ARTICLE: Evidence for the Soul

[lee_merrill]

Hi everyone,

Then I replace all the parts one by one and tranfer the stored data to the new hdd. The robot will still have stored the information that it was built in 2002.

Yes, that's true, I think he just proved with his deck analogy that animals have souls! Plants have souls! Ooops. Machines have souls? You could even make the same sort of argument there, if Greg replaced the boards in his deck one by one, as they wore out, he would still call it "his deck."

Oh well, you can't hit a home run every time.

But his basic point is still valid, I think, just because the Russian astronauts didn't see God in outer space, doesn't mean he is not there, invisible entities would be ... not visible.

So reductionism is concluding too much, as Solly mentioned, and we can maybe look elsewhere, for evidence of a soul, such as in the validity of reason! Discussed here...

Blessings,
Lee

[Kenny]

You could even make the same sort of argument there, if Greg replaced the boards in his deck one by one, as they wore out, he would still call it "his deck."

Yes, our naïve intuitions concerning identity and persistence often yield conflicting results – a reason to be wary about drawing strong conclusions from such examples. My own intuitions concerning Koukl's deck scenario point to the conclusions that – yes, the neighbor did steal Koukl's boards but not Koukl's deck (it's still the same deck even though its materials have been replaced). Likewise, it seems quite plausible to me to maintain that I have the same body now as I did yesterday, even if a few of my skin cells since then have been replaced.

My primary criteria for asserting "sameness" with respect to an object's persisting overtime is spatial/temporal continuity, not the maintenance of identical material composition.

[Kenny]

Hi Jezz,

I would clarify this slightly. In Paul's Jewish mind, the image of body and self is not quite one of inseparability. Rather, the image he uses of a self without its body is one of nakedness:

2 Corinthians 5:2-4

²Meanwhile we groan, longing to be clothed with our heavenly dwelling, ³because when we are clothed, we will not be found naked. ⁴For while we are in this tent, we groan and are burdened, because we do not wish to be unclothed but to be clothed with our heavenly dwelling, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by life.

Actually, I think New Testament Scholar Joel B. Green presents a more compelling interpretation of this verse (which he takes from Victor Furnish):

In this case, what is on center stage is the frailty of human existence and the concomitant possibility of denying that one has been clothed in Christ if one suffers as Paul has suffered. Paul, then, would be speaking of his having been clothed with Christ at his baptism, a well-known metaphor, and longing for the completion of his salvation (i.e. his being "clothed over" and therefore not found naked in the final judgement). As is typical of Pauline thought, the duality here would be eschatological, focused on the tension between the now and the not-yet, not anthropological

"'Bodies – That is, Human Lives': A Re-Examination of Human nature in the Bible" by Joel B. Green from Whatever Happened to the Soul edited by Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy and H. Newton Malony, p. 171-172

Oddly perhaps, given my materialist views of human composition, I do believe that there will a continuation of one's consciousness after death but before the resurrection, not for philosophical reasons, but since I believe that Scripture does teach such in other passages (although I don't think the evidence is that strong), but I'm not sure that this Paul has in view in this passage.

(Roughly) my way of maintaining both a materialist view of human composition and a conscious intermediate state is via something like a hardware/software analogy. The "software" (one's consciousness/personality) is fully instantiated by the hardware (one's "brain/body") in this life but it is temporally transferred (by God's power) to another format after the death of one's body until the time of the resurrection. Strictly speaking, however, the conscious aspect of the person that is made to continue on after death is not identical to the person herself, and full personal identity is not restored until the resurrection.

[Jezz]

Greg Koukl left out one important fact. Not all parts of the body renew themselves. Brain and nerve cells don't. If brain cells are "replace" like boards on his deck then you'd have no memories older than 7 years.

While it is true to say that we don't grow new brain cells once we've reached adulthood, it is false to say that brain cells are static. Brain and nerve cells exchange particles with their environment - thus, they are not comprised of the same atoms today as they were 7 years ago. Thus, Koukl's argument is still valid.

Again a fundy with no grasp on real science.

Again a freethinker with no grasp on what it means to really "think", nor to be really "free"...

Noone would end up like Chris Reeves. The nerves would grow back and we wouldn't have stem cell research. But again thats not the way it works.

As a matter of fact, nerve cells can regenerate. I had lost feeling in a small part of my hand once due to some nerve damage - the feeling came back after 6-12 months. And there are of course documented cases of quadraplegics/paraplegics who regain some or all of their motor control over time. Such cases are of course rare, but they are sufficient to disprove your foolish statement that nerve cells can't grow back. They do grow back - it's just that the regrowth is slow and not always perfect.

I wish teeth replaced themselves. We'd all save a forture in dentist bills.

You missed the point of the article. The point was not that every part of the body can regenerate. The point is that every part of the body exchanges its parts for new ones continuously throughout its life. Thus if a person is only the sum of their parts, this means that they become a completely different person every 7 years or so.

[Benster]

"Arrows are equivalent to "if...then..." statements. "If A, then B" means A -> B."

But not the reverse. Any part of the human body serves the whole. There is no part of the body that is the sole purpose of the workings of the rest.

A-> B but not B-> A

"Both of these statements are experimentally validated."

There is no soul. I've seen no definition of it, even, let alone an experimental proof!

"My point is that you can't have one [the part] without the other [the whole]. Because you can't have one without the other, it doesn't make any sense to talk about one of them "depending" on the other."

You can certainly have a heap of parts, and yet not have the whole!
And you CAN have a machine that operates, though perhaps not quite as well, missing one of its parts. Whereas, if you try to take away all but one part of a complex structure, it won't work at all. This happens again and again. It's just good sense. The principal is illustrated in practical design...evolution.. model airplane making...baseball, etc. it's a fact.


"Indeed, you have shown that any particular part cannot be expressed as a similarly simple function of the whole. Yes, this will be true not matter how complex the function of the parts is. Yes, there is a smell of burning straw in the air surrounding this point. Why does it matter if the function is more complex? It does not. What matters is that the function exists."

But this backwards function (the part expressed as the whole) is not a natural one. It is a construct of our reverse engineering and dissection. And the complexity of it all but proves that what is really happening is that a functioning whole has been built from partially functioning parts. Excuse me, but I AM incredulous. Every Vulcan would know this!

"But at any rate, you're over-complicating what is really a simple issue. Answer this question, and you'll understand what I mean:

Does 2.3.4 cause 24?
Or does 24 cause 2.3.4?"

No. But we are using mathematical equations (at your suggestion) as an analogy for material construction. I am not even saying that the parts of a machine cause the machine to exist. But they do enable its operation, and not the other way around. And the operation of a machine is the thing that makes it interesting. You sound like a skeptic. Do you believe that humans actually know how to make machines, or is engineering just an illusion?

"It is usually much simpler to define the behaviour of the parts in terms of the behaviour of the whole..."

Well, only if you are making up things to explain them to a child! I can tell my small son that the sun rises everday so that we can be sunny and happy, but that's a white lie. Unless you believe that the universe was created just for you...Oh, waitaminnit...you are a christian, aren't you!? You really DO believe this!

"Now, it is theoretically possible to describe this system by solving Newton's Laws for each and every particle in the tennis ball. This means keeping track of the (x,y,z) coordinates of every particle in the ball."

But you don't have to do this, because the motion of a tennis ball through the air is NOT dependent on its parts. But, as soon as the ball hits the ground and bounces, then you DO have to take into account the working of the parts. You only go down a level when you want or have to. You don't have to reduce everything to its lowest complexity.

"No, what any smart physicist would do in such a situation is eschew the idea of describing the behaviour of the tennis ball as a function of its consituent parts altogether."

The tennis ball is acting as a particle. It is being used as an analogy for an atom. Everyone knows that's what physicists mean when they talk about tennis balls...atoms!

As for the soul...well...There simply isn't one. Nothing to reduce there!

[C. D. Ward]

You missed the point of the article. The point was not that every part of the body can regenerate. The point is that every part of the body exchanges its parts for new ones continuously throughout its life. Thus if a person is only the sum of their parts, this means that they become a completely different person every 7 years or so.

True, but this fact doesn't necessarily impugn a reductionist approach to identity. That's (IMO) what Solly and I (and possibly Kenny) are on about. Koukl's article represents a philosophically naive and ill-informed attack on materialist/reductionist views of identity/consciousness.

[TrinityKicker]

It seems to me that if you admit that none of the physical parts of a person persist that materialism would intrinsically contradict a materialistic view of personal identity. Depending on how reductionist a view you take, it may also demolish a reductionist view.

If the who is no more than the sum of its parts, then when the parts change, the whole is destroyed and a new whole is born. Of course, this goes against the human experience of a persistant self.

[Hoosier]

This article is so silly. I can build a robot and store in its hard disk drive the following piece of information: "Built in 2002." Then I replace all the parts one by one and tranfer the stored data to the new hdd. The robot will still have stored the information that it was built in 2002.

Who stored that data in our hdd?

[Jezz]

"Arrows are equivalent to "if...then..." statements. "If A, then B" means A -> B."

But not the reverse.

Simply restating your assertion does not make it any more true.

Any part of the human body serves the whole.

Correct.

There is no part of the body that is the sole purpose of the workings of the rest.

Correct. But I'm not talking about a single part. I'm talking about a totality of parts. What you say is true if you consider the parts individually. But collectively, all the parts do serve each other, as a totality. That's what distinguishes a whole from a random collection of parts.

A-> B but not B-> A

Again, reasserting your assumption does not make an argument.

"Both of these statements are experimentally validated."

There is no soul. I've seen no definition of it, even, let alone an experimental proof!

"There is no forest. I've seen no definition of it, even, let alone an experimental proof! I've only ever seen trees!"

The problem with reductionism is, that you end up failing to see the forest for the trees...

Answer the following two questions (1 pearl for each answer, + 1 pearl for each correct answer, + 1 bonus pearl for participating at all):

Q1: What is the difference between a corpse and a living body?

Q2: What do "psychologists" and "psychaiatrists" study?

"My point is that you can't have one [the part] without the other [the whole]. Because you can't have one without the other, it doesn't make any sense to talk about one of them "depending" on the other."

You've paraphrased me incorrectly. What I actually meant was:

"My point is that you can't have one [the totality of parts] without the other [the whole]."

I'm not talking about a single part being equivalent to the whole. I'm talking about the totality of parts being equivalent to the whole.

You can certainly have a heap of parts, and yet not have the whole!

Well, then you've proved my point! if you can have all the parts and yet not have the whole, then the whole is something other than just the parts. In actual fact, it is the parts in a particular arrangement, as I pointed out above.

And you CAN have a machine that operates, though perhaps not quite as well, missing one of its parts. Whereas, if you try to take away all but one part of a complex structure, it won't work at all. This happens again and again. It's just good sense. The principal is illustrated in practical design...evolution.. model airplane making...baseball, etc. it's a fact.

True, but this is a strawman. I'm not saying that a complex machine is equivalent to one of its parts. It is equivalent to the totality of its parts.

"Indeed, you have shown that any particular part cannot be expressed as a similarly simple function of the whole. Yes, this will be true not matter how complex the function of the parts is. Yes, there is a smell of burning straw in the air surrounding this point. Why does it matter if the function is more complex? It does not. What matters is that the function exists."

But this backwards function (the part expressed as the whole)...

"Backwards" function? What makes you call it "backwards"? This is just you presupposing the direction again.

...is not a natural one. It is a construct of our reverse engineering and dissection.

It is no more or less natural than the "forward" function, and it is no more or less a "construct" than its inverse function is a construct of our forward engineering and aggregation.

And the complexity of it all but proves that what is really happening is that a functioning whole has been built from partially functioning parts.

It proves no such thing. Are you trying to tell me that if your function describing reality is not simple, then it's not "real"?

Excuse me, but I AM incredulous. Every Vulcan would know this!

Every Vulcan knows that argument from incredulity is not an argument. Vulcans can also recognise when their debate opponents simply restate their presuppositions.

"But at any rate, you're over-complicating what is really a simple issue. Answer this question, and you'll understand what I mean:

Does 2.3.4 cause 24?
Or does 24 cause 2.3.4?"

No.

Well, this is the correct answer, but I think more by accident than by any sort of clear thinking on your part.

It is true - it does not ultimately make sense to speak of "2.3.4" causing "24", or to claim the opposite. Both are simultaneously true - you cannot have one without the other.

Equally, there is no good reason to speak of a machine's operation to be "caused by" the operation of its parts, as opposed to claiming the opposite. Both are always simultaneously true.

But we are using mathematical equations (at your suggestion) as an analogy for material construction. I am not even saying that the parts of a machine cause the machine to exist. But they do enable its operation, and not the other way around. And the operation of a machine is the thing that makes it interesting.

The parts enable the operation of the machine? Or does the machine enable the operation of its parts? That is the question. And it is a non-sensical question, because the "parts" and the "machine" are one in the same thing. You cannot have one without the other.

You sound like a skeptic. Do you believe that humans actually know how to make machines, or is engineering just an illusion?

Do you really like to ask stupid red herring questions, or is that just an illusion?

Of course I believe that humans can make machines. I'm an engineer. As a matter of course, btw, I write software, and as a matter of course it is customary to speak of software enabling the machine (ie, the computer) to do its job. This is a perfect example of "top-down causality" picture of the sort I am describing.

"It is usually much simpler to define the behaviour of the parts in terms of the behaviour of the whole..."

Well, only if you are making up things to explain them to a child!

Rubbish. No real scientist would say this. Real scientists explain the behaviour of the parts in terms of the behaviour of the whole all the time. The example of rigid body mechanics is a perfect example of science being made much easier and more practical by defining the behaviour of the parts in terms of the whole. But that is only one example. Physicists typically work with Boyle's Law rather than statistical mechanics. Did the temperature of a body increase? Or did the mean kinetic energy per degree of freedom of its constituent particles increase? The reality: both increased, because they are one in the same thing.

I can tell my small son that the sun rises everday so that we can be sunny and happy, but that's a white lie. Unless you believe that the universe was created just for you...Oh, waitaminnit...you are a christian, aren't you!? You really DO believe this!

Speaking of behaving like a child...

"Oh waitaminnit, you are an atheist, aren't you? You really DO believe that the universe is an accident! Oh my!"

This is not a very productive way to engage in a useful discussion. It is simply arrogant and condescending. If you actually want to have a discussion, I suggest you avoid childish little jabs like this one.

"Now, it is theoretically possible to describe this system by solving Newton's Laws for each and every particle in the tennis ball. This means keeping track of the (x,y,z) coordinates of every particle in the ball."

But you don't have to do this, because the motion of a tennis ball through the air is NOT dependent on its parts.

You're claiming that the motion of the tennis ball is not dependent on its parts? In other words, the motion of the tennis ball through the air is independent of its parts?

Q3: Have you ever seen a tennis ball fly through the air while its parts stayed behind on the ground?

But, as soon as the ball hits the ground and bounces, then you DO have to take into account the working of the parts.

No you don't have to take into account the working of the parts. You can note that a tennis ball deforms when it bounces, describe the deformation of the ball mathematically, and then describe the motion of the parts of the ball as a function of the motion and deformation of the ball itself.

You only go down a level when you want or have to. You don't have to reduce everything to its lowest complexity.

Precisely. The level of complexity at which you treat something is completely arbitrary. And not only can you go down a level when you want or have to - you can also go up a level if you want or have to, and still be describing the same system in an equivalent fashion.

A tennis ball is a tennis ball regardless of whether you call it a tennis ball, or a particular arrangment of rubber and stuff, or a particular arrangement of certain types of molecules, or a particular arrangment of atoms, or a particular arrangement of electrons, protons and neutrons, etc... No matter which level of abstraction you use to describe it, it's still a tennis ball. All of these descriptions of the tennis ball are equivalent.

"No, what any smart physicist would do in such a situation is eschew the idea of describing the behaviour of the tennis ball as a function of its consituent parts altogether."

The tennis ball is acting as a particle. It is being used as an analogy for an atom. Everyone knows that's what physicists mean when they talk about tennis balls...atoms!

Either that was a cute joke, or you really do have no idea... I'm going to assume the former - if the latter, then please let me know and I'll attempt to explain.

As for the soul...well...There simply isn't one. Nothing to reduce there!

Argument by assertion again. Please see my questions above.

[Sacrificial Ram]

Argument by assertion again. Please see my questions above.

Well then

Define a soul. Give it's charateristics. Show how a soul can be demonstrated to exist.

Otherwise, it is just arguement by assertion AGAIN. Where is the evidence for a soul?

[Jezz]

True, but this fact doesn't necessarily impugn a reductionist approach to identity.

True, but I never claimed to be impugning a reductionist approach to identity in that post.

As a matter of fact, I am not impugning a reductionist approach per se even in my discussion with Benster. What I am impugning is the claim that some reductionists (eg Benster) make - that it is not merely a correct view of reality, but the correct view of reality, in exclusion to all others. This is simply false. If you always look at reality through reductionist goggles, then you will tend (quite literally) to fail to see the forest for the trees. Science (not to mention everyday life) simply doesn't work this way. In science, they work with aggregate systems as often as they work with reduced systems.

In short: reductionism is not "wrong", but it is only one side of the coin. The other side of that coin is "aggregationism". And the coin taken as a whole (a totality? ) is totalism. Totalism is the only way to look at people, the universe, etc in a holistic, balanced fashion.

That's (IMO) what Solly and I (and possibly Kenny) are on about. Koukl's article represents a philosophically naive and ill-informed attack on materialist/reductionist views of identity/consciousness.

I tend to agree that it was a pretty superficial treatment of the issue - and it had theological problems from a Christian point of view, in addition to philosophical ones. Kenny and I are pretty much in full agreement on this particular issue of anthropology and reductionism, btw - we've discussed it before.

[Benster]

"Q1: What is the difference between a corpse and a living body?"

There are lots. Basically, a corpse is a living body that has ceased to live, because its parts are no longer working together. It is no longer able to fight the trend of entropy and maintain its intricate organization, so it degrades and the parts degenerate.
It is the function of the whole that is missing from a corpse.

"Q2: What do "psychologists" and "psychaiatrists" study?"

Psychologists help people with their behavior and mind. Psychiatrists do the same and can prescibe medicines.

"...if you can have all the parts and yet not have the whole, then the whole is something other than just the parts. In actual fact, it is the parts in a particular arrangement, as I pointed out above."

I agree. In my words, it is a complex function of the parts...not a simple sum.

""Backwards" function? What makes you call it "backwards"? This is just you presupposing the direction again."

Your resistance to seeing the train of complexity of function as a directional arrow, at least conecptually, is irrational. Things proceed from the simple to the complex.

"It is true - it does not ultimately make sense to speak of "2.3.4" causing "24", or to claim the opposite. Both are simultaneously true - you cannot have one without the other."

The maths analogy is not perfect. If you were to build 24, which is what biological organisms do...they build body parts to serve a largely pre-determined function...then you have to get a 2 and then a 3 and then a 4 and multiply them. If you want to build a 2, you don't start with a 24 and work backwards...you start with two 1's.

[C. D. Ward]

True, but I never claimed to be impugning a reductionist approach to identity in that post.

Oh, I know that, but Koukl was in his article, and the statement I quoted was your paraphrase of his point. My point was that his point fails.

In short: reductionism is not "wrong", but it is only one side of the coin. The other side of that coin is "aggregationism". And the coin taken as a whole (a totality? ) is totalism. Totalism is the only way to look at people, the universe, etc in a holistic, balanced fashion.

While I agree that reductionism has a tendency toward superficiality (missing the forest for the trees), you're suggesting a top-down vs. a bottom-up approach? It seems to me that such an approach necessarily begins by presuming that an ordering principle exists, rather than by remaining neutral and attempting to discover if one does. IOW, "Does the part serve a purpose of the whole?" would seem to assume that "the whole" has a purpose whereas "Is the whole a function of the parts?" does not. Or I could just be misunderstanding you...

[Hoosier]

Well then

Define a soul. Give it's charateristics. Show how a soul can be demonstrated to exist.

A soul is the nonphysical component of a person, which might also loosely be termed mind or self.

Characteristics would include the property of memory, sometimes of wisdom, of decision or will, of belief, of reason, of fear, of joy, hope, despair, etc..

Koukl's first argument for identity about the parts of a deck was weak, as it invloves the abstraction of "my" deck. His second argument for the continuity of memory and self was better.

Was it actually you who blew out the candles at your third birthday party? Physically, of course, it was not the same you that wrote the above post. If you do feel however that it was you, then there must be something that transcends the purely physical properties of your personhood. The question this raises is whether this something is simply a property of your physical being that somehow mantains continuity though the physical properties do not, or if it is instead an actual substance, or soul.

Otherwise, it is just arguement by assertion AGAIN. Where is the evidence for a soul?

The fact that the physical properties above have almost totally changed, yet the continuity of memory and self remain, is evidence for the soul. It may not be conclusive evidence, but is certainly evidence. The question you need to ask is if this evidence can be more parsimoniously explained in another way, or if your a priori commitment that a soul cannot exist has constructed a definition of evidence that would preclude any pointing to it.

If so, I suspect it would also preclude the existence of universals, numbers abstractions, beliefs, and a host of other nonphysical entities that you do recognize at least implictly all the time.

[C. D. Ward]

The fact that the physical properties above have almost totally changed, yet the continuity of memory and self remain, is evidence for the soul. It may not be conclusive evidence, but is certainly evidence. The question you need to ask is if this evidence can be more parsimoniously explained in another way, or if your a priori commitment that a soul cannot exist has constructed a definition of evidence that would preclude any pointing to it.

While I tend to agree that SR seems to have given unduly short shrift to the argument at hand, continuity of memory and self may be some evidence for a soul, but they're not really very good evidence (IMHO). The chief component of "soul" which seems to be an issue with most skeptics isn't really its alleged immaterial nature (as you allude in your concluding paragraph), but its ability to survive the death of the physical body. Continuity of memory and self are not in any way evidence for this element of the soul and therefore can really only support the idea of an immaterial element to human existence. You'll need some additional support for the idea of post-death survivability to really count as evidence for a soul (as such).