Divine revelation

[Doug Shaver]

Then some friends of mine, whom I was trying to lead to Christ, kept asking me why they should believe what I was telling them. I gave them the best answers I could, and they would ask me why they should believe those answers. This went on for quite some time, and it got to a point where I had no answer except "Because I say so." But I could not give my friends that answer, because I knew it was really no answer. And at the moment I realized that, I knew that my Christian beliefs were indefensible. I could not believe that something must be true for no better reason than my personal conviction that it was true.

Did you ever explore the theology of John Scottus Eriugena?

I don't think "explore" would be the right word. When I took Philosophy 101, we spent a week or so getting introduced to the early Medieval philosophers, and he was one of those mentioned.

My transition from fundamentalism to atheism occurred in two stages. The first, which occurred over a period of several months, was my abandonment of scriptural inerrancy. That left me thinking there was something special about Jesus and therefore something true (though not exclusively so) about Christianity. I took me a few more years to decide that that wasn't so, either, but in the meantime I regarded myself as a liberal Christian.

In the early days of this stage of my development, some of my liberal Christian friends introduced me to what I recognize in hindsight as apophatic theology, or at least some version thereof. For the remainder of my time as a Christian, it was probably the only theology I had, and the consequence for me was that I didn't devote much attention to trying to figure God out. If he was so transcendent that we couldn't say anything about him, then why even try to say anything? What mattered to me as a Christian was trying to understand the message of Jesus Christ insofar as it had survived the filtering of early Christian orthodoxy.

[Doug Shaver]

My point is, to someone who didn't know better, I don't know that I could defend my marriage if they didn't want to believe me.

That could be true, depending on what you mean by "they didn't want to believe me."

There are lots of things I wish were not true, and in that sense I don't want to believe them. But I believe them anyway, because the evidence is such as to make my desires irrelevant. And for that matter, when it comes to deciding whether some statement is true or false, I think my desires are always irrelevant. The truth has nothing to do with what I wish it to be.

This is not to deny that my emotions may affect my credulity in many instances. Every one of us has a worldview that says certain things can't happen, and we don't like it one bit when we're confronted with facts that say, "Your worldview is wrong." When I turned on my TV set on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, I did not want to believe what I was seeing. But, no matter how much I didn't like believing it, it was entirely consistent with everything I thought I knew about the modern world. I could have mustered every weapon in my skeptical arsenal to try to convince myself that what I was watching wasn't really happening, but I would have been wasting my time, and I knew I'd be wasting my time. My worldview already told me: Like it or not, this is not prima facie unbelievable. These sorts of things do happen. They have happened before, and they will happen again.

But what if I turn on the news tomorrow and see a report about someone discovering Noah's ark? I will certainly believe that somebody found something on a mountain in Turkey and said, "This is Noah's ark." That has happened before, and even if it never had, it is consistent with my worldview that somebody could find something on a mountain in Turkey and believe it to be Noah's ark. But is it possible that someone could actually find Noah's ark? My worldview says no. It says that whatever they found, it can't be Noah's ark, because it says it story about Noah is not a true story, and so nobody can find his ark because neither Noah nor the ark ever existed and there has never been a worldwide flood.

Could my worldview be wrong? Of course it could. I've had to change it before, and I might have to change it again. But I am no more obliged to change it just on somebody's say-so than you are obliged to change yours just on somebody's say-so. We are all like this. For every one of us, there are some things we will not believe if our only evidence for it is someone's uncorroborated testimony. The only difference among us is what sort of things we assign to that category. And there is nothing wrong with this.

What is wrong is a presupposition that one's worldview is infallibly right. We have to think it possible that we've made a mistake in forming our worldview, and that means not just ignoring facts that seem to contradict it. But I'm not ignoring a fact just because I can accommodate it to my worldview in a way that is inconsistent with your worldview. Do I want to believe that somebody could find found Noah's ark? I'll admit I don't, but it does not follow that I'm making a mistake if I don't believe it.

Now to your hypothetical about whether I should take your word for it about being married.

Under ordinary circumstances, yes, I should. If I don't, then I must believe that you're either lying or mistaken. It's difficult (though not impossible) for anyone to be mistaken about whether they're married. A false claim of marriage is more likely to be a lie than a mistake, but it doesn't happen often. In your hypothetical situation ("to someone who didn't know better"), I have no reason to suspect you of being dishonest, and so my belief that you're a liar would be unjustified. Having tentatively ruled out both error and deceit, I'm obliged to take your word for it that you're married.

[robrecht]

I don't think "explore" would be the right word. When I took Philosophy 101, we spent a week or so getting introduced to the early Medieval philosophers, and he was one of those mentioned.

My transition from fundamentalism to atheism occurred in two stages. The first, which occurred over a period of several months, was my abandonment of scriptural inerrancy. That left me thinking there was something special about Jesus and therefore something true (though not exclusively so) about Christianity. I took me a few more years to decide that that wasn't so, either, but in the meantime I regarded myself as a liberal Christian.

In the early days of this stage of my development, some of my liberal Christian friends introduced me to what I recognize in hindsight as apophatic theology, or at least some version thereof. For the remainder of my time as a Christian, it was probably the only theology I had, and the consequence for me was that I didn't devote much attention to trying to figure God out. If he was so transcendent that we couldn't say anything about him, then why even try to say anything? What mattered to me as a Christian was trying to understand the message of Jesus Christ insofar as it had survived the filtering of early Christian orthodoxy.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scottus-eriugena/

[Doug Shaver]

For those that continue to pursue the 'why' long enough, I think they eventually find that everyone just believes certain things axiomatically.

Yes.

Truth and falsity cease to be real goals.

No.

An axiom, by definition, is something we assume to be true notwithstanding that we cannot prove it. But, just because we have no proof doesn't mean we accept axioms arbitrarily. We believe our axioms for some reason. Those reasons may be difficult to articulate in any coherent fashion, and so we typically fall back on some notion of obviousness or self-evidence. For Descartes it was clarity and distinctness. Whatever that reason is, whatever we call it, we think it justifies our regarding those axioms as actually true.

So, we have some justification for thinking our axioms are true. To whatever extent we actually are justified, we are also justified in regarding everything that logically follows from those axioms as true, and we are justified in regarding anything that contradicts those axioms as false. The truth and falsity of our conclusions are irrelevant, or cease to be our real goals, only insofar as we may think it irrelevant whether our axioms are true.

[Doug Shaver]

That tells me why you believe it. It doesn't tell me why I should believe it.

The reason you believe would be dependent on your own independent search for knowledge and degree understanding and certainty of belief.

I'm not sure how well I've succeeded in maintaining the independent of my search for knowledge, but I've tried, and my search has led me to adopt a kind of evidentialism. When someone tells me I should believe something, I want evidence, and if it isn't forthcoming, I don't believe. In many situations, their say-so is enough evidence. In other situations, it isn't. I think claims about divine revelation belong in the latter category.

[Doug Shaver]

If you've already convinced yourself it's not true, then I can't figure out why you're still here arguing about it.

You're convinced that it is true, and you're here arguing about it. What's the difference?

[Doug Shaver]

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scottus-eriugena/

I like that idea. It explains why a revelation happened, if we assume that it did happen.

[seanD]

You're convinced that it is true, and you're here arguing about it. What's the difference?

I believe I have a divine command to defend what I believe (i.e. 1 Peter 3:15; Titus 1:9, etc.). With that aside... when one has an affection for something, they'll naturally be inclined to defend it. In other words, you'll obviously be much more inclined to defend the honor of a person you have deep affection for, when you believe their honor is being threatened, than someone who doesn't hold the same affection for the person.

[robrecht]

I like that idea. It explains why a revelation happened, if we assume that it did happen.

It might also describe how revelation happens in a very human manner, individuals and communities coming to recognzie and articulate a view of themselves and their world as somehow authoritative and of foundational meaning. No need to assume that such has happened; clearly it has. We need only ask if it is properly called divine by those who believe it.

So, would some Christian (or other theist) care to tell me why I should believe that anyone has ever received any knowledge about God by divine revelation?

Personally, I would only believe it based on my own perception of meaning within my life as a member of a community. If anyone has any knowledge or experience or awareness of God, typically in a loving community that believes in God, it is accepted that it can only come from God, even if only articulated by humans with our very limited abilities. If you are looking for, or interested in invalidating, something more objective than that, I can't be of much help. An act of sacrifice, of compassion, of healing community, of life-giving empowerment and fruitfulness. All of these are rather intangible but nonetheless real for those who believe in them. I don't look for God to revealed outside of the human sphere but only within and through the human community.

[Doug Shaver]

I believe I have a divine command to defend what I believe (i.e. 1 Peter 3:15; Titus 1:9, etc.). With that aside... when one has an affection for something, they'll naturally be inclined to defend it. In other words, you'll obviously be much more inclined to defend the honor of a person you have deep affection for, when you believe their honor is being threatened, than someone who doesn't hold the same affection for the person.

OK. I believe I have an ethical command to defend what I believe, even if I have no written authority on the subject that I can quote. I also have some affection for my worldview, insofar as I am convinced that the world would be a better place if enough people shared it.

[seanD]

OK. I believe I have an ethical command to defend what I believe, even if I have no written authority on the subject that I can quote. I also have some affection for my worldview, insofar as I am convinced that the world would be a better place if enough people shared it.

From this I sense that you are steadfastly set in your belief (being your expressed belief in a worldview as an actual ethical command). So this goes back to what LJ stated. There really is no point in the thread as it would be futile for a Christian to convince you of divine revelation.

[OingoBoingo]

So, that's not representative of Baha'i followers?

I think I'll take Carrik's word on it.

You're better off. When shunyadragon says things like:

The main reason I reject the ancient religions is they cling to ancient paradigms with little or no relevance to today' knowledge of the world we live in today. There view of God is most often archaic, limited and exclusive. I actually believe these ancient God(s) do not exists, and they represent a very human limited view of the greater 'Source' some call God(s).

And

Source: M�idiy-i Asm�ni 2: 69

Some of the philosophers of Europe think that one species evolves into another species. For example, that the animal evolved until it became a human being. But the prophets teach that this theory is erroneous, as we have explained already in the book Some Answered Questions.

© Copyright Original Source

http://bahaitheway.blogspot.com/2007...confusion.html

And while shunyadragon may find that the Baha'i faith has an evolved understanding of the "social and legal equality of women" compared to those religions he shows contempt for, what he's not telling you is that women are not eligible for election (nine members every five years) to the Universal House of Justice, which is the governing body of the Baha'i faith.

shunyadragon also won't tell you that the Baha'i view on homosexuality is not in harmony with modern psychology and the paradigms of "the world we are entering into". The Baha'i faith teaches that homosexuality is an abnormality that should be treated medically:

Source: http://bahai-library.com/compilation_homosexuality_bwc#page7

...the Faith does not recognize homosexuality as a "natural" or permanent phenomenon. Rather, it sees this as an aberration subject to treatment, however intractable exclusive homosexuality may now seem to be. To the question of alteration of homosexual bents, much study must be given, and doubtless in the future clear principles of prevention and treatment will emerge. As for those now afflicted, a homosexual does not decide to be a problem human, but he does, as you rightly state, have decision in choosing his way of life, i.e. abstaining from homosexual acts.

© Copyright Original Source

[Doug Shaver]

From this I sense that you are steadfastly set in your belief (being your expressed belief in a worldview as an actual ethical command).

That depends on what is entailed by "steadfastly set." I have changed my worldview in the past, when I was confronted with what seemed to be good enough reasons to change it. I'm pretty sure I could do it again.

So this goes back to what LJ stated. There really is no point in the thread as it would be futile for a Christian to convince you of divine revelation.

If a Christian tries but fails to change my mind, you can still have the satisfaction of knowing that all the lurkers saw how pigheaded an atheist can be when confronted with an argument that really ought to have changed his mind.

[firstfloor]

Yes, and you would have to learn gibberish. It may be unkind to speak thus of Shuny, but I am sure he will understand having spoken so offhandedly of the error of Christianity.

Why is your particular brand of gibberish not gibberish? The answer is that your gibberish is traditional. Traditional gibberish = religious truth.

[Carrikature]

No.

An axiom, by definition, is something we assume to be true notwithstanding that we cannot prove it. But, just because we have no proof doesn't mean we accept axioms arbitrarily. We believe our axioms for some reason. Those reasons may be difficult to articulate in any coherent fashion, and so we typically fall back on some notion of obviousness or self-evidence. For Descartes it was clarity and distinctness. Whatever that reason is, whatever we call it, we think it justifies our regarding those axioms as actually true.

So, we have some justification for thinking our axioms are true. To whatever extent we actually are justified, we are also justified in regarding everything that logically follows from those axioms as true, and we are justified in regarding anything that contradicts those axioms as false. The truth and falsity of our conclusions are irrelevant, or cease to be our real goals, only insofar as we may think it irrelevant whether our axioms are true.

You're conflating layman and philosophical usages of 'justification'. In a philosophical sense, you don't provide justification for an axiom. An axiom is taken as true by definition, as you rightly point out. Justification in this sense would only be applicable to a conclusion. In the layman sense, we can conceivably provide a number of cases we belief exemplify the axiom. Even so, these aren't proof of the axiom per se, and even calling for internal consistency is a reliance on yet another axiom. Ideas like clarity and distinctness as Descartes uses them are still axioms. He just managed to narrow his set of axioms quite a bit. Claims of obviousness or self-evidence are simply declarations that support is not needed.

I haven't suggested that we accept axioms arbitrarily. I don't actually believe that we have much control over which axioms we accept, but that's quite a bit different than being arbitrary.