Miracles

[seer]

I think that'd be uncharitable. Its not incoherent, what he describes makes sense. I just think its completely detached from how reality is. We experience a change from state to another. This experience disproves it.

If he argues that the experience is an illusion, that's when things risks getting incoherent. I'd be curious to see how he'd do that.

Well he has been saying that our experience is an illusion, I think. I don't remember how he justified it though.

[Leonhard]

Well he has been saying that our experience is an illusion. I don't remember how he justified it though.

"I experience change, see this match I just lit, it was unlit before."
"That's just an illusion, caused by your brain. [proceeds to give a detailed description]"
"Then explain how the illusion changed, when you deny that anything changes."

Even if you call it an illusion that just moves the problem back one step and leaves the reality of change unexplained.

If he proceeds then to claim that the illusion really doesn't change, any B-time instance of myself just happen to think that it does. Then unless he's got very good arguments that superceds basic experience, then he'd be enganged in question begging. You can't disprove an attack on a position, by assuming the truth of the position.

As such I know of no really good arguments for B-time except: Its weird and fun (like most things in physics so there's a sort of argument from resemblance), its mathematically elegant (which some see as a good argument, I don't), its simpler (which is debatable) and finally its the worldview most popular between physicists (not a good argument).

[seer]

"I experience change, see this match I just lit, it was unlit before."
"That's just an illusion, caused by your brain. [proceeds to give a detailed description]"
"Then explain how the illusion changed, when you deny that anything changes."

Even if you call it an illusion that just moves the problem back one step and leaves the reality of change unexplained.

If he proceeds then to claim that the illusion really doesn't change, any B-time instance of myself just happen to think that it does. Then unless he's got very good arguments that superceds basic experience, then he'd be enganged in question begging. You can't disprove an attack on a position, by assuming the truth of the position.

As such I know of no really good arguments for B-time except: Its weird and fun (like most things in physics so there's a sort of argument from resemblance), its mathematically elegant (which some see as a good argument, I don't), its simpler (which is debatable) and finally its the worldview most popular between physicists (not a good argument).

Yes, Boxing is going to have to answer these points. Being a layman I can only say that it doesn't seem to line up with experience.

[JimL]

I think the problem lies in the fact that physicists don't see that time is nothing more than a discription of the relationship between things that move, and a thing that doesn't move, a thing that in itslelf is eternal and infinite. An infinite and eternal vacuum, i.e. an infinite empty space, or an infinite and eternal cosmos, the whole of existence as opposed to the parts therein, being that it is eternal and infinite, doesn't move. I'm no physicist, so of course I could be way off, but I think that time is the relationship between the moving parts contained within the eternal, infinite, and so unmoving whole. In other words things move or change within the unmoved and unchanging, and the measure of that motion is what we call time.

[Leonhard]

I think the problem lies in the fact that physicists don't see that time is nothing more than a discription of the relationship between things that move, and a thing that doesn't move, a thing that in itslelf is eternal and infinite. An infinite and eternal vacuum, i.e. an infinite empty space, or an infinite and eternal cosmos, the whole of existence as opposed to the parts therein, being that it is eternal and infinite, doesn't move. I'm no physicist, so of course I could be way off, but I think that time is the relationship between the moving parts contained within the eternal, infinite, and so unmoving whole. In other words things move or change within the unmoved and unchanging, and the measure of that motion is what we call time.

You sure said eternal and infinite a lot of times. Not sure what you mean though.

[Yttrium]

I think the problem lies in the fact that physicists don't see that time is nothing more than a discription of the relationship between things that move, and a thing that doesn't move, a thing that in itslelf is eternal and infinite. An infinite and eternal vacuum, i.e. an infinite empty space, or an infinite and eternal cosmos, the whole of existence as opposed to the parts therein, being that it is eternal and infinite, doesn't move. I'm no physicist, so of course I could be way off, but I think that time is the relationship between the moving parts contained within the eternal, infinite, and so unmoving whole. In other words things move or change within the unmoved and unchanging, and the measure of that motion is what we call time.

We don't have an absolute reference point in the universe for motion. The motion of an object is always measured against another object, which itself is moving relative to other objects. And so time is relative too. But we do have the speed of light in a vacuum, which is the same in every frame of reference. No matter how fast objects are moving relative to each other, they all see a beam of light moving at the same speed, the speed of light.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But the illusion of color is fundamentally different from the "illusion" of temporal becoming. The illusion of color is a misapprehension of external reality made by a brain state in a specific moment of time, while the illusion of temporal becoming is the perception of moving from one brain state to another.

...which I am arguing is a misapprehension of external reality made by a brain state in a specific moment of time.

What I'm objecting against is that this description of reality does not explain why it is that you're now aware of the particular moment of time that you're currently in, as opposed to any other moment of time.

This is why I am saying that you are stuck in an A-Theory mindset. You are still supposing that consciousness only actually occupies a single moment in time, and that this proceeds from one moment to the next.

My objection is that it would only explain the memory/perception of having moved from one moment to the next, it would not explain why we have the experience of presently moving from one moment to the next.

I think that's a distinction without a difference. The perception of having moved from one moment to the next is the experience of moving from one moment to the next.

Let's suppose that we isolate one single temporal position, and one single brain-state which occupies that temporal position. Now, we have agreed that memory creates the illusory perception of having arrived at that moment from the previous moment. In what way does this differ from that brain state having the illusory experience of arriving at that moment from the previous? What would you expect to find in an experience which you do not find in a perception?

Right. How do you think defining the arrow of time by entropy relevant to our perception of temporal becoming? If it would be just as valid to define the arrow of time to be towards decreasing entropy, why is it that everything we know tells us that the universe is moving towards increasing entropy?

...because we have defined "forward" to be in the direction of increasing entropy. If we had defined that direction to be "backward," instead, the universe would be moving toward decreasing entropy.

Is that simply a misconception due to the illusion of temporal becoming, or is it an objective facet of reality. I.e is there something about our spacetime-block that would lead a hypothetical outside observer to think that the history of the universe is towards increasing entropy, rather than decreasing entropy?

There does not seem to be anything about spacetime as a whole which would define a particular "forward" or "backward" for the arrow of time. I do agree that our intuitive labeling of the towards-increasing-entropy direction as being "forward" is due to the illusion of temporal progression.

That would mean that there are many different you's, consciously experiencing many different parts of your history, all the time.

Almost there, now. It would mean that there are many subsets of you each consciously experiencing many different parts of your history, at each temporal location which you occupy over the course of your life.

I think that'd be uncharitable. Its not incoherent, what he describes makes sense.

Thank you for that.

I just think its completely detached from how reality is. We experience a change from state to another. This experience disproves it.

This seems to be question begging. You're saying, "The experience of temporal progression cannot be illusory because we experience temporal progression."

[JonathanL]

...which I am arguing is a misapprehension of external reality made by a brain state in a specific moment of time.

And I'm arguing that the very nature of the perception of temporal becoming invalidates such an understanding.

This is why I am saying that you are stuck in an A-Theory mindset. You are still supposing that consciousness only actually occupies a single moment in time, and that this proceeds from one moment to the next.

You say that I'm stuck in an A-Theory mindset, but you're wrong. I'm not supposing that consciousness only occupies a single moment in time, I'm asking you to explain why we have the experience that our consciousness only occupies a single moment in time when on B-theory this is clearly not so. I'm also asking you to explain why it seems that we are aware of that specific moment as if it was "the present", as opposed to any of the other moments spread along the timeline of our lives, when in reality, all brain states along that line are equally real.

I think that's a distinction without a difference. The perception of having moved from one moment to the next is the experience of moving from one moment to the next.

I'm not sure about you, but I can clearly distinguish between my memory of having moved from one moment to the next and my experience that I'm currently moving forward in time.

Let's suppose that we isolate one single temporal position, and one single brain-state which occupies that temporal position. Now, we have agreed that memory creates the illusory perception of having arrived at that moment from the previous moment. In what way does this differ from that brain state having the illusory experience of arriving at that moment from the previous? What would you expect to find in an experience which you do not find in a perception?

I think the real question is what would you expect to find in an experience/perception that you do not find in a memory, and the answer to that would be the perception is about something happening in that very moment of time where you have the perception, while a memory is about something you experienced in a prior moment of time.

...because we have defined "forward" to be in the direction of increasing entropy. If we had defined that direction to be "backward," instead, the universe would be moving toward decreasing entropy.

There does not seem to be anything about spacetime as a whole which would define a particular "forward" or "backward" for the arrow of time. I do agree that our intuitive labeling of the towards-increasing-entropy direction as being "forward" is due to the illusion of temporal progression.

The reason I'm asking these questions is because I'm not entirely sure anymore what role the arrow of time has in your explanation on why we experience the illusion of temporal becoming.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

As such I know of no really good arguments for B-time except: Its weird and fun (like most things in physics so there's a sort of argument from resemblance), its mathematically elegant (which some see as a good argument, I don't), its simpler (which is debatable) and finally its the worldview most popular between physicists (not a good argument).

There's also the fact that the A-Theory would require that one accept the existence of a single preferred inertial reference frame representing "actual" space and time-- an aetherframe. Not only is there no evidence for an aetherframe, there does not seem to be any way which there could be evidence for an aetherframe, since it would be entirely indistinguishable from all other inertial reference frames. The aetherframe seems to be both unfalsifiable and unnecessary, and thus clearly opposed to Occam's Razor.

[JimL]

You sure said eternal and infinite a lot of times. Not sure what you mean though.

By eternal and infinite, I am describing the nature of a whole which has never not existed, and which is unbounded, extending everywhere. This could either be thought of as a pure vacuum, an infinite void, or it could be thought of as a whole in that it is the totality of its parts, which in either case has existed always and everywhere. In either case the whole, being that it already exists everywhere, can't be said to move, but the parts therein, whether they be distinct from the whole, i.e. contained within the vaccuum, or one and the same as the whole, such as matter in relation to energy, only the parts, which we would call temporal can change, or move, and time would merely be the term we use to describe the measure of the internal motion with respect to the unmoving whole. In other words there is no such thing as time in and of itself, there is only internal change within the unchanging nature of the whole.

[Leonhard]

There's also the fact that the A-Theory would require that one accept the existence of a single preferred inertial reference frame representing "actual" space and time-- an aetherframe. Not only is there no evidence for an aetherframe, there does not seem to be any way which there could be evidence for an aetherframe, since it would be entirely indistinguishable from all other inertial reference frames. The aetherframe seems to be both unfalsifiable and unnecessary, and thus clearly opposed to Occam's Razor.

This is an interesting argument you're making, except you haven't established any point beyond the unavailability of scientific evidence. For the same reason scalar values of wavefunctions cannot be measured, the insides of blackholes can't be measured, chaotic inflationary universes, multiverse interpretations of quantum mechanics can't be measured, etc... etc... and of course etc...

You'd need something stronger to invoke an argument otherwise you're making a vague appeal to a consequence you don't like. I'm not sure its true either, as I've spent far less time on the interpretation of Theory of Relativity, than I've done on Quantum Mechanics. Even if true, so what? Yes, if it truly implies an absolute but unmeasurable frame of reference, then such a one exists, but is irrelevant in as much as it can't be measured. Just like the scalar and vector fields of electromagnetism can't really be determined either (and can be infinitely gauge transformed). We're not even capable of determining by measurement whether magnetic and electric fields are more basic than their vector/scalar form, though the later seems simpler and more conceptually sound.

You can only invoke Occam's Razor if the two alternatives are otherwise equivalent, but they're not here. B-theory of time is completely incapable of accounting for our experience of change. Or if it does, I don't see how you avoid begging the question. Clearly we experience change. Clearly B-theory of time denies that this experience represents reality.

Personally I don't see why the argument against the B-theory of time would need to be deeper than this.

[JimL]

Almost there, now. It would mean that there are many subsets of you each consciously experiencing many different parts of your history, at each temporal location which you occupy over the course of your life.

I think that the B-time theory actually defines time as a non-existent thing in itself. All of space exists, and all events in space exist, and apparently they exist eternally since they don't begin or end existing. Individuals and events for instance exist in space even if nothing is consciously aware of their existence. How do you account for that? To say that you were born say 30 years ago doesn't really have any meaning because 30 years ago has always existed according to B-theory. If 30 years ago has always existed then why did it only become illuminated, so to speak, 30 years ago? If your argument is that time did not always exist, that it had a beginning with the beginning of the universe, then I see the same problem, you have existed in time for 14 billion years but have only been conscious of your existence for 30 years. So if there is no process involved, if all of time, and all events in time, exist, if each temporal moment is just as real as any other, If you have always existed in time, "if all of your brain states have always existed," then why weren't you conscious of yourself 14 billion years ago at the beginning of time?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

And I'm arguing that the very nature of the perception of temporal becoming invalidates such an understanding.

I understand that. However, to simply assert that my analogy to color fails is question begging. I made the analogy precisely to illustrate that I believe the perception of temporal progression is a misapprehension of external reality made by a brain state in a specific moment of time.

You say that I'm stuck in an A-Theory mindset, but you're wrong. I'm not supposing that consciousness only occupies a single moment in time, I'm asking you to explain why we have the experience that our consciousness only occupies a single moment in time when on B-theory this is clearly not so.

Again, this is precisely what we would expect of a brain state which cannot perceive stimuli from other temporal locations, so I'm not sure why you are confused, here. It is only aware of its own particular temporal location, hence the perception that our consciousness only occupies a single moment in time.

I'm not sure about you, but I can clearly distinguish between my memory of having moved from one moment to the next and my experience that I'm currently moving forward in time.

I think the real question is what would you expect to find in an experience/perception that you do not find in a memory, and the answer to that would be the perception is about something happening in that very moment of time where you have the perception, while a memory is about something you experienced in a prior moment of time.

Alright, so how do you differentiate between an experience which is happening in that very moment of time where you have the perception, and an illusion of temporal progression caused by memory? What would you expect to find in the former which you would not expect to find in the latter?

The reason I'm asking these questions is because I'm not entirely sure anymore what role the arrow of time has in your explanation on why we experience the illusion of temporal becoming.

It's just an acknowledgement that, unlike spatial dimensions, there does seem to be a way to differentiate one direction of the temporal dimension from the other.

This is an interesting argument you're making, except you haven't established any point beyond the unavailability of scientific evidence.

It's not that scientific evidence is unavailable. It's that there is absolutely nothing which would distinguish the aetherframe from all other inertial reference frames. The distinction is entirely arbitrary and meaningless. It's not like a situation where we would, in principle, expect different values for different things if it were possible to measure them. Even if we were to measure the properties of inertial reference frames, there would still be no way to differentiate an aetherframe from amongst them. There is literally nothing distinguishable about an aetherframe.

Imagine, for a moment, someone had scattered one thousand little red balls over the floor of a room. Each one of these balls is completely physically identical to all the others-- shape, weight, color, material, etc.-- and the only difference between them is their position on the floor. Your host points to one of the balls and says, "That's actually the correct ball. All the others are wrong." What does that statement even mean?

You can only invoke Occam's Razor if the two alternatives are otherwise equivalent, but they're not here. B-theory of time is completely incapable of accounting for our experience of change. Or if it does, I don't see how you avoid begging the question. Clearly we experience change. Clearly B-theory of time denies that this experience represents reality.

Once again, this is simply question begging. By saying, "Clearly we experience change," you are simply making a bald assertion that this experience cannot be illusory. The B-Theory is not "completely incapable of accounting for our experience of change." The B-Theory accounts for our experience of change by predicting that this experience is an illusion caused by successive brain states. If you want to demonstrate that such a view is untenable, you are welcome to do so; but that requires more than simply proclaiming that our experience of temporal progression is real.

I think that the B-time theory actually defines time as a non-existent thing in itself.

It does not. The B-Theory defines time as a dimension of measure, which is clearly not a "non-existent thing."

To say that you were born say 30 years ago doesn't really have any meaning because 30 years ago has always existed according to B-theory.

It certainly does have meaning, on the B-Theory-- in exactly the same way as, "New York is 100 miles away from Philadelphia" has meaning. It is a description of displacement along a dimension of measure.

So if there is no process involved, if all of time, and all events in time, exist, if each temporal moment is just as real as any other, If you have always existed in time, "if all of your brain states have always existed," then why weren't you conscious of yourself 14 billion years ago at the beginning of time?

Because brain states are only conscious of the temporal position which they occupy. None of my brain states exist at a temporal location 14-billion years ago. Therefore, I have no reason to expect that my brain state would be conscious of anything at that temporal location; just as I have no reason to expect that I would be conscious of anything on the surface of Mars, since my brain state has no way to perceive that location.

[JonathanL]

I understand that. However, to simply assert that my analogy to color fails is question begging. I made the analogy precisely to illustrate that I believe the perception of temporal progression is a misapprehension of external reality made by a brain state in a specific moment of time.

We will simply have to agree to disagree on this particular point for now, and proceed with the rest of the discussion it seems.

Again, this is precisely what we would expect of a brain state which cannot perceive stimuli from other temporal locations, so I'm not sure why you are confused, here. It is only aware of its own particular temporal location, hence the perception that our consciousness only occupies a single moment in time.

Right, so you've managed to explain why a brain state is only aware of the specific moment of time which it occupies. But I'd appreciate an answer to my second question as well, the one that you snipped out.

Alright, so how do you differentiate between an experience which is happening in that very moment of time where you have the perception, and an illusion of temporal progression caused by memory? What would you expect to find in the former which you would not expect to find in the latter?

For one, the memory of having traversed time is a more or less vague recollection in your mind, while the experience of currently traversing time in the present is something more vivid and immediate. It's basically the same as the difference between seeing, for example, an elephant in real life and only imagining the elephant in your mind with the seeing the elephant in real life corresponding to the experience happening in the moment, and imagining the elephant corresponding to the memory.

It's just an acknowledgement that, unlike spatial dimensions, there does seem to be a way to differentiate one direction of the temporal dimension from the other.

Right. Will it ever become relevant to your explanation as to why we experience the illusion of temporal becoming?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Right, so you've managed to explain why a brain state is only aware of the specific moment of time which it occupies. But I'd appreciate an answer to my second question as well, the one that you snipped out.

Are you talking about this one?

I'm also asking you to explain why it seems that we are aware of that specific moment as if it was "the present", as opposed to any of the other moments spread along the timeline of our lives, when in reality, all brain states along that line are equally real.

If so, I omitted it because it seems to be a restatement of the same question. We are aware of that specific moment as if it was "the present," as opposed to any of the other moments spread along the timeline of our lives, because our brain state at that moment is restricted to perception at that moment. We would not expect a brain state to perceive a moment in which it does not exist as being "the present." Each brain state previous to that one similarly perceived itself to be in "the present," as will each subsequent brain state. So, again, I'm really not sure why you are confused, here. You seem to be saying, "I grant that each brain state perceives itself to be in the present at the particular moment it occupies, but I do not see why we perceive ourselves to be in the present at the particular moment we occupy." However, since you've also granted (for the sake of argument) that consciousness is a product of the brain state, there does not seem to be any justification in attempting to separate the perception of our brain states from our perception. The two are synonymous.

For one, the memory of having traversed time is a more or less vague recollection in your mind, while the experience of currently traversing time in the present is something more vivid and immediate. It's basically the same as the difference between seeing, for example, an elephant in real life and only imagining the elephant in your mind with the seeing the elephant in real life corresponding to the experience happening in the moment, and imagining the elephant corresponding to the memory.

Again, how would you differentiate between the two? On both the A-Theory and the B-Theory, a brain state which is perceiving an elephant at a particular moment is actually having the experience of perceiving the elephant. So, let's say that a person remembers having seen an elephant five minutes ago. Based on that data alone, how would you differentiate between his having actually seen the elephant five minutes ago, and the illusion that he saw the elephant five minutes ago due to that memory?

Right. Will it ever become relevant to your explanation as to why we experience the illusion of temporal becoming?

No moreso than I've already stated.