God's Omniscience Excludes Man's Free Will

[Duder]

Up in the sacred halls of the Theology Department, Jason asked if there was any syllogistic proof that God's omniscience excludes man's free will. I thought I'd bring the topic down here so theists and non-theists alike could mix it up.

Jason remarked that the proposition seems attractive on some intuitive level, but is there a way to demonstrate it formally? This seemed like a fascinating challenge, so I decided to take it up purely as an intellectual exersize - I make to claim that the result is actually true.
____________

Before we get started, here are a couple of definitions and brief discussions of what they mean:

Omniscient: "To be in possesion of all knowledge"

If God is in possession of all knowledge, this means that for every event in the world there will have to be a corresponding idea of this event in God's mind.

For example, If Columbus sailed the ocean blue in seventeen hundred and ninety-two, then an idea perfectly reflecting both 1) all the characteristics of this event and 2) the fact that this event physically happened, has to exist in God's mind. We could call this idea a "memory". In much the same way, if it is true that Condi Rice will be nominated for president in 2008, then all information about this event, and the fact that this event will happen, must be reflected by an idea in God's mind. We can call this idea a "precognition".

The crucial point is that for all of the events in the world, past and future, there exists in God's mind an idea corresponding perfectly with that event. No event in the world can happen nor can have happened unless it is reflected by a memory or a precognition in the mind of God.

Free Will: "Action independent of external causes"

If an agent is in possession of free will, then that agency's actions will be self-caused, and not caused by something external to that agency.

Finally, there are a few things we have to assume are true before we can get to the actual arguments. I have tried to limit the starting assumptions to things orthodox Christians will accept:

1. God is omniscient. As noted in the definition, this means that there is a correspondence between events in the world and ideas in God's mind.

2. The correspondence of events in the world with ideas in God's mind is necessary. It can be no accident that the events in the world correspond with ideas in God's mind. It cannot just happen that they are correlated - they must be correlated. This is really just another way of saying God is not accidentally right about things. He must be right about things.

3. God is not a contingent being. In other words, nothing about God is caused by anything outside of God.

4. Man's actions all take place in the world. We allow for the possibility that some men will act outside of the world when they join God in heaven, but that exception is unimportant to our argument.


5. The heresy of pantheism is false. God is not a man, and no men are God. We allow for the unique and special exception of Jesus Christ, who is both, but that exception is also unimportant here.

Hang onto your hats and glasses, 'cause here we go:

_______________

Argument 1

If God is omniscient, then events in the world correspond with ideas in God's mind.

This follows from our definition of omniscience.

God is omniscient.

This was assumed.

Therefore, events in the world correspond with ideas in God's mind.

Argument 2

If the correspondence between 1) events in the world and 2) ideas in God's mind is necessary, then whatever causes either must be the cause of both.

This follows from the very nature of necessity.

The correspondence between 1) events in the world and 2) ideas in God's mind is necessary.

This was assumed

Therefore, whatever causes either 1) events in the world or 2) the ideas in God's mind must be the cause of both.

Argument 3

God is the sole cause of the ideas in his mind.

This follows from the assumption that God is not a contingent being.

Whatever causes either 1) events in the world or 2) ideas in God's mind must be the cause of both.

See conclusion, Argument 2

Therefore, God is the cause of events in the world.

Argument 4

Man's actions are events in the world.

This was assumed.

God is the cause of events in the world.

See conclusion, Argument 3

Therefore, God is the cause of man's actions.

Argument 5

God is external to man.

This reflects the assumed denial of pantheism.

God is the cause of man's actions.

See conclusion, Argument 4

Therefore, the cause of man's actions is external to man.

Argument 6

Free will actions are indepenent of external cause.

This follows from the definition of free will.

Man's actions are not independent of external cause.

See conclusion, Argument 5

Therefore, man's actions are not free will actions.

_______________

It is very hard to force your thinking into syllogistic form, and I'm not very good at it. For one thing, the proof above is probably longer than it needs to be. For another, I cannot be certain that my logic is valid at every point.

Can you see where it can be made shorter? And If you find errors, where are they?

Thanks

Matt

[Sparko]

I posted this in the other thread, but Duder asked me to bring it over here so...

I see the flaw as being in argument 3:

God is the sole cause of the ideas in his mind.

This follows from the assumption that God is not a contingent being.

If this were true, then God could not interact or know anything outside of his own mind. He would be stuck in an internal loop.

He may be the cause of his own original thoughts. but the recorded information in his mind can come from external sources. He can observe and record information. He can listen to others, etc. Gathering external information does not make him contingent, just omniscient. So the information memories of the events in the world can be caused by the freewill actions of others and he will record that information in his mind as foreknowledge. What he does with that knowledge is his business.

So if God can gather external information, then that information can be caused by external causes also, and God will know it. So assuming that there is free will, then Free will choices could be the causes of the actions that God knows about.

[Duder]

...And I posted the following reply in the other department:

Howdy, John -

Thanks for the feedback!

Unfortunately, I don' strictly qualify as a theist as defined by Tweb. I solemnly promise never to knowingly question the truth of Christianity and always to grant the unfailing authority of the Bible if I post in Theology 201 - but nevertheless I think I should keep my involvement here to an absolute minimum lest I accidentally slip over the line. Would you mind talking with me down in Apologetics? I posted the arguments there, too.

In the meantime I'll just venture this: The assumption was made that God is not contingent - that nothing in God is caused by anything outside of God. If we allow that the recorded information in God's mind can come from external sources, will that destroy our assumption of non-contingency? Does this proof fail because that assumption was wrong?

Thanks

Matt

[Sparko]

In the meantime I'll just venture this: The assumption was made that God is not contingent - that nothing in God is caused by anything outside of God. If we allow that the recorded information in God's mind can come from external sources, will that destroy our assumption of non-contingency? Does this proof fail because that assumption was wrong?

I think it might be part of the problem. Your definition of contingent to mean that nothing about God is caused anything outside of God is too strict a definition. If we allow that, then God can have no senses of anything external to him and cannot record any information about his creation. God could have no memories other than of his own thoughts.

The only such God where that could be true would be a Pantheistic God (where everything is part of God) and that would destroy your proof because your next assumption is that God is not Pantheistic.

[C. D. Ward]

There would appear to be an unintentional equivocation of knowledge with action. If God is assumed to also have libertarian free will (LFW), then He must be the cause of His actions, but not necessarily His ideas. IOW, God can see or have knowledge of things external to Himself without violating LFW. It's only His actions over which He must have causal control.

[Duder]

I think it might be part of the problem. Your definition of contingent to mean that nothing about God is caused anything outside of God is too strict a definition. If we allow that, then God can have no senses of anything external to him and cannot record any information about his creation. God could have no memories other than of his own thoughts.

The only such God where that could be true would be a Pantheistic God (where everything is part of God) and that would destroy your proof because your next assumption is that God is not Pantheistic.

Yes, I see that you are right. There appear to be two assumptions that are mutually exclusive. If pantheism is false, then God cannot be strictly non-contingent.

So the question now is, can we weaken the assumption of God's non-contingency, not so much that we actually destroy its meaning, but enough so that it doesn't imply the heresy of pantheism? Or does the assumption of non-contingency have to be abandoned?

[Xavier]

I will be assuming a Molinist perspective here. I think Middle Knowledge provides the solution to this problem:

2. The correspondence of events in the world with ideas in God's mind is necessary. It can be no accident that the events in the world correspond with ideas in God's mind. It cannot just happen that they are correlated - they must be correlated. This is really just another way of saying God is not accidentally right about things. He must be right about things.

Methinks that this statement needs to be unpackes a bit. I would agree that the correspondence of events in the world with ideas in God's mind is necessary (through infalliblity). However, we must not discount the fact that the truth of free will contingents are determined separate of God's volitional act. IOW, the truth of the free will actions of agent are wholely determined by the free will agent in and of themselves. The problem of course is that the agents are ALSO ideas in the mind of God.

Under the Molinist theory of Foreknowledge, God's knowledge exists in three separate logical "moments":
1) Natural Knowledge -- This is the knowledge of all contingents (counterfactuals) AND the truth values for Natural (Non-Free Will) Contingents.
2) Middle Knowledge -- This is the knowledge of the truth values for Free Will Contingents in every possible world. This knowledge is independant of a volitional act on the part of God.
3) Free Knowledge -- This is the knowledge of the truth values for ALL contingents in the world that God creates.

Now, what this says is that nothing is caused without God (ie: nothing exists prior to God's volitional act of creations) AND there are contingents that are not causally determined by God, but rather casually determined (God is A cause, but not THE cause).

That's all I'm going to get into at the moment... Alot of my statements need further unpacking, but let's see if I'm making any sense yet...

Yours,
Xavier

[Xavier]

There would appear to be an unintentional equivocation of knowledge with action. If God is assumed to also have libertarian free will (LFW), then He must be the cause of His actions, but not necessarily His ideas. IOW, God can see or have knowledge of things external to Himself without violating LFW. It's only His actions over which He must have causal control.

Exactly... This is why I am a Molinist...

[Sparko]

I think that CD Ward summed it up nicely.

Non-contingent means that "nothing can cause God to act in a way he does not want to" and that his existence does not depend on anything past, present, or future.

In other words, God has no cause, and he is not dependent on his creation for existence.

[Duder]

There would appear to be an unintentional equivocation of knowledge with action. If God is assumed to also have libertarian free will (LFW), then He must be the cause of His actions, but not necessarily His ideas. IOW, God can see or have knowledge of things external to Himself without violating LFW. It's only His actions over which He must have causal control.

C.D. -

I think you honed in to the same thing John did, but from a different route.

If there is nothing outside of God (pantheism), then God can be the only cause of His own thoughts. He could be truly and strictly non-contingent in all respects.

However, if we assume that pantheism is false, then there are things outside of God that could be the cause of some of God's thoughts. So I think you and John are in agreement. You cannot affirm both God's non-contingency and deny pantheism.

But can orthodox Christianity tolerate this? Are not both assumptions (that non-contingency is true and that panteism is heresy) affirmed in orthodox Christianity?

[C. D. Ward]

But can orthodox Christianity tolerate this? Are not both assumptions (that non-contingency is true and that panteism is heresy) affirmed in orthodox Christianity?

They are, but you are taking "non-contingency" further than orthodox Christianity (which I believe JS has already pointed out).

God is non-contingent insofar as his existence or abilities are concerned. Nothing in "non-contingent" can be taken, or is taken AFAICS, to mean that the actual content of God's mind is non-contingent.

It is the Will which is non-contingent, not the Ideas. And Xavier's exposition on Middle Knowledge covered this nicely...

[Duder]

They are, but you are taking "non-contingency" further than orthodox Christianity (which I believe JS has already pointed out).

God is non-contingent insofar as his existence or abilities are concerned. Nothing in "non-contingent" can be taken, or is taken AFAICS, to mean that the actual content of God's mind is non-contingent.

It is the Will which is non-contingent, not the Ideas. And Xavier's exposition on Middle Knowledge covered this nicely...

C.D. -

If orthodoxy affirms a softer verson of non-contingency which implies no pantheism, then you and John are right - the proof fails.

But golly - somebody give me more pearls! Over a hundred posts in the original thread, and no one even tried to answer Jasons challenge. I think I gave it a heck of a go.

[Xavier]

But golly - somebody give me more pearls! Over a hundred posts in the original thread, and no one even tried to answer Jasons challenge. I think I gave it a heck of a go.

Works for me...

[Sparko]

Pearls comin' at ya!

[Stinky]

John Sparks:

this were true, then God could not interact or know anything outside of his own mind. He would be stuck in an internal loop.

He may be the cause of his own original thoughts. but the recorded information in his mind can come from external sources. He can observe and record information. He can listen to others, etc. Gathering external information does not make him contingent, just omniscient.

But how could he gather any information in light of,

"

Omniscient: "To be in possesion of all knowledge"



If God is in possession of all knowledge, this means that for every event in the world there will have to be a corresponding idea of this event in God's mind.

For example, If Columbus sailed the ocean blue in seventeen hundred and ninety-two, then an idea perfectly reflecting both 1) all the characteristics of this event and 2) the fact that this event physically happened, has to exist in God's mind. We could call this idea a "memory". In much the same way, if it is true that Condi Rice will be nominated for president in 2008, then all information about this event, and the fact that this event will happen, must be reflected by an idea in God's mind. We can call this idea a "precognition".

The crucial point is that for all of the events in the world, past and future, there exists in God's mind an idea corresponding perfectly with that event. No event in the world can happen nor can have happened unless it is reflected by a memory or a precognition in the mind of God."

If God is in possession of knowledge of all events, past and future, what other knowledge can he gather?

So the information memories of the events in the world can be caused by the freewill actions of others and he will record that information in his mind as foreknowledge. What he does with that knowledge is his business.
So if God can gather external information, then that information can be caused by external causes also, and God will know it. So assuming that there is free will, then Free will choices could be the causes of the actions that God knows about.

I don’t get how this could work. If God knew Adam would eat the apple before God created Adam, then Adam could not have been the cause of Adam’s decision. A non-existent being cannot make a free-will decision. Since the choice was made when God was the only being in existence, only he could be the cause of that decision.

I think it might be part of the problem. Your definition of contingent to mean that nothing about God is caused anything outside of God is too strict a definition. If we allow that, then God can have no senses of anything external to him and cannot record any information about his creation. God could have no memories other than of his own thoughts.

But this does seem to be the case. How can God record anything about his creation, other than that which he already knows? If a future event is already known to God, what more is there to record?

When Adam ate the apple, God did not record any information, he already possessed that information. In fact, he possessed that information before Adam existed, excluding Adam as the cause of that action.

CD Ward:

There would appear to be an unintentional equivocation of knowledge with action. If God is assumed to also have libertarian free will (LFW), then He must be the cause of His actions, but not necessarily His ideas. IOW, God can see or have knowledge of things external to Himself without violating LFW. It's only His actions over which He must have causal control.

If God is not the cause of his ideas, what is?

Obviously God can have knowledge of things external to him, the premise is that he has COMPLETE knowledge of everything external to him. While this does not exclude Gods free will, it certainly excludes the free will of temporal beings.



CD WARD:

God is non-contingent insofar as his existence or abilities are concerned. Nothing in "non-contingent" can be taken, or is taken AFAICS, to mean that the actual content of God's mind is non-contingent.

What could be an example of one of Gods non-contingent thoughts?


And what does the Bible say about all this?

"All the days ordained for me were written in your book before one of them came to be" (Psalm 139: 16). "The lot is cast onto the lap, but its every decision is from the Lord" (Proverbs 16:33).

Duder:

But golly - somebody give me more pearls! Over a hundred posts in the original thread, and no one even tried to answer Jasons challenge. I think I gave it a heck of a go.

Which thread was that?