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Cogito ergo sum

Here in the Philosophy forum we will talk about all the "why" questions. We'll have conversations about the way in which philosophy and theology and religion interact with each other. Metaphysics, ontology, origins, truth? They're all fair game so jump right in and have some fun! But remember...play nice!

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Is "Why is there something rather than nothing?" a legitimate question?

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  • Originally posted by 37818 View Post
    And if the falsehood is believed to be a truth? There are more false beliefs than true ones. Is that not the case?
    You are talking about a belief here not a logical proof. Of course there are many false beliefs, so what!?!?!?!?

    OK. Explaining it like that. Can we simplify this explanation any? It is true those who propose the teleological argument are coming from a point of view that already believes the proposed conclusion. That cannot be denied. Design, function giving purpose. Definitions being used. DNA is code, instructions, information, the very knowledge which builds life and is life. From our human perspective it fits our understanding of design and function. Does it not? If not how does it not?
    Anyway I think this argument, as you presented it, to be a circular argument, needs simplification some how.
    . . . because science provides an adequate explanation for the complexity of nature caused by Natural Law.

    That is one type of argument that I have made. To show what I believe as based on the written, called scripture, regarded to be the word of God. Now as for that written being the word of God, the implication being, it is therefore true. God being inerrant, and it being God's word.
    Yes, you did, and it based on the assumption of 'belief.'

    But I also make other arguments. A starting premise that there is uncaused existence. What is my scriptural bases for that? I've have given it. But the thrust of the argument, is existence exists, an uncaused existence needs no God. What is my scripture for that? Do you know or remember? Understand, at issue is what is true and what is not true. My citing scriptures which are not received versus making arguments, not citing any scriptures.
    This is old turf, if your goal is to convince others your argument has to have more to it.

    Yes. And then my profession of knowing God personally would then be false.
    There is good reason and evidence to believe the claim of the inerrancy of scripture is false.


    Then how do we recognize truth? There are many belief claims. One can be true [or Some of them can be true, embracing common truths] and all the rest to be false. Or all of them can be false. How we know comes before what we know. So again, how do we recognize truth? The odds are we are going to be wrong.
    These are all options, and by the evidence claims of 'truth' from the human perspective, such as the many diverse claims of 'truth' of religious beliefs, are most definitely not consistent. At present the knowledge of science is moat consistent based on the evidence.

    I will ask you the same question; considering the fallibility of humanity, and the evidence, how do we know????

    [
    Last edited by shunyadragon; 02-19-2015, 07:09 AM.
    Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
    Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
    But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

    go with the flow the river knows . . .

    Frank

    I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

    Comment


    • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
      You are talking about a belief here not a logical proof. Of course there are many false beliefs, so what!?!?!?!?
      A logical proof can be the very reason a falsehood is believed. Starting with a false assumption being thought to be true.


      . . . because science provides an adequate explanation for the complexity of nature caused by Natural Law.
      Can you show that science is not based on any false assumption?


      Yes, you did, and it based on the assumption of 'belief.'
      No one knows anything without belief. Name one thing you know is true, that you do not believe.


      This is old turf, if your goal is to convince others your argument has to have more to it.
      You are going back to your own meaningless rhetoric.

      Question: Do you or do you not know conclusions from inductive reasoning are not always true?


      There is good reason and evidence to believe the claim of the inerrancy of scripture is false.
      And give just one, which is not a matter of disagreement on how it is interpreted. Not to be a problem do to disagreement on translation. Or a known textual variant. Just one.



      These are all options, and by the evidence claims of 'truth' from the human perspective, such as the many diverse claims of 'truth' of religious beliefs, are most definitely not consistent. At present the knowledge of science is moat consistent based on the evidence.
      In other words, you are not sure when it comes to belief which cannot be tested by empirical observation or experiment.
      I will ask you the same question; considering the fallibility of humanity, and the evidence, how do we know????
      The same way we know anything. I had a Buddhist explain it this way:
      1. Personal experience.
      2. Witness of others.
      3. Logical deduction.
      Last edited by 37818; 02-19-2015, 08:46 AM.
      . . . the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; . . . -- Romans 1:16 KJV

      . . . that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; And that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures: . . . -- 1 Corinthians 15:3-4 KJV

      Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God: . . . -- 1 John 5:1 KJV

      Comment


      • Originally posted by 37818 View Post
        A logical proof can be the very reason a falsehood is believed. Starting with a false assumption being thought to be true.
        By definition a falsehood cannot be proved by a logical proof.

        Can you show that science is not based on any false assumption?
        No.

        No one knows anything without belief. Name one thing you know is true, that you do not believe.
        You are going back to your own meaningless rhetoric.
        I described the problem of truth already. I consider the objective knowledge of science to valid as far as the physical nature of our existence. Again human nature is far to fallible and beliefs are far to diverse to judge one as true over another. It is meaningless rhetoric to assert that 'my view' is absolutely true over another based on anecdotal evidence only.

        Question: Do you or do you not know conclusions from inductive reasoning are not always true?
        As far as inductive reasoning, new objective evidence can always falsify something previous considered true. Note the below definition and highlighted. Knowledge of science evolves with objective evidence.

        Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning) is reasoning in which the premises seek to supply strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is supposed to be certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is supposed to be probable, based upon the evidence given.[1]

        The philosophical definition of inductive reasoning is more nuanced than simple progression from particular/individual instances to broader generalizations. Rather, the premises of an inductive logical argument indicate some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail it; that is, they suggest truth but do not ensure it. In this manner, there is the possibility of moving from general statements to individual instances (for example, statistical syllogisms, discussed below).

        Many dictionaries define inductive reasoning as reasoning that derives general principles from specific observations, though some sources disagree with this usage. [/cite]

        Science is based heavily on objective observations, and falsification of theories and hypothesis. Knowledge is progressive and evolves. If you're getting deeper into science, maybe another thread.





        And give just one, which is not a matter of disagreement on how it is interpreted. Not to be a problem do to disagreement on translation. Or a known textual variant. Just one.
        Easily, the Creation myths of Genesis, and their interpretation.



        In other words, you are not sure when it comes to belief which cannot be tested by empirical observation or experiment.
        Most definitely not sure about what is absolutely true or false. Human fallibility rules as far as faith beliefs.


        The same way we know anything. I had a Buddhist explain it this way:
        1. Personal experience.
        2. Witness of others.
        3. Logical deduction.
        Careful of what the Buddhist perspective leads to. It is not that simple. In fact with some Buddhists, like Nihilists, all may be an illusion.
        Last edited by shunyadragon; 02-19-2015, 11:11 AM.
        Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
        Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
        But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

        go with the flow the river knows . . .

        Frank

        I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

        Comment


        • Originally posted by 37818 View Post
          Can you show that science is [not?] based on any false assumption?
          I thought I would address this question more, because it is not clear. You are asking a double negative, which needs clarification. The assumptions of science are fairly simple. Our physical existence is uniform and predictable. Up to the present the objective observations of the proposed falsification of theories and hypothesis have consistent and predictable, and the knowledge of science has evolved based on new observations and knowledge. No problem.

          I have at present no reason to believe science is based on false assumptions.
          Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
          Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
          But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

          go with the flow the river knows . . .

          Frank

          I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
            By definition a falsehood cannot be proved by a logical proof.



            No.



            I described the problem of truth already. I consider the objective knowledge of science to valid as far as the physical nature of our existence. Again human nature is far to fallible and beliefs are far to diverse to judge one as true over another. It is meaningless rhetoric to assert that 'my view' is absolutely true over another based on anecdotal evidence only.



            As far as inductive reasoning, new objective evidence can always falsify something previous considered true. Note the below definition and highlighted. Knowledge of science evolves with objective evidence.

            Inductive reasoning (as opposed to deductive reasoning) is reasoning in which the premises seek to supply strong evidence for (not absolute proof of) the truth of the conclusion. While the conclusion of a deductive argument is supposed to be certain, the truth of the conclusion of an inductive argument is supposed to be probable, based upon the evidence given.[1]

            The philosophical definition of inductive reasoning is more nuanced than simple progression from particular/individual instances to broader generalizations. Rather, the premises of an inductive logical argument indicate some degree of support (inductive probability) for the conclusion but do not entail it; that is, they suggest truth but do not ensure it. In this manner, there is the possibility of moving from general statements to individual instances (for example, statistical syllogisms, discussed below).

            Many dictionaries define inductive reasoning as reasoning that derives general principles from specific observations, though some sources disagree with this usage. [/cite]

            Science is based heavily on objective observations, and falsification of theories and hypothesis. Knowledge is progressive and evolves. If you're getting deeper into science, maybe another thread.







            Easily, the Creation myths of Genesis, and their interpretation.





            Most definitely not sure about what is absolutely true or false. Human fallibility rules as far as faith beliefs.



            Careful of what the Buddhist perspective leads to. It is not that simple. In fact with some Buddhists, like Nihilists, all may be an illusion.
            The Budha was an agnostic, and so Buddhism is agnosticism. As a religion Buddhism has only to do with life in the here and now.

            Comment


            • Sorry shunya, I should have addressed that to 37818.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by JimL View Post
                The Buddha was an agnostic, and so Buddhism is agnosticism. As a religion Buddhism has only to do with life in the here and now.
                Yes and no, Buddha did acknowledge a source that 'All things come from, and return to,' and acknowledged the Maha Bramha. It is best to describe Buddha as apophatic in that his 'source cannot be defined' as in Western religions. He did reject worldly manifestation of Gods.
                Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                go with the flow the river knows . . .

                Frank

                I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                Comment


                • Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                  No worries! I just had to pick up a third job, and I'm completing a degree in Mathematics, so I know that feel, bro. The nice thing about Internet forums is that the posts will still be here whenever we get the opportunity to respond.
                  Thanks so much for understanding! Good luck on your degree! I think you'll do some damage out there in academia if you make it. And I agree. It's great that the posts will always be here waiting for us. On to the crucible!

                  I see two main issues with this formulation. Firstly, "enters into the property-exemplification" seems just as ambiguous as "began to exist," though certainly more verbose. Enters from whence? From some point of non-property-exemplification? What does that even mean?
                  Regarding verbosity, this may be unavoidable. 'Regular quadrilateral' is certainly more verbose than 'square'. On the charge of ambiguity, I plead guilty. Let me try to back up and unpack 'existence' generally again. My analysis of existence can't be self-refuting. In other words, I can't say that to exist means to be in space/time, since space/time aren't in space/time. The strange implication is that existence itself has to exist; and it's in virtue of existence itself existing that particular things exist. I also can't say that to exist means to enter into a causal relation, since while I admit that causes bring about effects by virtue of entering into the causal relation, the causal relation itself is causally inert; yet I wouldn't want to say that such a relation did on that account not exist.

                  (i) Existence - My theory of existence seems to implicitly be a reaction against calling existence a property, something of which Kant might agree. Existence relates to an object/thing differently than the thing's properties. The ball's redness is related to the ball differently than the ball's existence. Kant: it doesn't add to the concept of a thing that it exists; it does add to the concept of the thing to call it red. So, I have two things: 'red' and the thing 'having' (?) the red (if it's a red thing). This goes to what properties a thing has, its 'essence' (what it is); and 'existence' goes to whether this thing, with these properties, is real (whether it is). So, let me repeat the existence-analysis really quick:

                  1. Existence is the 'entering into' the exemplification-relation (ER).

                  Does this satisfy the criterion of existence itself existing? It seems so, since ER exists, since it is itself (1) exemplified and (2) exemplifies relational properties.

                  (ii) Coming-to-be (CTB)- Simply, this is just 'gaining' existence. But what does this mean? Let me try to analyze CTB for temporal things first, then I'll try to get into Time itself. So, a temporal thing X comes to be (or begins to exist) if X gains at least one property P at some time T, and X is such that X didn't have that property at some point prior to T. For example, assuming certain ontological categories, when I began to exist, I gained the property 'being human' (BH) at T, and I gained it such that I didn't have BH prior to T, and thus didn't exist until T.

                  What about time itself? Time, I would argue, wouldn't exist at all without events happening. It's hard for me to think of time in any other way. I think I have a biased aversion to a sort of Newtonian temporal container of sorts that 'house' temporal events. Time just is the happening of various events. So, it doesn't seem as if we need time for events to happen; it's that we need events to happen for there to be any time at all. Thus, when God creates time, this is just to say that God creates the first event, thus rendering time's beginning to exist. But in what sense is the cause before the effect in the case of Time's CBT?

                  To answer that I have to deal with what seems to be a counter-intuitive assumption. Namely, causes temporally precede effects. But this doesn't seem to me to be necessarily the case. There doesn't seem to be a logical contradiction in thinking that causes and effects can happen at the same time, even if there's logical or causal priority subsisting within the causal constituents. To see this, I consider a deductive argument's conclusion's relationship to that same argument's premises: the conclusion isn't deduced, say, 5 seconds after the premises - the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. But this isn't to say that the premises don't logically precede the conclusion, or that there isn't a sense in which the premises 'cause' the conclusion. So, let me apply this to Time. I'll fix this in terms of the last post, since I think I got sloppy with my variables.

                  2. Time T comes to be at T=0 if and only if (i) T is caused to be at T=0, (ii) The cause of T is logically/causally prior to T, (iii) The cause of T 'causes' T simultaneous with T's coming to be at T=0.

                  In this sense, God (who I think is this cause) is timeless, and before I carry my burden of proof for defining timelessness, let me just point out that all that matters for 2 is that timelessness (the abode of God sans creation) logically/causally precedes T.

                  The second issue is that you seem to be saying there is no X prior to t=0, and there is an X at t=1, which would leave open the possibility of temporal causation at some point t where 0<t<1; however, we both seem to agree that it is incoherent to assert that Time did not exist at time t=0, so this formulation does not seem applicable to the cosmos, as a whole.
                  This is where I got sloppy. Let's drop X, and replace it with T for simplicity. I still want to say that there is no T prior to T=0, but I failed to have T's CBT simultaneous with T=0. I skipped from 'no T prior to T=0' straight to T=1. T=0 has to be underlined, here. It's just if T @ T=0 had a cause, because the effect happens to be T (and not just any ordinary temporal object), the cause, by necessity, must be 'simultaneous with' the effect. So, because you say we both seem to agree that T didn't exist at T=0, I need to be more clear. At T=0, T exists, T has begun to exist at T=0, T has 'come to be' at T=0. Now, I think this necessarily applies to the Cosmos, since T is a fundamental feature of the Cosmos, since the Cosmos is constitutive of events, and events are a necessary prerequisite for T.

                  Whether or not imaginability is a requirement for coherency, definition most certainly is. I can quite easily define a billion-sided polygon, and in defining it, I can differentiate it from objects which are not billion-sided polygons, even if I cannot imagine the whole polygon in my head. How does one define what it means to exist timelessly? How does one differentiate a thing which exists timelessly from a thing which exists temporally or one which does not exist, at all?
                  Agreed. My point about imaginability applies to the capacity for definitions to do their work. All I was saying is that we don't need to be able to imagine, or form a picture of, X in order to define it. So, how is it that God, or anything, can exist timelessly? The rub comes from our prima facie impression that existence implies some sort of temporal succession. To say that X hasn't existed for any time seems synonymous with X not existing. And I would agree that this applies to T and to particular temporally-bound objects. But for a timeless Being, this criteria wouldn't apply. So:

                  3. X is timeless if and only if (i) X doesn't exemplify the relation of temporal succession, (ii) X undergoes no 'intrinsic' change, (iii) X is incorporeal, and (iv) X's knowledge is tenseless.

                  On what grounds would you assert that space-time cannot exemplify the property of self-existence?
                  This might lead us far astray, but maybe not. Since I make events explanatorily prior to time, I'm persuaded by Dr. Craig's argument that it's metaphysically impossible for such events to be actually infinite, and the metaphysical impossibility of traversing an actual infinite supposing one did exist. So, if space/time is self-existent, time is past-eternal; if time is past-eternal, this presupposes an actual infinite amount of events, which presupposes the metaphysical possibility of an actual infinite, and the metaphysical possibility of traversing one, since today has arrived. I also presuppose that the argument doesn't presuppose an infinitely distant starting point, since a self-existent space/time wouldn't have one. Again, this might lead us into other areas, but if you're willing, I'm good. I'm sure you've heard of all this, so the sooner we can get beneath the surface, more interesting advances or progress can be accomplished.

                  When Aristotle described Gravity, he did so by employing poetical metaphor. He said that things fall to the Earth because they have an intrinsic desire to move towards the center of the world. Heavier things, he argued, are heavier because they have a stronger desire to move towards the center of the world than do light things.
                  I think we need to make a distinction between the use of metaphor to scientifically describe phenomena, and the inevitability of metaphor in any explanation. Aristotle, admittedly, is demonstrably mistaken in postulating 'desire' as an explanation of movement of objects towards the world's center. You and I are in wholehearted agreement.

                  Keep in mind, however, that it doesn't follow that metaphor has been totally discarded. I'll get to why below.

                  Secondly, my metaphor-point should be confined to descriptions of either the super-sensible (if such things exist), or that which has not been sensibly experienced. Let me organize the two types of metaphorical descriptions that are possible.

                  1. There is the metaphor we use to teach by wherein we, who already grasp a concept independently of the metaphor, try to teach someone who has had no experience of that of which we're trying to relay a hint of meaning. For example, suppose we understand the meaning of Kant's Copernican Revolution using the abstract terminology of a priori categories of thought, the transcendental aesthetic, how we structure noumenal reality via our forms of thought, and how the subsequent structure is the study of scientific observation. But further suppose that we're trying to communicate this to someone who has no prior acquaintance with Kant's terminology by using the metaphor of 'Blue Spectacles'. To the student, 'Blue Spectacles' becomes sort of a shorthand for referring to the entire Kantian machinery. 'Blue Spectacles' will be a means to the possible end of the student climbing up the metaphorical ladder to finally kick it away to grasp at non-metaphorical concepts, in the sense of having a literal reference. I would argue that even in this case, in the case of literal reference, the concepts themselves, if they contain any sort of supersensible constituent, are naturally just as metaphorical as 'Blue Spectacles'.

                  2. There is the metaphor we learn by. In this sense, we depend on the metaphor for any inkling of meaning we have of the concept. This is where Flatland relates to the supersensible realm of the Spiritual in general, and language describing God's decision to create space/time in particular. Due to this reality, by nature, alluding empirical verification, any description of it is bound to be metaphorical, since all language is bound up with the sensuous. We could multiply examples to include any item that is not directly observable. Thus, we could say that just as 2-dimensional objects couldn't have an inkling of a 3-dimensional object, perhaps a similar relation hinders our perfect apprehension of spiritual activity, which may include a supplementary eternal dimension, branching off of the temporal one, as the relation of 2-dimensional planes relate to a solid, 3-dimensional figure, branching off from the planes. Now, what was once hopelessly inscrutable at least has the first hint of a meaning that we could ascribe to this reality. Therefore, we say God 'created' space/time, where the mode of this peculiar instance of creation is concerned isn't wholly explicable in terms of the temporal instances of creation we've empirically verified in our spatio-temporal mode of existence/consciousness.

                  But with these two notions of metaphor in mind, let's look at the gravity-example anyway, knowing that this example won't completely discard the theory, since gravity is within the temporal/spacial realm.

                  A couple of millennia later, Newton offered a mathematical description of the phenomenon, , which described Gravity far more precisely and accurately than did Aristotle's depiction, and which allowed scientists to predict the motion of planets and stars.
                  Agreed! In this case, gravity in terms of desire was being used as a scientific explanation. This was falsified, and Newton's mathematics did the trick. Perhaps you see based on the above why this isn't sufficient to undercut my point. Even in Newton's descriptions, we shifted from one set of symbol to another. Gravity is one thing; our mathematical description is another. Undeniably, the variables and mathematical notations literally refer to empirically verifiable phenomena in the world, and in that sense their reference is literal. Thus, force, mass, and the Gravitational Constant are all empirically verifiable, and all such concepts are within the realm of experience. But what of descriptions to those who have never experienced force, mass, or the constant? And what of supersensible realities? Metaphorical language in these instances is inevitable and necessary.

                  Three hundred years after that, Einstein further refined Newton's depiction into , which allowed even better predictions and gave us even further understanding of the effects of Gravity. However, it is still clearly apparent that this is only a description of the phenomenon, rather than being equivalent to the phenomenon itself.
                  Same points as above. Let me know what you think! Take care!
                  Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-20-2015, 08:47 AM.
                  Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                  George Horne

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                    (ii) Coming-to-be (CTB)- Simply, this is just 'gaining' existence. But what does this mean? Let me try to analyze CTB for temporal things first, then I'll try to get into Time itself. So, a temporal thing X comes to be (or begins to exist) if X gains at least one property P at some time T, and X is such that X didn't have that property at some point prior to T. For example, assuming certain ontological categories, when I began to exist, I gained the property 'being human' (BH) at T, and I gained it such that I didn't have BH prior to T, and thus didn't exist until T.
                    This definition seems problematic. In order for a thing to "gain a property," that thing must exist. Existence is logically prior to "gaining," since non-existent things cannot "gain" anything. Therefore, it doesn't seem to make much sense to define the beginning of existence as the gaining of some initial property. In order for a thing to "gain" a property, it must first exist without that property, and subsequently exist with that property. Otherwise, it has not "gained" anything.

                    What about time itself? Time, I would argue, wouldn't exist at all without events happening. It's hard for me to think of time in any other way. I think I have a biased aversion to a sort of Newtonian temporal container of sorts that 'house' temporal events. Time just is the happening of various events. So, it doesn't seem as if we need time for events to happen; it's that we need events to happen for there to be any time at all.
                    Time is a dimension by which events are measured. So, while I would agree with the idea that time cannot exist without events, I would say that the converse is just as true: events cannot exist without time. Honestly, I don't really understand your objection, here. It's like looking at a 3-Dimensional space consisting of length, breadth, and depth and saying, "Depth wouldn't exist at all without Volume." Well, yes, technically that's true-- just as volume would not exist without depth-- but I'm not sure what that is supposed to indicate.

                    To answer that I have to deal with what seems to be a counter-intuitive assumption. Namely, causes temporally precede effects... To see this, I consider a deductive argument's conclusion's relationship to that same argument's premises: the conclusion isn't deduced, say, 5 seconds after the premises - the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. But this isn't to say that the premises don't logically precede the conclusion, or that there isn't a sense in which the premises 'cause' the conclusion.
                    I would absolutely disagree that the premises cause the conclusion. Even if there is a sense in which they do, they certainly don't cause the conclusion in the same way as a thing is caused to exist.

                    3. X is timeless if and only if (i) X doesn't exemplify the relation of temporal succession, (ii) X undergoes no 'intrinsic' change, (iii) X is incorporeal, and (iv) X's knowledge is tenseless.
                    This definition seems very strange. I don't see how incorporeality has any bearing on whether a thing is timeless; and tenseless knowledge would seem to be a consequence of timelessness for a being which has some sort of knowledge, rather than a defining aspect of timelessness. Of course, without (iii) and (iv) it is quite easy to argue that the Cosmos, as a whole, fits the definition of timelessness.

                    This might lead us far astray, but maybe not. Since I make events explanatorily prior to time, I'm persuaded by Dr. Craig's argument that it's metaphysically impossible for such events to be actually infinite, and the metaphysical impossibility of traversing an actual infinite supposing one did exist.
                    I disagree quite strongly with Dr. Craig's objections to actual infinites. I see no reason why actual infinites cannot exist, nor do I believe that it is impossible to traverse actual infinities.

                    So, if space/time is self-existent, time is past-eternal
                    I'll disagree, here. Self-existence does not require that Time be past-infinite. I see no reason why past-finite Time cannot be self-existent.

                    Keep in mind, however, that it doesn't follow that metaphor has been totally discarded. I'll get to why below.
                    I think you might have misunderstood me. I was not arguing that metaphor has been totally discarded. Quite the contrary! Newtonian mechanics and General Relativity are still metaphors for the manner in which reality works. My point was simply that they are far more accurate and powerful metaphors than the merely poetical. And just as GR is vastly more accurate and powerful than Aristotle's description of gravity, I would argue that 3+1 Minkowski space models of space-time are far more accurate and powerful than merely poetical metaphors for describing the nature of time.

                    Now, what was once hopelessly inscrutable at least has the first hint of a meaning that we could ascribe to this reality. Therefore, we say God 'created' space/time, where the mode of this peculiar instance of creation is concerned isn't wholly explicable in terms of the temporal instances of creation we've empirically verified in our spatio-temporal mode of existence/consciousness.
                    Again, though, this does not seem to satisfy the necessity of a clear definition. We do not need to be able to actively imagine a concept in order for that concept to be rational; however, we must be able to clearly define that concept in order for it to be rational. It is not enough to say that "the mode of this peculiar instance of creation... isn't wholly explicable in terms of the temporal instances of creation" which we have witnessed. That does not offer any rational definition for what it means to create a thing atemporally.
                    "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                    --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                      This definition seems problematic. In order for a thing to "gain a property," that thing must exist. Existence is logically prior to "gaining," since non-existent things cannot "gain" anything. Therefore, it doesn't seem to make much sense to define the beginning of existence as the gaining of some initial property. In order for a thing to "gain" a property, it must first exist without that property, and subsequently exist with that property. Otherwise, it has not "gained" anything.
                      But a 'thing' can gain a property simultaneous with its existence, even if the thing's existence is logically prior to its gaining a property. And 'thing' might be being used in two different senses. 'Thing', here, has to be defined closely. A 'thing', logically prior to its gaining a property, I'll call X; and the thing 'after' it has gained the property I'll call X+1. For example, an acorn is not a tree, since - per Leibniz - acorns and trees have different properties. But an acorn becomes a tree by gaining properties that render it a tree. It's not that the acorn had to first have the property of 'being a tree' temporally prior to it becoming a tree. The acorn gains its 'tree properties' simultaneous with its becoming a tree, and the gaining of these properties is logically prior to its being a tree, even if the acorn had to exist first in order that the tree come to be. So, it's not that the tree existed first in order that the property 'being a tree' could be predicated of it; it's that the property 'being a tree' is predicated of the tree simultaneous with the tree's coming to be. Thus, X can be the acorn; and X+1 the tree. And we can postulate Y as a shorthand for X+1, since the Indiscernability of Identicals permits us to still say X and Y aren't identical, since they have different properties.

                      Time is a dimension by which events are measured. So, while I would agree with the idea that time cannot exist without events, I would say that the converse is just as true: events cannot exist without time. Honestly, I don't really understand your objection, here. It's like looking at a 3-Dimensional space consisting of length, breadth, and depth and saying, "Depth wouldn't exist at all without Volume." Well, yes, technically that's true-- just as volume would not exist without depth-- but I'm not sure what that is supposed to indicate.
                      Very helpful analogy! But if time is understood as a dimension by which events are measured, I might agree, and further say that the measuring of events requires spatial objects such that without such objects Time itself couldn't be measured. We need a world of spatial objects first before we can foist a metric on it. In defining time as merely the dimension by which events are measured, however, I don't want to confuse the map for the place. To make the relation between Time/Events analogous to the relation between Volume/Depth seems to presuppose a literal interpretation of Minkowski space/time informed by Special Relativity. Here, if I understand it, duration doesn't depend on anything like operational clocks, or what have you. On a Relational View of time, though, events are necessary for time, and can even be understood as the same thing as time, even if events logically precede time. So, while I understand how depth can't exist without volume (or volume without depth), I can't understand how time could in any sense exist without events. The only sense in which events exist without time is in the sense of logical priority, even if time comes to exist simultaneous with the first event. Think of the saying, 'two is company, and three is a crowd'. The crowd wouldn't logically precede the third person entering a group, so that we couldn't say the third person can't enter the group without the group first being a crowd. The third person entering the group is necessary for the group to be a crowd; and the group becomes a crowd simultaneous with the third person entering it. So, while in a sense it's true that the crowd can't exist without the third person, and the third person can't exist without the crowd, the third person entering the group is logically prior to our calling the group a crowd, even if the third person can't have entered the group without it first being a crowd. I understand time in a similar way in relation to events.

                      I would absolutely disagree that the premises cause the conclusion. Even if there is a sense in which they do, they certainly don't cause the conclusion in the same way as a thing is caused to exist.
                      Agreed. The relation between deductive premise/conclusion is one of logical priority; the inferred conclusion is logically posterior to the postulation of the premises. And if there's logical priority this doesn't mean that the conclusion's inference is temporally posterior to the postulation of the premises. So, the relevant sense of 'cause' in this case is just simply grounds logically implying their consequent such that the postulation of the grounds is simultaneous with the consequent conclusion. This would be an instance of logical priority without temporal duration. As regards the supposed creation of Time, God could be logically prior to such creation, and at the moment of creation, God creates simultaneous with the first's events creation, thus implying Time's creation. This was to illustrate how God's creation of Time doesn't involve logical incoherence, since there's no logical incoherence involving the logical priority of premises/conclusion, which doesn't require temporal duration.

                      This definition seems very strange. I don't see how incorporeality has any bearing on whether a thing is timeless; and tenseless knowledge would seem to be a consequence of timelessness for a being which has some sort of knowledge, rather than a defining aspect of timelessness. Of course, without (iii) and (iv) it is quite easy to argue that the Cosmos, as a whole, fits the definition of timelessness.
                      I get that a lot. With your help hopefully it can be polished up. To me, incorporeality is necessary for timelessness, because to be corporeal means to be made of matter. To be made of matter means to be physical. To be physical means to be temporal. So, to be incorporeal is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for timelessness. Regarding tenseless knowledge, I only meant to say, again, that it was necessary, but not sufficient, for timelessness. I would argue that if a timeless being had tensed knowledge, that being would have to be related to Time in such a way as to know the ever becoming present.

                      It's hard for me to predicate timelessness of the Cosmos, just because I hold to an A-Theory of time and a Relational View of Time, which I know you disagree with, so we can go down that route. I don't think the Cosmos is timeless, because I believe in temporal becoming, and therefore the Cosmos exemplifies the relation of temporal succession, a relation that a timeless thing wouldn't exemplify. Further, I believe that the Cosmos is an aggregate of events that are past-finite, and if events are past-finite, the inference is that so is time. If X is timeless, the aggregate of events would be past-eternal, to me, since I don't think you would agree with that.

                      I disagree quite strongly with Dr. Craig's objections to actual infinites. I see no reason why actual infinites cannot exist, nor do I believe that it is impossible to traverse actual infinities.
                      Trust me, I know! Which argument would you like to discuss first?

                      I'll disagree, here. Self-existence does not require that Time be past-infinite. I see no reason why past-finite Time cannot be self-existent.
                      Before I presume to follow you here, since I don't want to prop up a strawman, could you outline what you mean by a self-existent Time that is past-finite? If you don't think you have to, that's fine, just because I made the claim, and the burden of proof is on me anyway.

                      I think you might have misunderstood me. I was not arguing that metaphor has been totally discarded. Quite the contrary! Newtonian mechanics and General Relativity are still metaphors for the manner in which reality works. My point was simply that they are far more accurate and powerful metaphors than the merely poetical. And just as GR is vastly more accurate and powerful than Aristotle's description of gravity, I would argue that 3+1 Minkowski space models of space-time are far more accurate and powerful than merely poetical metaphors for describing the nature of time.
                      I follow you. I think we're talking past each other. Agreed that metaphor is never totally discarded. Model succession via paradigm shifts are the shuffling of metaphors in accordance with the scientific method with increased precision and predictive value. I get that. My main point is the inevitability of metaphorical language to describe supersensible realities, like when we have to use 'creation', or 'before', or 'God's decision to create', or 'God decided to create', or some locution like that, since by nature the realities to which the locutions refer exceed the bounds of Univocal language informed by imaginations that have been experientially conditioned by temporal/spatial events.

                      Again, though, this does not seem to satisfy the necessity of a clear definition. We do not need to be able to actively imagine a concept in order for that concept to be rational; however, we must be able to clearly define that concept in order for it to be rational. It is not enough to say that "the mode of this peculiar instance of creation... isn't wholly explicable in terms of the temporal instances of creation" which we have witnessed. That does not offer any rational definition for what it means to create a thing atemporally.
                      Here's the rub. It depends on what is meant by 'clear' or 'rational' definition, since I think there's other conceptual avenues through which we can attain meaning besides scientific/mathematical models/formulas. Let me explain this through an illustration.

                      In an essay called The Language of Religion, C.S. Lewis asks us to consider three different propositions.

                      1. It is cold.
                      2. It is 22 degrees Fahrenheit.
                      3. Ah, bitter chill it was!
                      The owl, for all his feathers, was a-cold;
                      The hare limp’d trembling through the frozen grass,
                      And silent was the flock in woolly fold:
                      Numb were the Beadsman’s fingers, . . . (John Keats: ST. AGNES’ Eve)

                      1 is ordinary language. 2 is scientific. 3 is poetic. 2 and 3 improve 1 in different ways. Because of 2, we now have a quantity that can measured by a thermometer. We have predictive value in light of its effects, and all the rest. But 2 wouldn't give us any information on the 'quality' or 'quale' of coldness. Supposing we hadn't ever felt 'coldness', 2 wouldn't convey to me any meaning at all. 1 would take a step closer in this direction if we said that your fingers would numb, or you might feel as if your ears are falling off. Or consider 'seeing'. To the blind man, the science of optics couldn't inform him of the 'quale' of sight. Metaphors of 'hearing' might have to be used so that the blind man could get an inkling of what the 'quale' of sight might be like. This isn't to say that the blind man couldn't be a brilliant scientist of optics.

                      But to better understand 3, returning to our case of poetic metaphor, consider what it isn't trying to do. It isn't essentially trying to arouse an emotion. In the case of Keats, the poetry qua poetry seems to be a direct appeal to my senses, though an emotion is perhaps aroused as an accident. The 'quale' of whatever cold night Keats is writing about (fiction or not) is what's attempting to be conveyed. This quality leaves out all that 2 provides, since the success of conveying the quality leaves out 2's imposition of quantitative precision. Keats is trying to 'inform' us of the quality of the coldness, and the poetic language used appeals to the senses, and if the emotion thus aroused as a result of the sensuous language, the aroused emotion is for the sake of informing us about this quality in the coldness. Thus, 3 seems to transmit 'qualitative' information. Regarding emotions, consider calling a woman 'a red, red rose' (Burns), or a 'violet by a mossy stone half hidden from the eye (Wordsworth). Burns wouldn't be saying that the woman is like the rose in terms of sensuous qualities, but because the emotions aroused when observing this rose are 'analogous' to the emotions Burns felt when he observed the 'quale' of the woman he's trying to tell us about: and the same with Wordsworth. To subjective experience, this can even be falsifiable! I can see the woman Burns is talking about and agree that the emotions aroused are analogous, and thus confirm the metaphor.

                      Thus far, poetic language, such as 3, has been referring to experiences of the sensible, rendering more meaningful the concrete. But what about the supersensible? Supersensible experiences are such that no one has had (can have?) such experiences, since they aren't confined to the world accessible via the senses. In Prometheus Unbound, Shelley has Asia say, "My soul is an enchanted boat." This is 'not' intended to just be decorative/cosmetic ordinary language. Shelley is trying to convey the 'quale' of transfiguration. How? Well, what comes to mind when you ponder the metaphor of an enchanted boat?: it's moving toward a destined port without the use of sails or oars. It moves without any obstacles and its movement isn't assisted by sails/oars. The point is that Shelley is saying that the emotions aroused when pondering the enchanted boat are 'analogous' to what it might feel like to experience 'transfiguration'. So, what was once without meaning now has an inkling without the 'rational' or 'precise' definition envisioned by scientific language.

                      This is why poetic language is powerful: it attempts to convey the 'quale' of experiences we haven't had, or couldn't have. But it uses elements within sensuous experience to render the 'quale' meaningful by being dim analogies of the thing not experienced. Thus, the poetic can be a medium of information not able to be conveyed by the scientific. Like any other piece of information it can be true/false. But the problem most people have with it is the degree to which, and the conditions under which, it's falsifiable. Not everyone can enter into that degree of imaginative sympathy that would enable experiential verification of whether the woman Burns was referring to was really like a red, red rose. Scientific language has poetic language beat here, since it's easier for people to 'just see' that it's 22 degrees outside. I'm not saying that scientific language can't be complex; I'm saying that the measurements/formulas/models (MFM) are precisely fixed for the person with patience enough to understand its symbolic constituents and relate them to confirmatory experimentation. What I would say is that MFM, while precise, isolate one type of 'quale' from concrete existence. This leads to the crucial point.

                      As I said, the information capable of being transmitted/received from poetic language to reader is dependent on the prior capacity of imaginative sympathy the reader is willing to exercise, or capable of exercising. Something like Coleridge's 'willing suspension of disbelief' is a logical priority. The first step is to 'trust' the poet. We can't put the poet on the witness stand and demand how a river could have hair. The approach would exclude our access to the 'quale' the poet could have provided us had we begun by trying to meet the poet halfway.

                      Perhaps I haven't been clear, but I thought a thorough analysis (even if still inadequate) was required before an attempt at definition commenced, especially since such a definition needs to illuminate a concrete action via abstract terminology, with such action being itself supersensible.
                      Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-21-2015, 03:08 AM.
                      Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                      George Horne

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                        But a 'thing' can gain a property simultaneous with its existence, even if the thing's existence is logically prior to its gaining a property... A 'thing', logically prior to its gaining a property, I'll call X; and the thing 'after' it has gained the property I'll call X+1. For example, an acorn is not a tree, since - per Leibniz - acorns and trees have different properties. But an acorn becomes a tree by gaining properties that render it a tree.
                        There are two problems which I have with this explanation. The first is that I still do not agree that it is coherent for a thing to "gain" a property without there being some temporally prior state in which that thing exists without that property. To "gain" necessarily implies a prior state of lacking. Without a state in which an entity lacks a property, it cannot gain a property; and an entity cannot lack a property without existing.

                        Which brings me to the second problem: Leibniz's example of the acorn and the tree employs a temporal state in which the tree does not exist followed by a temporal state in which the tree does exist. This is obviously not the case for the Cosmos, as a whole. There was no state in which the Cosmos did not exist.

                        Very helpful analogy! But if time is understood as a dimension by which events are measured, I might agree, and further say that the measuring of events requires spatial objects such that without such objects Time itself couldn't be measured.
                        I'm not sure if I disagree with you here, so I'll respond conditionally. If you are referring to the practical act of measuring, I'll agree that spatial objects are necessary-- but that applies equally to spatial dimensions, as well, so I'm not sure what relevance it has. If you are referring to the theoretical measure of time, I would say that spatial objects are not necessary, at all. It's rather easy to create a mathematical model in which time exists without any spatial dimensions.

                        In defining time as merely the dimension by which events are measured, however, I don't want to confuse the map for the place. To make the relation between Time/Events analogous to the relation between Volume/Depth seems to presuppose a literal interpretation of Minkowski space/time informed by Special Relativity.
                        That's not a presupposition. It's a conclusion based upon more than a century of experimentation in overwhelming support of both Special and General Relativity.

                        So, while I understand how depth can't exist without volume (or volume without depth), I can't understand how time could in any sense exist without events.
                        I didn't say that time could exist without events. Quite the contrary, the one cannot exist without the other.

                        The only sense in which events exist without time is in the sense of logical priority, even if time comes to exist simultaneous with the first event. Think of the saying, 'two is company, and three is a crowd'. The crowd wouldn't logically precede the third person entering a group, so that we couldn't say the third person can't enter the group without the group first being a crowd. The third person entering the group is necessary for the group to be a crowd; and the group becomes a crowd simultaneous with the third person entering it. So, while in a sense it's true that the crowd can't exist without the third person, and the third person can't exist without the crowd, the third person entering the group is logically prior to our calling the group a crowd, even if the third person can't have entered the group without it first being a crowd. I understand time in a similar way in relation to events.
                        You are, again, using a distinctly temporal situation (a group which once had two people gaining a third person) in an attempt to describe something atemporal. I completely disagree that there is any sense in which events can exist without time.

                        So, the relevant sense of 'cause' in this case is just simply grounds logically implying their consequent such that the postulation of the grounds is simultaneous with the consequent conclusion. This would be an instance of logical priority without temporal duration. As regards the supposed creation of Time, God could be logically prior to such creation, and at the moment of creation, God creates simultaneous with the first's events creation, thus implying Time's creation.
                        Logical implication is not at all equivalent to the act of creation. It does not follow that, if it is possible God is logically prior to Time, then God could have created Time. Logical premises do not create their conclusions.

                        To me, incorporeality is necessary for timelessness, because to be corporeal means to be made of matter. To be made of matter means to be physical. To be physical means to be temporal. So, to be incorporeal is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for timelessness.
                        Physical does not imply temporal. It's a fairly trivial matter to conceive of a physical universe which has spatial dimensions but lacks Time.

                        Regarding tenseless knowledge, I only meant to say, again, that it was necessary, but not sufficient, for timelessness. I would argue that if a timeless being had tensed knowledge, that being would have to be related to Time in such a way as to know the ever becoming present.
                        Again, tenseless knowledge seems to be a consequence of timelessness, not a condition for it-- unless you are claiming that an entity must have knowledge in order to be timeless.

                        It's hard for me to predicate timelessness of the Cosmos, just because I hold to an A-Theory of time and a Relational View of Time, which I know you disagree with, so we can go down that route. I don't think the Cosmos is timeless, because I believe in temporal becoming, and therefore the Cosmos exemplifies the relation of temporal succession, a relation that a timeless thing wouldn't exemplify.
                        However, I assume you'll agree that on the B-Theory, the Cosmos as-a-whole does not exemplify temporal succession, and therefore would be considered "timeless," right? If so, it seems it would be necessary to prove that the B-Theory is false before one could reasonably claim that the Cosmos as-a-whole cannot be timeless.

                        Further, I believe that the Cosmos is an aggregate of events that are past-finite, and if events are past-finite, the inference is that so is time. If X is timeless, the aggregate of events would be past-eternal, to me, since I don't think you would agree with that...

                        Before I presume to follow you here, since I don't want to prop up a strawman, could you outline what you mean by a self-existent Time that is past-finite? If you don't think you have to, that's fine, just because I made the claim, and the burden of proof is on me anyway.
                        Timelessness does not imply a past-infinite history. In fact, to say that it does is entirely incoherent. A thing which is timeless has no history, at all, so a past-infinite history cannot be a necessary condition of timelessness.

                        As for a self-existent, past-finite space-time, I like to use a polar graph as an exemplary model. This would be a two-dimensional model, as opposed to a four-dimensional one (like our universe), and the geometry is a bit different, but I find it's the easiest way to conceptualize my understanding of time without getting into really weird non-Euclidean spaces.


                        The red dot at the center of the graph is the pole. Displacement from the pole would be the temporal dimension, on this model, while the angle about the pole represents the spatial dimension. So, there is a past-finite boundary to this model at t=0, but the whole model remains self-existent. Nothing "creates" the pole. There is no state of this model in which the space-time it describes is not extant.

                        Trust me, I know! Which argument would you like to discuss first?
                        As you mentioned your objection to actual infinities, whichever arguments against infinity you would like to offer up, I'll do my best to answer.

                        I follow you. I think we're talking past each other. Agreed that metaphor is never totally discarded. Model succession via paradigm shifts are the shuffling of metaphors in accordance with the scientific method with increased precision and predictive value. I get that. My main point is the inevitability of metaphorical language to describe supersensible realities, like when we have to use 'creation', or 'before', or 'God's decision to create', or 'God decided to create', or some locution like that, since by nature the realities to which the locutions refer exceed the bounds of Univocal language informed by imaginations that have been experientially conditioned by temporal/spatial events.
                        I certainly agree that it can be extremely difficult-- if not impossible-- to divorce our descriptive language from spatio-temporal terms, when describing the Cosmos as a whole. However, if one wants to utilize the word "before" (for example) in a non-spatio-temporal manner, one needs to be very careful not to equivocate this non-spatio-temporal "before" with the usual meaning of "before." Using an example from earlier, let's take the word "prior." A premise is prior to a conclusion; and prior to becoming a tree, an acorn is not a tree. However, these two uses of "prior" are not equivalent. The former describes a relationship in logic, while the latter describes a relationship in time.

                        Here's the rub. It depends on what is meant by 'clear' or 'rational' definition, since I think there's other conceptual avenues through which we can attain meaning besides scientific/mathematical models/formulas. Let me explain this through an illustration.
                        I completely understand what you are saying. However, the problem is that the quale described by poetic metaphors are necessarily subjective. For example, let's say I were to alter Lewis' example thusly:

                        1. It is cold.
                        2. It is 62 degrees Fahrenheit.
                        3. Ah, bitter chill it was!
                        The owl, for all his feathers, was a-cold;
                        The hare limp’d trembling through the frozen grass,
                        And silent was the flock in woolly fold:
                        Numb were the Beadsman’s fingers, . . . (John Keats: ST. AGNES’ Eve)

                        My wife feels cold very easily. When our house is 82 degrees F in the summer, she's wearing a sweatshirt and wrapped in blankets. So, for her, (1), (2), and (3) all convey her experience of 62-degree temperatures. However, for most people, (3) would seem to be an extreme exaggeration of 62-degree weather. For my part, I don't even put on a long-sleeved shirt to go outside unless the temperature is under 30 degrees, and I almost never wear a coat, leading many people to ask me, "Aren't you cold?" (to which, I generally reply, "Nope"). As such, it is clear that such poetic metaphors can be very poor for describing objective reality with any accuracy.

                        This is why mathematical and scientific models are to be preferred. They are the same, regardless of the person relating the data. When my wife asks me what the temperature is like outside, I can't just reply, "It's warm," because I tend to think that anything over 50 degrees is warm, while she thinks anything less than 80 is cold. So, I've learned that when she asks, "How cold is it today?" my proper response should be, "It's X degrees out."
                        "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                        --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

                        Comment


                        • The same way we know anything. I had a Buddhist explain it this way:
                          1. Personal experience.
                          2. Witness of others.
                          3. Logical deduction.
                          Originally posted by JimL View Post
                          The Budha was an agnostic, and so Buddhism is agnosticism. As a religion Buddhism has only to do with life in the here and now.
                          Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                          Yes and no, Buddha did acknowledge a source that 'All things come from, and return to,' and acknowledged the Maha Bramha. It is best to describe Buddha as apophatic in that his 'source cannot be defined' as in Western religions. He did reject worldly manifestation of Gods.
                          What I cited was from just one professed Buddhist to me. We can all learn from others. Just as I can learn from you JimL and from shuny. In my view being narrow minded does not mean closed minded.
                          . . . the gospel of Christ: for it is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; . . . -- Romans 1:16 KJV

                          . . . that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; And that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures: . . . -- 1 Corinthians 15:3-4 KJV

                          Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God: . . . -- 1 John 5:1 KJV

                          Comment


                          • Originally posted by 37818 View Post
                            What I cited was from just one professed Buddhist to me. We can all learn from others. Just as I can learn from you JimL and from shuny. In my view being narrow minded does not mean closed minded.
                            There is use of logic in Buddhism. It is not the same as western logic. I most definitely learn from others. From Buddhism I learned. (1) Impermanence rules. (2) Nothing is necessary. (3) Everything we hold sacred is likely wrong.
                            Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                            Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                            But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                            go with the flow the river knows . . .

                            Frank

                            I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                            Comment


                            • I had tried to type responses two times, and both times my computer crashed! So, this is my third go at this.

                              Originally posted by Boxing Pythagoras View Post
                              There are two problems which I have with this explanation. The first is that I still do not agree that it is coherent for a thing to "gain" a property without there being some temporally prior state in which that thing exists without that property. To "gain" necessarily implies a prior state of lacking. Without a state in which an entity lacks a property, it cannot gain a property; and an entity cannot lack a property without existing.
                              Agreed. To gain a property assumes a temporally prior state in which that thing didn't have the property. If I remember, I was giving an example of a temporal thing gaining a property first in order to shed light on the conceptual analysis of what it means to 'gain a property' generally before moving on to Time itself. The same is true of the acorn analogy, so I'll move on here, since it seems that we agree on the disanalogy between temporal things gaining a property and Time beginning to exist.

                              I'm not sure if I disagree with you here, so I'll respond conditionally. If you are referring to the practical act of measuring, I'll agree that spatial objects are necessary-- but that applies equally to spatial dimensions, as well, so I'm not sure what relevance it has. If you are referring to the theoretical measure of time, I would say that spatial objects are not necessary, at all. It's rather easy to create a mathematical model in which time exists without any spatial dimensions.
                              I agree that a temporal dimension doesn't require a spatial one. This would seem to agree with Euclidean space and it's compatibility with Time being a universal frame of reference. But wouldn't you agree that the Special Theory of Relativity theorizes that time can't exist without space, since it assumes Minkowski space, and this involves measuring time in terms of gravity and an object's velocity? When you say it's easy to create a model of time without spatial dimensions, are you saying that it's easy to just 'take out' the spatial dimensions from the coordinate system and leave time in? In this case, would this model leave out 'events', since events occur at some time at some place? In other words, since you say time is a dimension by which events are measured, doesn't this presuppose a Minkowski space in which events are specified in terms of a coordinate at which, and in which, an event occurs? And if, as I mentioned, an event can't be measured without taking into account fields of gravitational force and measuring the velocity of objects, doesn't that mean that, according to Relativity, these spatial dimensions are just as required as temporal ones to measure events?

                              That's not a presupposition. It's a conclusion based upon more than a century of experimentation in overwhelming support of both Special and General Relativity.
                              'Presupposition' was a bad choice of words. I said it because I thought it implicitly assumed dialectically in what you said, not that I thought you were doing anything rhetorically illicit. But I do want to press the point. I was responding to your analogy that time is to space what volume is to depth. It seems that even you would disagree with this, since - as you said above - it's easy to create a mathematical model in which time exists without spatial dimensions. But by extension, do you think it's just as possible to create a similar mathematical model in which volume exists without depth? If not - and I don't see a reason to think so - then time isn't to space what volume is to depth. Thus, it doesn't seem to logically follow that the relation between time and space is transitive. Time is related to space differently that space is related to time. Volume and depth, however, are related in terms of mutual - even logical - dependence. You just can't seem to have one without the other. But with time and space it seems you can. Perhaps I'm missing your point.

                              I didn't say that time could exist without events. Quite the contrary, the one cannot exist without the other.
                              Maybe this is where I went wrong. Of course, there's a conceptual distinction between events and space, though they're related, as Minkowski space delineates. If the idea is that the relation between time and events is the same as between volume and depth, we agree.

                              Logical implication is not at all equivalent to the act of creation. It does not follow that, if it is possible God is logically prior to Time, then God could have created Time. Logical premises do not create their conclusions.
                              Logical implication is indeed different than creation. However, it's possible that the type of priority subsisting between God's creating Time and Time beginning to exist at T=1, and an argument's premises and its conclusion, is a logical one. This isn't to say that the relationship in the two examples is identical in all respects, but that the relationship of the antecedent state of affairs to the consequent state of affairs is a species of logical priority. It goes to show that in some cases of priority, there isn't necessarily a temporal priority. For example, the present existence of a square is logically preceded by two 90 degree angles and equal lines joining together in a particular relationship. That the one logically precedes the other doesn't entail, supposing the square has existed from all eternity, that the square ever existed without the lines/angles, or that the lines/angles ever existed without the square. The relationship underlined is one of logical priority. Of course, the relationship between God and Time's beginning to exist is different is relevant respects from the relationship between the said square and its lines/angles, or the said premises and its conclusions. But as long as the relationship between God and time's beginning to exist is one of logical priority, then we can't say that the relation is internally incoherent because there needs to a temporal prior state. Temporal prior states are by nature excluded from relationships involving logical priority.

                              Physical does not imply temporal. It's a fairly trivial matter to conceive of a physical universe which has spatial dimensions but lacks Time.
                              That goes to my point above, but inverts it. Mathematically, you just delete time and keep, let's say, Euclidean space. But perhaps I'm assuming that in Minkowski space, physicality entails temporality. It seems to me that to be a physical object entails being a collection of specified events, and since events presuppose time, then logically, a timeless being can't be physical.

                              Again, tenseless knowledge seems to be a consequence of timelessness, not a condition for it-- unless you are claiming that an entity must have knowledge in order to be timeless.
                              I don't think knowledge is necessary for timelessness; I do think that if X is timeless, and if X has knowledge, then X's knowledge must be tenseless. Thus, assuming that X has knowledge, and assuming that X is timeless, it's a necessary condition of X, possessing these two properties, that the type of knowledge had to be tenseless. This is the sense in which I said that X's knowledge must be tenseless. So, my analysis could be referring less to necessary/sufficient conditions for a timeless being, and more to the necessary/sufficient conditions for a timeless being with knowledge. That may be too much baggage for conceptual analysis to do its optimal work, so thanks for pointing this out.

                              However, I assume you'll agree that on the B-Theory, the Cosmos as-a-whole does not exemplify temporal succession, and therefore would be considered "timeless," right? If so, it seems it would be necessary to prove that the B-Theory is false before one could reasonably claim that the Cosmos as-a-whole cannot be timeless.
                              Very true. Before we do that, though, let's come to an agreement on what's said above first, and leave this suspended for now for dialectical purposes. At this juncture, we can put a signpost at this dialectical fork in the road and take our left or right after the above issues are settled first. We do agree on the conditional, though, right? If the A-theory is argued for, and the B-theory argued against, the Cosmos would exemplify temporal succession, and therefore wouldn't be considered timeless, right?

                              Timelessness does not imply a past-infinite history. In fact, to say that it does is entirely incoherent. A thing which is timeless has no history, at all, so a past-infinite history cannot be a necessary condition of timelessness.
                              Agreed. This 'past-infinite history' would seem to presuppose a metric of sorts to delineate an aggregate or assortment of a past regression of events. Such a metric wouldn't exist in a timeless state of affairs. So, if the B-theory is true, and the Cosmos doesn't exemplify temporal succession, then the Cosmos would be timeless, and therefore couldn't be measured by a metric in terms of a past-regress of events.

                              As for a self-existent, past-finite space-time, I like to use a polar graph as an exemplary model. This would be a two-dimensional model, as opposed to a four-dimensional one (like our universe), and the geometry is a bit different, but I find it's the easiest way to conceptualize my understanding of time without getting into really weird non-Euclidean spaces.
                              [ATTACH=CONFIG]4142[/ATTACH]

                              The red dot at the center of the graph is the pole. Displacement from the pole would be the temporal dimension, on this model, while the angle about the pole represents the spatial dimension. So, there is a past-finite boundary to this model at t=0, but the whole model remains self-existent. Nothing "creates" the pole. There is no state of this model in which the space-time it describes is not extant.
                              The link didn't work, but I'll try to follow you. And I think I'm being sloppy with terms again with the whole T=0/T=1 thing. But for practical purposes, I think we mean the same thing. Agreed. According to the model, there's no creation of the pole. At every point of the model, space/time exists. And agreed again on the point that past-finite space/time (in a certain sense!) doesn't necessarily entail that it 'began to exist' or that it's beginning to exist entails a Creator. But this refers to the fork in the road I mentioned above. According to the B-theory, this model of space/time is akin to a ruler in which there's a beginning to the ruler, and that there's a metrical beginning corresponding to the first metrical measurement that the ruler measures. On this analogy, it makes no sense to say what metric is before the first metrical measurement, before the ruler's 'edge', so to speak. Even if we adhere to the B-theory, however, I still think some concerns can be raised, but I'll leave that aside for now. This gets into the controversies revolving around the appropriateness of such analogies between spatial objects and temporal objects. Again, let's leave this suspended for now. But we can see at this point, that past-finite space/time under an A-theory is different compared to the B-theory.

                              As you mentioned your objection to actual infinities, whichever arguments against infinity you would like to offer up, I'll do my best to answer.
                              This will be another can of infinite worms. Perhaps a preliminary to this will be to address the A/B Theory question first. But maybe not. Perhaps the A/B Theory becomes relevant with just one of the types of arguments: the metaphysical impossibility of traversing an actual infinite via the successive addition of events, mathematically modeled in terms of the one-to-one correspondence between events and intervals. But I'm not sure if this will work with a B Theory, since the whole can exist, and 'traversing' is an illicit importation of A-theory concepts. The other type of argument is to argue against the metaphysical existence of an actual infinite, which may apply to a B-theoretic space/time block. But again, I propose we settle the above issues first, then decide left or right at the A/B Theory fork, and then explore proposals pro/con for/against arguments against traversing/existing actual infinity.

                              I certainly agree that it can be extremely difficult-- if not impossible-- to divorce our descriptive language from spatio-temporal terms, when describing the Cosmos as a whole. However, if one wants to utilize the word "before" (for example) in a non-spatio-temporal manner, one needs to be very careful not to equivocate this non-spatio-temporal "before" with the usual meaning of "before." Using an example from earlier, let's take the word "prior." A premise is prior to a conclusion; and prior to becoming a tree, an acorn is not a tree. However, these two uses of "prior" are not equivalent. The former describes a relationship in logic, while the latter describes a relationship in time.
                              As you probably notice from the above, I agree wholeheartedly. And this goes to my tentative thesis that 'creation of Time at T=0' is simultaneous with 'Time's existence at T=0', and by virtue of such simultaneity these states of affairs possess a before/after in terms of logical priority.

                              I completely understand what you are saying. However, the problem is that the quale described by poetic metaphors are necessarily subjective.
                              Poetic metaphors refer to subjective quale in a sense. Its objectivity, however, refers to the existence of the subjective quale. Further, the purpose of poetic metaphors isn't just to refer to the objectivity of subjective quale, but the objectivity of understanding the meaning of supersensible realities by analogy to subjective quale. Coldness is surely qualitatively distinct from scientific measurements of temperature, as the example of your wife illustrates. But this doesn't entail that poetic metaphors are poor at describing objective reality, since our subjective quale is surely a part of objective reality. In terms of the precision of measurement, it's poor in terms of predictive value and scientific progress. But surely we cut ourselves off from the vast majority of our experience by confining objective reality to its measurable elements. For saying it's 62 degrees outside gives me no information about whether your wife is hot or cold. I have to ask her about her subjective quale.

                              This is why mathematical and scientific models are to be preferred. They are the same, regardless of the person relating the data. When my wife asks me what the temperature is like outside, I can't just reply, "It's warm," because I tend to think that anything over 50 degrees is warm, while she thinks anything less than 80 is cold. So, I've learned that when she asks, "How cold is it today?" my proper response should be, "It's X degrees out."
                              It depends on the context. And I agree that mathematical/scientific models are to be preferred in relaying measurable elements of experience that hold independent of subjective quale. That is undeniable. But to say that this relaying of temperatures excludes additional qualitative information inasmuch as it relates to you or your wife being cold doesn't mean that such subjective quale isn't an objective experience you or your wife are having, that it has meaning, and that such meaning while the quale is being the condition for said meaning can't be enriched by poetic metaphor. The proper response to 'How cold is it today' depends on whether the questioner is asking for measurable elements, or asking for how such elements relate to the subjective quale.

                              But all this is beside the point I was making referring to the necessity of poetic metaphor in descriptions which try to render meaningful realities which are either in themselves not apprehended by the senses, or can't be, or haven't yet. The distinction I want to draw attention to is that the majority of concepts have meaning only insofar as they are enriched and conditioned by metaphor. Concepts confirmed by science are independent of metaphor because they can be put in terms of mathematical/scientific models, even though as you admitted they are still a certain type of symbol, a particular map with the predictive success required to be an accurate representation of the place.
                              Last edited by mattbballman31; 02-26-2015, 03:27 AM.
                              Many and painful are the researches sometimes necessary to be made, for settling points of [this] kind. Pertness and ignorance may ask a question in three lines, which it will cost learning and ingenuity thirty pages to answer. When this is done, the same question shall be triumphantly asked again the next year, as if nothing had ever been written upon the subject.
                              George Horne

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                              • Originally posted by mattbballman31 View Post
                                I had tried to type responses two times, and both times my computer crashed! So, this is my third go at this.
                                Argh... I hate it when that happens. Well, thank you for taking the time to re-type it, again!

                                I agree that a temporal dimension doesn't require a spatial one. This would seem to agree with Euclidean space and it's compatibility with Time being a universal frame of reference. But wouldn't you agree that the Special Theory of Relativity theorizes that time can't exist without space, since it assumes Minkowski space, and this involves measuring time in terms of gravity and an object's velocity?
                                A Minkowski space is just a model of 3 space-like dimensions and one time-like dimension. Gravity and velocity are functions over the time-like dimension-- they do not define the time-like dimension.

                                (As a side-note, Special Relativity breaks down when one begins to discuss accelerated frames, as in the case of gravity; that's where we need General Relativity)

                                When you say it's easy to create a model of time without spatial dimensions, are you saying that it's easy to just 'take out' the spatial dimensions from the coordinate system and leave time in? In this case, would this model leave out 'events', since events occur at some time at some place?
                                Yes, that is what I mean. And on such a model, an 'event' would have a temporal component but no spatial component. For example, if we were to assume for a moment that Mind-Body Dualism is true, a sequence of different thoughts from a disembodied mind would comprise separate events, despite the fact that they have no spatial component and are only measured by the temporal dimension.

                                I was responding to your analogy that time is to space what volume is to depth.

                                ...Maybe this is where I went wrong. Of course, there's a conceptual distinction between events and space, though they're related, as Minkowski space delineates. If the idea is that the relation between time and events is the same as between volume and depth, we agree.
                                Yes, my analogy was that events are to time as volume is to depth. In both cases, the former is a composite concept which is defined over some set of dimensions that includes the latter. So, events must have a temporal aspect in a similar manner as volume must have an aspect of depth.

                                For example, the present existence of a square is logically preceded by two 90 degree angles and equal lines joining together in a particular relationship. That the one logically precedes the other doesn't entail, supposing the square has existed from all eternity, that the square ever existed without the lines/angles, or that the lines/angles ever existed without the square. The relationship underlined is one of logical priority. Of course, the relationship between God and Time's beginning to exist is different is relevant respects from the relationship between the said square and its lines/angles, or the said premises and its conclusions. But as long as the relationship between God and time's beginning to exist is one of logical priority, then we can't say that the relation is internally incoherent because there needs to a temporal prior state. Temporal prior states are by nature excluded from relationships involving logical priority.

                                ...my tentative thesis [is] that 'creation of Time at T=0' is simultaneous with 'Time's existence at T=0', and by virtue of such simultaneity these states of affairs possess a before/after in terms of logical priority.
                                My objection is to that you are using equivocated definitions of "prior" to draw a false conclusion. So, if I were to summarize your argument in a syllogism, it sounds like you are arguing:

                                (1) Creation requires that the creating entity be prior to the created entity.
                                (2) God is prior to time.
                                (3) Therefore, it is coherent to assert that God created time.

                                However, the word "prior" in (1) refers to temporal priority, while the "prior" in (2) refers to logical priority. These are wholly different concepts, which do not carry the same properties or implications, so we cannot draw our conclusion in (3) from these premises.

                                The act of creation necessarily requires temporal priority, and not simply logical priority. It implies a state in which the created entity does not exist followed by a state in which the created entity exists. It is completely incoherent to claim that there was ever a state in which time did not exist, and therefore it seems incoherent to claim that time could have been created.

                                That goes to my point above, but inverts it. Mathematically, you just delete time and keep, let's say, Euclidean space. But perhaps I'm assuming that in Minkowski space, physicality entails temporality. It seems to me that to be a physical object entails being a collection of specified events, and since events presuppose time, then logically, a timeless being can't be physical.
                                A Minkowski space is a description of a universe which does include a time-like dimension. However, it's not the only possible description of a physical universe.

                                If the A-theory is argued for, and the B-theory argued against, the Cosmos would exemplify temporal succession, and therefore wouldn't be considered timeless, right?
                                I can agree with that.

                                The link didn't work, but I'll try to follow you.
                                Ack! Apologies. I'll attempt to fix the attachment in the original post. Sorry!

                                But we can see at this point, that past-finite space/time under an A-theory is different compared to the B-theory.
                                True, even past-finitude on the A-Theory doesn't imply that there was ever a state in which Time did not exist. That remains incoherent, and still seems to preclude the notion that Time could have been created.

                                I propose we settle the above issues first, then decide left or right at the A/B Theory fork, and then explore proposals pro/con for/against arguments against traversing/existing actual infinity.
                                If opposition to actual infinites is necessary for the argument against the B-Theory, then perhaps we should discuss that before the nature of time; but I'm open to whichever course you'd like to take in the conversation.

                                But all this is beside the point I was making referring to the necessity of poetic metaphor in descriptions which try to render meaningful realities which are either in themselves not apprehended by the senses, or can't be, or haven't yet.
                                I rather disagree with this. Let's take, for instance, a Black Hole. Now, the mathematics which describe a Black Hole pre-existed the poetic metaphors which are utilized to describe them. The concept was rendered meaningful on the basis of mathematics, despite the fact that these entities cannot be apprehended by the senses. It was only much later that poetic descriptions, including the very name "Black Hole," became attached to these entities. The reality had already been rendered meaningful; the poetic metaphors were intended to be a way to approximate that meaning to people who could not understand the original language which described the entities (mathematics). Furthermore, the mathematics is far more meaningful than the poetic metaphor-- after all, a Black Hole is neither black nor a hole.
                                "[Mathematics] is the revealer of every genuine truth, for it knows every hidden secret, and bears the key to every subtlety of letters; whoever, then, has the effrontery to pursue physics while neglecting mathematics should know from the start he will never make his entry through the portals of wisdom."
                                --Thomas Bradwardine, De Continuo (c. 1325)

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