God knows all that exists

[yxboom]

I have heard this argument quite a few times against Open Theism and thought it was worth mentioning.

The argument flows like this.

• God knows all that can be known (omniscience)
• According to Open Theism the future free actions of men does not exist to be known.
• God does not know the future free actions of men however retains omniscience in that God fully knows all that is knowable.
• A rock exists.
• Therefore God knows what is a rock.
• 1+1=2 does not exist.
• Therefore God can not know 1+1=2.

I realize this argument has the element of fallacy of distraction (specifically a Complex Question) in that it assumes both unrelated propositions are conjoined; however, this rebuttal in one form or another tends to show up rather constantly in "refuting" OVT so I figured I would open this up for some discussion and how OVers have approached this argument.

[Xavier]

The argument flows like this.

1) God knows all that can be known (omniscience)
2) According to Open Theism the future free actions of men does not exist to be known.
3) God does not know the future free actions of men however retains omniscience in that God fully knows all that is knowable.
4) A rock exists.
5) Therefore God knows what is a rock.
6) 1+1=2 does not exist.
7) Therefore God can not know 1+1=2.

I think it fails at 6... The quanities of 1 and 2 exist. The statement is merely a fact concerning the relationship between them.

Of course, I also personally have problems with 3, since I'm not yet convinced that the future isn't knowable.

My Two (Very Quick) Cents...

[Tercel]

In (mainstream) philosophy the debate on the ontological status of particulars vs universals and of propositions is still open: ie. Nobody's really sure.

Decoding the geekspeak for non-philosophers:
A "particular" is a specific instance of a thing in the world wheras a "universal" is the generalisation. So there are lots of white things in the world: Milk, whiteboards, projector screens, cars etc. These are "particulars" - they are a specific object that exists somewhere in the world that can be seen, touched, changed and whatever else. But all these particulars share a common attribute, namely "being white" or "whiteness". This "whiteness" is what is called a "universal": Whiteness, in itself, doesn't exist anywhere within the world that we can point to or touch, rather it is a concept which seems to be partaken of to a greater or lesser degree by various objects in the world that we call "white".

Unsolved questions in philosophy are the questions of "what exactly is the relationship between particulars and universals?" and "in what sense of thew word do universals 'exist'?" Some philosophers think universals really exist, floating somewhere out there beyond space and time, whereas others think that universals are just a feature of language and correspond to nothing other than how we use language, while others think universals exist as concepts in our minds.

Similar questions arise with what are called propositions - which are statements (they may be true or false). eg "My shirt is green", or "2*5=10" or "Canada is north of the USA". But what is "1+1=2"? Does it 'exist' somewhere out there beyond space and time, is it a statement that follows from our definitions of language (ie we define the symbols and hence the result follows) that doesn't necessarily tell us anything about the real world, or is it a universal truth that applies everywhere and to everything (and if so, why), is it a good model for which we are yet to find a counter-example?

Philosophers are all over the board on these issues: There is no known, well-established, "correct" answer to these questions. What exactly it means for something to 'exist' or in what senses things such as propositions or universals 'exist' is well and truly open for debate and unsolved.

Now back to the original argument on the subject of Open Theism...

• God knows all that can be known (omniscience)
• According to Open Theism the future free actions of men does not exist to be known.

It is important to note here that when the Open Viewer says future actions don't "exist" to be known they are not necessarily commiting themselves to any particular philosophical position on any of the matters I discussed above. Their claim is not a philosophical position on the nature of propositions or universals, but rather the claim that the future doesn't exist in the same manner as the present, and that God's knowledge extends to the present but not to the future. Their claim is about what is knowable. The future might well 'exist' in some wierd or wonderful manner (perhaps all possible futures 'exist') but it does not exist in the same way that the present exists, and the future is not knowable in the same way that the present is.

• God does not know the future free actions of men however retains omniscience in that God fully knows all that is knowable.

This premise correctly implies that what the Open Viewer is doing is saying that the future is not knowable, not so much making any grand philosophical claims about what exists and in what manner it exists.

• A rock exists.
• Therefore God knows what is a rock.

This gets problematic. Rocks exist true, but why should rocks need to exist for God to have an idea about the concept of a rock. Unicorns don't exist, yet we have no problem having an idea about what sort of a thing a unicorn would be if it were to exist. In other words we understand the concept of a unicorn, even though none exist. Presumably God also does. The Open View has nothing to do with this: What the open view denies is God's certain knowledge of the future actions of free-willed beings. Any open viewer would agree God understood concepts.

• 1+1=2 does not exist.
• Therefore God can not know 1+1=2.

Does 1+1=2 "not exist" in any sense? That's advocating a not-proven philosophical position. The argument has now lost all relation to the Open View position. The Open Viewers were making a claim that the future did not exist in the same sense that the present existed because the actions of free-willed creatures presented a barrier to knowability. The argument has claimed that Open Viewers were making a claim about "existence" in general and then tries to claim that any concept whos 'existence' isn't fully understood (such as propositions) therefore 'exists' in the same way that the future does and is therefore unknowable to God.

The obvious problem of this argument is shown simply by the following:
We know that 1+1=2, and we don't know the future. Therefore it is possible to know 1+1=2 without knowing the future: so God might indeed have this level of knowledge.

[Xmansmommy]

Absolutely fantastic post Tercel! That helped tremendously. Pearls for ya.

[Starkman]

God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods.

Perhaps that can better clarify the Open View.

Starkman

[yxboom]

Thanks Tercel for the excellent post.

I would breifly add that it could be argued the existance of the future to be exhaustively foreknown contradicts "conjoined might determinants" and can not make logical sense along such. For instance we can not say A "will happen" and coherently maintain that A "may not happen". 1+1=2 is a proposition unrelated to "conjoined might determinants" and therefore doesn't contradict it and can be known.
Which is essentially the same vein as what you stated here

Does 1+1=2 "not exist" in any sense? That's advocating a not-proven philosophical position. The argument has now lost all relation to the Open View position. The Open Viewers were making a claim that the future did not exist in the same sense that the present existed because the actions of free-willed creatures presented a barrier to knowability. The argument has claimed that Open Viewers were making a claim about "existence" in general and then tries to claim that any concept whos 'existence' isn't fully understood (such as propositions) therefore 'exists' in the same way that the future does and is therefore unknowable to God.

God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods.

Then that would open up the issue of what I will do in the future. Is it false that I will eat breakfast tomorrow?

[JardinPrayer]

God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods.

Perhaps that can better clarify the Open View.

Starkman

Actually, that didn't clarify anything at all for me...someone who is still trying to understand Open View Theism.

[yxboom]

Actually, that didn't clarify anything at all for me...someone who is still trying to understand Open View Theism.

The problem I see with simply saying "God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods." is that all views of God propose that, well with the exception of Molinism. Than again, Molinism is the exception to about everything

[Tercel]

The problem I see with simply saying "God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods." is that all views of God propose that, well with the exception of Molinism. Than again, Molinism is the exception to about everything

Uh? How does Molinism deny that?

[Trout]

Please forgive me if my post is contrary to the thread starters wishes, yxboom, feel free to delete my post if it was your intention that those posting here need to be of the OV. Or if it's simply too far off topic.

thanks.

The argument flows like this.

• God knows all that can be known (omniscience)

• Will God know more tomorrow than He knows today?
  
  If so, how would the Open View answer the following:
  
  
  1) God has more knowledge today than He had yesterday.
  
  2) God will have more knowledge tomorrow than He does today.
  
  3) Therefore God cannot have been, nor currently be a perfect being.
  
  

• According to Open Theism the future free actions of men does not exist to be known.

[Tercel]

Will God know more tomorrow than He knows today?
If so, how would the Open View answer the following:

1) God has more knowledge today than He had yesterday.
2) God will have more knowledge tomorrow than He does today.
3) Therefore God cannot have been, nor currently be a perfect being.

According to some non-OV position, such as Calvinism, God foreordains things that will come to pass. Before God foreordained them, He presumably didn't know what would come to pass (otherwise it seems He'd have had no choice in His foreordination: He could only predestine what he already foreknew... which smacks of Arminianism.). And thus He "found out" what was going to come to pass, when He decided on it... thus His level of knowledge increased: He had more knowledge after His decision than before it. So is God therefore not a perfect being? As you can see, I think the same question applies regardless of what viewpoint you advocate, so the question really isn't a stumper just for Open Viewers.

How would I answer the question? I would attack the notion that perfection entails non-changability. I would argue God's perfection is one of continual re-expression and renewal. He is "ever-changing from glory to glory" (as the hymn goes) and his mercies are "new every morning" (Lam 3:22-23).

The past actions of men don't currently exist either, yet an omniscient being would know all of them, by definition.

But an omnipresent being would have experienced the past in the past and an omni-non-forgetful being would remember it.

The statement, "yxboom will have breakfast tomorrow" seems to have a truth value, and with that, an omniscient being would, by definition, need to know it.

The whole point of the Open View position is that the proposition doesn't gain a knowable truth value until it actually occurs. The omniscient being will know it as soon as it can become known.

That would be true if there were to be no future actions of mankind. However simply knowing that there will be future actions of mankind makes it necessary that an omni-being know what those actions will be. Otherwise you don't have an omniscient being, you have a very smart being.

This is merely creating an arbitrary definition of "omniscient". Why should anyone agree that your definition of the word is the correct one as opposed to the one the Open Viewers put forward?

This reminds me of Origen's version of "omnipotent". Origen was one of the first theologians to use the word (and thus had the "right" to define it if anyone does)... and he used it to mean that God had power (not infinite power) over all things that exist. ie God's power was "omni" in scope, not in magnitude.
In a way the open view version of omniscience is similar: It is not how we have been taught to understand the word, but it seems a reasonably valid use of the word.

As a newbie regarding the OV, I think that the argument, would have to "die the death of a thousand qualifications" before it could be discussed very far.

Yup.

[Trout]

According to some non-OV position, such as Calvinism, God foreordains things that will come to pass. Before God foreordained them, He presumably didn't know what would come to pass (otherwise it seems He'd have had no choice in His foreordination: He could only predestine what he already foreknew... which smacks of Arminianism.). And thus He "found out" what was going to come to pass, when He decided on it... thus His level of knowledge increased: He had more knowledge after His decision than before it. So is God therefore not a perfect being? As you can see, I think the same question applies regardless of what viewpoint you advocate, so the question really isn't a stumper just for Open Viewers.

An omni-being would know not only the outcome and details of this world, but also all possible worlds, there would never be a time when an omni-being wasn't in possession of complete knowledge of all possible future contingents. If an omni-being aquired knowledge, there isn't the slightest possibility that he was omniscient prior to His having all knowledge.

How would I answer the question? I would attack the notion that perfection entails non-changability. I would argue God's perfection is one of continual re-expression and renewal. He is "ever-changing from glory to glory" (as the hymn goes) and his mercies are "new every morning" (Lam 3:22-23).

How can something be perfect and aquire more knowledge? Is God therefore more perfect? The very notion of perfection implies immutability and completeness. I think my argument remains quite valid.

1) God has more knowledge today than He had yesterday.
2) God will have more knowledge tomorrow than He does today.
3) Therefore God cannot have been, nor currently be a perfect being.

Trout:
The past actions of men don't currently exist either, yet an omniscient being would know all of them, by definition.

Tercel:
But an omnipresent being would have experienced the past in the past and an omni-non-forgetful being would remember it.

So then the difference we have is the truth value of future tense statements.
Statements about the past have a truth value, even though the past doesn't exist. Statements about the future seem to have a truth value, i.e. "Tercel will read this post" has a truth value, and an omni-being would need to know whether that statement is true.

Trout:
The statement, "yxboom will have breakfast tomorrow" seems to have a truth value, and with that, an omniscient being would, by definition, need to know it.

Tercel:
The whole point of the Open View position is that the proposition doesn't gain a knowable truth value until it actually occurs. The omniscient being will know it as soon as it can become known.

OK?

1) God has more knowledge today than He had yesterday.

2) God will have more knowledge tomorrow than He has today.

3) God was not nor currently is omniscient.

Trout:
That would be true if there were to be no future actions of mankind. However simply knowing that there will be future actions of mankind makes it necessary that an omni-being know what those actions will be. Otherwise you don't have an omniscient being, you have a very smart being.

Tercel:
This is merely creating an arbitrary definition of "omniscient". Why should anyone agree that your definition of the word is the correct one as opposed to the one the Open Viewers put forward?

I like starkmans definition, "God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods." With that in mind, an omni-being would have to be in possession of all things true, including the truth value of future tense statements, in order to qualify, which He does.

And what a joy it is to talk about our Wonderful God, may we all grow in our understanding of Him.

As the hymn goes:

Great is Thy faithfulness, O God my Father;
There is no shadow of turning with Thee;
Thou changest not, Thy compassions, they fail not;
As Thou hast been, Thou forever will be.

Trout

[Starkman]

Quote: originally Posted by Starkman - God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods.

Yxboom: Then that would open up the issue of what I will do in the future. Is it false that I will eat breakfast tomorrow?

God knows it's false that you WILL eat breakfast tomorrow; you may be dead! Rather, God knows it's POSSIBLE that you might eat breakfast tomorrow; however, we must also take into consideration what WE do not know: again, you may be dead, and God alone knows that, for He alone allows your death or keeps you alive.


Quote: orginally posted by Starkman - God knows all truths; He believes no falsehoods. Perhaps that can better clarify the Open View.

JardinPrayer: Actually, that didn't clarify anything at all for me...someone who is still trying to understand Open View Theism.

It makes absolutely perfect sense AS LONG AS you do not add to it the preconditionally learned concept of omniscience having to include that God's foreknowledge is exhaustive (thus the future must be settled). So, that God knows all truths means that God knows every single one of them; anything that is true, that is truth. And that God believes no falsehoods means that God does not believe anything to be true that either is not true or only "might" be true.

None of this, as an Open Theist sees God interacting in Scripture, forces upon the meaning of omniscience to include everything that will ever be--every word, thought, deed, emotion, blink of the eye, etc.--that has not happened yet. This isn't re-defining omniscience; it's re-defining what can Scripturally and, in reality, be included in omniscience (very important to understand this!). Open Theism is, in it's most simple explanation, this: that apart from that portion of the future which God has determined, and apart from that portion into the future that God can see (e.g. in one year you'll be dead if you don't get some help, because your heart is going to give out), the rest is open; it has not happened. There's nothing to know and, therefore, nothing to insist God must know.

Consider this. Can God make Himself non-existent and still be God ? Of course not. (I mean, hey, if He doesn't exist anymore, He's no God, right). Can God make someone married and not married at the same time? No, He cannot, by simple definition of the word "marriage." In other words, there are many things that God cannot "do." But those things are not issues in relationship to God's omnipotence, for "omnipotence" is not to be understood to mean ABSOLUTELY ANYTHING AND EVERYTHING. To make omnipotence mean this is first not possible, and second, it's not what Scripture portrays in regard to God's omnipotence. (Heavens, having a fit because God can't cease to exists...permanently, mind you, and demand that He still must be God because He can "do everything"...well, it's hard to break out of the box of our thinking sometimes, but we really need to try, at least!)

So, if omnipotence can be more reasonably understood to not mean ABSOLUTELY EVERYTHING, is there a problem if omniscience must also be understood in the same manner? No, not at all. And that's all Open Theism tries to do; strike the chord that resonates a best, and natural, Scriptural understanding of God's omniscience.

For hoping that I've helped here,

Starkman

[yxboom]

Uh? How does Molinism deny that?

It was a comment in jest based off the belief that God knows what my life would be like if I were a Victoria's Secret model in one of the infinite possible worlds.

[yxboom]

Will God know more tomorrow than He knows today?

Yes.

If so, how would the Open View answer the following:

1) God has more knowledge today than He had yesterday.

2) God will have more knowledge tomorrow than He does today.

3) Therefore God cannot have been, nor currently be a perfect being.

You are drawing a conclusion based off of your own definition of what perfect means. This would be a failure to elucidate and a fallacious argument in that your definition of perfect isn't necessarily the definition everyone else agrees with. The platonic view of perfection that led to immutability isn't the only understanding of perfection out there.
I understand perfect to be void of defects and whole. Provide proof that to have all attainable knowledge at any given moment is defective or incomplete. All views would fall under this scrutiny because the views differ on what knoweldge is attainable at any given moment.
Cellphones didn't exist 2000 years ago (or at least there is no evidence that any such thing existed). Why would an all-knowing being have to know 2000 years ago what a cellphone is to be all knowing?

The past actions of men don't currently exist either, yet an omniscient being would know all of them, by definition.

The omniscient being would have to be unconscious or unaware of all reality to not have past knowledge which is irrelevant to arguing against OV.

The statement, "yxboom will have breakfast tomorrow" seems to have a truth value, and with that, an omniscient being would, by definition, need to know it.

Yes however, show that I will have breakfast tomorrow.
OVT believes the future is made up of "might/might nots". If I will have breakfast tomorrow than it can never be said I might not have breakfast tomorrow. This is contradictory and yet in the way we live and observe the world around us we see that I might not have breakfast tomorrow.

Exo 4:8

"If they will not believe you," God said, "or listen to the first sign, they may believe the latter sign.

That would be true if there were to be no future actions of mankind. However simply knowing that there will be future actions of mankind makes it necessary that an omni-being know what those actions will be. Otherwise you don't have an omniscient being, you have a very smart being.

That made no sense. Because I may or may not do something doesn't mean an omnibeing has to know what I will do in order for this omnibeing to be omni.

God knew what a rock would be before He created it, He didn't create it and then learn of it's properties, unless He wasn't an omni-being.

Mathematic equations correspond with reality, and an omni-being would have to know the truth value of them.

Ok.

As a newbie regarding the OV, I think that the argument, would have to "die the death of a thousand qualifications" before it could be discussed very far.

Ok.