A different objection to molinism

[john-philip]

A recent objection I've heard to molinism is that the truth-values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom existing without God being the origin of the truth denies God's sole eternality. The argument basically states that, allowing that some CCF's can be true, since God does not determine the truth-value of CCF's and because they are not truths about God's attributes, the truths exist without any origin whatsoever (or with an origin outside God). Thus, since CCF's are eternally true without origin, God is not soley eternal.

Now, I've been studying molinism with a lot of focus over the passed two years or so, but have not come across this argument academically (but I've been told it's in the Four Views book which I have yet to read.) So I'm wanting to hear what others' responses are.

My response, which in hindsight, may have not been the best way to go about it, was this:

1. Logically true propositions exist if, and only if, God exists. That is, God's existence is a necessary condition for logical truths (ax)
2. Some counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF's) are logically true propositions (given for the sake of argument)
3. Y exists "outside, apart, or without" X if, and only if, X is not a necessary condition for Y.
4. Given (1) and (2), CCF's are true if and only if God exists. That is, God's existence is a necessary condition for the truth-value of CCF's.
5. Therefore, given (3) and (4), CCF's do not exist "outside, apart, or without" God.
Therefore, God's sole eternality is preserved.

The response for this, essentially, is that it is not enough to claim that God being a necessary condition is sufficient in showing the truth's origin (thusly rejecting premise 3 above.) Also, since the truth could have been either way with God's existence, no explanation has been given for the truth's origin.

Now, I have another idea in mind, but I'd like to see if this thread develops. I'm particularly interested in hearing from the molinistically incnlined such as infide and others, but I'd love to hear anyone's input.


JP

[infide]

A recent objection I've heard to molinism is that the truth-values of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom existing without God being the origin of the truth denies God's sole eternality. The argument basically states that, allowing that some CCF's can be true, since God does not determine the truth-value of CCF's and because they are not truths about God's attributes, the truths exist without any origin whatsoever (or with an origin outside God). Thus, since CCF's are eternally true without origin, God is not soley eternal.

I think this is just another way of stating the grounding objection. The objection is asking - "What grounds the truth of CCFs"? The issue of "sole eternity" (aseity?) is merely support for the fact that, the objector thinks, God must be the grounds of CCFs if they are true before the divine decree.

This may lead to another series of questions. At least, it does in my mind. What about necessary truths? Does God make it the case that "2+2=4" is true rather than "2+2=5"? Or does God just know that "2+2=4" is true, because 2+2=4? It seems to me that Molinism is just about this. God doesnt choose which necessary truths are true and which are false. They precede God's volition. In the same way, God doesnt choose which CCFs are true and which are false either.

This brings up an interesting point. Does a truth which God just simply "knows" apart from His volition need to be necessary? If God can just know something AS true without declaring it true in terms of a necessary truth, then why not truths that vary from world to world?

To me, this helps explain aseity. God does not receive information from outside Himself, whether it be natural knowledge OR free knowledge or even middle-knowledge. God's knowledge originates from His own cognitive power in a unique non-humanoid way.

I dont know if that would satisfy the objector, but it seems to me the rationale behind what i am saying is valid. I just may need to formulate it more precisely.

Now, I've been studying molinism with a lot of focus over the passed two years or so, but have not come across this argument academically (but I've been told it's in the Four Views book which I have yet to read.) So I'm wanting to hear what others' responses are.

My response, which in hindsight, may have not been the best way to go about it, was this:

1. Logically true propositions exist if, and only if, God exists. That is, God's existence is a necessary condition for logical truths (ax)
2. Some counterfactuals of creaturely freedom (CCF's) are logically true propositions (given for the sake of argument)
3. Y exists "outside, apart, or without" X if, and only if, X is not a necessary condition for Y.
4. Given (1) and (2), CCF's are true if and only if God exists. That is, God's existence is a necessary condition for the truth-value of CCF's.
5. Therefore, given (3) and (4), CCF's do not exist "outside, apart, or without" God.
Therefore, God's sole eternality is preserved.

The response for this, essentially, is that it is not enough to claim that God being a necessary condition is sufficient in showing the truth's origin (thusly rejecting premise 3 above.) Also, since the truth could have been either way with God's existence, no explanation has been given for the truth's origin.

Yeah I dont think that answers the objection. Every truth depends on God's necessity, trivially, even necessary ones. And God's existence depends on other necessary truths as well, trivially, by the same rules. This, of course, led the medieval scholastics to the radical doctrine of divine simplicity. But I am leary to endorse it - especially because of some of the conclusions it posits. Honestly, i dont know exactly how to navigate all of these difficulties. Thats why I wouldnt go there to try to prove something.

Now, I have another idea in mind, but I'd like to see if this thread develops. I'm particularly interested in hearing from the molinistically incnlined such as infide and others, but I'd love to hear anyone's input.

I'd love to hear it.

peace,
jd

[john-philip]

Hey, JD, glad you could offer your input.

I think this is just another way of stating the grounding objection. The objection is asking - "What grounds the truth of CCFs"? The issue of "sole eternity" (aseity?) is merely support for the fact that, the objector thinks, God must be the grounds of CCFs if they are true before the divine decree.

Yeah, it's at least a form of the grounding objection, but I guess giving a new reason why it should be considered.

I suppose this does concern aseity, but it's specifically the doctrine that affirms that only God has no beginning and no end. (In this case, has been termed "sole eternality")

This may lead to another series of questions. At least, it does in my mind. What about necessary truths? Does God make it the case that "2+2=4" is true rather than "2+2=5"? Or does God just know that "2+2=4" is true, because 2+2=4? It seems to me that Molinism is just about this. God doesnt choose which necessary truths are true and which are false. They precede God's volition. In the same way, God doesnt choose which CCFs are true and which are false either.

Yeah, this is one thing that came to mind. However, apparently necessary truths are alleged to be God's attributes. Thus, only CCF's existing eternally "without a source" for it's truth.

This brings up an interesting point. Does a truth which God just simply "knows" apart from His volition need to be necessary? If God can just know something AS true without declaring it true in terms of a necessary truth, then why not truths that vary from world to world?

To me, this helps explain aseity. God does not receive information from outside Himself, whether it be natural knowledge OR free knowledge or even middle-knowledge. God's knowledge originates from His own cognitive power in a unique non-humanoid way.

Yes, I agree, this is interesting, and probably the best way to go about it. I seem to be having trouble articulating the notion myself though. The agents that the CCF's are about do not exist, they are uninstantiates essences (as I understand it.) I think such uninstantiated essences can even fit within the category of the 'thoughts' of God (as some have asserted about necessary truths.) But either way, it does stem, as you said, from God's cognitive power. The issue that this objector is going to take is that since God does not determine the truth or falsity of the CCF, (or that the truths are not grounded in God) then they are either grounded in something other than God or they exist all on their own, both of which are asserted to have denied God's 'sole eternality' (or aseity.) Now, I have pointed out before that the uninstantiated essences are grounded in God (they stem from His cognitive abilities - He knows what and who is capable of creating), but I'm not sure if this helps any unless I am asserting that the uninstantiated essences "make" the CCF's true (which I'm not sure is coherent.) This is where I'm a bit confused.

Yeah I dont think that answers the objection. Every truth depends on God's necessity, trivially, even necessary ones. And God's existence depends on other necessary truths as well, trivially, by the same rules. This, of course, led the medieval scholastics to the radical doctrine of divine simplicity. But I am leary to endorse it - especially because of some of the conclusions it posits. Honestly, i dont know exactly how to navigate all of these difficulties. Thats why I wouldnt go there to try to prove something.

Yeah, believe me, I'd rather not go there. The objection seems to be carrying a lot of philosophical baggage, though, which could easily carry into that direction, I'm afraid. For example, the implications of truths such as a triangle having three sides being one of God's attributes seems to be either incoherant and just an "easy out" to not have to deal with the problem of necessary truths, or an appeal to divine simplicity (though I doubt the objector would argue that God can "decide" His attributes) I'm trying to allow for as many presuppositions of the objector as possible. (Both so I can avoid having to get beyond my own grasp of metaphysics, and because I think it's a better way to argue. )

Oh, and here is interesting article dealing with the issue of God's relation to necessary truths and briefly touches on four different views. Although it discusses the view of God's "thoughts" being necessary truths, I seem to recall a view saying that God necessarily "thinks" in that way (as opposed to necessary truths somehow being contingent on God's thinks or wills.)

Anyway, here's the article.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-necessary-being/

[Anoetos]

If a person sits down with a Bible, he will not stand up a Molinist.

[Xavier]

If a person sits down with a Bible, he will not stand up a Molinist.

Funny, I say the same thing about Calvinism....

But what you say is accurate in a deeper sense... The person sitting down and reading the Bible will come to the conclusion that Man has Libertarian Free Will and that God is sovereign. Molinism is only an outworking to explain how those two ideas are not contradictory. Further, Counterfactual knowledge is present in the Bible in several places, thus providing a grounding in the text for the philosophical outworking.

[Anoetos]

Funny, I say the same thing about Calvinism....

But what you say is accurate in a deeper sense... The person sitting down and reading the Bible will come to the conclusion that Man has Libertarian Free Will and that God is sovereign. Molinism is only an outworking to explain how those two ideas are not contradictory. Further, Counterfactual knowledge is present in the Bible in several places, thus providing a grounding in the text for the philosophical outworking.

Of course, I disagree, but, no reason to hi-jack John-Philip's thread.

:)

[john-philip]

If a person sits down with a Bible, he will not stand up a Molinist.

If a person sits down at his Bible He won't believe that God knows what would happen in circumstances that were not created but could have been?

Matthew 11:21
“Woe to you, Chorazin! Woe to you, Bethsaida! For if the mighty works which were done in you had been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes.

Guess God was just guessing?

Anyway, I'd prefer you discuss this in another thread. Mine has a prett specific topic in mind.

[Anoetos]

Hopefully, by now you've seen the post above.

[john-philip]

Hopefully, by now you've seen the post above.

Ditto.

[infide]

Yeah, it's at least a form of the grounding objection, but I guess giving a new reason why it should be considered.

I suppose this does concern aseity, but it's specifically the doctrine that affirms that only God has no beginning and no end. (In this case, has been termed "sole eternality")

ohh ok. So, not simply just that God is unaffected or independent of other objects, but just that there simply are no other objects in God's eternal past prior to Creation.

Yeah, this is one thing that came to mind. However, apparently necessary truths are alleged to be God's attributes. Thus, only CCF's existing eternally "without a source" for it's truth.

I question that reasoning as it seems to be non-intuitive. How is "2+2=4" an attribute of God? It doesnt seem to attribute anything to God at all. Now, of course, God knows "2+2=4", but knowing that 2+2=4 is a different thing then saying that God is 2+2=4.

Further, what about a necessary truth like "God is necessary"? Is "God is necessary" an attribute of God? That means, "God is God is necessary" is true, and true necessarily. Which means that truth is an attribute of God, and "God is God is God is necessary" and that is necessary, and so on.

Yes, I agree, this is interesting, and probably the best way to go about it. I seem to be having trouble articulating the notion myself though. The agents that the CCF's are about do not exist, they are uninstantiates essences (as I understand it.) I think such uninstantiated essences can even fit within the category of the 'thoughts' of God (as some have asserted about necessary truths.) But either way, it does stem, as you said, from God's cognitive power. The issue that this objector is going to take is that since God does not determine the truth or falsity of the CCF, (or that the truths are not grounded in God) then they are either grounded in something other than God or they exist all on their own, both of which are asserted to have denied God's 'sole eternality' (or aseity.) Now, I have pointed out before that the uninstantiated essences are grounded in God (they stem from His cognitive abilities - He knows what and who is capable of creating), but I'm not sure if this helps any unless I am asserting that the uninstantiated essences "make" the CCF's true (which I'm not sure is coherent.) This is where I'm a bit confused.

well, again, what makes "2+2=4" true, rather than "2+2=5"? Without divine simplicity (or even with it), it seems irrational to think that God's nature makes such a thing true. God's cognitive power to know what just is true, perhaps.

And i would think we are going to have to say something about counterfactual dependence. Its not that uninstantiated essences cause the CCF to be true in this world, but would cause the CCF to be true, if they were to be in the appropriate circumstances.

After all, If I assert, "if I were to become President, I would veto overspending bills", I am not saying that right now I am causing it to be true that I choose veto power. I am asserting that If I were to be in the relevant circumstances, I would use presidential veto power.

Yeah, believe me, I'd rather not go there. The objection seems to be carrying a lot of philosophical baggage, though, which could easily carry into that direction, I'm afraid. For example, the implications of truths such as a triangle having three sides being one of God's attributes seems to be either incoherant and just an "easy out" to not have to deal with the problem of necessary truths, or an appeal to divine simplicity (though I doubt the objector would argue that God can "decide" His attributes) I'm trying to allow for as many presuppositions of the objector as possible. (Both so I can avoid having to get beyond my own grasp of metaphysics, and because I think it's a better way to argue. )

Oh, and here is interesting article dealing with the issue of God's relation to necessary truths and briefly touches on four different views. Although it discusses the view of God's "thoughts" being necessary truths, I seem to recall a view saying that God necessarily "thinks" in that way (as opposed to necessary truths somehow being contingent on God's thinks or wills.)

Anyway, here's the article.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/god-necessary-being/

Actually, I have seen that essay before. It is good on showing problems with the views i would usually take, but not good on offering a solution

peace,
jd

[Chytraeus]

Ditto.

I think that what my friend Anoetos was trying to say was that this whole concept of molinism is more philosophical than theological, for true theology will only be based on what God has chosen to reveal about Himself. I have yet to see a single Bible quote to support or to attack molinism here, nor do I expect to see one, for the concept is simply outside of what the Bible has to say. True Christian theology has only the saving acts of God as its subject, and will not delve too deeply into concepts of the pre-existance of truths that do not derive from the attributes of God.

All I can say on the subject, since I have read almost nothing of molinism, is that if God did not exist, then whether or not 2+2=4 would not matter to anyone, for there would be no one to care. In that case, there is no knowledge that exists for us that does not have God as its source, and we would not be here to know anything if we did not have God for our source. As far as the forknowledge of God is concerned, it is too big for our little brains to wrap around, so just take comfort in the fact that God saw you and chose you to be saved through faith in His son before the worlds were created. As far as Libertarian Free Will is concerned, know that you are free and responsible for many of your decisions in life, and tremble.

[infide]

I think that what my friend Anoetos was trying to say was that this whole concept of molinism is more philosophical than theological, for true theology will only be based on what God has chosen to reveal about Himself. I have yet to see a single Bible quote to support or to attack molinism here, nor do I expect to see one, for the concept is simply outside of what the Bible has to say. True Christian theology has only the saving acts of God as its subject, and will not delve too deeply into concepts of the pre-existance of truths that do not derive from the attributes of God.

Theres a simple answer to that. Most objections to middle-knowledge are not Biblical, but philosophical. You dont answer philosophical objections with Biblical arguments usually.

But of course the idea that Scripture has nothing to say about middle-knowledge is just not true. There are several places in Scripture which demonstrate God's counterfactual knowledge. The most famous being 1 Samuel 23. Read that passage, see what God said and what actually happenned.

All I can say on the subject, since I have read almost nothing of molinism, is that if God did not exist, then whether or not 2+2=4 would not matter to anyone, for there would be no one to care. In that case, there is no knowledge that exists for us that does not have God as its source, and we would not be here to know anything if we did not have God for our source. As far as the forknowledge of God is concerned, it is too big for our little brains to wrap around, so just take comfort in the fact that God saw you and chose you to be saved through faith in His son before the worlds were created. As far as Libertarian Free Will is concerned, know that you are free and responsible for many of your decisions in life, and tremble.

It has nothing to do with what people know. This is about what God knows.

peace,
jd

[Chytraeus]

Theres a simple answer to that. Most objections to middle-knowledge are not Biblical, but philosophical. You dont answer philosophical objections with Biblical arguments usually.

They are philosophical arguments because molinism is a philosophical position. I propose that as a philosophical position, it is not truly theological, for we can only know things about God that God has specifically chosen to reveal, and He has not specifically chosen to reveal this about Himself.

But of course the idea that Scripture has nothing to say about middle-knowledge is just not true. There are several places in Scripture which demonstrate God's counterfactual knowledge. The most famous being 1 Samuel 23. Read that passage, see what God said and what actually happenned.

Places in Scripture that seem to demonstrate counterfactual knowledge and specific references concerning God's "middle-knowledge" are very different things. In the passage you quoted, David was asking God a conditional question with some implied conditions. "If I stay here, will Saul come to get me, and if he comes, will these people turn me over to him." Knowing the hearts of men, God answered both questions in the affirmative. Yes, it is very likely that God also knew that once David had this information he was going to eliminated the implied condition, that is, his remaining there, for David, being an honorable man of God, sought always to avoid a confrontation between himself and Saul. There are an abundance of good, theological points to bring out in this passage about the nature of God, men, and those whose hearts are given to God. To turn away from all of those in order to ask a philosophical question about the knowledge of God is to miss the real beauty of the story.

Coming into this debate with little knowledge of molinism, I am beginning to see what I think the issue is. The supposition is that the knowledge of God is a kind of active force that brings into reality the things which God forknows, as in all of history is nothing more than the acting out of a story that pre-existed in the mind of God. Therefore, if God knows that something "might" happen, because it is God who knows it, it will come about. However, in this case, God revealing his "knowledge" to David changed how David acted in the story, thus meaning that what God said He knew did not come to pass because of the actions of David after gaining this knowledge for himself.

So, my question is, where in the Bible does it ever say that all things that God "knows" must come to pass, and that nothing comes to pass unless God specifically "for-knows" it. It seems to me that this is a western philosophy imposing itself on a very eastern Bible. In the Bible God knows the hearts of men, and knows what they are capable of in all situations, but it is not God who makes them do those things. Again, molinism just is not a biblical question, because although it is an attempt to explain some things that we seem to see in the Bible, it is not God as God has chosen to reveal himself in the Word.

It has nothing to do with what people know. This is about what God knows.

It seems more to be about what people think God knows. I don't think that molinism is "bad" in the same way that I think simi-pelagianism is "bad." I just think that it is a distraction from the real purpose of the biblical revelation, God reconciling the world to himself through the life, death, and resurrection of His only begotton Son, Jesus Christ.

Peace to you, my friend.

ts

[RanRan]

God's knowledge originates from His own cognitive power in a unique non-humanoid way.

And what happens when God is a human? Christ did not know when He would return and punctuated that statement by saying those words would not pass away. A warning to us not to assume that He knows now. (No leaks of info to dispensationalists, sorry). The very idea (and virtue) of obedience admits to free-will.

[infide]

They are philosophical arguments because molinism is a philosophical position. I propose that as a philosophical position, it is not truly theological, for we can only know things about God that God has specifically chosen to reveal, and He has not specifically chosen to reveal this about Himself.

For one, it is no more philosophical than Calvinism or Lutheranism, it just uses different philosophical views than those do. Secondly, who ever said that God never revealed something via philosophy? Philosophy serves theology, and to the extent that philosophy can reveal truths, God just may well do that.

Also, you need to understand that middle-knowledge and Molinism are theological positions - they are about God and His Nature.

Places in Scripture that seem to demonstrate counterfactual knowledge and specific references concerning God's "middle-knowledge" are very different things.

Well, middle-knowledge IS prevolitional counterfactual knowledge. So they really ARENT different things, the Molinist just need show that middle-knowledge can be prevolitional. In fact, this is the only way that God wouldnt obliterate human freedom, thus very simply we can see that from Scripture and reason we can conclude God has revealed middle-knowledge.

In the passage you quoted, David was asking God a conditional question with some implied conditions. "If I stay here, will Saul come to get me, and if he comes, will these people turn me over to him." Knowing the hearts of men, God answered both questions in the affirmative. Yes, it is very likely that God also knew that once David had this information he was going to eliminated the implied condition, that is, his remaining there, for David, being an honorable man of God, sought always to avoid a confrontation between himself and Saul. There are an abundance of good, theological points to bring out in this passage about the nature of God, men, and those whose hearts are given to God. To turn away from all of those in order to ask a philosophical question about the knowledge of God is to miss the real beauty of the story.

Middle-knowledge is a theological concept, by the way.

Secondly, If the passage demonstrates God's middle-knowledge, then you cannot object to its use because it might serve other theological goals. The answers that God gave via the ephod cannot be understand as simple foreknowledge, since then God would have lied. If we understand the passage to be demonstrating any kind of determinism (including compatibilism) we should question why God didnt cause the things He was predicting to happen. So we are left with either two options - one, God has middle-knowledge and revealed this in this passage. The other possibility is to postulate that God is making a good guess based on Saul's character (OVT). Given the theological merit of Molinism over OVT, the better conclusion here is Molinism.

Coming into this debate with little knowledge of molinism, I am beginning to see what I think the issue is. The supposition is that the knowledge of God is a kind of active force that brings into reality the things which God forknows, as in all of history is nothing more than the acting out of a story that pre-existed in the mind of God. Therefore, if God knows that something "might" happen, because it is God who knows it, it will come about. However, in this case, God revealing his "knowledge" to David changed how David acted in the story, thus meaning that what God said He knew did not come to pass because of the actions of David after gaining this knowledge for himself.

Actually, no. Molinist dont suppose that God's knowledge is a "kind of active force...", rather, we believe that God's knowledge is just that - knowledge. However, it should be obvious, that if God knows that something is infallibly true, that it will not fail to happen despite the fact that it could, since then God would have believed something false. (that something will happen, then it doesnt).

What the Molinist believes is that God revealed to him counterfactual knowledge of what WOULD happen under sets of circumstances that were not actual - that is precisely middle-knowledge.

And unless one is prepared to say that God chose to make such a sinful act true, we should believe that this is prevolitional middle-knowledge.

So, my question is, where in the Bible does it ever say that all things that God "knows" must come to pass, and that nothing comes to pass unless God specifically "for-knows" it.

So you are denying that God is Omniscient, then? If something which God foreknows does not come to pass, then God held a false belief (and thus is not Omniscient), and if God did not know something that WILL come to pass would mean that God failed to know some truth, which would also deny God's Omniscience.

The Biblical case is an elaborate one to be sure. The entire Biblical record of Prophecy assumes that God knows the future infallibly, even of sinful acts. Isaiah makes this case so strongly that it is the very proof of who the true God is when He gives a piece of infallible foreknowledge (see chap 41:21-24, chap 44:6-8 and throughout Isaiah). The Psalmist talks about the intimate knowledge and even foreknowledge of God in Psalm 139 (see v.2 and 4 specifically) which of course is poetic, but it could indicate the idea of foreknowledge was in his concept of God. The New Testament ascribes foreknowledge to Christ especially about His death and resurrection, the former being completed by sinful acts, of which we would not think God causing it. In Acts, Peter preached that Christ's death was by God's foreknowledge (Acts 2:23, 25, cf. 1 Peter 1:19-20). And the Biblical case goes on and on. To suppose that these are all exceptions to a general rule, is, as William Lane Craig says, equivalent to thinking you can pick your way through an avalanche by theoretically calculating the trajectory of each rock.

It seems to me that this is a western philosophy imposing itself on a very eastern Bible. In the Bible God knows the hearts of men, and knows what they are capable of in all situations, but it is not God who makes them do those things. Again, molinism just is not a biblical question, because although it is an attempt to explain some things that we seem to see in the Bible, it is not God as God has chosen to reveal himself in the Word.

That is according to you, friend. The job of systematic theology is to look at the big picture. It answers the question: What do all of the various Scriptures on the whole intend to reveal? If you want to camp out on one verse or one chapter, then that is fine, you are not a systematic theologian.

Secondly, the idea that western philosophy "imposed itself" on the eastern Bible is a bit confused. If that were the case then Christianity should jettison almost every doctrine that it holds, since it might use the law of bivalence or identity to assess the coherency of some Biblical doctrine. Further, we would have no doctrine of Trinity, no hypostatic union, no dual nature of Christ, and so on. These are all philosophical expressions of understated Biblical doctrines.

Philosophy helped Christians better understand the things they already believed, and how to defend them in the Western world. The Gospel didnt stay in the East, it went West.

It seems more to be about what people think God knows. I don't think that molinism is "bad" in the same way that I think simi-pelagianism is "bad."

Except that semi-pelagianism is rejected on theological grounds, not biblical ones. Unless you have found a Biblical text that says "semi-pelagianism is false" or some equivalent conceptual form.

People like yourself seem to forget that their are philosophical and theological assumptions in your own position, and in your arguments, and in how you approach these things. Then, you reject other views because THEY are theological or philosophical.

I just think that it is a distraction from the real purpose of the biblical revelation, God reconciling the world to himself through the life, death, and resurrection of His only begotton Son, Jesus Christ.

And Molinism suggests a model for HOW God did this very thing. Molinism is about how God is Provident in a world that exhibits things that seem to be against His very character. Can you affirm that God is perfectly Provident and that he is not responsible for evil?

I think not.

Peace to you, my friend.

ts

peace,
jd