Immortality

[Teallaura]

I think the replacement analogy is flawed. Cells replicate - we don't install new ones (usually - absent a transplant). Excepting transplant recipients and installed prosthetics all cells of a body originate ultimately from the first. There is a continuity that is not found in machines which have parts replaced from external sources.

[Paprika]

If we're talking about identical copies that are all actively living (i.e., not in stasis) this statement is nonsensical.

That's because you're begging the question that 'identical [physical] copies' is a coherent concept, but that is the very issue at debate.

[Carrikature]

Carrikature, it is obvious to me that we are talking past one another. I really don't care if each of the other "clones" is the same as me in any sense. At the moment of creation we become different. I will not willingly die so another one of me can be the one who continues. Neither would one of them die so that I might be the one who continues.

We seem to be at an impasse.

You have yet to explain what makes you different from your clone at the moment of creation. It's less that we're talking past each other, in my opinion, than that you've yet to answer this fundamental question. I understand that you would not willingly die for another can continue. That's perfectly legitimate, but my claim has entirely been that there is nothing that distinguishes one from the other. All you're doing is insisting that there's a difference, and that's not going to be enough. Show what that difference is, if you can.

This wouldn't be a game.

Nor have I claimed otherwise. My reference to games is to provide examples of how these scenarios have been envisioned by others. This is an area where science fiction, in all forms, is extremely useful. If done right, it can provide us a framework for examining potential outcomes of the introduction and use of new technologies in a specific way. Your reference to Mindscan is another example of that. Games like EVE and Anarchy Online rely heavily (if not completely) upon science fiction, and they must do so in a way that is sufficiently logical if they wish to achieve any concept of immersion. It's quite relevant to the current discussion to bring up instances where people have conceived of having replaceable physical bodies which allow them to access experiences they otherwise would not have. The concept in EVE, where one can transfer consciousness to another clone, is also relevant in a discussion of possibilities where consciousness can be uploaded and transferred.

And I, like Jed, don't believe you would allow yourself to be shot in the head and killed so that some copy of yours could go on living. YOU would still die.

I continue to challenge both you and Jed to show how I am in any way distinct from my copy. I've relied heavily upon consciousness as that which identifies us as individuals. If there are identical consciousnesses, it has yet to be shown how these are also individuals. You're free to disbelieve me, but at least put some work into it.

Just because the copy thinks he is you doesn't mean he is you. Before being shot in the head, there would be two people who each thought they were you. One would have a physical continuity with the you before the copying and one would not.

It's not just that the copy thinks that he is me. We could say the same of an amnesiac who has been convinced that my life is his life. Rather, the copy thinks exactly as I do. However, the physical continuity is definitely a step in the right direction. We could pursue whether or not physical continuity is a necessary condition. Does the physical form matter? Does the process of continuity matter (i.e., replacing parts one at a time as opposed to whole transfer)? Is there a limit to how much physical continuity must be maintained? I think we'd need to explore what physical continuity entails before we conclude whether or not it's a requirement for the identification of one physical form or another as 'me'.

I think the replacement analogy is flawed. Cells replicate - we don't install new ones (usually - absent a transplant). Excepting transplant recipients and installed prosthetics all cells of a body originate ultimately from the first. There is a continuity that is not found in machines which have parts replaced from external sources.

It's only flawed if you keep transplants as an exception. I don't find that to be a valid exception. We're already at a point where we can replace 'parts' from external sources and/or add new parts (even inorganic ones) to the existing system. The ultimate question is 'how much of me has to remain for it to still be me'. The only common answer I've found boils down to consciousness.

That's because you're begging the question that 'identical [physical] copies' is a coherent concept, but that is the very issue at debate.

It's easy to claim logical fallacies without having to actually put in any effort, and I'd go so far as to suggest that 'begging the question' doesn't mean what you think it means. I've done no such thing. I've certainly asked enough times what there is that would prevent these physical copies from being identical. The support for my position that it is a coherent concept has been discussed if not (though not fully revealed within this or any thread), but it's hardly an assumed conclusion.

[Carrikature]

I'm not sure if a bulk response is the best way to do this. If any of you would like me to break out responses to you, please let me know. I lumped them together into a single response in the interest of time and effort.

[Irate Canadian]

I'm not sure if a bulk response is the best way to do this. If any of you would like me to break out responses to you, please let me know. I lumped them together into a single response in the interest of time and effort.

Carrik, just a quick question. Would you consider your existence to continue after being cloned? Because the way I see it at t = 1 second, the clone begins another life, even if it believes it has another...

[Jedidiah]

You have yet to explain what makes you different from your clone at the moment of creation. It's less that we're talking past each other, in my opinion, than that you've yet to answer this fundamental question. I understand that you would not willingly die for another can continue. That's perfectly legitimate, but my claim has entirely been that there is nothing that distinguishes one from the other. All you're doing is insisting that there's a difference, and that's not going to be enough. Show what that difference is, if you can.

The difference is experience. I would be standing in a room (for convenience) with one or more identical individuals. I would still experience being me looking at some other folks who looked like me. Unless you posit some mystical unity of thought I am not one of them they are not experiencing the same thing I am. How do I know they are supposedly me? Your argument is nonsense as far as I can see. You have failed to show that I would not see them as strangers.

I continue to challenge both you and Jed to show how I am in any way distinct from my copy. I've relied heavily upon consciousness as that which identifies us as individuals. If there are identical consciousnesses, it has yet to be shown how these are also individuals. You're free to disbelieve me, but at least put some work into it.

I have done so, and repeated it above. You have failed to show or give any reason for me to see these other people as me. Sure from here it is evident, but experience is a different matter.

[Teallaura]

You have yet to explain what makes you different from your clone at the moment of creation

You lost me here - how can this possibly need explanation? Original and copy exist separately and are not the same physical thing.

I'll get back to the other later.

[Carrikature]

Carrik, just a quick question. Would you consider your existence to continue after being cloned? Because the way I see it at t = 1 second, the clone begins another life, even if it believes it has another...

Strictly speaking, I would say that I had two existences after being cloned. I would continue to have an existence, and I would have a new, second existence. This is kind of weird to think about, but I'm sticking to my guns that I've not yet seen anything that makes the original me specifically unique. Given that the clone is identical, it would also share my thoughts and memories, and it would be interpreting any new information and experiences under the same framework that I interpret them. As time goes on, the experiences diverge. So too do the lives in a certain sense. Even so, at any point in time after divergence, the clone is equivalent to "Carrikature + Experience Set A" while the original is equivalent to "Carrikature + Experience Set B" (or vice versa). Hence I have two lives, but both of those lives are effectively 'me'. Are one of those lives intrinsically more important than the other? Is one of them any less 'me'? I don't see how. For what it's worth, I don't think this is any different than a thought experiment asking what you would be like if your dad had died when you were a kid, or if you had three sisters instead of one (or none). Who you are is shaped by your experiences, but you wouldn't be any less 'you' if those experiences had been different. Does that make sense?

[Carrikature]

The difference is experience. I would be standing in a room (for convenience) with one or more identical individuals. I would still experience being me looking at some other folks who looked like me. Unless you posit some mystical unity of thought I am not one of them they are not experiencing the same thing I am. How do I know they are supposedly me? Your argument is nonsense as far as I can see. You have failed to show that I would not see them as strangers.

I'm not positing a unity of thought, so we can leave that off the table. However, each of you is experiencing the same sensation: looking at some other folks who look exactly like you. If there are six clones, each clone sees five other people that look exactly like them. Each clone sees the others as 'them but not them'. I haven't argued that you wouldn't see them as strangers. I'm arguing that all of their thoughts and reactions to the experience of seeing a number of other folks that look the same is also identical. If there are six identical clones standing in a circle, all six of them would think "I see five other people that look just like me, but I am the real Jedidiah." Their reaction and experience is still the same. The stipulation is that your memory/thoughts/experiences are all copied perfectly and that all clones possess them. All of you possess the same experiences. Only when one or more clones are separated and exposed to unique experiences do they cease to be identical, but they still retain the same starting point: the thoughts/memories/experiences/body that thinks of itself as 'Jedidiah'.

I have done so, and repeated it above. You have failed to show or give any reason for me to see these other people as me. Sure from here it is evident, but experience is a different matter.

And this is perhaps where things have gotten crossed. I'm not denying that the clones will be different once they have different experiences. I'm denying that at the starting point, before they have different experiences, that there is any difference between one and the other. You will see each of them as 'other'. They will all see you as 'other'.

[Carrikature]

You lost me here - how can this possibly need explanation? Original and copy exist separately and are not the same physical thing.

I'll get back to the other later.

If you have two plastic cups that are perfectly identical except for their location, we can differentiate one from the other by its placement. However, if you closed your eyes and the two were switched, you would have no way of knowing. If we deprived you of sensory perception and moved you to another location, you haven't changed. You're the same you but at a new location. Spatial indicators aren't enough. As such, I'm unconvinced that spatial location is a true indicator of uniqueness for all that it would solve certain philosophical problems. I agree that they are not the same physical thing, but neither of them are physically unique. That's what is at issue. If they're not physically unique, in what sense is one the 'real' you and other one not? My argument is that there is no sense in which that's the case. They're both you. You and your clone would identify as "Teallaura", and both you and the clone would look at the other and say "that can't be Teallaura because I'm Teallaura". If I were to arbitrarily kill one of you, Teallaura would still exist. My argument is that it's no loss as long as there exists a Teallaura. Sparko and Jedidiah don't believe me.

[Carrikature]

In other news, this is fun.

[Cerebrum123]

In other news, this is fun.

For some reason I'm reminded of the episode of The Simpsons where Homer became a Krusty the Clown impersonator. The scene where Krusty tried to trick the mafia by doing a shell game type thing was pretty funny.

[Carrikature]

For some reason I'm reminded of the episode of The Simpsons where Homer became a Krusty the Clown impersonator. The scene where Krusty tried to trick the mafia by doing a shell game type thing was pretty funny.

I have to tell you...never watched The Simpsons.

[Truthseeker]

In other news, this is fun.

Suppose a perfect copy of Carri is made moments ago, but I was not a witness to that event. Later, I see two persons that appear identical. I ask, "Which of you is the original?" I cannot see why one of them would admit that he is the copy if he was disposed to tell the truth as he sees matters. The original would answer truthfully if he said he was the original. The other person would not be telling the truth, if he said he was the original, but he would not be lying. He would feel strongly that he is the original.

[Cerebrum123]

I have to tell you...never watched The Simpsons.

That's okay.