Time, Omniscience and Free Will

[Stoic]

Well, it would seem so, yes, but if the universe is determined then so to would you be. That you are freely choosing to argue on tweb or going for a walk instead, as much as it would feel to be a free choice, it would be an illusion if the universe is determined. The question is how can you be both determined and free willed? I mean maybe there is a way in which the two theories fit together, that's what combatabilism is supposed to be about, but how do you understand that to work?

As I said, it's basically a matter of how you define free will. It's possible to define free will in such a way that it is incompatible with determinism, in which case I wonder if it matters whether we have free will. Or you can define free will such that it matters whether we have it, in which case I wonder why anyone thinks we don't have it, even if the universe is deterministic.

[JimL]

As I said, it's basically a matter of how you define free will. It's possible to define free will in such a way that it is incompatible with determinism, in which case I wonder if it matters whether we have free will. Or you can define free will such that it matters whether we have it, in which case I wonder why anyone thinks we don't have it, even if the universe is deterministic.

But how are you defining free will in a deterministic universe? I mean just calling it free will doesn't make it free will, how you define it has to make sense.

[Stoic]

But how are you defining free will in a deterministic universe? I mean just calling it free will doesn't make it free will, how you define it has to make sense.

Who gets to decide whether the definition makes sense?

Personally, it doesn't really matter to me how it's defined. You can even define it as "that which would not exist if the universe was deterministic." Then I would agree that free will can't exist if the universe is deterministic. But I would add, "So what?"

In what way would my life be different if I was convinced that the world is deterministic, and free will does not exist? As far as I can tell, it would make no difference.

[shunyadragon]

But how are you defining free will in a deterministic universe? I mean just calling it free will doesn't make it free will, how you define it has to make sense.

I believe our physical existence is deterministic by Karl Popper's understanding of 'Determinism,' which is compatable with 'Compatablism.'

There are different types of 'Determinism.' You may be referring to what I call it Hard Philosophical Determinism described as follows:

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=determinism+definition&oq=Determinism&aqs =chrome.1.0l8.10953j1j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

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I prefer Karl Poppers view of determinism:

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

In this century, Karl Popper (1982) defined determinism in terms of predictability also, in his book The Open Universe.

Laplace probably had God in mind as the powerful intelligence to whose gaze the whole future is open. If not, he should have: 19th and 20th century mathematical studies showed convincingly that neither a finite, nor an infinite but embedded-in-the-world intelligence can have the computing power necessary to predict the actual future, in any world remotely like ours. But even if our aim is only to predict a well-defined subsystem of the world, for a limited period of time, this may be impossible for any reasonable finite agent embedded in the world, as many studies of chaos (sensitive dependence on initial conditions) show. Conversely, certain parts of the world could be highly predictable, in some senses, without the world being deterministic. When it comes to predictability of future events by humans or other finite agents in the world, then, predictability and determinism are simply not logically connected at all.

The equation of “determinism”with “predictability” is therefore a façon de parler that at best makes vivid what is at stake in determinism: our fears about our own status as free agents in the world. In Laplace's story, a sufficiently bright demon who knew how things stood in the world 100 years before my birth could predict every action, every emotion, every belief in the course of my life. Were she then to watch me live through it, she might smile condescendingly, as one who watches a marionette dance to the tugs of strings that it knows nothing about. We can't stand the thought that we are (in some sense) marionettes. Nor does it matter whether any demon (or even God) can, or cares to, actually predict what we will do: the existence of the strings of physical necessity, linked to far-past states of the world and determining our current every move, is what alarms us. Whether such alarm is actually warranted is a question well outside the scope of this article (see Hoefer (2002a), Ismael (2016) and the entries on free will and incompatibilist theories of freedom). But a clear understanding of what determinism is, and how we might be able to decide its truth or falsity, is surely a useful starting point for any attempt to grapple with this issue.

Also . . .

2.4 Laws of nature

In the loose statement of determinism we are working from, metaphors such as “govern” and “under the sway of” are used to indicate the strong force being attributed to the laws of nature. Part of understanding determinism—and especially, whether and why it is metaphysically important—is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature.

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical. We can characterize the usual assumptions about laws in this way: the laws of nature are assumed to be pushy explainers. They make things happen in certain ways , and by having this power, their existence lets us explain why things happen in certain ways. (For a defense of this perspective on laws, see Maudlin (2007)). Laws, we might say, are implicitly thought of as the cause of everything that happens. If the laws governing our world are deterministic, then in principle everything that happens can be explained as following from states of the world at earlier times. (Again, we note that even though the entailment typically works in the future→past direction also, we have trouble thinking of this as a legitimate explanatory entailment. In this respect also, we see that laws of nature are being implicitly treated as the causes of what happens: causation, intuitively, can only go past→future.)

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[Tassman]

In what way would my life be different if I was convinced that the world is deterministic, and free will does not exist? As far as I can tell, it would make no difference.

I agree. We have the illusion of free-will. We act as though it was free and make our decisions accordingly.

[Stoic]

I agree. We have the illusion of free-will. We act as though it was free and make our decisions accordingly.

Well, we have whatever is necessary in order for us to consider the consequences of our decisions, and choose accordingly. I don't think that is libertarian free will, and I don't think it is an illusion. Until someone comes up with a suitable name for it, I'll think of it as free will, or perhaps freedom (ala Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves).

[Tassman]

Well, we have whatever is necessary in order for us to consider the consequences of our decisions, and choose accordingly. I don't think that is libertarian free will, and I don't think it is an illusion. Until someone comes up with a suitable name for it, I'll think of it as free will, or perhaps freedom (ala Daniel Dennett in Freedom Evolves).

It is in practical terms ‘free will’ - we feel and act as though we were free. But in actuality I think our decisions are largely informed by our genetic make-up, social and environmental influences plus sub-conscious memories dating from our formative years.

[Stoic]

It is in practical terms ‘free will’

I think it matches what most people think of as free will.

- we feel and act as though we were free. But in actuality I think our decisions are largely informed by our genetic make-up, social and environmental influences plus sub-conscious memories dating from our formative years.

Yeah, there is nature and nurture, and probably nothing else. But I don't see that as a problem.

[JimL]

I believe our physical existence is deterministic by Karl Popper's understanding of 'Determinism,' which is compatable with 'Compatablism.'

There are different types of 'Determinism.' You may be referring to what I call it Hard Philosophical Determinism described as follows:

Source: https://www.google.com/search?q=determinism+definition&oq=Determinism&aqs =chrome.1.0l8.10953j1j15&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

the doctrine that all events, including human action, are ultimately determined by causes external to the will. Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions.

© Copyright Original Source

I prefer Karl Poppers view of determinism:

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

In this century, Karl Popper (1982) defined determinism in terms of predictability also, in his book The Open Universe.

Laplace probably had God in mind as the powerful intelligence to whose gaze the whole future is open. If not, he should have: 19th and 20th century mathematical studies showed convincingly that neither a finite, nor an infinite but embedded-in-the-world intelligence can have the computing power necessary to predict the actual future, in any world remotely like ours. But even if our aim is only to predict a well-defined subsystem of the world, for a limited period of time, this may be impossible for any reasonable finite agent embedded in the world, as many studies of chaos (sensitive dependence on initial conditions) show. Conversely, certain parts of the world could be highly predictable, in some senses, without the world being deterministic. When it comes to predictability of future events by humans or other finite agents in the world, then, predictability and determinism are simply not logically connected at all.

The equation of “determinism”with “predictability” is therefore a façon de parler that at best makes vivid what is at stake in determinism: our fears about our own status as free agents in the world. In Laplace's story, a sufficiently bright demon who knew how things stood in the world 100 years before my birth could predict every action, every emotion, every belief in the course of my life. Were she then to watch me live through it, she might smile condescendingly, as one who watches a marionette dance to the tugs of strings that it knows nothing about. We can't stand the thought that we are (in some sense) marionettes. Nor does it matter whether any demon (or even God) can, or cares to, actually predict what we will do: the existence of the strings of physical necessity, linked to far-past states of the world and determining our current every move, is what alarms us. Whether such alarm is actually warranted is a question well outside the scope of this article (see Hoefer (2002a), Ismael (2016) and the entries on free will and incompatibilist theories of freedom). But a clear understanding of what determinism is, and how we might be able to decide its truth or falsity, is surely a useful starting point for any attempt to grapple with this issue.

Also . . .

2.4 Laws of nature

In the loose statement of determinism we are working from, metaphors such as “govern” and “under the sway of” are used to indicate the strong force being attributed to the laws of nature. Part of understanding determinism—and especially, whether and why it is metaphysically important—is getting clear about the status of the presumed laws of nature.

In the physical sciences, the assumption that there are fundamental, exceptionless laws of nature, and that they have some strong sort of modal force, usually goes unquestioned. Indeed, talk of laws “governing” and so on is so commonplace that it takes an effort of will to see it as metaphorical. We can characterize the usual assumptions about laws in this way: the laws of nature are assumed to be pushy explainers. They make things happen in certain ways , and by having this power, their existence lets us explain why things happen in certain ways. (For a defense of this perspective on laws, see Maudlin (2007)). Laws, we might say, are implicitly thought of as the cause of everything that happens. If the laws governing our world are deterministic, then in principle everything that happens can be explained as following from states of the world at earlier times. (Again, we note that even though the entailment typically works in the future→past direction also, we have trouble thinking of this as a legitimate explanatory entailment. In this respect also, we see that laws of nature are being implicitly treated as the causes of what happens: causation, intuitively, can only go past→future.)

© Copyright Original Source

As I read the above I'm not seeing Popper define free will or how it is compatible with determinism. He seems to me to be saying that we don't necessarily have an exact understanding of what determinism entails, and that perhaps free will is compatible with a universe that is otherwise determined by physical laws. Perhaps you could clear that up for me.

[shunyadragon]

As I read the above I'm not seeing Popper define free will or how it is compatible with determinism. He seems to me to be saying that we don't necessarily have an exact understanding of what determinism entails, and that perhaps free will is compatible with a universe that is otherwise determined by physical laws. Perhaps you could clear that up for me.

Do not need to clear anything up. Popper, of course, does not consider the nature of our will as either free nor rigidly determined based on his definition of 'Determinism,' neither do I. The question of the existence of and the degree of free will an open questionnot answered by 'Determinism.'. If you want to know more read his book.

Also, read the reference I gave in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and realize there are a number of different views and definitions of 'Determinism,' the existence nor non-existence of Free Will is not determined be 'Determinism.'

Notice in the first definition of Determinism it stated that, "Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."

[JimL]

Do not need to clear anything up. Popper, of course, does not consider the nature of our will as either free nor rigidly determined based on his definition of 'Determinism,' neither do I. The question of the existence of and the degree of free will an open questionnot answered by 'Determinism.'. If you want to know more read his book.

Also, read the reference I gave in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and realize there are a number of different views and definitions of 'Determinism,' the existence nor non-existence of Free Will is not determined be 'Determinism.'

Notice in the first definition of Determinism it stated that, "Some philosophers have taken determinism to imply that individual human beings have no free will and cannot be held morally responsible for their actions."

The bolded above is all I'm asking about. What is Popper's definition of determinism with respect to the universe, and how does free will fit within that definition?

[shunyadragon]

The bolded above is all I'm asking about. What is Popper's definition of determinism with respect to the universe, and how does free will fit within that definition?

I already gave the reference where Popper describes his view of determinism with respect ot our physical existence, and only related to scientific knowledge that is determined by the predictability and consitencey of our physicla existence by scientific methods and it is my position, and he does not consider the question of 'Free Will to be determined by Determinism. The limits of Determinism is described in the reference. As pere the reference provided there are different views of Determiniam and the relationship to human will.

Based on the references provided, only some philosophers and scientist ahare ht e view of 'Determinism and the degree and nature of human will.

Again, if you want to know more about the question read the book.

Your questions are answered in the references provided. The following all encompasing definition of 'Determinism' does not make any mention of the question of Free Will.

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

Traditionally determinism has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. This is only problematic if one is investigating determinism in a specific, well-defined theoretical context; but it is important to avoid certain major errors of definition. In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

© Copyright Original Source

[JimL]

I already gave the reference where Popper describes his view of determinism with respect ot our physical existence, and only related to scientific knowledge that is determined by the predictability and consitencey of our physicla existence by scientific methods and it is my position, and he does not consider the question of 'Free Will to be determined by Determinism. The limits of Determinism is described in the reference. As pere the reference provided there are different views of Determiniam and the relationship to human will.

Based on the references provided, only some philosophers and scientist ahare ht e view of 'Determinism and the degree and nature of human will.

Again, if you want to know more about the question read the book.

Your questions are answered in the references provided. The following all encompasing definition of 'Determinism' does not make any mention of the question of Free Will.

Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/

Traditionally determinism has been given various, usually imprecise definitions. This is only problematic if one is investigating determinism in a specific, well-defined theoretical context; but it is important to avoid certain major errors of definition. In order to get started we can begin with a loose and (nearly) all-encompassing definition as follows:

Determinism: The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.

© Copyright Original Source

I'm simply asking you what those limits to determinism are with respect to free wil fitting in to the equation according to Popper. How does Popper figure free will fits together with the laws of physics.

[shunyadragon]

The bolded above is all I'm asking about. What is Popper's definition of determinism with respect to the universe,

Already described that in the previous reference, and provided the over all definition of 'Determinism,' which considers determinism in terms Nataural Laws with no metion of human will. My source the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is the highest academic standard availble, and apparently you refuse to read it and respond. Popper considers determinism in terms of the consistency and predictability of Natural Laws in the falsifiability of theories and hypothesis.

and how does free will fit within that definition?

As cited Popper does not consider human will can be defined nor fit within his definition of Determinism, though in his writings he describes the indeterminacy of the limits of scientific falsifiable theories and hypothesis from the human perspective, which never can be proven, but only falsifiable. Theories and hypothesis are to a certain extent indeterminate and cannot be proven, because of the elimits of the human perspective. He acknowledges the implications of his definition of determinism concerning the nature of human will and acknowledges the possibility of compatibilism.

Puzzle; have you ever tried to read Karl Popper's writings to understand his view on determinism? I hve his books, but cannote cite him from my books. I will look for references to further describe his philosophy, but it is apparent you are not willing to do your homework.

[JimL]

Already described that in the previous reference, and provided the over all definition of 'Determinism,' which considers determinism in terms Nataural Laws with no metion of human will. My source the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is the highest academic standard availble, and apparently you refuse to read it and respond. Popper considers determinism in terms of the consistency and predictability of Natural Laws in the falsifiability of theories and hypothesis.

But in what sense is the human will not subject to the same natural laws as the rest of the natural world. That's what I'm not seeing in your posts. It's one thing to say that the human will is not subject to natural law, it's another thing to explain why, or how that is.

As cited Popper does not consider human will can be defined nor fit within his definition of Determinism, though in his writings he describes the indeterminacy of the limits of scientific falsifiable theories and hypothesis from the human perspective, which never can be proven, but only falsifiable. Theories and hypothesis are to a certain extent indeterminate and cannot be proven, because of the elimits of the human perspective. He acknowledges the implications of his definition of determinism concerning the nature of human will and acknowledges the possibility of compatibilism.

Puzzle; have you ever tried to read Karl Popper's writings to understand his view on determinism? I hve his books, but cannote cite him from my books. I will look for references to further describe his philosophy, but it is apparent you are not willing to do your homework.

Great, I'd appreciate it, because if as you say Popper doesn't consider the will to be the effect of natural and deterministic laws, I'd be interested to know what he thinks the will is determined, or rather freely determined by.