Originally posted by Adrift
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M. A thing can’t have any reality unless it can be theoretically confirmed by one of the biological or natural sciences.
N. A thing has no reality at all unless its existence is required by a theory of a single natural science enjoying the widest universality (physics). [1]
[1] A defender of M but not N would hold that some kinds of biological matters will never be reducible without remainder to chemistry/physics. It may be the absence of a bridging law, or it may be about teleological explanation. Lots of matters involving consciousness or attentive reasoning, for example, may at last get their natural place with brain functionality, but they could remain invisible and unreal to physics. John Dewey affirms M but rejects N. As do I. The fault line between M and N is the one of the greatest, sharply dividing naturalists over the past 200 years, and I don’t foresee how it will vanish. N makes far vaster philosophical claims than just M.
N. A thing has no reality at all unless its existence is required by a theory of a single natural science enjoying the widest universality (physics). [1]
[1] A defender of M but not N would hold that some kinds of biological matters will never be reducible without remainder to chemistry/physics. It may be the absence of a bridging law, or it may be about teleological explanation. Lots of matters involving consciousness or attentive reasoning, for example, may at last get their natural place with brain functionality, but they could remain invisible and unreal to physics. John Dewey affirms M but rejects N. As do I. The fault line between M and N is the one of the greatest, sharply dividing naturalists over the past 200 years, and I don’t foresee how it will vanish. N makes far vaster philosophical claims than just M.
This does not fit his casual designation of scientism in 2007 and it seems to plant one of his feet firmly in the camp of perspectival pluralism rather than reductive physicalism, the two main types of naturalism he concluded his 2007 piece.
Another of his comments seems to indicate that there are not many that he knows of who would positively accept this label: "the point of this list isn’t to identify what scientism truly means ... I would be greatly pleased, however, if defenders of science, and especially those who are willing to answer to charges of scientism, would at least be specific about what they are defending and what they aren’t." One could put a spin on this both ways, ie, that he has defined what he is willing to defend as he is asking other proponents of scientism to do, but, on the other hand, this is at best implied and I would have expected a much stronger statement or formal definition of scientism.
As always, I could be wrong, and I did not do any extensive reading so if you were to find a piece in which is clearly and unambiguously identifies himself as a explicit proponent of scientism, I would not be crushed or greatly surprised, but I think he is happier to stick with a more traditional understanding of philosophical naturalism.
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