect to length. It is perfectly reasonable and cogent to discuss changes with respect to time. Again, the B-Theory does not deny change. Changes with respect to time are every bit as cogent on the B-Theory as they are on the A-Theory (in fact, they are moreso, in my humblest of opinions).

Well, kinda, because there has never been a time, for lack of a better term, in which any particular point in time, was not real. Past, present and future, all of time, from beginning to end, all real.

There is no space in which all other points of space are not real. That does not, in any way, imply that all points in space are therefore the same point in space. Neither does the fact that all points in time are real and extant on the B-Theory imply that they are all therefore the same point in time.

[EvoUK]

Do you think that it is logically possible for a person to be given a free choice between two options and that the person will always, 100% of the time freely, choose one option over the other?

'You, cake or death?'
- Eddie Izzard

[JimL]

Again, since this is precisely what I was describing in the first place, and since Seer seems to have some misunderstanding about entropy which he thinks entails change, I really don't think that this is what Seer meant. I'll wait for him to clarify his own meaning before responding to things he may or may not have actually meant.

I agree, he can clarify if he wishes.

In exactly the same way that a ruler changes from its first inch to its last inch, despite both still being a part of the ruler as a whole. That is a change with respect to length. It is perfectly reasonable and cogent to discuss changes with respect to time. Again, the B-Theory does not deny change. Changes with respect to time are every bit as cogent on the B-Theory as they are on the A-Theory (in fact, they are moreso, in my humblest of opinions)

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But, actual change is an active process. There is, it's true, a difference from one point in time to the next in B-theory, but nothing is actively changing, the points on the ruler, if you will, as well as the whole of the ruler itself, never changes. For instance, the kind of change you are defining with the respect to B-theory, is not the same kind of change we are refering to with respect to A-theory. The former is a static change, the latter and active change.

There is no space in which all other points of space are not real. That does not, in any way, imply that all points in space are therefore the same point in space. Neither does the fact that all points in time are real and extant on the B-Theory imply that they are all therefore the same point in time.

See above.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But, actual change is an active process. There is, it's true, a difference from one point in time to the next in B-theory, but nothing is actively changing, the points on the ruler, if you will, as well as the whole of the ruler itself, never changes. For instance, the kind of change you are defining with the respect to B-theory, is not the same kind of change we are refering to with respect to A-theory. The former is a static change, the latter and active change.

Change is one thing. Ontological becoming is another thing entirely. Change doesn't entail ontological becoming, even though ontological becoming entails change. If all you are saying is that the B-Theory contradicts the notion of ontological becoming, I'll happily agree. I simply don't see how ontological becoming is at all necessary to anything we've been discussing.

[JimL]

Change is one thing. Ontological becoming is another thing entirely. Change doesn't entail ontological becoming, even though ontological becoming entails change. If all you are saying is that the B-Theory contradicts the notion of ontological becoming, I'll happily agree. I simply don't see how ontological becoming is at all necessary to anything we've been discussing.

I guess that's the point upon which we are in disagreement, BP. I think that ontological becoming has everything to do with what we've been discussing. Free will. Afaics, change in B-theory doesn't entail agency, A-theory allows for it.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I guess that's the point upon which we are in disagreement, BP. I think that ontological becoming has everything to do with what we've been discussing. Free will. Afaics, change in B-theory doesn't entail agency, A-theory allows for it.

As far as I can see, there's nothing in the B-Theory's understanding of change which contradicts the notion of agency or free will. Now, we seem to have isolated the particular sticking point that you have: temporal ontological becoming. So why do you think that TOB is necessary for agency and free will? I'm not seeing how that follows logically, at all.

[JimL]

As far as I can see, there's nothing in the B-Theory's understanding of change which contradicts the notion of agency or free will. Now, we seem to have isolated the particular sticking point that you have: temporal ontological becoming. So why do you think that TOB is necessary for agency and free will? I'm not seeing how that follows logically, at all.

Because, how can change be the result of agency if all points in time are coextant? If the entirety of the universe, and everything in it, if all points in time, all points in space, like the markings on a ruler, have always been real, then how do you fit agency into that. You don't see agency in the changes between the points of a ruler, so how is that different the the B-theory universe?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Because, how can change be the result of agency if all points in time are coextant? If the entirety of the universe, and everything in it, if all points in time, all points in space, like the markings on a ruler, have always been real, then how do you fit agency into that. You don't see agency in the changes between the points of a ruler, so how is that different the the B-theory universe?

When I say "agency," I am referring to the responsibility of a cognitive entity for its actions. Do you understand the term in the same way? If so, what about that notion requires temporal ontological becoming?

[Sparko]

Seer asking 'if the future exists, why can't I remember it?' is equivalent to me asking him 'if the past doesn't exist any longer, how can you remember it?' Both questions are nonsense.

[Sparko]

So what if time is both B-theory AND it flows?

Like a river, it exists both at it's source and throughout it's existence till it's end. Yet all points are constantly moving along the path. moving at the same rate. From someone standing on the bank, they can see the whole river, but to those in it, they can only see their own location which is moving along. Think of your life as a series of twigs floating down the river.

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1 2 3 --->

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1=You a week ago, 2=you now, 3=you a week from now,

When you get to "3" a week from now, 3 will have moved on to two weeks from now, 1 will have moved into today.

[JimL]

When I say "agency," I am referring to the responsibility of a cognitive entity for its actions. Do you understand the term in the same way? If so, what about that notion requires temporal ontological becoming?

I thought that I made that clear, BP.Cognition in B-theory is no different than anything else. If the entirety of the universe, and everything in it, if all points of time, all points in space, like the markings on a ruler, have always been real and coextant, then how can actual agency fit into that system. In other words, in terms of the timeline, your entire life span, being that each point, or moment of it, if you will, are coextant, came into existence at once along with the entirety of the time dimension, the entirety of the whole universe. You may be experiencing your past, present and future, in some sense, but you're not creating it, it's always been there, like the entirety of time has always been there, the entirety of the universe.