Time, Omniscience and Free Will

[mattbballman31]

For one thing it's not about gods beliefs, it's about gods knowledge. So, you need to come up with a logical reason for how it is that god knows what you will do in the future and have it remain a free choice. If you can't do that, then it's just a "because I said so argument".

Doesn't bother me because knowledge is a subset of belief. God knows what you will do because God knows future tense propositions conceptually. And God's knowing those propositions has nothing to do with God making those propositions true. The truth conditions for future tense propositions involving 'free choice' are that the creature just freely does it. Insert whatever libertarian criteria you want. As long as the explanatory priority goes in the required direction, there's no issue: God knows it because you'll do it, not you'll do it because God knows it.

[JimL]

Doesn't bother me because knowledge is a subset of belief.

Irrelevant. They are not the same. Look it up.

God knows what you will do because God knows future tense propositions conceptually.

Please try and speak english, not mumbojumbo. How does god know the future, does the future already exist for god? If so then it already does and always has existed period. If not, then how does he know what you will do in the future.

And God's knowing those propositions has nothing to do with God making those propositions true.

Propositions have nothing to do with it. How does he know which proposition will be true?

The truth conditions for future tense propositions involving 'free choice' are that the creature just freely does it.

I don't believe that even makes sense. Perhaps you are able to speak more plainly.

Insert whatever libertarian criteria you want. As long as the explanatory priority goes in the required direction, there's no issue: God knows it because you'll do it, not you'll do it because God knows it.

I don't believe there is anything "explanatory" in anything you've said.

[Stoic]

If God is omniscient and omnipotent, would He not exist outside of time?

If God exists outside of time, He can no doubt see the future as easily as seeing the present and the past. Correct?

Many an atheist has argued that if such a deity exists then "free will" does not. That if anyone can know the future with certainty then no one has "free will".

I never understood the argument. Anybody here care to explain it?

I'm a compatibilist, so even if the universe was completely deterministic, and was going to go on like clockwork with exactly one possible future that's going to play out as it will, that would not mean (to me) that there is no free will. And if God was able to foresee exactly how that future is going to play out, that would make no difference with regard to the existence of free will.

But some (most?) people have a different idea of free will, and would say that if there is only one possible future, then I have no power to change what that future will be, and thus I have no free will. And if God knows what the future will be, then there is only one possible future, so there is no free will.

[JimL]

I'm a compatibilist, so even if the universe was completely deterministic, and was going to go on like clockwork with exactly one possible future that's going to play out as it will, that would not mean (to me) that there is no free will. And if God was able to foresee exactly how that future is going to play out, that would make no difference with regard to the existence of free will.

But some (most?) people have a different idea of free will, and would say that if there is only one possible future, then I have no power to change what that future will be, and thus I have no free will. And if God knows what the future will be, then there is only one possible future, so there is no free will.

I've never been able to see how free will can fit together with determinism. How can one who is part of a determined universe have free will? A determined universe is of a nature that it unfolds according to the physics of its starting off point, also known by some as the big bang. How do you fit free will into that, or how is free will compatible with the physics of determinism.

[Stoic]

I've never been able to see how free will can fit together with determinism. How can one who is part of a determined universe have free will? A determined universe is of a nature that it unfolds according to the physics of its starting off point, also known by some as the big bang. How do you fit free will into that, or how is free will compatible with the physics of determinism.

It's a matter of definitions. Clearly libertarian free will is not compatible with that, but I don't know why anyone would want or need libertarian free will. I'm not even sure it's a coherent concept.

As far as I'm concerned, being free to do what I want is freedom enough. And when people argue for the existence of free will, that's the kind of freedom that they usually point to.

[shunyadragon]

If God is omniscient and omnipotent, would He not exist outside of time?

Nothing must be concerning God from the human perspective, but yes I believe God is outside time. Biblically it describes God and the hosts of heave as inside time.

If God exists outside of time, He can no doubt see the future as easily as seeing the present and the past. Correct?

Yes to a degree, but not absolutely. Creation would be within certain parameters, which is how the nature of our physical existence is described by science. Our physical existence is observed to be deterministic, but not in the absolute sense.

Many an atheist has argued that if such a deity exists then "free will" does not. That if anyone can know the future with certainty then no one has "free will".

I never understood the argument. Anybody here care to explain it?

Too much of a generalization.

[JimL]

It's a matter of definitions. Clearly libertarian free will is not compatible with that, but I don't know why anyone would want or need libertarian free will. I'm not even sure it's a coherent concept.

As far as I'm concerned, being free to do what I want is freedom enough. And when people argue for the existence of free will, that's the kind of freedom that they usually point to.

Yes, but how are you free to do what you want if you are part of a deterministic universe?

[Jim B.]

I'm a compatibilist, so even if the universe was completely deterministic, and was going to go on like clockwork with exactly one possible future that's going to play out as it will, that would not mean (to me) that there is no free will. And if God was able to foresee exactly how that future is going to play out, that would make no difference with regard to the existence of free will.

But some (most?) people have a different idea of free will, and would say that if there is only one possible future, then I have no power to change what that future will be, and thus I have no free will. And if God knows what the future will be, then there is only one possible future, so there is no free will.

Yes, I would count myself among "most people" as you describe them. What you describe is not metaphysical freedom but circumstantial freedom. I would be free of external constraints but my thoughts and intentions would have no real power to affect the future.

[Jim B.]

So, nothing existed prior to the existence of time? Or are you suggesting that prior to the existence of time god only existed in a metaphorical sense? Whether god is eternal or not, if he created time, then he existed before time.

Again, you're saying "prior to the existence of time." That's like saying "slightly to the left of space." If anything exists outside of time, it exists timelessly, or unconditioned by temporal categories, like the Platonic Forms.

I was simply agreeing with you that god can't see time, can't see the future of time, until and unless it exists. If you agree with that, and still insist that god can see the future of time, then time doesn't emerge incrementally, it was created in it's entirety, otherwise god couldn't see it. And if that is true, if all of time came into existence at once, then your will has nothing to do with with the future.

I'm proposing another way of looking at it. What if time exists "inside" of God, as an idea in his mind? God encompasses time and temporal categories of 'before' and 'after', etc.

That, again, is a logical contradiction.

Not if God has every frame of the film in front of him.

Actually it is a logical contradiction. You're making the "well we can't logically explain it, put an argument into words, how it is that god could possibly see our futures, but we just believe he can.

Where is the logical contradiction in abstracting away from God the categories of time?

[JimL]

Yes, I would count myself among "most people" as you describe them. What you describe is not metaphysical freedom but circumstantial freedom. I would be free of external constraints but my thoughts and intentions would have no real power to affect the future.

But if your actions are not the detemining cause of your future, then your actions would not be free acts. How can you be said to be free of external constraints if your future, if the future, is determined?

[Stoic]

Yes, but how are you free to do what you want if you are part of a deterministic universe?

I don't understand why that is even a question. If I want to spend time arguing on TWEB, I am free to do so. If I would rather go for a walk, I can do that instead.

[Stoic]

Yes, I would count myself among "most people" as you describe them. What you describe is not metaphysical freedom but circumstantial freedom. I would be free of external constraints but my thoughts and intentions would have no real power to affect the future.

I'm not familiar with the terminology, but as you use the terms, circumstantial freedom is the kind of freedom that is important to me. Metaphysical freedom, not so much.

[Ronson]

I'm a compatibilist, so even if the universe was completely deterministic, and was going to go on like clockwork with exactly one possible future that's going to play out as it will, that would not mean (to me) that there is no free will. And if God was able to foresee exactly how that future is going to play out, that would make no difference with regard to the existence of free will.

Agreed.

But some (most?) people have a different idea of free will, and would say that if there is only one possible future, then I have no power to change what that future will be, and thus I have no free will. And if God knows what the future will be, then there is only one possible future, so there is no free will.

I think most/many atheists have that idea because they're not inclined to think about omniscience. I understand that, it's not something they believe in anyway so a specific trait of omniscience is mostly alien.

[shunyadragon]

It's a matter of definitions. Clearly libertarian free will is not compatible with that, but I don't know why anyone would want or need libertarian free will. I'm not even sure it's a coherent concept.

As far as I'm concerned, being free to do what I want is freedom enough. And when people argue for the existence of free will, that's the kind of freedom that they usually point to.

From the scientific perspective the nature of our existence and the Laws of Nature are deterministic, but not rigidely deterministic. The Fractal Nature (Chaos Theory) of the outcomee of cause and effect events demonstrates we do not have a 'clock work' physical existence.

Only the extremes of Will, libertarian or rigid deterministic no Free Will are most unlikely, and the degree and nature of Free Will is at present open to many questions.

[JimL]

I don't understand why that is even a question. If I want to spend time arguing on TWEB, I am free to do so. If I would rather go for a walk, I can do that instead.

Well, it would seem so, yes, but if the universe is determined then so to would you be. That you are freely choosing to argue on tweb or going for a walk instead, as much as it would feel to be a free choice, it would be an illusion if the universe is determined. The question is how can you be both determined and free willed? I mean maybe there is a way in which the two theories fit together, that's what combatabilism is supposed to be about, but how do you understand that to work?