Miracles

[seer]

That's only a small fraction of the description which you had quoted, earlier:

The initial singularity was the gravitational singularity of infinite density thought to have contained all of the mass and spacetime of the Universe[1] before quantum fluctuations caused it to rapidly expand in the Big Bang and subsequent inflation, creating the present-day Universe

Regardless, events are things, so I'm not sure how this is relevant.

Again, this is entirely nonsensical. If there was even an infinitesimally small period of time, there was time. If there was no time, what are you describing as being a "short period?" How was it at all periodic?

Again, I don't agree that there were no events, there.

As long as initial singularity was a singularity there could be no events. Events did not begin until the expansion. Unless you you can show that events were happening in the singularity. BTW - do you think that everything that exists must be subject to time.

Not at all. I don't subscribe to the notion that everything in nature necessarily follows a cause-effect model.

Really? Why?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

As long as initial singularity was a singularity there could be no events.

Again, you really don't understand what a singularity is. The initial singularity predicted by classical models of the Big Bang Theory really is a description of a particular set of points in spacetime. Once again, it does not make any sense to claim that spacetime doesn't exist for a subset of spacetime.

Really? Why?

Because I have no reason to believe that everything in nature necessarily follows a cause-effect model, and because a cause-effect model is nonsensical for certain aspects of nature-- such as time.

[Adrift]

Even if I were to grant this point for the sake of argument, it is a composition fallacy. The properties of subsets are not necessarily applicable to the properties of parent sets. Hydrogen atoms contain one proton, one neutron, and one electron. That does not imply that Hydrogen gas therefore contains only one proton, one neutron, and one electron. Similarly, even if there is a causal relationship between subsets of spacetime, that does not imply that spacetime itself must also bear some causal relationship to something else.

The philosopher Edward Feser has an interesting reply to this charge of composition fallacy in one of his blog posts. He goes into it in more detail, but here are the two main issues he finds with it:

[seer]

Again, you really don't understand what a singularity is. The initial singularity predicted by classical models of the Big Bang Theory really is a description of a particular set of points in spacetime. Once again, it does not make any sense to claim that spacetime doesn't exist for a subset of spacetime

Because I have no reason to believe that everything in nature necessarily follows a cause-effect model, and because a cause-effect model is nonsensical for certain aspects of nature-- such as time.

No, according to the definition I linked the singularity is a physical entity. And that dense entity began to expand. And until it did there was no time, nor could there be. And cause and effect as it relates to time - time is event dependent. Without events there is no time. So do you have any other examples in nature where cause and effect does not apply?

[Yttrium]

So do you have any other examples in nature where cause and effect does not apply?

I think quantum fluctuations might meet that standard. Particles can simply pop into existence for very brief periods of time.

[Adrift]

Because I have no reason to believe that everything in nature necessarily follows a cause-effect model, and because a cause-effect model is nonsensical for certain aspects of nature-- such as time.

So you believe that time began to exist with the Big Bang, but that the Big Bang is not the cause of time existing?

[seer]

I think quantum fluctuations might meet that standard. Particles can simply pop into existence for very brief periods of time.

So something comes from nothing?

[Yttrium]

So something comes from nothing?

Apparently, as far as we can tell so far, but only for a tiny amount of time. I've even seen speculation that the creation of the universe could have been a much larger, long lasting quantum fluctuation. I've also seen speculation that there may be something like an "energy level of the universe", and any quantum fluctuation borrows from that energy level temporarily.

Personally, I doubt that something comes from nothing. It could be one form of something changing into another, even though we currently might not be able to identify that something. I'm rather fond of cause and effect, and until demonstrated otherwise, I assume that there are causes that we may just not yet see or understand.

[JimL]

No, according to the B-Theory, time itself is not in motion. Motion is a function of spatial position over time. It certainly exists on the B-Theory.

But your argument is that nothing is in motion, not time, not things, not physical bodies, not physical brains, nothing, so if none of these things is what is experiencing motion, what is it then that you are asserting experiences time and motion.

I really don't understand what you are asking, here. I figured it was obvious that the "source which does the experiencing or measuring" is whoever is having the experience or performing the measurement, regardless of whether one is measuring distance or elapsed time or anything else.

Yes, but the source which does the experiencing of time and motion can not itself be physical if all physical things are themselves static. It seems to me that the B-time hypotheses implies the existence of something distinct and separable from the physical body that moves through the totality of existing reality. No?

[JimL]

Apparently, as far as we can tell so far, but only for a tiny amount of time. I've even seen speculation that the creation of the universe could have been a much larger, long lasting quantum fluctuation. I've also seen speculation that there may be something like an "energy level of the universe", and any quantum fluctuation borrows from that energy level temporarily.

Personally, I doubt that something comes from nothing. It could be one form of something changing into another, even though we currently might not be able to identify that something. I'm rather fond of cause and effect, and until demonstrated otherwise, I assume that there are causes that we may just not yet see or understand.

Matter particles, the way I understand it, do not come from nothing. Matter converts from energy, they are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. E=MC2.

[Yttrium]

Matter particles, the way I understand it, do not come from nothing. Matter converts from energy, they are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. E=MC2.

Yes, well, I think so too, but tell that to those pesky quantum fluctuations.

[Adrift]

Yes, well, I think so too, but tell that to those pesky quantum fluctuations.

Quantum fluctuations don't come from nothing. They originate in a vacuum. As the philosopher and theoretical physicist David Albert puts it in his review of Lawrence Krauss' A Universe From Nothing,

[Paprika]

Even if one were to grant that the efficient causation is simultaneous, the material cause must still have been temporally prior to the effect.

How do you arrive at this conclusion?

[Paprika]

The philosopher Edward Feser has an interesting reply to this charge of composition fallacy in one of his blog posts. He goes into it in more detail, but here are the two main issues he finds with it:

Source: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2010/12/hume-cosmological-arguments-and-fallacy.html

It seems a natural extension of the reasoning, and the burden of proof is surely on the critic of such an argument to show that the universe as a whole is somehow non-contingent, given that the parts, and collections of parts smaller than the universe as a whole, are contingent.

© Copyright Original Source

No, the burden of proof is on the side who proposes the argument. The critic merely needs to point out that the composition is not (sufficiently) addressed, and so the argument is incomplete.

Source: Feser

Another problem is that it isn’t obvious that the sort of cosmological argument that takes as a premise the contingency of the universe needs to rely on such part-to-whole reasoning in the first place. When we judge that a book, an apple, or a typewriter is contingent, do we do so only after first judging that each page of the book, each seed in the apple, each key of the typewriter, and indeed each particle making up any of these things is contingent? Surely not; we can just consider the book, apple, or typewriter itself, directly and without reference to the contingency of its parts. So why should things be any different for the universe as a whole?

© Copyright Original Source

The obvious response is that we can apprehend the objects mentioned as a whole, and we can't do the same for the universe. Moreover, it is Craig's version that makes the argument from part-to-whole, hence it is perfectly valid to criticise it on the very grounds the argument presupposes.

If Feser wants to propose an alternative formulation from observation of the whole, then he can and we can debate it.

[JimL]

How do you arrive at this conclusion?

I think he probably meant that the cause must be "logically" prior to the effect, which of course is just as illogical. If the two are simultaneous then the simultaneity would render the terms cause and effect moot.