Immortality

[Carrikature]

Suppose a perfect copy of Carri is made moments ago, but I was not a witness to that event. Later, I see two persons that appear identical. I ask, "Which of you is the original?" I cannot see why one of them would admit that he is the copy if he was disposed to tell the truth as he sees matters. The original would answer truthfully if he said he was the original. The other person would not be telling the truth, if he said he was the original, but he would not be lying. He would feel strongly that he is the original.

He wouldn't just feel strongly that he is the original; to the best of his knowledge he is the original. It's effectively Last Thursdayism in a sci-fi setting.

[Sparko]

Strictly speaking, I would say that I had two existences after being cloned. I would continue to have an existence, and I would have a new, second existence. This is kind of weird to think about, but I'm sticking to my guns that I've not yet seen anything that makes the original me specifically unique.

So are identical twins the same person? After all they start from the same cell, have the same experience and memories in the womb. They are basically a person who has been cloned.

[Paprika]

It's easy to claim logical fallacies without having to actually put in any effort, and I'd go so far as to suggest that 'begging the question' doesn't mean what you think it means. I've done no such thing. I've certainly asked enough times what there is that would prevent these physical copies from being identical. The support for my position that it is a coherent concept has been discussed if not (though not fully revealed within this or any thread), but it's hardly an assumed conclusion.

Your claim that the statement is 'nonsensical' assumes the coherence of an 'identical copy', but that is the very issue at debate.

And you guys should distinguish between '[physically] identical copy' and 'identical [physical] copy', the former denoting that the copy is only of the physical part of the human, and the latter being premised on the view that humans are completely physical and thus in theory completely copyable.

[Teallaura]

He wouldn't just feel strongly that he is the original; to the best of his knowledge he is the original. It's effectively Last Thursdayism in a sci-fi setting.

Kinda defeats the whole thing right there. If they don't know the original from the copy then shooting the copy by mistake is a 50/50 chance - about half the time you're gonna leave the old one in place and sooner or later, it's gonna die before a new copy can be made.




Seriously, the 'copy = original' thing doesn't make sense. I'll get back to you when I've had time to think about it...

[Carrikature]

So are identical twins the same person? After all they start from the same cell, have the same experience and memories in the womb. They are basically a person who has been cloned.

Identical twins aren't actually identical, so no. Though the majority of their DNA is the same, there are still differences.


ETA:

A little more information (emphasis mine):

[block]Monozygotic twins are genetically nearly identical and they are always the same sex unless there has been a mutation during development. The children of monozygotic twins test genetically as half-siblings (or full siblings, if a pair of monozygotic twins reproduces with another pair or with the same person), rather than first cousins. Identical twins do not have the same fingerprints, due to the fact that even in a small space inside the womb, people have contact with different parts of this environment, which gives small variations in the same digital, making them unique.[23] Monozygotic twins always have different phenotypes. Normally due to an environmental factor or the deactivation of different X chromosomes in female monozygotic twins, and in some extremely rare cases, due to aneuploidy, twins may express different sexual phenotypes, normally from an XXY Klinefelter syndrome zygote splitting unevenly.[24][25][26]

Monozygotic twins, although genetically very similar, are not genetically exactly the same. The DNA in white blood cells of 66 pairs of monozygotic twins was analyzed for 506,786 single nucleotide polymorphisms known to occur in human populations. Polymorphisms appeared in 2 of the 33 million comparisons, leading the researchers to extrapolate that the blood cells of monozygotic twins may have on the order of one DNA-sequence difference for every 1.2 x 107 nucleotides, which would imply hundreds of differences across the entire genome.[27] The mutations producing the differences detected in this study would have occurred during embryonic cell-division (after the point of fertilization). If they occur early in fetal development, they will be present in a very large proportion of body cells.[/block]

[Carrikature]

Your claim that the statement is 'nonsensical' assumes the coherence of an 'identical copy', but that is the very issue at debate.

It relies upon that coherence, sure, but the coherence isn't simply assumed. If you wish to debate it, be my guest.

And you guys should distinguish between '[physically] identical copy' and 'identical [physical] copy', the former denoting that the copy is only of the physical part of the human, and the latter being premised on the view that humans are completely physical and thus in theory completely copyable.

I'm not sure that '[physically] identical copy' accomplishes what you hope, but I acknowledge the desire for such a distinction. If the copy is not identical in all aspects, I don't think we can use the 'identical' descriptor at all. I've been trying to use 'physical' to denote a physical form, but I may not have been completely successful.

[Carrikature]

Kinda defeats the whole thing right there. If they don't know the original from the copy then shooting the copy by mistake is a 50/50 chance - about half the time you're gonna leave the old one in place and sooner or later, it's gonna die before a new copy can be made.

Sure. This is yet another reason that I expect the original would be eliminated as part of the process of copying/transferring consciousness. It cleans up a lot of the potential ethical issues.

Seriously, the 'copy = original' thing doesn't make sense. I'll get back to you when I've had time to think about it...

Take your time.

[Sparko]

Identical twins aren't actually identical, so no. Though the majority of their DNA is the same, there are still differences.


ETA:

A little more information (emphasis mine):

[block]Monozygotic twins are genetically nearly identical and they are always the same sex unless there has been a mutation during development. The children of monozygotic twins test genetically as half-siblings (or full siblings, if a pair of monozygotic twins reproduces with another pair or with the same person), rather than first cousins. Identical twins do not have the same fingerprints, due to the fact that even in a small space inside the womb, people have contact with different parts of this environment, which gives small variations in the same digital, making them unique.[23] Monozygotic twins always have different phenotypes. Normally due to an environmental factor or the deactivation of different X chromosomes in female monozygotic twins, and in some extremely rare cases, due to aneuploidy, twins may express different sexual phenotypes, normally from an XXY Klinefelter syndrome zygote splitting unevenly.[24][25][26]

Monozygotic twins, although genetically very similar, are not genetically exactly the same. The DNA in white blood cells of 66 pairs of monozygotic twins was analyzed for 506,786 single nucleotide polymorphisms known to occur in human populations. Polymorphisms appeared in 2 of the 33 million comparisons, leading the researchers to extrapolate that the blood cells of monozygotic twins may have on the order of one DNA-sequence difference for every 1.2 x 107 nucleotides, which would imply hundreds of differences across the entire genome.[27] The mutations producing the differences detected in this study would have occurred during embryonic cell-division (after the point of fertilization). If they occur early in fetal development, they will be present in a very large proportion of body cells.[/block]

So basically even though they start out as the same egg and have the same DNA, as they develop, environment, expression of DNA, and other factors mean that by the time they are born they are not the same person, perfect copies of the original.

The same could be said of ANY copy. The copy presumably would not be grown in a womb, but in some artificial way. Even if grown in a womb, it would not be the same womb as the original was, and would be exposed to different stimulus during development. So in no way would it be YOU, because it would never be a perfect copy. It would be a distinct individual from you. So you would not have immortality, you would have an "identical" twin.

[Carrikature]

So basically even though they start out as the same egg and have the same DNA, as they develop, environment, expression of DNA, and other factors mean that by the time they are born they are not the same person, perfect copies of the original.

The same could be said of ANY copy. The copy presumably would not be grown in a womb, but in some artificial way. Even if grown in a womb, it would not be the same womb as the original was, and would be exposed to different stimulus during development. So in no way would it be YOU, because it would never be a perfect copy. It would be a distinct individual from you. So you would not have immortality, you would have an "identical" twin.

If the copy were grown in a womb, it would not be an identical copy once it undergoes any sort of development. In that, we agree. If this were the only method for creating a copy, you might have something. It's not. Similarly, if this is an active, living copy as opposed to one kept in stasis, it would not be you. That's not what I've been proposing either.

More importantly, though, is that I've argued that 'you' are your consciousness. Your physical form can be altered in significant ways, up to and including removal/replacement of parts, without it ceasing to be you. In this sense, I'm not convinced a strictly identical physical copy is even necessary, though it would still be strongly advisable (at least at first). Similar to a body's rejection of a transplanted organ, the greater the difference between the new body and the old body, the higher likelihood that 'you' will reject it as not your body. Even a copy grown in the womb in a way similar to monozygotic twins would be sufficient for this. For that matter, your physical form undergoes constant change. At no point do you cease to think of yourself as you, despite the very noticeable changes over even short periods of time.

What I really recommend, to you and anyone interested, is to read up on some philosophy of the self. It's a Wikipedia page, but start with this:

Source: Bundle Theory of Self

David Hume pointed out that we tend to think that we are the same person we were five years ago. Though we have changed in many respects, the same person appears present as was present then. We might start thinking about which features can be changed without changing the underlying self. Hume, however, denies that there is a distinction between the various features of a person and the mysterious self that supposedly bears those features. When we start introspecting, "we are never intimately conscious of anything but a particular perception; man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions which succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in perpetual flux and movement".[7]


It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects."[8]

On Hume's view, these perceptions do not belong to anything. Rather, Hume compares the soul to a commonwealth, which retains its identity not by virtue of some enduring core substance, but by being composed of many different, related, and yet constantly changing elements. The question of personal identity then becomes a matter of characterizing the loose cohesion of one's personal experience. (Note that in the Appendix to the Treatise, Hume said mysteriously that he was dissatisfied with his account of the self, yet he never returned to the issue.) Hume’s position is very similar to Indian Buddhists’ conception of the self.

The paradox of the Ship of Theseus can be used as an analogy of the self as a bundle of parts in flux.

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[Paprika]

It relies upon that coherence, sure, but the coherence isn't simply assumed. If you wish to debate it, be my guest.

I have no interest in participation, but as a viewer the coherence has not be demonstrated and is thus, as part of your argument here, merely assumed. Though to be fair, I must say your interlocutors have not made great cases either.