An interesting paper I read awhile back on children of theist parents figuring out what's morally right and morally wrong in the context of divine commands:
One point this paper illustrates that even theistic children can, and do, think of moral obligations as distinct from God's commands, instead view moral obligations as being based on secular grounds that don't require God's existence.
Nucci's sample included children from the following religious communities: 64 from Amish-Mennonite groups, 64 from Dutch Reformed Calvinism (1477), 64 from conservative Judaism, and 32 from orthodox Judaism (1484). Here are some relevant quotations from the paper:
Nucci, Larry, and Elliott Turiel. "God's Word, Religious Rules, and Their Relation to Christian and Jewish Children's Concepts of Morality." Child Development 64.5 (1993): 1475-91.
One point this paper illustrates that even theistic children can, and do, think of moral obligations as distinct from God's commands, instead view moral obligations as being based on secular grounds that don't require God's existence.
Nucci's sample included children from the following religious communities: 64 from Amish-Mennonite groups, 64 from Dutch Reformed Calvinism (1477), 64 from conservative Judaism, and 32 from orthodox Judaism (1484). Here are some relevant quotations from the paper:
"It was expected that subjects from each denomination would judge nonmoral religious rules, but not moral rules, as contingent on the authority of God. Two types of questions were posed to assess this dimension. The first posed a variant of the rule contingency criterion employed in studies regarding secular moral and conventional issues. Subjects were asked whether the right or wrong of a given action was contingent on the presence or absence of a specific command from God regulating the behavior. The second type of question was derived from the dialogue between Socrates and Euthyphro, which turned on what is known as the "open question." Put simply, the open question asks the following: "God commands X, but is X right?" [emphasis added] According to the philosopher Nielsen (1973), answering the question may require criteria for the good that are independent of God's word. We asked children whether God's commands could make right something (stealing) that most children treated as morally wrong. It was hypothesized that children would reject the notion that God's commands would make stealing morally right and would reject the notion that God would command people to steal as a normative behavior. We anticipated that children's answers would reflect their efforts to coordinate conceptions of moral issues in terms of the effects on persons of such actions with their conceptions of God as omniscient, omnipotent, and perfect (1476-7) […]
The results from Study 1 provide evidence that Amish-Mennonite children's conceptions of morality are not reducible to their knowledge of or adherence to religious rules. Consonant with prior research with Catholic subjects (Nucci, 1982), the Amish-Mennonite and Dutch Reform Calvinist children evaluated moral issues in terms of justice and welfare considerations, rather than precepts of the Bible or positions taken by religious authorities [emphasis added]. As did the Catholics, the Amish-Mennonite children generalized moral issues, and viewed moral rules as unalterable by religious authorities. They also viewed the status of moral transgressions as noncontingent on God's word. Furthermore, most of the Dutch Reform Calvinist children responded that God's command would not make stealing right. These findings indicate that children from these groups maintain a distinct moral position based on justice and welfare criteria from which they apprehend the moral aspects of the Christian God [emphasis added].
In contrast with their view of moral issues, the Amish-Mennonite subjects viewed the nonmoral precepts of their religion to be relative to their religion and contingent on God's word as evidenced in the Bible (1483) […]
Findings from Study 2 demonstrated that the conceptual differentiation between morality and religious prescription is made by Jewish children, as well as the Amish-Mennonites and the Dutch Reform Calvinists. Issues of morality were conceptualized by Conservative and Orthodox children and adolescents in terms of the impact actions had on the welfare of others, and not as a function of religious prescriptions or commands from God [emphasis added]. As with the subjects in Study 1, this differentiation between morality and religious prescription was maintained in responses to the "open question." The great majority of both groups of Jewish subjects held that a commandment from God could not make an unjust or harmful act morally right [emphasis added]. As anticipated, there were denominational differences in responses to the nonmoral issues (1489)."
The results from Study 1 provide evidence that Amish-Mennonite children's conceptions of morality are not reducible to their knowledge of or adherence to religious rules. Consonant with prior research with Catholic subjects (Nucci, 1982), the Amish-Mennonite and Dutch Reform Calvinist children evaluated moral issues in terms of justice and welfare considerations, rather than precepts of the Bible or positions taken by religious authorities [emphasis added]. As did the Catholics, the Amish-Mennonite children generalized moral issues, and viewed moral rules as unalterable by religious authorities. They also viewed the status of moral transgressions as noncontingent on God's word. Furthermore, most of the Dutch Reform Calvinist children responded that God's command would not make stealing right. These findings indicate that children from these groups maintain a distinct moral position based on justice and welfare criteria from which they apprehend the moral aspects of the Christian God [emphasis added].
In contrast with their view of moral issues, the Amish-Mennonite subjects viewed the nonmoral precepts of their religion to be relative to their religion and contingent on God's word as evidenced in the Bible (1483) […]
Findings from Study 2 demonstrated that the conceptual differentiation between morality and religious prescription is made by Jewish children, as well as the Amish-Mennonites and the Dutch Reform Calvinists. Issues of morality were conceptualized by Conservative and Orthodox children and adolescents in terms of the impact actions had on the welfare of others, and not as a function of religious prescriptions or commands from God [emphasis added]. As with the subjects in Study 1, this differentiation between morality and religious prescription was maintained in responses to the "open question." The great majority of both groups of Jewish subjects held that a commandment from God could not make an unjust or harmful act morally right [emphasis added]. As anticipated, there were denominational differences in responses to the nonmoral issues (1489)."
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