Miracles

[JonathanL]

I understood your meaning. I apologize that my response wasn't clear in this regard.

It's ok. Atleast we got it cleared and out of the way.

I don't see how the fact that a brain state is bound to its temporal position precludes the notion of temporal becoming from being an effect of the brain's configuration. In fact, I find that to be the primary reason for the illusion.

The problem as I see it is that we perceive ourselves to be moving from one state of mind (or brain state) to the next. Kind of like this (each "-" is a brain state during single moment in time, while "X" is the moment where our consciousness perceives itself to be at the moment):

X - - - - - -
- X - - - - -
- - X - - - -
- - - X - - -
- - - - X - - (and so on...)


I.e in other words, the above is what we perceive to be happening, whether or not it actually corresponds with reality. I.e, it's this perceived movement of our consciousness from one brain state to the next that the proponents of the B-theory claims is an illusion of our mind/brain state. Appealing to the fact that a particular brain state is bound to a single moment in time does nothing to explain this perceived movement.

I agree that we cannot pinpoint any privileged moment in time as being the "actual" present, on the B-Theory, and that such a notion is absurd. All perception of the present is necessarily subjective. Each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present. That brain state contains data which describes moments previous to its temporal location along the arrow of time defined by entropy, but not subsequent moments along that direction-- a phenomenon we have labeled "memory." At any particular moment, the brain state bears the illusion of having arrived at that moment because that state has a contiguous chain of memory describing previous moments in time. Since each brain state is locked into its own temporal position, it can only actively perceive outside stimuli at that particular temporal location, which gives the illusion of a "now." All such brain states believe themselves to be in the "now," and each is distinctly unable to perceive the outside stimuli from other temporal locations, which explains why we do not seem to perceive all moments of time at each particular moment of time. Indeed, it seems entirely unreasonable to suppose that a brain state which is bound to a particular temporal location would perceive outside stimuli from other temporal locations.

You're correct about the fact it seems unreasonable that we should be aware of all moments of time at once under the B-theory of time. I think was operating under the assumption of a single unified consciousness "owning" all these brain states (i.e I was presupposing dualism) without realizing it. I'll concede this point.

Instead, I'll raise another objection. I'll grant you that each particular brain state perceives itself to have arrived at the moment of time it currently is in because it has memories of previous moments in time. I will also grant you that it can only actively perceive outside stimuli at that particular location. What I will not grant you however, is that this is sufficient to explain why we have the illusion of being in a present that is continuously moving forward in time from one moment to the next. Your explanation fails to explain why our first moments of awareness is at the beginning of our lives, rather than at an arbitrary moment along the subset of moments of time which our lives occupy, it fails to explain why we perceive ourselves to be in the specific moment of time that we are currently perceiving ourselves to be in (i.e it fails to explain why you perceive yourself to be in the moment of time where you are currently reading this post of mine) instead of any other arbitrary moment of time in our lives, and it fails to explain why you perceive yourself to be in one moment in a specific state of mind/awareness and in the next moment in another state of mind/awareness.

Your explanation would account for nothing more than us having the memory of having traversed time and having traversed it in a particular direction (from the past to the present, or from a moment of time where entropy was lower to a moment of time where entropy was higher). But it fails to account for why we perceive ourselves to be at one particular moment of time, and it fails to account for why we perceive ourselves to be at that very specific moment of time rather than some other arbitrary moment of time and it fails to account for why that specific moment seems to be replaced with another moment, as if there really was a real and objective "present".

Defining the arrow of time as being in the direction of increasing entropy appears to be a completely subjective decision on your part. What reason for defining the arrow of time as being in the direction of increasing entropy do you have other than you having the illusion that you're moving forward in time towards increasing entropy? Or to put it another way, can you give an objective reason for defining the arrow of time as being towards increasing entropy, other than the subjective illusion of temporal becoming? Otherwise it would seem that you're taking an aspect of what you claim is an illusion, namely temporal becoming, and without justification applying it to an objective aspect of reality, namely time itself as it exists outside of our perceptions.

Again, the illusion of temporal becoming does not require any sort of supernatural explanation on the B-Theory. Nothing needs to traverse spacetime in an A-Theory sort of way in order to account for this perception.

The issue of course is that I do not grant that temporal becoming can be relegated to the realm of illusion in the first place. The very fact that we have the perception of temporal becoming indicates IMO disproves B-theory in it's pure form and indicates that the correct theory of time is either some sort of hybrid between B-theory and A-theory, or simply A-theory. My claim is that if any sort of pure B-theory were true, we wouldn't even have the perception of temporal becoming.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The problem as I see it is that we perceive ourselves to be moving from one state of mind (or brain state) to the next. Kind of like this (each "-" is a brain state during single moment in time, while "X" is the moment where our consciousness perceives itself to be at the moment):

X - - - - - -
- X - - - - -
- - X - - - -
- - - X - - -
- - - - X - - (and so on...)

I would heartily disagree with this diagram. In its place, I would offer this one:

XXXXXXXX

...where each X is "the moment where our consciousness perceives itself to be at the moment." Your diagram implies that there is something inherently different between brain states and consciousness, which is a position that I reject.

Your explanation fails to explain why our first moments of awareness is at the beginning of our lives, rather than at an arbitrary moment along the subset of moments of time which our lives occupy

I don't think that it fails in this regard, at all. "First" and "beginning" are temporal indicators of relation, which are given meaning on the B-Theory by the arrow of time defined by entropy. The first brain state which perceives outside stimuli, by this standard, would be the first moments of awareness, and that obviously coincides with the beginning of our lives, by this standard.

it fails to explain why we perceive ourselves to be in the specific moment of time that we are currently perceiving ourselves to be in (i.e it fails to explain why you perceive yourself to be in the moment of time where you are currently reading this post of mine) instead of any other arbitrary moment of time in our lives, and it fails to explain why you perceive yourself to be in one moment in a specific state of mind/awareness and in the next moment in another state of mind/awareness.

Again, I don't believe it fails in this, at all. A brain state can only perceive the stimuli at the temporal location which it occupies, as you have granted. This premise explains precisely why we perceive ourselves to be in the specific moment of time that we are currently perceiving ourselves to be in. Our brain state at that moment perceives stimuli at that moment, and it does not perceive stimuli from any other arbitrary moment of time in our lives.

Similarly, you have granted that the brain state perceives itself to have arrived at the moment of time which it occupies due to memory, which explains why brain states are different from moment to moment, since each brain state in each moment has a different set of memories.

You still seem to be stuck on an A-Theory point-of-view, as if consciousness ceases to be in moment X when it exists in X+1, and as if it does not yet exist in X+2. On the B-Theory, each brain state at each of these moments perceives itself to be in the present. It's not like one of them is actually in the present while the others are not.

Defining the arrow of time as being in the direction of increasing entropy appears to be a completely subjective decision on your part.

It's actually not an arbitrary definition, at all. The majority of formulae and theories in modern physics are directionally independent in their treatment of time. The systems could evolve in either temporal direction, and there would be no objective way of determining which direction of time is "forward" and which is "backward." The exception to this rule is entropy. Entropy in a closed system does not decrease-- it only either remains steady or else it increases-- over the direction of time which we have come to consider "forward."

I'm not defining the arrow of time based on entropy because the B-Theory requires me to do so. I'm defining the arrow of time based on entropy because that is how it is defined in cosmology.

So it seems as though you are saying that the temporal past, and all of the people therein, exist, like frozen statues, and that the temporal future exists in the same way, but that time somehow illuminates and gives the illusion of animation to the present. But doesn't that mean that those who are in our past and those who are in our future are also experiencing their own present at the same time that we are experiencing our present?

Precisely! I think you're starting to get it!

I said that not having the answer does not invalidate it, you could be right, I don't know, just like abiogenesis could be right, I don't know, but if someone comes up with an explanation for abiogenesis as you have done for the B-theory of time, then I will base my belief on the coherency of the explanation.

So, you do think that Young Earth Creationists are justified in rejecting biological evolution because science has not answered the question of abiogenesis?

[JimL]

I would heartily disagree with this diagram. In its place, I would offer this one:

XXXXXXXX

...where each X is "the moment where our consciousness perceives itself to be at the moment." Your diagram implies that there is something inherently different between brain states and consciousness, which is a position that I reject.

If there is no difference between brain states and consciousness, which btw I agree with, and neither brain states, nor time itself are in motion, i.e. neither time is passing nor is consciousness passing through time, then why are brain states only conscious of what we call the present? I really don't think that it makes sense BP.

I don't think that it fails in this regard, at all. "First" and "beginning" are temporal indicators of relation, which are given meaning on the B-Theory by the arrow of time defined by entropy. The first brain state which perceives outside stimuli, by this standard, would be the first moments of awareness, and that obviously coincides with the beginning of our lives, by this standard.

If nothing is physically moving, nothing physically changing, neither time nor conscious brain states, then why aren't we just as conscious of what we call the past and the future as we are of the present?

Again, I don't believe it fails in this, at all. A brain state can only perceive the stimuli at the temporal location which it occupies, as you have granted. This premise explains precisely why we perceive ourselves to be in the specific moment of time that we are currently perceiving ourselves to be in. Our brain state at that moment perceives stimuli at that moment, and it does not perceive stimuli from any other arbitrary moment of time in our lives.

Yes, but every brain state occupies its own temporal present location, so why do those unchanging brain states become unconscious of the unchanging external stimuli in their temporal location?

Similarly, you have granted that the brain state perceives itself to have arrived at the moment of time which it occupies due to memory, which explains why brain states are different from moment to moment, since each brain state in each moment has a different set of memories.

But having more memories doesn't erase the previous conscious brain state with less memories. Why isn't each and every brain state conscious if they all exist along the time line?

You still seem to be stuck on an A-Theory point-of-view, as if consciousness ceases to be in moment X when it exists in X+1, and as if it does not yet exist in X+2. On the B-Theory, each brain state at each of these moments perceives itself to be in the present. It's not like one of them is actually in the present while the others are not.

The problem is that, according to B-theory, although all brain states are in the present, none of them cease to exist, only one of those brain states is a conscious state. How does that happen?

I'm not defining the arrow of time based on entropy because the B-Theory requires me to do so. I'm defining the arrow of time based on entropy because that is how it is defined in cosmology.

So again, if all of time exists, and all brain states exist along that time line, and nothing is moving or changing, why are we only conscious of increments of time.

Precisely! I think you're starting to get it!

I'm getting your argument but it still isn't making sense to me. Are you experiencing your past as well as your future right now in the same way that you are experiencing your present?

So, you do think that Young Earth Creationists are justified in rejecting biological evolution because science has not answered the question of abiogenesis?

What is there to reject? We don't have a detailed explanation for abiogenesis as of yet, such as you are puting forth for time.

[JonathanL]

I would heartily disagree with this diagram. In its place, I would offer this one:

XXXXXXXX

...where each X is "the moment where our consciousness perceives itself to be at the moment." Your diagram implies that there is something inherently different between brain states and consciousness, which is a position that I reject.

Read what I wrote more carefully. I said that the above diagram is how we perceive ourselves to be moving forward in time, not how things really are assuming N+B is true. The fact that perception implies that there is a difference between brain states and consciousness doesn't really change the fact that it is undeniably what we perceive to be happening, whether or not this perception of ours actually corresponds to reality or not.

But of course, the fact that our perception of temporal becoming implies that there is a difference between brain states and consciousness under the B-theory is only advantageous to my argument because it's yet another argument against N+B.

I don't think that it fails in this regard, at all. "First" and "beginning" are temporal indicators of relation, which are given meaning on the B-Theory by the arrow of time defined by entropy. The first brain state which perceives outside stimuli, by this standard, would be the first moments of awareness, and that obviously coincides with the beginning of our lives, by this standard.

This is dependent on the view that the arrow of time is defined by increasing entropy, which I do not think is an objective definition given pure B-theory.

Again, I don't believe it fails in this, at all. A brain state can only perceive the stimuli at the temporal location which it occupies, as you have granted. This premise explains precisely why we perceive ourselves to be in the specific moment of time that we are currently perceiving ourselves to be in. Our brain state at that moment perceives stimuli at that moment, and it does not perceive stimuli from any other arbitrary moment of time in our lives.

That does not answer the dilemma. Assuming for a moment that our brain state is the same as our consciousness (which I don't believe for a second) and that the B-theory of time is true, our lives would be spread out over a length of time. And each moment of time in our lives would be characterized by a particular brain state. And these moments of time would all be static and unchanging. And all of the brain states are equally real, so that it would be impossible for anyone looking at all of our brain states simultaneously (I'm assuming for the sake of the argument that this is a possibility) to pick out a particular brain state amongst all the others and say "this person perceives themselves to be at this particular moment of time". Instead he would have to say, just as you do that "each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present". But our perception that we are in a specific moment of time occupied by one of our brain states, implies on B-theory that our awareness/consciousness is not equal to our brain states. N+B simply cannot account for this perception.

The statement "Each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present", does not solve the dilemma, it's a description of the dilemma. If each brain state perceive itself as being in the present, why is it that you're aware of the specific moment of time that you're now aware of, and not any other arbitrary moment of time occupied by any of your brain states?

Similarly, you have granted that the brain state perceives itself to have arrived at the moment of time which it occupies due to memory, which explains why brain states are different from moment to moment, since each brain state in each moment has a different set of memories.

Yes, but that was not the bone of contention. The issue is not how each brain state can be different under B-theory, but why it is that we perceive ourselves to be moving from one moment to the next, when each brain state is locked to it's particular moment of static time.

You still seem to be stuck on an A-Theory point-of-view, as if consciousness ceases to be in moment X when it exists in X+1, and as if it does not yet exist in X+2. On the B-Theory, each brain state at each of these moments perceives itself to be in the present. It's not like one of them is actually in the present while the others are not.

I'm not stuck on an A-theory point-of-view. I'm just trying to get a satisfactory explanation to why it seems "as if consciousness ceases to be in moment X when it exists in X+1, and as if it does not yet exist in X+2". So far your explanation hasn't succeeded in explaining that perception, IMO atleast.

It's actually not an arbitrary definition, at all. The majority of formulae and theories in modern physics are directionally independent in their treatment of time. The systems could evolve in either temporal direction, and there would be no objective way of determining which direction of time is "forward" and which is "backward." The exception to this rule is entropy. Entropy in a closed system does not decrease-- it only either remains steady or else it increases-- over the direction of time which we have come to consider "forward."

I'm not defining the arrow of time based on entropy because the B-Theory requires me to do so. I'm defining the arrow of time based on entropy because that is how it is defined in cosmology.

First of all, why define the direction of time as towards increasing entropy, rather than decreasing entropy? What is it that makes increasing entropy any more special than decreasing entropy? On B-theory it does not seem to me like defining the arrow of time to be towards increasing entropy to be any more objectively real than defining it to be towards decreasing entropy.
Second, on B-theory, it does not seem to me like it's proper to say that entropy in a closed system does not decrease, but only remains steady or increases. The only reason we think this is the case is because we have the perception that entropy increases the further we move along in time, but since that perception is allegedly illusory, you cannot use that perception to define the arrow of time to be in the direction of increasing entropy.

And I did not claim that you defined the arrow of time based on entropy because the B-theory requires it. I claimed that defining the arrow of time as being towards increasing entropy is completely subjective given the B-theory of time. Where you got that definition from doesn't really change that.

[Pytharchimedes]

Read what I wrote more carefully. I said that the above diagram is how we perceive ourselves to be moving forward in time, not how things really are assuming N+B is true. The fact that perception implies that there is a difference between brain states and consciousness doesn't really change the fact that it is undeniably what we perceive to be happening, whether or not this perception of ours actually corresponds to reality or not.

But of course, the fact that our perception of temporal becoming implies that there is a difference between brain states and consciousness under the B-theory is only advantageous to my argument because it's yet another argument against N+B.



This is dependent on the view that the arrow of time is defined by increasing entropy, which I do not think is an objective definition given pure B-theory.



That does not answer the dilemma. Assuming for a moment that our brain state is the same as our consciousness (which I don't believe for a second) and that the B-theory of time is true, our lives would be spread out over a length of time. And each moment of time in our lives would be characterized by a particular brain state. And these moments of time would all be static and unchanging. And all of the brain states are equally real, so that it would be impossible for anyone looking at all of our brain states simultaneously (I'm assuming for the sake of the argument that this is a possibility) to pick out a particular brain state amongst all the others and say "this person perceives themselves to be at this particular moment of time". Instead he would have to say, just as you do that "each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present". But our perception that we are in a specific moment of time occupied by one of our brain states, implies on B-theory that our awareness/consciousness is not equal to our brain states. N+B simply cannot account for this perception.

The statement "Each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present", does not solve the dilemma, it's a description of the dilemma. If each brain state perceive itself as being in the present, why is it that you're aware of the specific moment of time that you're now aware of, and not any other arbitrary moment of time occupied by any of your brain states?



Yes, but that was not the bone of contention. The issue is not how each brain state can be different under B-theory, but why it is that we perceive ourselves to be moving from one moment to the next, when each brain state is locked to it's particular moment of static time.



I'm not stuck on an A-theory point-of-view. I'm just trying to get a satisfactory explanation to why it seems "as if consciousness ceases to be in moment X when it exists in X+1, and as if it does not yet exist in X+2". So far your explanation hasn't succeeded in explaining that perception, IMO atleast.



First of all, why define the direction of time as towards increasing entropy, rather than decreasing entropy? What is it that makes increasing entropy any more special than decreasing entropy? On B-theory it does not seem to me like defining the arrow of time to be towards increasing entropy to be any more objectively real than defining it to be towards decreasing entropy.
Second, on B-theory, it does not seem to me like it's proper to say that entropy in a closed system does not decrease, but only remains steady or increases. The only reason we think this is the case is because we have the perception that entropy increases the further we move along in time, but since that perception is allegedly illusory, you cannot use that perception to define the arrow of time to be in the direction of increasing entropy.

And I did not claim that you defined the arrow of time based on entropy because the B-theory requires it. I claimed that defining the arrow of time as being towards increasing entropy is completely subjective given the B-theory of time. Where you got that definition from doesn't really change that.

Beyond all of your complicated thoughts is a simple answer to the supposed dilemma that you both speak of, but no amount of grandstanding your own opinion will make the other person see any clearer in my opinion. Better for you to both ignore each others convoluted explanations and find the truth within your own framework of understanding. That is to say that this debate is an exercise in futility as better understanding could be found through the act of inner contemplation without regard for another persons perception.

[JonathanL]

Beyond all of your complicated thoughts is a simple answer to the supposed dilemma that you both speak of, but no amount of grandstanding your own opinion will make the other person see any clearer in my opinion. Better for you to both ignore each others convoluted explanations and find the truth within your own framework of understanding. That is to say that this debate is an exercise in futility as better understanding could be found through the act of inner contemplation without regard for another persons perception.

Inner contemplation will not bring me one inch closer to a better understanding of time, which is a facet of outside reality, or temporal becoming which I believe to be a facet of outside reality. I would rather sharpen my understanding of temporal becoming and time by pitting it against the viewpoint of someone who has a different opinion than my own, rather than engaging in inner contemplation, by which I can do nothing else but affirm that which I believe to already be true.

But if you believe that there is a "simple answer to the supposed dilemma that [we] both speak of", you're certainly free to provide that answer for us.

[Pytharchimedes]

Inner contemplation will not bring me one inch closer to a better understanding of time, which is a facet of outside reality, or temporal becoming which I believe to be a facet of outside reality. I would rather sharpen my understanding of temporal becoming and time by pitting it against the viewpoint of someone who has a different opinion than my own, rather than engaging in inner contemplation, by which I can do nothing else but affirm that which I believe to already be true.

But if you believe that there is a "simple answer to the supposed dilemma that [we] both speak of", you're certainly free to provide that answer for us.

Then I shall do my best; You are guilty of the old proverb "unable to see the forest through the trees"...you are looking for something that is right in front of you.

That is my synopsis.

[JonathanL]

Then I shall do my best; You are guilty of the old proverb "unable to see the forest through the trees"...you are looking for something that is right in front of you.

That is my synopsis.

In other words, you have no answer.

[Pytharchimedes]

In other words, you have no answer.

Did I not just say that the answer can not be told to you by me, but only understood by you your own self?

How then did I err?

[JonathanL]

Did I not just say that the answer can not be told to you by me, but only understood by you your own self?

How then did I err?

You did not say "that the answer can not be told to you by me, but only understood by you your own self", you said "better understanding could be found through the act of inner contemplation without regard for another persons perception.", which is not the same thing. Presumably, if you know that a better understanding of time and temporal becoming can be achieved through the act of inner contemplation then you must have engaged in this inner contemplation of time and temporal becoming yourself, or else there is no way for you to know that it would provide this simpe answer you're talking about. And if you understood this answer then it follows that you can communicate it to us, or atleast try to. Anything which you cannot even begin to attempt to explain to someone else is not something you've understood.

[Pytharchimedes]

You did not say "that the answer can not be told to you by me, but only understood by you your own self", you said "better understanding could be found through the act of inner contemplation without regard for another persons perception.", which is not the same thing. Presumably, if you know that a better understanding of time and temporal becoming can be achieved through the act of inner contemplation then you must have engaged in this inner contemplation of time and temporal becoming yourself, or else there is no way for you to know that it would provide this simpe answer you're talking about. And if you understood this answer then it follows that you can communicate it to us, or atleast try to. Anything which you cannot even begin to attempt to explain to someone else is not something you've understood.

By disregarding what I say you would consequently find the answer that you seek without me telling you anything. Why drink water from some others cistern? When you have flowing water from your own well?

[JonathanL]

By disregarding what I say. . .

That's the best advice you've given so far in this thread. I will consequently disregard everything you've said in this thread so far and continue my debate with Boxing Pythagoras.

[Pytharchimedes]

That's the best advice you've given so far in this thread. I will consequently disregard everything you've said in this thread so far and continue my debate with Boxing Pythagoras.

This is what you would have done anyway, regardless of what I said.

[JonathanL]

This is what you would have done anyway, regardless of what I said.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

If nothing is physically moving, nothing physically changing, neither time nor conscious brain states, then why aren't we just as conscious of what we call the past and the future as we are of the present?

Our brain states in those moments are conscious of those moments. I've explained why each particular brain state is not conscious of other particular temporal locations.

Yes, but every brain state occupies its own temporal present location, so why do those unchanging brain states become unconscious of the unchanging external stimuli in their temporal location?

They don't.

But having more memories doesn't erase the previous conscious brain state with less memories. Why isn't each and every brain state conscious if they all exist along the time line?

They are.

The problem is that, according to B-theory, although all brain states are in the present, none of them cease to exist, only one of those brain states is a conscious state.

No, all of those brain states are conscious states.

I'm getting your argument but it still isn't making sense to me. Are you experiencing your past as well as your future right now in the same way that you are experiencing your present?

You're really not getting my argument, at all, because you are still thinking in an A-Theory sort of way-- as if consciousness does not exist in moments not perceived by a particular brain state.

What is there to reject? We don't have a detailed explanation for abiogenesis as of yet, such as you are puting forth for time.

You misread. Do you think that YEC's are justified in dismissing the Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection because we do not have an explanation for abiogenesis?

But of course, the fact that our perception of temporal becoming implies that there is a difference between brain states and consciousness under the B-theory is only advantageous to my argument because it's yet another argument against N+B.

Again, I disagree with this just as much as I disagree that our ability to perceive color constitutes an argument against the notion that the perception of color is illusory.

That does not answer the dilemma. Assuming for a moment that our brain state is the same as our consciousness (which I don't believe for a second) and that the B-theory of time is true, our lives would be spread out over a length of time. And each moment of time in our lives would be characterized by a particular brain state. And these moments of time would all be static and unchanging. And all of the brain states are equally real, so that it would be impossible for anyone looking at all of our brain states simultaneously (I'm assuming for the sake of the argument that this is a possibility) to pick out a particular brain state amongst all the others and say "this person perceives themselves to be at this particular moment of time". Instead he would have to say, just as you do that "each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present". But our perception that we are in a specific moment of time occupied by one of our brain states, implies on B-theory that our awareness/consciousness is not equal to our brain states. N+B simply cannot account for this perception.

The statement "Each particular brain state at each particular moment in time perceives itself to be in the present", does not solve the dilemma, it's a description of the dilemma. If each brain state perceive itself as being in the present, why is it that you're aware of the specific moment of time that you're now aware of, and not any other arbitrary moment of time occupied by any of your brain states?

Once again, I don't see what you're objecting to, here.

You've granted, for the sake of argument, the B-Theory. You've granted that consciousness is a property of the brain state. You've granted that a brain state would only be able to perceive stimuli from its particular temporal location. You've granted that it would be unreasonable to expect a brain state to be aware of stimuli from other temporal locations. So why are you still confused as to how a brain state is not aware of specific moments of time besides the one which it occupies?

Yes, but that was not the bone of contention. The issue is not how each brain state can be different under B-theory, but why it is that we perceive ourselves to be moving from one moment to the next, when each brain state is locked to it's particular moment of static time.

Again, you've granted that memories give each particular brain state the illusion of having arrived at that brain state from the previous-- the perception that we have moved from one moment to the next-- so I don't understand your objection here.

This is dependent on the view that the arrow of time is defined by increasing entropy, which I do not think is an objective definition given pure B-theory.

First of all, why define the direction of time as towards increasing entropy, rather than decreasing entropy? What is it that makes increasing entropy any more special than decreasing entropy? On B-theory it does not seem to me like defining the arrow of time to be towards increasing entropy to be any more objectively real than defining it to be towards decreasing entropy.

It really doesn't matter whether you define increasing entropy as "forward" or "backward." The point is that entropy gives us a referential by which we can define a direction in time. Again, I'll make an analogy to the surface of the Earth: the magnetic field of our planet allows us to define a particular direction based on magnetic poles. The words "North" and "South" are entirely arbitrary descriptors which we use to label objectively different directions. So long as we are consistent in their usage, we could quite easily swap the words-- or substitute entirely new ones-- while still accurately describing the objective reality behind them.

Similarly, it doesn't matter whether one defines increasing entropy as "forward" or "backward," so long as one is consistent in their application of the words. The underlying objective difference in the direction is still there.