Is "Why is there something rather than nothing?" a legitimate question?

[mattbballman31]

Hello!

A Minkowski space is just a model of 3 space-like dimensions and one time-like dimension. Gravity and velocity are functions over the time-like dimension-- they do not define the time-like dimension.

Agreed. The time-like dimension is essentially the succession of events from future, to present, to past, such that temporal succession becomes.

(As a side-note, Special Relativity breaks down when one begins to discuss accelerated frames, as in the case of gravity; that's where we need General Relativity)

Thanks for the reminder!

Yes, that is what I mean. And on such a model, an 'event' would have a temporal component but no spatial component. For example, if we were to assume for a moment that Mind-Body Dualism is true, a sequence of different thoughts from a disembodied mind would comprise separate events, despite the fact that they have no spatial component and are only measured by the temporal dimension.

I can agree with this.

Yes, my analogy was that events are to time as volume is to depth. In both cases, the former is a composite concept which is defined over some set of dimensions that includes the latter. So, events must have a temporal aspect in a similar manner as volume must have an aspect of depth.

But what about the first event before its succession by a second? Since there was no succession, there was as yet no time. Thus, time comes to be at the same time as the first succession. Yet, since there was a first event that didn't correspond to a time until after the succession, then it follows that the first event wasn't related to time as volume to depth.

My objection is to that you are using equivocated definitions of "prior" to draw a false conclusion. So, if I were to summarize your argument in a syllogism, it sounds like you are arguing:

(1) Creation requires that the creating entity be prior to the created entity.
(2) God is prior to time.
(3) Therefore, it is coherent to assert that God created time.

However, the word "prior" in (1) refers to temporal priority, while the "prior" in (2) refers to logical priority. These are wholly different concepts, which do not carry the same properties or implications, so we cannot draw our conclusion in (3) from these premises.

I dispute that 'prior' in (1) refers to temporal priority. Permit me to change logical priority to causal priority. It's possible that causes can be simultaneous with their effects. Thus, it's possible that, though a cause is causally prior to its effect, the effect is simultaneous to its being caused. If God is timeless sans creation, then God's causing (creating entity) time (created entity) at T=0, and God's creating is simultaneous with time's creation, doesn't seem to require temporal priority.

The act of creation necessarily requires temporal priority, and not simply logical priority. It implies a state in which the created entity does not exist followed by a state in which the created entity exists. It is completely incoherent to claim that there was ever a state in which time did not exist, and therefore it seems incoherent to claim that time could have been created.

I'm not sure I see how creation 'necessarily' requires temporal priority. First, at T=0, all that's required for me is that the effect is simultaneous with the cause (that the created is simultaneous with the creating), and once the timeless being B causes time T at T=0, B becomes temporal at T=0, since B is extrinsically changed by T at T=0, and such change recurs at every successive time. Further, it's important that this creation event is sui generis, since it had no temporally prior state. Second, the implication of a 'state' doesn't necessarily require a temporal state. There are other kinds of states that are not temporal. Do you not say that the Greater Cosmos is in a timeless state? Granted, the Greater Cosmos is of a piece with the static events contained therein. However, a timeless state could also be the condition in which God subsisted sans creation. I don't see a problem, unless you suppose that there's something inherently problematic with simultaneous causation of time's existence.

A Minkowski space is a description of a universe which does include a time-like dimension. However, it's not the only possible description of a physical universe.

That's pretty cool. What are some of those possible descriptions?

True, even past-finitude on the A-Theory doesn't imply that there was ever a state in which Time did not exist. That remains incoherent, and still seems to preclude the notion that Time could have been created.

I'm still having trouble comprehending why it's incoherent. I don't see anything prima facie implausible about a timeless state, since it would seem you attribute this to the Greater Cosmos. My apologies, though, if I'm mistaken there. Perhaps you're saying that a timeless state is coherent, but that a timeless state, or - more precisely - a timeless being's creating time is problematic, since 'creating' assumes a prior, temporal state. I do see the rub. Let me know how simultaneous causation doesn't at least get us closer to coherence. Further, I'm still driven by the notion that whatever begins to exist has a cause even if the 'whatever' is time, since if the A-theory is correct, time literally came into being for some reason or cause. I'm not sure that I can understand something, even time, beginning to exist, without the cause. Like I said, we're in agreement that cause is typically a temporal concept, but the concept's temporal feature is indicative of the cause's being temporally prior to the effect, which is not what is meant by the cause 'causing' the effect simultaneous with the effect's coming to be, and this is what I would expect if the effect was time at T=0.

If opposition to actual infinites is necessary for the argument against the B-Theory, then perhaps we should discuss that before the nature of time; but I'm open to whichever course you'd like to take in the conversation.

Are actual infinities necessarily incompatible with a B-theory? It doesn't seem so. Wouldn't the Greater Cosmos be actually infinite, since it's past-eternal? But that's irrelevant since that's not your view, so if you didn't want to go down that route, that's cool. The following is a presentation of a heuristic from my point of view regarding how my mental processes go for the mutakallim with the philosophical arguments.

1. The philosophical argument against the formation of an actual infinite via successive addition is dependent on an A-theory, since on the B-theory, temporal becoming, which presupposes the successive, gradual, temporal addition of events from a first event, is a psychological illusion that doesn't believe in the static nature of time.
2. The philosophical argument against the metaphysical possibility of an actual infinite: while the static, space/time block isn't made up of an actual infinite number of events, the B-theory can utilize your North Pole analogy and not require a cause at T=0.

Thus, I agree that A vs. B theory would be apropos first. Before I can into the arguments for an A-theory, may I ask whether your primary reason for endorsing a B theory is that Einstein's theories of relativity have made the A theory obsolete?

I rather disagree with this. Let's take, for instance, a Black Hole. Now, the mathematics which describe a Black Hole pre-existed the poetic metaphors which are utilized to describe them. The concept was rendered meaningful on the basis of mathematics, despite the fact that these entities cannot be apprehended by the senses. It was only much later that poetic descriptions, including the very name "Black Hole," became attached to these entities. The reality had already been rendered meaningful; the poetic metaphors were intended to be a way to approximate that meaning to people who could not understand the original language which described the entities (mathematics). Furthermore, the mathematics is far more meaningful than the poetic metaphor-- after all, a Black Hole is neither black nor a hole.

I recommend you read C.S. Lewis' essay Bluspels and Flalansferes: A Semantic Nightmare. The Black Hole example doesn't undercut my point, as it's an instance of a Master's Metaphor (MM), as opposed to a Pupil's Metaphor (PM). Since we have mathematics to give meaning to a Black Hole, the term 'Black Hole' is a MM, since it can be understood independent of the metaphor. For someone who doesn't understand, Black Hole is a PM, since those who aren't specialists in mathematics are totally dependent on it. But Lewis would try to quarantine those concepts of which we all are the prisoners of PM, as with the Flatlanders, or those realities not susceptible to mathematical formula, such as a timeless state perhaps. Further, the mathematical formula are, again, more symbols, and so each constituent symbol, while it works in describing a Black Hole with mathematical precision, isolates only those parts of the reality that are the common, measurable parts. If we dig deep enough, wouldn't we have to say that each symbol in the formula, when excavated down its most rudimentary form, run into a wall, which - at bottom - is an instance of PM? Lastly, the quale/mathematics distinction still seems to show me that the latter doesn't give me the total aletheia of a concept, but - again - only the common, measurable elements useful for prediction. If given the choice between having a masterly grasp of all the mathematical equations that perhaps provide exhaustive algorithmic predictions of Boxing Pythagorus and having a friendship with him, I'd choose the latter! And it seems knowing the former wouldn't allow me to have the meaningful grasp I'd have of the friendship if I confined myself to only knowing the former. There seems to be more to the quale of friendship than just a discovery of the math. So, to say that the math is more meaningful seems like a category error. It's superior, no doubt, in prediction because of its emphasis on the common, measurable elements; but it seems to be inferior regarding the other elements that life seems to be about. The quale of sight seems to provide more qualitative meaning to the experience of sight than the blind man earning his Ph.D in optics while reading his studies in Braille.

Cheers!

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But what about the first event before its succession by a second? Since there was no succession, there was as yet no time. Thus, time comes to be at the same time as the first succession. Yet, since there was a first event that didn't correspond to a time until after the succession, then it follows that the first event wasn't related to time as volume to depth.

Yes, if you isolate your view to a single value for a particular dimension, you effectively eliminate that dimension. This applies equally for any moment of time, not just the first. This is somewhat akin to looking at the base of a cylinder, such that the depth of the object is hidden from your view, and saying, "See! It's just a circle! There is no depth."

I dispute that 'prior' in (1) refers to temporal priority...

I'm not sure I see how creation 'necessarily' requires temporal priority.

What does it mean to "create?" Does it not mean to cause the existence of a thing which did not previously exist? How can something which was literally never non-existent be created? How can one create a thing which already exists?

That's pretty cool. What are some of those possible descriptions?

Different types of dimensional manifolds. Physicists-- especially cosmologists-- love to play around with these sorts of ideas. For one very popular example, String Theory postulates that there are at least 10 different spatial dimensions, plus one temporal dimension. Other physicists have played around with the idea of multiple temporal dimensions, or no temporal dimension. In each of these cases, the scientist defines a mathematical space, and then investigates the physical properties which that space might accord.

I'm still having trouble comprehending why it's incoherent. I don't see anything prima facie implausible about a timeless state, since it would seem you attribute this to the Greater Cosmos.

The incoherence is in asserting that a timeless state can be changed. If a state is timeless, then it does not change. Therefore, it seems completely incoherent to assert that a timeless state of things changed to become a temporal state of things.

So, again, whether one believes the A-Theory or the B-Theory, there was literally never any state when Time did not exist. What sense does it make to say that it could have been created? How does one create a thing which already exists?

Are actual infinities necessarily incompatible with a B-theory?

Sorry, I think I may have been unclear. I didn't mean to imply that actual infinities are incompatible with the B-Theory. What I was intending to say is that many people base their opposition against the B-Theory upon their opposition to actual infinities. They argue that the B-Theory requires actual infinities to exist, and since they deny these, they deny the B-Theory. I disagree that the B-Theory is reliant upon the existence of actual infinities, but it remains that some people pose this argument. As such, I was simply saying that if your opposition to the B-Theory is due to an opposition to actual infinities, then it might be pertinent to start by discussing infinities.

Thus, I agree that A vs. B theory would be apropos first. Before I can into the arguments for an A-theory, may I ask whether your primary reason for endorsing a B theory is that Einstein's theories of relativity have made the A theory obsolete?

I was a B-Theorist even before I had a good understanding of Relativity. While I understand that this is the opposite of most people's experience, the B-Theory just seemed entirely intuitive, to me. I used to explain the way I understood Time to my friends in High School and Youth Group long before I ever knew that there existed established philosophical terminology to describe my position.

Now that I have explored the concept more, I find that Relativity greatly strengthens and supports my view of the B-Theory, but I would not say that it is my primary reason for endorsing it.

I recommend you read C.S. Lewis' essay Bluspels and Flalansferes: A Semantic Nightmare.

I'll add it to my ever-growing queue! Thanks!

So, to say that the math is more meaningful seems like a category error. It's superior, no doubt, in prediction because of its emphasis on the common, measurable elements; but it seems to be inferior regarding the other elements that life seems to be about. The quale of sight seems to provide more qualitative meaning to the experience of sight than the blind man earning his Ph.D in optics while reading his studies in Braille.

When I said that the mathematics is more meaningful than poetic metaphor, I did so specifically in reference to Black Holes; I was not saying that, in general, mathematics is more meaningful than poetic metaphor.

I was responding to your claim that there exists a "necessity of poetic metaphor in descriptions which try to render meaningful realities which are either in themselves not apprehended by the senses, or can't be, or haven't yet." I disagree than such a necessity exists. The Black Hole example was to show that there existed a reality which was rendered meaningful long before any poetic metaphor had been ascribed to it.

[mattbballman31]

Hello! I hope you get this. Got all caught up with life and stuff. I hope all is well!

Yes, if you isolate your view to a single value for a particular dimension, you effectively eliminate that dimension. This applies equally for any moment of time, not just the first. This is somewhat akin to looking at the base of a cylinder, such that the depth of the object is hidden from your view, and saying, "See! It's just a circle! There is no depth."

Yes, but saying it's a circle would be what is at issue. If an A-theory is correct, is really was a circle at T=0, and not a cylinder, per B-theory. So, that's where we need to go next.

What does it mean to "create?" Does it not mean to cause the existence of a thing which did not previously exist? How can something which was literally never non-existent be created? How can one create a thing which already exists?

With Time, we can't use the word 'previously' in a temporal sense, unless we want to (as some theologians do) postulate a hyper-time (in which there is no intrinsic metric, but in which there might be properties sufficient for some kind of temporal passage). But if I postulate pure timelessness, 'previously' can only mean 'causally' previous, the implicit assumption being the intelligibility of the concept of 'simultaneous causation' (SC). In SC, the cause doesn't temporally precede the effect; the cause and the effect are coincident. Thus, when God creates the first event at T=0, the creating is the cause 'coincident' with the effect, the first event. And since there's no 'temporal' priority, 'previously' is construed in terms of 'causal' priority, where 'causal' is understood within the context of SC. The same goes for the temporal, conceptual baggage attached to 'never' and 'already'. These terms assume temporal priority; but when speaking of Time itself, this baggage needs to be left behind. Implicit here is the notion that time is sufficient, but not necessary, for existence: timeless existence. We can probably marshal forth various arguments given by Platonists to at least lend plausibility to the notion that abstract objects exist, but are timeless. In this case, God is said to exist in much the same way: only God is a concrete object, lacking the property of temporality, causally prior to Time.

The incoherence is in asserting that a timeless state can be changed. If a state is timeless, then it does not change. Therefore, it seems completely incoherent to assert that a timeless state of things changed to become a temporal state of things.

When God ceased to be timeless coincident with the first event, it's not that 'timelessness' changed; it's the 'timelessness' ceased to exist coincident with God gaining the property of temporality. Thus, it's not as if 'timelessness' changed by gaining a property in the same way as a I change by gaining weight. In the latter case, the 'I' (for simplicity's sake) is the underlying substrate which gains certain properties relevant to weight increase; in the former case, timelessness isn't, and can't be, an underlying substrate which gains a certain property called temporality. The state of affairs of God being timeless just ceases to exist, since, as you say, it is the essence of timelessness not to change. Thus, the introduction of change is simultaneously the termination of timeless existence 'from' existence. It is now the case that timelessness does not, nor ever will, exist again, it seems.

Sorry, I think I may have been unclear. I didn't mean to imply that actual infinities are incompatible with the B-Theory. What I was intending to say is that many people base their opposition against the B-Theory upon their opposition to actual infinities. They argue that the B-Theory requires actual infinities to exist, and since they deny these, they deny the B-Theory. I disagree that the B-Theory is reliant upon the existence of actual infinities, but it remains that some people pose this argument. As such, I was simply saying that if your opposition to the B-Theory is due to an opposition to actual infinities, then it might be pertinent to start by discussing infinities.

I might say that the argument against metaphysical possibility of an actual infinite collection can apply to A or B theory, since both theories are metaphysical, and thus effected by the metaphysical implication of argument. But the argument from the metaphysical possibility of 'forming' an actual infinite via successive addition explicitly assumes an A-theory, since A-theory assumes temporal passage, or temporal becoming, the temporal succession of one event after another, that this is a real, mind-independent succession, and not an illusion of consciousness.

When I said that the mathematics is more meaningful than poetic metaphor, I did so specifically in reference to Black Holes; I was not saying that, in general, mathematics is more meaningful than poetic metaphor.

Yes. Lewis would agree. Once the mathematics allows us to shift from metaphor to mathematical symbol, the mathematical symbol is superior. But to the one not initiated in mathematics, the master can employ a 'pupil's metaphor' for assistance. Admittedly, timelessness existence is perhaps in a different boat than Black Holes. This would imply a distinction between supersensible realities grasped (at least, partially) by mathematical formula, and those that aren't, or can't.

Cheers!

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Hello! I hope you get this. Got all caught up with life and stuff. I hope all is well!

No worries! I completely understand! I'm just pleased that we get to continue our conversation.

Yes, but saying it's a circle would be what is at issue. If an A-theory is correct, is really was a circle at T=0, and not a cylinder, per B-theory. So, that's where we need to go next.

I was discussing the geometry based on an assumption of the B-Theory. Yes, the A-Theory would carry distinctly different implications.

With Time, we can't use the word 'previously' in a temporal sense, unless we want to (as some theologians do) postulate a hyper-time (in which there is no intrinsic metric, but in which there might be properties sufficient for some kind of temporal passage). But if I postulate pure timelessness, 'previously' can only mean 'causally' previous, the implicit assumption being the intelligibility of the concept of 'simultaneous causation' (SC).

The problem, here, is that in the absence of temporality, existential causation loses all meaning. What does it mean to cause a thing to exist when there was never a state in which it did not exist? I do not see how the idea of simultaneous causation can be applied to a thing's existence.

When God ceased to be timeless coincident with the first event, it's not that 'timelessness' changed;

I agree that "timelessness" did not change, in such a scenario. Rather, God changed. And if God changed, he cannot have been timeless. It is entirely incoherent to claim that a thing which is timeless can change. Either it is timeless, or else it is not. If it is, it cannot change, as time measures the displacement between two different states.

God cannot "cease to be timeless." If God ceases something, that implies God changes. Timelessness implies changelessness. Therefore, either God is timeless, or else God changed, but not both.

I might say that the argument against metaphysical possibility of an actual infinite collection can apply to A or B theory, since both theories are metaphysical, and thus effected by the metaphysical implication of argument. But the argument from the metaphysical possibility of 'forming' an actual infinite via successive addition explicitly assumes an A-theory, since A-theory assumes temporal passage, or temporal becoming, the temporal succession of one event after another, that this is a real, mind-independent succession, and not an illusion of consciousness.

So, you're saying that the argument against actual infinities must first presume the A-Theory? In that case, I think we can both agree that it cannot serve as an argument against the B-Theory, since it is obviously fallacious to presume one's conclusion an argument.

[mattbballman31]

Okay, back! I'm the most unreliable dialogue partner ever. Hopefully I can remember the flow of my arguments.

I was discussing the geometry based on an assumption of the B-Theory. Yes, the A-Theory would carry distinctly different implications.

Okay, good. Then the pros and cons of A-theory need to be discussed.

The problem, here, is that in the absence of temporality, existential causation loses all meaning. What does it mean to cause a thing to exist when there was never a state in which it did not exist? I do not see how the idea of simultaneous causation can be applied to a thing's existence.

By 'existential causation' I assume you mean 'that kind of causation which involves bringing something into existence'.

As to your question, X is caused to exist when there was never a state in which X did not exist only if the cause of X is timeless. If the cause of X is timeless, it's incoherent to say there 'was' a state in which X did not exist, since the concept 'was' doesn't apply to timeless existence. The idea of simultaneous causation is applied to X's existence, because X's coming into being at T=0 and God's creative act happen concurrently. If X's coming into being happens 'after' God's creative act (where X = Time), then God's creative act becomes T=0, and X's coming into being becomes T=1. But God's creative act is the first instant at which succession is introduced. The moment God 'creates' is the same moment at which X begins. God simultaneously loses the accidental property of timelessness and gains the property of temporality by being related to X at T=0. If we got rid of simultaneous causation, then God's creative act would be 'before' time's first instant, which is incoherent, since a creative act involves temporal passage.

I agree that "timelessness" did not change, in such a scenario. Rather, God changed. And if God changed, he cannot have been timeless. It is entirely incoherent to claim that a thing which is timeless can change. Either it is timeless, or else it is not. If it is, it cannot change, as time measures the displacement between two different states.

I think this objection assumes a B-theory of time. If an A-theory of time is true, then time's existence had a beginning. If time's existence had a beginning, it's necessary that time's cause be timeless, where the cause of time becomes temporal simultaneous with time's existence. You agreed above that the property of timelessness did not change, and that God did. If that's true, this seems to undercut your point that 'it cannot change'. Your reason is unclear to me. You say time measures the displacement between two different states. I think that's not specific enough. I think time measures the displacement between two 'temporal' states. Time cannot measure the displacement between a timeless state and the first temporal state, because time would have to exist before its first temporal state, which is incoherent. Consider this analogy, which isn't perfect. Suppose X is 5 feet tall and Y is 6 feet tall. Suppose X grew taller than Y and became 7 feet tall. Prior to X's growing, Y had the relational property of 'being taller than' Y. But after X grew, Y lost this property simultaneous with X and Y being of equal height, and gained the relational property of 'being short than' X simultaneous with X's first moment of being taller than Y. Throughout this scenario, Y didn't undergo any intrinsic change. Y underwent extrinsic change relative to X's growth. A similar thing happened regarding God's timelessness and subsequent temporality. God existing alone without the universe existed timelessly. God then exercised His will and creates the universe, and simultaneous with time's first instant, became extrinsically related to time, without undergoing any intrinsic change.

God cannot "cease to be timeless." If God ceases something, that implies God changes. Timelessness implies changelessness. Therefore, either God is timeless, or else God changed, but not both.

It seems to me that God can 'cease to be timeless' simultaneous with time's first instant. I'm not quite sure what is meant by 'God ceases something'. I'm not sure I'd say that 'God' ceased anything. I'd say that God's nature, simultaneous with time's first instant, became extrinsically related to time's first instant. Sure, timelessness implies changelessness. That's why the introduction of the first change at time's first instant simultaneously excludes timelessness and inaugurates time. If timelessness implies changeless, then change implies time. If a hole implies a lack, then not having a lack implies the lack of a hole. Timelessness and change are at antipodes; and time and changelessness are as well. But all that this implies is that changes on this level of description require the concept of simultaneous causation to explain time's first instant.

So, you're saying that the argument against actual infinities must first presume the A-Theory? In that case, I think we can both agree that it cannot serve as an argument against the B-Theory, since it is obviously fallacious to presume one's conclusion an argument.

Not exactly. The argument against the metaphysical possibility of 'forming' an actual infinite by collecting events day by day (you can use any unit of temporal measurement as long as succession is a factor) assumes the A-theory. The other metaphysical argument against the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite's 'existence' is compatible with A or B. Thus, the second philosophical argument can be launched even assuming that a B theory is true.

I hope you're doing well, sir!

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Okay, back! I'm the most unreliable dialogue partner ever. Hopefully I can remember the flow of my arguments.

I'm just glad that we can continue! I'm still enjoying this dialogue.

I hope you're doing well, sir!

I am, indeed! And I hope you are, as well!

By 'existential causation' I assume you mean 'that kind of causation which involves bringing something into existence'.

Precisely. For something to be "brought into existence" implies a state in which that thing did not exist. In the absence of such a state, the thing in question does not seem to have been "brought into existence."

As to your question, X is caused to exist when there was never a state in which X did not exist only if the cause of X is timeless. If the cause of X is timeless, it's incoherent to say there 'was' a state in which X did not exist, since the concept 'was' doesn't apply to timeless existence. The idea of simultaneous causation is applied to X's existence, because X's coming into being at T=0 and God's creative act happen concurrently. If X's coming into being happens 'after' God's creative act (where X = Time), then God's creative act becomes T=0, and X's coming into being becomes T=1. But God's creative act is the first instant at which succession is introduced. The moment God 'creates' is the same moment at which X begins... If we got rid of simultaneous causation, then God's creative act would be 'before' time's first instant, which is incoherent, since a creative act involves temporal passage.

A creative act also involves the introduction of something previously absent. If an entity was not previously absent, in what way is it meaningful to say that it was created?

God simultaneously loses the accidental property of timelessness and gains the property of temporality by being related to X at T=0...

I think this objection assumes a B-theory of time.

It doesn't presume the B-Theory, at all. Even on the A-Theory, it is incoherent to claim that something Timeless can lose the property of Timelessness. If it is Timeless, it cannot change. If it can lose a property, it is not Timeless. In what sense is a thing Timeless if it has states which are ordered temporally? It seems fairly obvious that the expression "God was Timeless before God was in Time," or that "God was Timeless but came into Time," or similar phrases are incoherent.

Again, if God is in time at T, and there is no moment of time prior to T, then there was never a state in which God was Timeless.

If an A-theory of time is true, then time's existence had a beginning.

Not necessarily, but I'll consider a past-finite, A-Theory model of Time for the sake of discussion.

If time's existence had a beginning, it's necessary that time's cause be timeless, where the cause of time becomes temporal simultaneous with time's existence.

This presumes that Time has a cause, which is the question under discussion. Why should one think that Time was caused, at all?

You agreed above that the property of timelessness did not change, and that God did. If that's true, this seems to undercut your point that 'it cannot change'. Your reason is unclear to me. You say time measures the displacement between two different states. I think that's not specific enough. I think time measures the displacement between two 'temporal' states. Time cannot measure the displacement between a timeless state and the first temporal state, because time would have to exist before its first temporal state, which is incoherent.

What do you mean by a "timeless state?" If a thing exists in state X, and then subsequently exists in state Y, the displacement between those states is precisely what we mean when we use the word "Time." Time is a manner in which change is measured. If a thing is Timeless, it seems perfectly obvious that this thing cannot change.

Consider this analogy, which isn't perfect. Suppose X is 5 feet tall and Y is 6 feet tall. Suppose X grew taller than Y and became 7 feet tall. Prior to X's growing, Y had the relational property of 'being taller than' Y. But after X grew, Y lost this property simultaneous with X and Y being of equal height, and gained the relational property of 'being short than' X simultaneous with X's first moment of being taller than Y. Throughout this scenario, Y didn't undergo any intrinsic change. Y underwent extrinsic change relative to X's growth.

This analogy isn't just imperfect-- it's wholly inapplicable. In this scenario, there exists a time in which Y is taller than X, followed by a time in which Y is not taller than X. How is this analogy supposed to show that it is coherent for God to have been Timeless, but that God is now Temporal? There was never a time when God was Timeless, followed by a time in which he wasn't. Nor was there ever a time in which God wasn't Temporal followed by a time in which he was.

Honestly, this analogy seems to be making my point for me. In the absence of Time, it is nonsensical to claim that something changed.

A similar thing happened regarding God's timelessness and subsequent temporality. God existing alone without the universe existed timelessly. God then exercised His will and creates the universe, and simultaneous with time's first instant, became extrinsically related to time, without undergoing any intrinsic change.

I've emboldened and underlined the key phrase, in here. "Subsequent" is an ordinal phrase. In what way can God's temporality possibly be subsequent to his Timelessness? We are in agreement that it would be incoherent for God's temporality to be temporally subsequent to God's Timelessness; and I'm fairly sure that you'll agree with me that it is similarly incoherent to claim that God's temporality is spatially subsequent to God's Timelessness. So by what ordinal measure is God's temporality subsequent to God's Timelessness?

It seems to me that God can 'cease to be timeless' simultaneous with time's first instant.

In order for something to "cease to" exhibit a certain property, it must change, correct? If a thing is Timeless, it cannot change, correct? So, in what way does it make sense to say that a Timeless thing ceases to exhibit any property, let alone the property of Timelessness?

Not exactly. The argument against the metaphysical possibility of 'forming' an actual infinite by collecting events day by day (you can use any unit of temporal measurement as long as succession is a factor) assumes the A-theory. The other metaphysical argument against the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite's 'existence' is compatible with A or B. Thus, the second philosophical argument can be launched even assuming that a B theory is true.

Cool. Then let's discuss the metaphysical argument.

[Jim B.]

According to my crap knowledge of physics, there is no such thing as "nothing" scientifically speaking. What we call empty space is still full of fields and infinitesimal quantum particles popping in and out of existence (or is that arising from and going back into the background field? Depends on one's view of quantum mechanics?) Philosophically, I've been told that "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is a nonsense question because we cannot conceive of true nothingness and thus have no reference point from which to talk about it.

As I understand him, this is basically what Stephen Hawking means when he says that the universe creates itself without a God. He considers nothingness to be impossible and since there there is no such thing as a "beginning of time" therefore the universe must have an eternal past. I think Hawking killed my belief in a traditional Creator with this. All I'm left with as an alternative is the possibility of a God "eternal creating" the universe and providing a reason for it to exist rather than nothing at all. So, pretty much, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is my last recourse at having anything like a reason to believe in God. I know the idea of a "First Cause" just pushes the question of "why?" back one layer, but I'm trying to tackle one issue at a time here.

I'm not sure true nothingness really is an oxymoron, though. I feel like I can, in fact, imagine nothingness. If I think of a finite particle or field, then I also have to think of the places beyond it's reach, the places where it does not exist. What's to stop me from adding "this field is not here" to every field I can think of until I've imagined a "place" in which there none of the fields in the universe are, in fact, located.

I liken it to the way in which we speak about fictional characters. To say that Batman does not exist doesn't mean that I am speaking gibberish when I talk about Batman. The word, "Batman" has a referent. There are certain qualities and attributes and ideas that we have agreed to associate with the word, "Batman." There is no Batman in the real world and yet the idea of Batman still exists.

One could reply that the referent for the word, "Batman" can never be as coherent as the referent, "Kevin Conroy" is because Conroy is a real person and Batman is a fictitious construct of literary devises and tropes designed to partially simulate a real person but that have no actual subject outside the mind of the speaker. However, there is enough of an agreed standardization of the character that we can refer, broadly, to the Batman and not just an arbitrary thing that each individual decides to subjectively call, "Batman" for themselves, right? It will never be as precise as the layers we refer to when we name a real person, but we can still at least know what we are talking about.

In the same way, I think I can conceive of nothingness even if I've never experienced it and even if I can only think of a limited number of fields to negate and "add up to" nothingness. And if I can conceive of nothing, then I'm also allowed to ask why there is something rather than nothing.

Am I making any sense?

Imagining and conceiving are two different things. I can conceive of no longer existing after I die but it's probably impossible for me to imagineme no longer existing. To imagine means to think by means of images. Any image I call up runs counter to the concept of true nothingness. So even if I can't imagine my post-mortem non-existence, I think it's still a useful idea and not an oxymoron (necessarily).

The question as I see it is "Why is there something rather than nothing at all?" not "How is there something rather than nothing at all?" Even if we can't imagine nothingness or scientifically isolate and observe nothingness and then observe the process of how things that exist emerge from that nothingness, does it still make sense to wonder "Why?"? Is God the only true answer to that question? Some would say that if so, then it's not a legitimate question because the answer is already implicit in the question. But I don't think that God is the only possible answer to this question...

[shunyadragon]

The question as I see it is "Why is there something rather than nothing at all?" not "How is there something rather than nothing at all?" Even if we can't imagine nothingness or scientifically isolate and observe nothingness and then observe the process of how things that exist emerge from that nothingness, does it still make sense to wonder "Why?"? Is God the only true answer to that question? Some would say that if so, then it's not a legitimate question because the answer is already implicit in the question. But I don't think that God is the only possible answer to this question...

Beside considering vague possibilities I do not consider the 'How?' nor 'Why?' questions concerning nothing are meaningful. The answers can only be hypothetical. My question is why would be try and get answers to these question at all?

[robrecht]

Beside considering vague possibilities I do not consider the 'How?' nor 'Why?' questions concerning nothing are meaningful. The answers can only be hypothetical. My question is why would be try and get answers to these question at all?

Because we are blessed, at least some of us are, with an insatiable desireally to understand all that we can.

[shunyadragon]

Because we are blessed, at least some of us are, with an insatiable desireally to understand all that we can.

I prefer more 'real and meaningful' questions, and do not desire to satiate my illusive desire to understand things that only have vague anecdotal answers. These question remind me of the observing the hamster on the wheel, a lot of effort, but no result.

[Jim B.]

Beside considering vague possibilities I do not consider the 'How?' nor 'Why?' questions concerning nothing are meaningful. The answers can only be hypothetical. My question is why would be try and get answers to these question at all?

Because "Man by nature desires to know." This kind of question isn't your cup of tea, Shuny. We all have different interests. It's all good.

[shunyadragon]

Because "Man by nature desires to know." This kind of question isn't your cup of tea, Shuny. We all have different interests. It's all good.

Sarcasm noted, please explain coherently.

[Adrift]

Sarcasm noted, please explain coherently.

Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coherent

: logical and well-organized : easy to understand
: able to talk or express yourself in a clear way that can be easily understood
: working closely and well together

© Copyright Original Source

[shunyadragon]

Source: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/coherent

: logical and well-organized : easy to understand
: able to talk or express yourself in a clear way that can be easily understood
: working closely and well together

© Copyright Original Source

Looking forward to your logical and well organized posts contributing to the subject.

[Jim B.]

Sarcasm noted, please explain coherently.

No sarcasm intended. It just doesn't seem to be the kind of question that you find interesting. We all have different interests. Why would you assume that to be a sarcastic remark? It's no reflection on intellectual capacity at all, if that's what you thought I meant. Russell didn't find it to be a very interesting question either and he was a genius, imho.