The Supernatural is inherently irrational

[Doubting John]

I try, but I just can't do it. I can't resist the urge to respond.

Yes you can.

No I can't.



POWELL:

Ok, then we are closer to agreeing than I realized. However, if you read my reply to him about his revised wording then you'll see that I don't agree with it. That means you and I still disagree about it.

Welcome to TWEB, where there are disagreements. I’m content if we agree to disagree.

Apparently, you neglected to answer my specific questions with respect to those issues.

And welcome to my world where I can only sufficiently deal with what I consider to be the most important questions, leaving some aside because of my limited time. I can’t do everything, no I can’t.

POWELL:

I still think it's mistaken to beg the question of whether a miracle has occurred.

And welcome to Powell’s world, where, hmmm, where is your world?

DOUBTING JOHN:

Begging the question is not the same thing as what I do.

POWELL:

It was begging the question whether a violation had occurred if you concluded that a violation had not occurred because they don't.

However, maybe you were making an inductive argument. Maybe you concluded that very probably a violation had not occurred because they rarely do.

There you go, trying to answer as I would answer! That was good. You can do it!

Powell,

Well, maybe this was one of those rare times. How can you tell? By performing the proper test.

But this is extremely difficult to do with any non-repeatable event in history, much less a supposed non-repeatable event that is claimed to be miraculous. The truth is, I am within my intellectual rights be a priori skeptical of any miraculous claim if I have never experienced a miracle in my own life, even though that experience itself is anecdotal evidence, an informal fallacy. But while that initial skepticism may be mine from my experience, no one should claim that miracles couldn’t occur, which is your point here. David Hume himself didn’t say this. The whole topic of miracles itself is one where we could have a great deal of discussion, so I’ll leave that for the distant future.

Warning! The following comments in blue are technical and do not have much to do at all with the topic of this thread. If you're not interested in this technical stuff you can skip the blue.


Powell,

Let me remind you that in your view it is not absolutely certain that the conclusions of modus ponens form arguments are true given the truth of the premises. It is only "as extremely probable up to the closest point of certainty that one can achieve." It is "certain" in a looser sense than apodictic certainty. Therefore, so-called valid deductive arguments are really only inductive arguments.

Based upon my very reasonable assumptions about logic, reasoning, and coherence, valid arguments are indeed certain arguments. I’ve said that before. What this means is that the conclusion follows with certainty from the premises WHETHER OR NOT THE PREMISES ARE TRUE, and whether or not the premises make sense or have any connection to one another! As in…

If the moon is made of cheese, then Elvis is alive.
The moon is made of cheese.
Therefore, Elvis is alive.

This is Modus Ponens, and as such is valid. The conclusion follows with certainty from the form of the argument itself.

But the strength of a deductive argument itself is to be found in its soundness, that is, whether or not it is sound. A sound deductive argument is one where the form of the argument is valid (a necessary condition), and where the premises are also judged to be true. If we judge any one of the premises to be false (or, if there is just one…remember? ), then it is not a sound argument. And if the soundness of the argument has a high degree of probability, then it will probably be a convincing argument too.

But the conclusion, which is certainly valid based upon the form of the argument itself, is only as strong as soundness of the argument, and the soundness of the argument depends entirely on the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves. If a deductive argument is about definitional terms or the rules of logic, and not about our world of experiences, then a valid argument can also be a certainly sound argument (depending on our assumptions, i.e., whether we are eastern pantheists, idealists, nominalists, etc--we'll ignore nihilists and solipsists, since you say we should).

However, when a deductive argument is about our world of experiences, then there is no certainty with the soundness that argument, even if it’s certainly valid, because at least one premise must be established on inductive grounds, and whenever there is induction, there is only probability. So all deductive arguments having to do with the world of our experiences are probabilty arguments in this sense.

Comprendo? [The thing that most bothered me was that you came into that other thread to find fault, assuming I didn't know what I was talking about, and that I couldn't articulate what I thought, or argue for it]. I can. I can dance...on my own terms.

Moreover, while you claim not to make deductive arguments, in every debate concerning the world of our experiences, whether stated or unstated, there is both a deductive argument and also an inductive argument. Deductive arguments are always there and are a necessary condition for any disagreement we may have, for they establish the rules of the debate and what must be shown.

[I am done describing what is true of certainty, valid deductive arguments, the inductive soundness of those arguments about the world of experiences, and what that means for those arguments. I have said it too many times].

I don't know why I taught you the "more excellent way" for free, even though your prior behavior didn't deserve it, but I just did. Merry Christmas.

Powell,

You bring up a good point. [ Just one? ] It appears that the agreement criterion should be included in "realistically falsifiable" since the point of falsification is that it's something that would also persuade the believer.

Perhaps the "realistically falsifiable" criterion should be of "an agreed to, realistically doable, reliably discriminatory, predictive test." That way the skeptic could propose tests for the believer to consider. I think this criterion is now consistent with the methodology of James Randi, which seems proper.

But then we're back to agreeing on such a test. How about we talk about what kind of test that we could perform that would actually and truly test whether or not there is a supernatural? I think it should be an empirical test, don’t you, atheist Powell (I have to make sure which side of your face to speak to, now don't I)? That is, the supernatural should be tested by empirical means. But what would theist Powell say about this? How would agreement be even possible (among yourselves ) with regard to the specific test we each propose to know whether or not there is a supernatural? Wm. Craig claims he knows because of "the inner witness of the Holy Spirit." D'ya want to test that, atheist Powell? It's here where Alchemist and I are right. If we agree that falsifiable means a mutually agreed upon test, then there (most probably--do I have to always say this?) ain't any. And if that's the case, then join us and say there (most probably) ain't any.

Powell.

Do you consider Elijah's altar test to be "agreed to" and "realistically doable" and "predictive" in the sense needed, you know where he competed with the priests of Baal trying to get their bullock to burn without setting any fire, but by petition to their respective deities? (1 Kgs. 18: 17-40) Do you consider it to "reliably discriminate" between Elijah's God and Baal?

Oh come on sweetheart. That event never happened. (Most probably) Never, for many reasons that I choose not to elaborate here. I'll just let atheist Powell have a talk with theist Powell about this one. Give me a real test.

DJ:

Probably, perhaps, probably, perhaps probably.

POWELL:

You probably overdid things above.

Yes, wasn’t that (probably) fun?

I am finding you to be a more reasonable man than first impressions.


Happy Hanukah!

--------------------

P.S. Please, please, please don't respond. I have things I need to do, and I cannot resist!

[John Powell]

DOUBTING JOHN:
I try, but I just can't do it. I can't resist the urge to respond.

Yes you can.

No I can't.

POWELL:
Ok, then we are closer to agreeing than I realized. However, if you read my reply to him about his revised wording then you'll see that I don't agree with it. That means you and I still disagree about it.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Welcome to TWEB, where there are disagreements. I’m content if we agree to disagree.

POWELL:
Apparently, you neglected to answer my specific questions with respect to those issues.

DOUBTING JOHN:
And welcome to my world where I can only sufficiently deal with what I consider to be the most important questions, leaving some aside because of my limited time. I can’t do everything, no I can’t.

POWELL:
I still think it's mistaken to beg the question of whether a miracle has occurred.

DOUBTING JOHN:
And welcome to Powell’s world, where, hmmm, where is your world?

POWELL:
Where I imagine it to be.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Begging the question is not the same thing as what I do.

POWELL:
It was begging the question whether a violation had occurred if you concluded that a violation had not occurred because they don't.

However, maybe you were making an inductive argument. Maybe you concluded that very probably a violation had not occurred because they rarely do.

DOUBTING JOHN:
There you go, trying to answer as I would answer! That was good. You can do it!

POWELL:
Well, maybe this was one of those rare times. How can you tell? By performing the proper test.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But this is extremely difficult to do with any non-repeatable event in history, much less a supposed non-repeatable event that is claimed to be miraculous. The truth is, I am within my intellectual rights be a priori skeptical of any miraculous claim if I have never experienced a miracle in my own life, even though that experience itself is anecdotal evidence, an informal fallacy. But while that initial skepticism may be mine from my experience, no one should claim that miracles couldn’t occur, which is your point here. David Hume himself didn’t say this. The whole topic of miracles itself is one where we could have a great deal of discussion, so I’ll leave that for the distant future.

POWELL:
You continue to toss this red herring onto the discussion table. The discussion here does not concern whether or not you are justified in disbelieving a supernatural claim. The relevant issue is under what conditions it's proper to criticize a supernatural claim for being realistically unfalsifiable. We're not discussing whether or not it's ok for you to reply to a supernatural claim with something like "Your claim is unworthy of belief because it's a violation of the known laws of modern science." We're discussing whether or not it's ok for a skeptic to reply with "Your claim is unworthy of serious consideration because it's realistically unfalsifiable."

DOUBTING JOHN:
Warning! The following comments in blue are technical and do not have much to do at all with the topic of this thread. If you're not interested in this technical stuff you can skip the blue.

POWELL:
Let me remind you that in your view it is not absolutely certain that the conclusions of modus ponens form arguments are true given the truth of the premises. It is only "as extremely probable up to the closest point of certainty that one can achieve." It is "certain" in a looser sense than apodictic certainty. Therefore, so-called valid deductive arguments are really only inductive arguments.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Based upon my very reasonable assumptions about logic, reasoning, and coherence, valid arguments are indeed certain arguments.

POWELL:
By "certain" you mean with exceedingly high probability. You mean "as extremely probable up to the closest point of certainty that one can achieve."

DOUBTING JOHN:
I’ve said that before. What this means is that the conclusion follows with certainty from the premises WHETHER OR NOT THE PREMISES ARE TRUE, and whether or not the premises make sense or have any connection to one another! As in…

POWELL:
What you mean is something like ". . . the conclusion follows from the premises with a confidence level that is 'as extremely probable up to the closest point of certainty that one can achieve' WHETHER OR NOT . . . "

DOUBTING JOHN:
If the moon is made of cheese, then Elvis is alive.
The moon is made of cheese.
Therefore, Elvis is alive.

This is Modus Ponens, and as such is valid. The conclusion follows with certainty from the form of the argument itself.

POWELL:
In your view, the conclusion "Elvis is alive" is "as extremely probable up to the closest point of certainty that one can achieve" given the truth of those premises.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But the strength of a deductive argument itself is to be found in its soundness, that is, whether or not it is sound.

POWELL:
Deductive arguments are not classified as to their logical strength. They are either valid or invalid, sound or unsound.

Perhaps you are speaking of their persuasive strength. In that case, let me remind you that even sound deductive arguments might be unpersuasive.

DOUBTING JOHN:
A sound deductive argument is one where the form of the argument is valid (a necessary condition), and where the premises are also judged to be true.

POWELL:
Wrong. To be correct either remove the "judged to be" at the end or change the beginning to read "A deductive argument judged to be sound . . ."

This is the kind of error Capn Ochre pointed out to you. You haven't yet learned to avoid it. I suggest you make extra efforts in the future to avoid it.

DOUBTING JOHN:
If we judge any one of the premises to be false (or, if there is just one…remember? ), then it is not a sound argument.

POWELL:
Wrong again. The truth value of a premise doesn't change because we judge it to be different than what it actually is.

If we JUDGE one of the premises of the valid deductive argument to be false then we JUDGE it to be unsound. Judging it to be unsound doesn't make it so even if we have the support of the rest of the world.

DOUBTING JOHN:
And if the soundness of the argument has a high degree of probability, then it will probably be a convincing argument too.

But the conclusion, which is certainly valid based upon the form of the argument itself, is only as strong as soundness of the argument, and the soundness of the argument depends entirely on the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves. If a deductive argument is about definitional terms or the rules of logic, and not about our world of experiences, then a valid argument can also be a certainly sound argument (depending on our assumptions, i.e., whether we are eastern pantheists, idealists, nominalists, etc--we'l ignore nihilists and solipsists, since you say we should). However, when a deductive argument is about our world of experiences, then there is no certainty with the soundness that argument, even if it’s certainly valid, because at least one premise must be established on inductive grounds, and whenever there is induction, there is only probability. So all deductive arguments having to do with the world of our experiences are probabilty arguments in this sense.

POWELL:
You are not absolutely certain about these things and neither am I.

It appears that the arguments you are making above are inductive.

In my opinion,
logic is based on human experiences. It is a special language that human beings have developed to aid them in their decision making. The rules and definitions of deductive logic such as the law of noncontradiction and validity and soundness are justified by inductive arguments. The rules of deductive logic strictly apply to some of the imaginary worlds of our thinking (those imaginary worlds that are most coherent). To the extent that they also apply to the real world, they are especially useful to us. To the extent that they don't apply, we disregard them or revise them.

I can imagine a future in which arguments are no more distinguished as to whether the conclusions are certain or probable given the truths of the premises, but they are all rated according to the degree of probability of the conclusion given the truth of the premises.

Can you also imagine such a world or is that beyond your abilities to imagine? Assuming you can imagine such a world then you should admit that it's rationally possible that the deductive-inductive distinction is a mistake. Whether it's "logically" possible depends on whether logicians allow it or not. The have the trademark, you might say, as to what counts as "logical."

DOUBTING JOHN:
Comprendo? [The thing that most bothered me was that you came into that other thread to find fault, assuming I didn't know what I was talking about, and that I couldn't articulate what I thought, or argue for it]. I can.

POWELL:
I don't know, do you? You asked in Spanish "(do I) understand?"

DOUBTING JOHN:
Moreover, while you claim not to make deductive arguments, every debate concerning the world of our experiences, whether stated or unstated, there is both a deductive argument and also an inductive argument. Deductive arguments are always there and are a necessary condition for any disagreement we may have, for they establish the rules of the debate and what must be shown.

POWELL:
There are implied deductive arguments in everything I write. For example, for every word I use there is an associated circular argument based on the identity principle. However, usually the words I put to the screen are written to express the inductive part of the debate. When this isn't the case, when I mean to be stating a deductive argument, then I try to make a special issue about it such as posting an enumerated list of premises and conclusion.

DOUBTING JOHN:
[I am done describing what is true of certainty, valid deductive arguments, the inductive soundness of those arguments about the world of experiences, and what that means for those arguments. I have said it too many times].

I don't know why I taught you the "more excellent way" for free, even though your prior behavior didn't deserve it, but I just did. Merry Christmas.

POWELL:
Perhaps because I'm so polite.

POWELL:
You bring up a good point.

DOUBTING JOHN:
[ Just one? ]

POWELL:
It appears that the agreement criterion should be included in "realistically falsifiable" since the point of falsification is that it's something that would also persuade the believer.

Perhaps the "realistically falsifiable" criterion should be of "an agreed to, realistically doable, reliably discriminatory, predictive test." That way the skeptic could propose tests for the believer to consider. I think this criterion is now consistent with the methodology of James Randi, which seems proper.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But then we're back to agreeing on such a test. How about we talk about what kind of test that we could perform that would actually and truly test whether or not there is a supernatural?

POWELL:
James Randi does that on a regular basis. So far, none of the tests have been reliably verified.

DOUBTING JOHN:
I think it should be an empirical test, don’t you, atheist Powell (I have to make sure which side of your face to speak to, now don't I)? That is, the supernatural should be tested by empirical means.

POWELL:
What important improvement would that produce? Should we add "objective", "repeatable," and "machine recordable" too?

I don't want to add more words to the criterion if we don't really need them. I don't want our opponents to conclude that we're just trying to produce an unreachable standard.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But what would theist Powell say about this?

POWELL:
Probably that if you read the Book of Mormon according to the stipulations of Moroni 10:3-5 and others he might add then the promise will be fulfilled eventually.

DOUBTING JOHN:
How would agreement be even possible (among yourselves ) with regard to the specific test we each propose to know whether or not there is a supernatural?

POWELL:
I don't see a logical contradiction there so I think it's possible.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Wm. Craig claims he knows because of "the inner witness of the Holy Spirit." D'ya want to test that, atheist Powell?

POWELL:
Sure. How does Wm. Craig propose we test it?

DOUBTING JOHN:
It's here where Alchemist and I are right. If we agree that falsifiable means a mutually agreed upon test, then there (most probably--do I have to always say this?) ain't any. And if that's the case, then join us and say there (most probably) ain't any.

POWELL:
I don't recall Alchemist saying anything about "mutually agreed upon test." That's something you added to the discussion.

All that means is that apparently current theists aren't agreeing to any proper tests. It doesn't imply it's impossible that there are any or that there weren't some in the past or that there won't be some in the future. Keep an open mind, my skeptical friend. Ask the theists for their evidence. Don't merely tell them they don't have any while you put your hands over your ears. Perhaps God will make His big appearance during our lifetime. (I seriously doubt that).

POWELL:
Do you consider Elijah's altar test to be "agreed to" and "realistically doable" and "predictive" in the sense needed, you know where he competed with the priests of Baal trying to get their bullock to burn without setting any fire, but by petition to their respective deities? (1 Kgs. 18: 17-40) Do you consider it to "reliably discriminate" between Elijah's God and Baal?

DOUBTING JOHN:
Oh come on sweetheart. That event never happened. (Most probably) Never, for many reasons that I choose not to elaborate here. I'll just let atheist Powell have a talk with theist Powell about this one. Give me a real test.

POWELL:
In order for the criterion to justify its existence it's helpful if there are some well-known examples that both sides agree satisfy the conditions and well-known examples that don't. Assume for the sake of argument that the Biblical account is correct as far as this passage goes. Under that assumption would Elijah's altar test satisfy those separate parts of the criterion?

Biblicists challenging the criticism of "realistically unfalsifiable" may very well use Biblical examples in an effort to expose the inadequacies of the methodology.

So, are there good Biblical examples that pass and others that fail?

DJ:
Probably, perhaps, probably, perhaps probably.

POWELL:
You probably overdid things above.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Yes, wasn’t that (probably) fun?

I am finding you to be a more reasonable man than first impressions.

Happy Hanukah!

POWELL:
I see.

Cheers.

John Powell

[Doubting John]

John Powell,

Happy Solstice.

[Doubting John]

DOUBTING JOHN:

But the strength of a deductive argument itself is to be found in its soundness, that is, whether or not it is sound.

POWELL:

Deductive arguments are not classified as to their logical strength. They are either valid or invalid, sound or unsound.
Perhaps you are speaking of their persuasive strength. In that case, let me remind you that even sound deductive arguments might be unpersuasive.

Okay, then eat this argument......

If p, a creator God exists, then q, there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world.
Not q, there is gratuitous evil in the world.
Therefore not p, God doesn’t exist.

This is a valid Modus Tollens argument. The valid conclusion follows with certainty from the form of the argument itself. It’s certainly valid. I believe it is a sound argument too, and I argued this way in a debate. But is this conclusion certainly sound, that there is no God? It depends upon the strength of the second premise, doesn’t it? While I believe the second premise is true, how sure am I that it is true? How sure are you that it is true? Therefore this conclusion is still only probably sound, and therefore this argument does not prove with certainty, even to myself, that there is no creator God. Furthermore, even if this conclusion is certainly sound, and I do not think so, it still doesn’t say whether or not there is a creator God, despite the argument itself. Why? Because there could still be a creator God who is malevolent or inept.

Are we now on the same page Mr. Logical Expert? These things are obvious to my beginning students, just out of High School. Are you just debating nomenclature here, or is there a real disagreement?

DOUBTING JOHN:

A sound deductive argument is one where the form of the argument is valid (a necessary condition), and where the premises are also judged to be true.

POWELL:

Wrong. To be correct either remove the "judged to be" at the end or change the beginning to read "A deductive argument judged to be sound . . ."
This is the kind of error Capn Ochre pointed out to you. You haven't yet learned to avoid it. I suggest you make extra efforts in the future to avoid it.

So, are you suggesting that an argument can be sound even if there is no one to judge it as sound? That’s bizarre to me. Epistemology is all about assessing truth claims, and there is always someone to do the assessing. A sound argument is one where the form is valid and the premises are true, yes. But how is anyone going to know this? If there is no one to judge whether or not the premises are true, then there is also no one to put forth the argument (how can this be?). Just when you were beginning to impress me you wind up being obtuse.

Powell:

If we JUDGE one of the premises of the valid deductive argument to be false then we JUDGE it to be unsound. Judging it to be unsound doesn't make it so even if we have the support of the rest of the world.

An argument that is judged to be sound is also persuasively sound to the person making the judgment. What’s not to understand about this? A person who judges an argument to be unsound is not persuaded by that argument. Are you a janitor at that astronomy lab? Or is this just nomenclature, again?

DOUBTING JOHN:

And if the soundness of the argument has a high degree of probability, then it will probably be a convincing argument too.

But the conclusion, which is certainly valid based upon the form of the argument itself, is only as strong as soundness of the argument, and the soundness of the argument depends entirely on the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves. If a deductive argument is about definitional terms or the rules of logic, and not about our world of experiences, then a valid argument can also be a certainly sound argument (depending on our assumptions, i.e., whether we are eastern pantheists, idealists, nominalists, etc--we'l ignore nihilists and solipsists, since you say we should). However, when a deductive argument is about our world of experiences, then there is no certainty with the soundness that argument, even if it’s certainly valid, because at least one premise must be established on inductive grounds, and whenever there is induction, there is only probability. So all deductive arguments having to do with the world of our experiences are probabilty arguments in this sense.

POWELL:

You are not absolutely certain about these things and neither am I.
It appears that the arguments you are making above are inductive.

ONCE AGAIN. I AM NOT CERTAIN ABOUT MUCH OF ANYTHING. I have said that all deductive arguments having to do with our world of experiences are supported inductively. Without an inductive argument there is no case. You still have not listened to me here. When will you listen to what I am saying? Only when you listen can you properly respond. So far you haven’t done either too well at all, as I judge things (and without someone to judge things, then what? ).

Powell,

In my opinion, logic is based on human experiences. It is a special language that human beings have developed to aid them in their decision making. The rules and definitions of deductive logic such as the law of noncontradiction and validity and soundness are justified by inductive arguments. The rules of deductive logic strictly apply to some of the imaginary worlds of our thinking (those imaginary worlds that are most coherent). To the extent that they also apply to the real world, they are especially useful to us. To the extent that they don't apply, we disregard them or revise them.

This is interesting. I’m trying to see if and where we disagree here, but the way you describe this is a muddle to me. But I think this is what I’ve been saying all along. Sometimes I think all you’re doing is arguing for your own nomenclature, and your own way of describing things. You want to be the one that “properly” describes things, and if anyone describes it differently, you disagree with their description in favor of yours. You’ll do this even though at heart we’re basically agreeing. You have power and control issues, my friend.

Powell,

I can imagine a future in which arguments are no more distinguished as to whether the conclusions are certain or probable given the truths of the premises, but they are all rated according to the degree of probability of the conclusion given the truth of the premises.

Welcome to the world that already exists, if I understand you correctly. And welcome to my world, the world I’ve been arguing for with a man named Powell—do you know him?

Powell,

Can you also imagine such a world or is that beyond your abilities to imagine? Assuming you can imagine such a world then you should admit that it's rationally possible that the deductive-inductive distinction is a mistake. Whether it's "logically" possible depends on whether logicians allow it or not. The[y] have the trademark, you might say, as to what counts as "logical."

You do have control issues. What’s your point here?

Let’s have an argument okay? Let’s try to resolve whether God exists from the previously stated argument (about gratuitous evil). That’s only one side of an argument. The other side of our argument is to inductively argue whether or not it’s sound. And along the way we will have to make other arguments in favor (or against) its soundness, which will additionally require a deductive side and an inductive side to that additional argument. But it’s all one argument. The deductive side speaks about what must be shown, and the inductive side speaks about how it is shown. But it’s one argument, with necessary components. You cannot have one without the other, even if the deductive side goes unstated. And the only way to dispute with the logicians about what is possible or probable is to dispute the rules of logic themselves, since those rules are not capriciously adopted by logicians. The basic ones are rock solid, just like math. In The Journal of Symbolic Logic you will find scholars debating certain ways of expressing these rules, and trying to hammer out new ones, or implications of others, just like Mathematicians do in their journals.

DOUBTING JOHN:

But then we're back to agreeing on such a test. How about we talk about what kind of test that we could perform that would actually and truly test whether or not there is a supernatural?

POWELL:

James Randi does that on a regular basis. So far, none of the tests have been reliably verified.

Anthony Flew’s, the invisible gardener story again. The believer will simply say there is an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener. He (or she, remember?) will not agree to the tests.

DOUBTING JOHN:

I think it should be an empirical test, don’t you, atheist Powell (I have to make sure which side of your face to speak to, now don't I)? That is, the supernatural should be tested by empirical means.

POWELL:

What important improvement would that produce? Should we add "objective", "repeatable," and "machine recordable" too?
I don't want to add more words to the criterion if we don't really need them. I don't want our opponents to conclude that we're just trying to produce an unreachable standard.

But the point I’m making with Flew’s invisible gardener story is that the believer will reject empirical tests, and that’s all that a non-believer will accept. So there cannot be an agreed upon test between the believer and the non-believer. And if that’s the case, the supernatural cannot be falsified. Grant this point. You know it’s true. Stop with the political egomaniacal gerrymandering.

DOUBTING JOHN:

Wm. Craig claims he knows because of "the inner witness of the Holy Spirit." D'ya want to test that, atheist Powell?

POWELL:

Sure. How does Wm. Craig propose we test it?

He doesn't. You cannot test it because he would never agree to an empirical test for it. Get the point.

DOUBTING JOHN:

It's here where Alchemist and I are right. If we agree that falsifiable means a mutually agreed upon test, then there (most probably--do I have to always say this?) ain't any. And if that's the case, then join us and say there (most probably) ain't any.

POWELL:

I don't recall Alchemist saying anything about "mutually agreed upon test." That's something you added to the discussion.

But it’s inherent in the nature of testing anything—anything. Although many empirical tests have a much greater level of agreement on which tests show which results.

Powell,

All that means is that apparently current theists aren't agreeing to any proper tests. It doesn't imply it's impossible that there are any or that there weren't some in the past or that there won't be some in the future. Keep an open mind, my skeptical friend. Ask the theists for their evidence. Don't merely tell them they don't have any while you put your hands over your ears. Perhaps God will make His big appearance during our lifetime. (I seriously doubt that).

I seriously doubt that too, and since I’m not certain of much of anything, then why do you state the obvious (again) here? I never said this was impossible. You continue to want to disagree with me about a standard I never have accepted, stated, or agreed to. I have repeatedly said I’m talking about what is most probable, and on that point you’ve just agreed with me. So why state the obvious, that something like this is possible? This is quite plainly obvious to any thinking person.

POWELL:

Assume for the sake of argument that the Biblical account is correct as far as this passage [about Elijah] goes. Under that assumption would Elijah's altar test satisfy those separate parts of the criterion?

I think so. But why even suggest this test? Not even theists today would accept this test (has any theist proposed this?). If Elijah had challenged me to bring down fire from the sky, I wouldn’t have even wasted my time. I’d simply say, “go ahead and show me. Bring it on.”

Powell,

Biblicists challenging the criticism of "realistically unfalsifiable" may very well use Biblical examples in an effort to expose the inadequacies of the methodology.
So, are there good Biblical examples that pass and others that fail?

I’m not sure on this. I’m not sure what Biblical test, if accomplished, would convince me otherwise. This is a tough question for which I have no answers (finally!). But I suspect neither do you. And I also doubt very much that any modern theist would propose to make an axe head float, or raise someone from the dead, or create an earthquake on command, or heal a blind man, or restore an amputated leg, either.

Happy Holidays.

[Soundsurfr]

Forgive me if I've missed it, but I've seen some attempts to define the term "supernatural", all hinging upon the term "natural", but I have not seen any attempt to define the term "nature" or "natural" as it relates to the OP. I think that would have been an appropriate starting point - even though we're well along in the discussion.

Anyone care to provide one?

[Doubting John]

Forgive me if I've missed it, but I've seen some attempts to define the term "supernatural", all hinging upon the term "natural", but I have not seen any attempt to define the term "nature" or "natural" as it relates to the OP. I think that would have been an appropriate starting point - even though we're well along in the discussion.

Anyone care to provide one?

Great question. We can just as easily describe the natural as that which is not "super" or beyond nature.

There is the physical world which is not the meta/physical world.

Matter vs spirit.

The world of our empirical experiences and the world beyond our empirical experiences.

But these definitions are already value laden, aren't they, and isn't that your point? So such a discussion like this can only occur if people accept the value laden descriptions of what is to be considered as nature and super/nature.

But since the debate is going along, it seems as though those involved already share those value laden descriptions. Right? This discussion would proceed differently if we didn't.

[Captain Ochre]

Great question. We can just as easily describe the natural as that which is not "super" or beyond nature.

As is, the definitions constitute a vicious circularity. That is probably one of Soundsurfr's concerns (and if it isn't then it should be).

There is the physical world which is not the meta/physical world.

Matter vs spirit.

That might be a helpful avenue to pursue in order to obtain a useful distinction between the two.

The world of our empirical experiences and the world beyond our empirical experiences.

Is self-awareness an empirical experience?
How about the self-awareness of others?

But these definitions are already value laden, aren't they, and isn't that your point? So such a discussion like this can only occur if people accept the value laden descriptions of what is to be considered as nature and super/nature.

In my experience, folks who operate from a naturalistic worldview tend to question the coherence of "supernatural", and the OP would dip into that territory if it weren't tantamount to saying that methodological naturalism can't make natural laws out of supernatural events.

But since the debate is going along, it seems as though those involved already share those value laden descriptions. Right? This discussion would proceed differently if we didn't.

Not necessarily.

[Soundsurfr]

Great question. We can just as easily describe the natural as that which is not "super" or beyond nature.

There is the physical world which is not the meta/physical world.

Matter vs spirit.

The world of our empirical experiences and the world beyond our empirical experiences.

But these definitions are already value laden, aren't they, and isn't that your point? So such a discussion like this can only occur if people accept the value laden descriptions of what is to be considered as nature and super/nature.

But since the debate is going along, it seems as though those involved already share those value laden descriptions. Right? This discussion would proceed differently if we didn't.

Bingo.

[Soundsurfr]

As is, the definitions constitute a vicious circularity. That is probably one of Soundsurfr's concerns (and if it isn't then it should be).

Bingo again.

Is self-awareness an empirical experience?
How about the self-awareness of others?

Wow. That's a question I've never asked in exactly that way. I'm too fried right now to respond to it.

In my experience, folks who operate from a naturalistic worldview tend to question the coherence of "supernatural", and the OP would dip into that territory if it weren't tantamount to saying that methodological naturalism can't make natural laws out of supernatural events.

Yes.

[Doubting John]

John Powell, you will respond to what I've said here won't you? We're waiting.

[John Powell]

DOUBTING JOHN:
But the strength of a deductive argument itself is to be found in its soundness, that is, whether or not it is sound.

POWELL:
Deductive arguments are not classified as to their logical strength. They are either valid or invalid, sound or unsound.

Perhaps you are speaking of their persuasive strength. In that case, let me remind you that even sound deductive arguments might be unpersuasive.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Okay, then eat this argument......

If p, a creator God exists, then q, there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world.
Not q, there is gratuitous evil in the world.
Therefore not p, God doesn’t exist.

POWELL:
You're sloppy, John. If q is "there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" then not q is "it is not the case that there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" which might mean that there OUGHT to be gratuitous evil in the world!

Let me rewrite your argument as a charitable reading suggests you really meant. I'll use the cumbersome "it is the case" to help ensure I do the negation properly.

If it is the case that a Creator God exists then it is the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.

It is NOT the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.

Therefore

It is NOT the case that a Creator God exists.

DOUBTING JOHN:
This is a valid Modus Tollens argument.

POWELL:
It is now.

DOUBTING JOHN:
The valid conclusion follows with certainty from the form of the argument itself. It’s certainly valid. I believe it is a sound argument too, and I argued this way in a debate.

POWELL:
We disagree as to what you believe concerning the certainty of such things. I keep telling you what you believe but then you imply that you don't believe me.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But is this conclusion certainly sound, that there is no God? It depends upon the strength of the second premise, doesn’t it?

POWELL:
It depends on the certainty of the premises.

DOUBTING JOHN:
While I believe the second premise is true, how sure am I that it is true? How sure are you that it is true?

POWELL:
I'm confident.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Therefore this conclusion is still only probably sound, and therefore this argument does not prove with certainty, even to myself, that there is no creator God.

POWELL:
No John. You believe that the argument IS sound because you judge it to be sound. Trust me, I know what you believe.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Furthermore, even if this conclusion is certainly sound, and I do not think so, it still doesn’t say whether or not there is a creator God, despite the argument itself. Why? Because there could still be a creator God who is malevolent or inept.

POWELL:
Your writing is confused. Would a creator God who is malevolent or inept somehow cease to be a creator God? Perhaps you should test the idea via a circular argument.

If the valid argument is sound then the conclusion is true. That's what I read the logicians claiming.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Are we now on the same page Mr. Logical Expert? These things are obvious to my beginning students, just out of High School. Are you just debating nomenclature here, or is there a real disagreement?

POWELL:
I suppose we're somewhere on the same page.

I think we are more in agreement than your writing would suggest. If you'd let me proofread what you intend to write to me before posting it then I think we'd be in much greater agreement.

DOUBTING JOHN:
A sound deductive argument is one where the form of the argument is valid (a necessary condition), and where the premises are also judged to be true.

POWELL:
Wrong. To be correct either remove the "judged to be" at the end or change the beginning to read "A deductive argument judged to be sound . . ."

This is the kind of error Capn Ochre pointed out to you. You haven't yet learned to avoid it. I suggest you make extra efforts in the future to avoid it.

DOUBTING JOHN:
So, are you suggesting that an argument can be sound even if there is no one to judge it as sound? That’s bizarre to me. Epistemology is all about assessing truth claims, and there is always someone to do the assessing. A sound argument is one where the form is valid and the premises are true, yes. But how is anyone going to know this? If there is no one to judge whether or not the premises are true, then there is also no one to put forth the argument (how can this be?). Just when you were beginning to impress me you wind up being obtuse.

POWELL:
See? I told you that you really thought the argument from evil IS sound because you judge it to be sound. If you can't trust me as to what you believe, then who can you trust?

POWELL:
If we JUDGE one of the premises of the valid deductive argument to be false then we JUDGE it to be unsound. Judging it to be unsound doesn't make it so even if we have the support of the rest of the world.

DOUBTING JOHN:
An argument that is judged to be sound is also persuasively sound to the person making the judgment. What’s not to understand about this?

POWELL:
That's fine.

DOUBTING JOHN:
A person who judges an argument to be unsound is not persuaded by that argument. Are you a janitor at that astronomy lab? Or is this just nomenclature, again?

POWELL:
No. I think it's more than that.

DOUBTING JOHN:
And if the soundness of the argument has a high degree of probability, then it will probably be a convincing argument too.

But the conclusion, which is certainly valid based upon the form of the argument itself, is only as strong as soundness of the argument, and the soundness of the argument depends entirely on the truth or falsehood of the premises themselves. If a deductive argument is about definitional terms or the rules of logic, and not about our world of experiences, then a valid argument can also be a certainly sound argument (depending on our assumptions, i.e., whether we are eastern pantheists, idealists, nominalists, etc--we'l ignore nihilists and solipsists, since you say we should). However, when a deductive argument is about our world of experiences, then there is no certainty with the soundness that argument, even if it’s certainly valid, because at least one premise must be established on inductive grounds, and whenever there is induction, there is only probability. So all deductive arguments having to do with the world of our experiences are probabilty arguments in this sense.

POWELL:
You are not absolutely certain about these things and neither am I. It appears that the arguments you are making above are inductive.

DOUBTING JOHN:
ONCE AGAIN. I AM NOT CERTAIN ABOUT MUCH OF ANYTHING. I have said that all deductive arguments having to do with our world of experiences are supported inductively. Without an inductive argument there is no case. You still have not listened to me here.

POWELL:
I have read what you wrote. I keep telling you what you believe but apparently you won't believe me.

DOUBTING JOHN:
When will you listen to what I am saying?

POWELL:
When my computer vocalizes what you write.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Only when you listen can you properly respond. So far you haven’t done either too well at all, as I judge things (and without someone to judge things, then what? ).

POWELL:
Via a circular argument, given "without someone to judge things", I can deductively conclude "without someone to judge things."

POWELL:
In my opinion, logic is based on human experiences. It is a special language that human beings have developed to aid them in their decision making. The rules and definitions of deductive logic such as the law of noncontradiction and validity and soundness are justified by inductive arguments. The rules of deductive logic strictly apply to some of the imaginary worlds of our thinking (those imaginary worlds that are most coherent). To the extent that they also apply to the real world, they are especially useful to us. To the extent that they don't apply, we disregard them or revise them.

DOUBTING JOHN:
This is interesting. I’m trying to see if and where we disagree here, but the way you describe this is a muddle to me. But I think this is what I’ve been saying all along. Sometimes I think all you’re doing is arguing for your own nomenclature, and your own way of describing things. You want to be the one that “properly” describes things, and if anyone describes it differently, you disagree with their description in favor of yours. You’ll do this even though at heart we’re basically agreeing. You have power and control issues, my friend.

POWELL:
Then why did I add to my criterion YOUR suggestion of "agreed to"?

POWELL:
I can imagine a future in which arguments are no more distinguished as to whether the conclusions are certain or probable given the truths of the premises, but they are all rated according to the degree of probability of the conclusion given the truth of the premises.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Welcome to the world that already exists, if I understand you correctly. And welcome to my world, the world I’ve been arguing for with a man named Powell—do you know him?

POWELL:
Yes, I know him. He's me!

POWELL:
Can you also imagine such a world or is that beyond your abilities to imagine? Assuming you can imagine such a world then you should admit that it's rationally possible that the deductive-inductive distinction is a mistake. Whether it's "logically" possible depends on whether logicians allow it or not. The[y] have the trademark, you might say, as to what counts as "logical."

DOUBTING JOHN:
You do have control issues. What’s your point here?

POWELL:
If you can coherently imagine such a world then you should concede that it's a rationally possible world.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Let’s have an argument okay? Let’s try to resolve whether God exists from the previously stated argument (about gratuitous evil). That’s only one side of an argument. The other side of our argument is to inductively argue whether or not it’s sound. And along the way we will have to make other arguments in favor (or against) its soundness, which will additionally require a deductive side and an inductive side to that additional argument. But it’s all one argument. The deductive side speaks about what must be shown, and the inductive side speaks about how it is shown. But it’s one argument, with necessary components. You cannot have one without the other, even if the deductive side goes unstated. And the only way to dispute with the logicians about what is possible or probable is to dispute the rules of logic themselves, since those rules are not capriciously adopted by logicians. The basic ones are rock solid, just like math. In The Journal of Symbolic Logic you will find scholars debating certain ways of expressing these rules, and trying to hammer out new ones, or implications of others, just like Mathematicians do in their journals.

POWELL:
You see? Logicians are discovering things just like mathematicians are. Logic is a human created language, like mathematics is. Because logic and math have great relevance to the real world, we benefit from using them. However, if they don't seem to work for us then we ignore them or revise them.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But then we're back to agreeing on such a test. How about we talk about what kind of test that we could perform that would actually and truly test whether or not there is a supernatural?

POWELL:
James Randi does that on a regular basis. So far, none of the tests have been reliably verified.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Anthony Flew’s, the invisible gardener story again. The believer will simply say there is an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener. He (or she, remember?) will not agree to the tests.

POWELL:
Then skeptics would be justified in disregarding the claim because it's realistically unfalsifiable.

DOUBTING JOHN:
I think it should be an empirical test, don’t you, atheist Powell (I have to make sure which side of your face to speak to, now don't I)? That is, the supernatural should be tested by empirical means.

POWELL:
What important improvement would that produce? Should we add "objective", "repeatable," and "machine recordable" too?

I don't want to add more words to the criterion if we don't really need them. I don't want our opponents to conclude that we're just trying to produce an unreachable standard.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But the point I’m making with Flew’s invisible gardener story is that the believer will reject empirical tests, and that’s all that a non-believer will accept.

POWELL:
I'm willing to consider tests that aren't dependent on the 5 senses, such as a dream. Will the otherwise elusive gardener answer questions in my dreams?

DOUBTING JOHN:
So there cannot be an agreed upon test between the believer and the non-believer. And if that’s the case, the supernatural cannot be falsified. Grant this point. You know it’s true. Stop with the political egomaniacal gerrymandering.

POWELL:
Why is agreement impossible?

DOUBTING JOHN:
Wm. Craig claims he knows because of "the inner witness of the Holy Spirit." D'ya want to test that, atheist Powell?

POWELL:
Sure. How does Wm. Craig propose we test it?

DOUBTING JOHN:
He doesn't. You cannot test it because he would never agree to an empirical test for it. Get the point.

POWELL:
Is he willing to agree to a non empirical test?

DOUBTING JOHN:
It's here where Alchemist and I are right. If we agree that falsifiable means a mutually agreed upon test, then there (most probably--do I have to always say this?) ain't any. And if that's the case, then join us and say there (most probably) ain't any.

POWELL:
I don't recall Alchemist saying anything about "mutually agreed upon test." That's something you added to the discussion.

DOUBTING JOHN:
But it’s inherent in the nature of testing anything—anything. Although many empirical tests have a much greater level of agreement on which tests show which results.

POWELL:
No it's not inherent. The proponent might propose and perform a test that the skeptic does not agree to and vice versa.

Didn't you suggest that you might test the claim about me turning lead into gold by a bunch of people (without my agreement) trying it on their own?

POWELL:
All that means is that apparently current theists aren't agreeing to any proper tests. It doesn't imply it's impossible that there are any or that there weren't some in the past or that there won't be some in the future. Keep an open mind, my skeptical friend. Ask the theists for their evidence. Don't merely tell them they don't have any while you put your hands over your ears. Perhaps God will make His big appearance during our lifetime. (I seriously doubt that).

DOUBTING JOHN:
I seriously doubt that too, and since I’m not certain of much of anything, then why do you state the obvious (again) here?

POWELL:
To persuade you and others.

DOUBTING JOHN:
I never said this was impossible.

POWELL:
What does "cannot be" mean to you if not "impossible"?

DOUBTING JOHN:
You continue to want to disagree with me about a standard I never have accepted, stated, or agreed to. I have repeatedly said I’m talking about what is most probable, and on that point you’ve just agreed with me. So why state the obvious, that something like this is possible? This is quite plainly obvious to any thinking person.

POWELL:
I try to avoid the word "obvious." It doesn't seem to me to apply to the real world nearly as often as its usage suggests.

POWELL:
Assume for the sake of argument that the Biblical account is correct as far as this passage [about Elijah] goes. Under that assumption would Elijah's altar test satisfy those separate parts of the criterion?

DOUBTING JOHN:
I think so. But why even suggest this test?

POWELL:
So that we might arrive at common ground with our opponents.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Not even theists today would accept this test (has any theist proposed this?).

POWELL:
Not that I know of.

DOUBTING JOHN:
If Elijah had challenged me to bring down fire from the sky, I wouldn’t have even wasted my time. I’d simply say, “go ahead and show me. Bring it on.”

POWELL:
Exactly. Allow them to do their demonstration in our presence.

POWELL:
Biblicists challenging the criticism of "realistically unfalsifiable" may very well use Biblical examples in an effort to expose the inadequacies of the methodology.
So, are there good Biblical examples that pass and others that fail?

DOUBTING JOHN:
I’m not sure on this. I’m not sure what Biblical test, if accomplished, would convince me otherwise. This is a tough question for which I have no answers (finally!). But I suspect neither do you. And I also doubt very much that any modern theist would propose to make an axe head float, or raise someone from the dead, or create an earthquake on command, or heal a blind man, or restore an amputated leg, either.

Happy Holidays.

POWELL:
Well, if they wish to avoid the justified criticism that their claims are realistically unfalsifiable then they had better figure something out.

Happy Holidays.

John Powell

[Doubting John]

POWELL:
John. If q is "there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" then not q is "it is not the case that there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" which might mean that there OUGHT to be gratuitous evil in the world!

Can I proofread what you write? And can I tell you what you believe?

Let me solve "the case of the double negative" better than either of our previous attempts.

Here's yours: Powell,

If it is the case that a Creator God exists then it is the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.
It is NOT the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.
Therefore
It is NOT the case that a Creator God exists.

Double begative arguments are sometimes difficult to state, Mr. nitpicker.

Try to eat this one:

If a creator God exists, then all evil serves a higher purpose.
But not all evil serves a higher purpose.
Therefore, a creator God does not exist.

Anyway, this was a fun ride. See ya on the flip side.

Drink one for me.

[John Powell]

POWELL:
If q is "there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" then not q is "it is not the case that there ought to be no gratuitous evil in the world" which might mean that there OUGHT to be gratuitous evil in the world!

DOUBTING JOHN:
Can I proofread what you write? And can I tell you what you believe?

POWELL:
You are able to try.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Let me solve "the case of the double negative" better than either of our previous attempts.

Here's yours:

POWELL:

If it is the case that a Creator God exists then it is the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.

It is NOT the case that there is no gratuitous evil in the world.

Therefore

It is NOT the case that a Creator God exists.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Double begative arguments are sometimes difficult to state, Mr. nitpicker.

POWELL:
I know. That's why I used the reliable, but burdensome "it is the case" to help insure I didn't screw up. If you don't make use of it then you'll likely screw up.

DOUBTING JOHN:
Try to eat this one:

If a creator God exists, then all evil serves a higher purpose.
But not all evil serves a higher purpose.
Therefore, a creator God does not exist.

Anyway, this was a fun ride. See ya on the flip side.

Drink one for me.

POWELL:
That argument has a problem being of the M.T. form because the second premise implies that evil exists whereas the proper negation of "all evil serves a higher purpose" makes no such implication. Your conclusion fortuitously avoids a similar problem because the words "God does not X" do NOT imply that God exists if X = exists.

Let's try another one that will more clearly show the problem. Is the following a Modus Tollens form argument? I say it isn't.

If God loves John then John is in heaven.
John is not in heaven.
Therefore
God does not love John.

The reason it isn't M.T. is because it is of the form

If (G loves J) then (J is in H)
J ~(is in H)
Therefore
G ~(loves J)

To be M.T. the form should be:

If (G loves J) then (J is in H)
~(J is in H)
Therefore
~(G loves J)

The proper M.T. conclusion is NOT that God exists but doesn't love John. Rather, the proper M.T. conclusion is that it's not the case that God loves John. Perhaps that's because God doesn't exist or John doesn't exist or love doesn't exist.

If you better remembered algebra you would better realize how one should deal with negating a parenthetical expression. You negate the whole thing. Perhaps our colleges and universities should require more mathematics of their philosophy students.

John Powell

Science is knowledge. Philosophy is the love of ideas. Especially one's own.

[Doubting John]

POWELL:
If you better remembered algebra you would better realize how one should deal with negating a parenthetical expression. You negate the whole thing.

Perhaps our colleges and universities should require more mathematics of their philosophy students.

John Powell

Science is knowledge. Philosophy is the love of ideas. Especially one's own.

You know, I went to a military school in the 8th grade where I was taught one whole year of symbolic logic under the guise of "the new math." When I reached the public school where we had Algebra in 9th grade I almost flunked out of it because I never had 8th grade math. As a result I never did much more in the area of math than that 9th grade class. But I was way ahead when it came to logic, even though at that time I didn't know what I was taught (I thought it was the new math, like he said).

You are (probably) a mathematician and you approach symbolic logic that way too. But I believe I know what I'm talking about, it's just that your math background and my logic background may contain different ways of expressing things. I liked how you do things here, no doubt, but it's not like it's an either/or situation.

I do wish I had more of a math background like you, but I do fine as it is.

[Kenny]

Anytime someone invokes a supernatural explanation for something, that supernatural cause is completely unfalsifiable.

So what. Falsifiability is a terrible criterion of rationality anyway. What really matters in science or any other form of abductive reasoning is confirmation (i.e. having evidence that raises the probability that the hypothesis in question is true). And, a hypothesis can be confirmable without being falsifiable.

For example, many theists claim that God started the Big Bang. Can't falsify that. Not anymore than you can falsify my claim that it was the IPU or a giant baked potatoe that started the big bang.

Perhaps not, but some of these hypotheses may have a greater intrinsic probability than others or they may explain the observed data better than others. All else being equal, a hypothesis with a greater intrinsic probability or one that better explains the evidence receives more confirmation than its rivals.

Lets presume for a moment that Jesus really did rise from the dead. Christian apologists claim that if Jesus rose from the dead that Christianity is true. However, how could someone tell that Jesus really was God? What if he was a tricky demon or an alien with a morbid sense of humor? How could anyone tell if it was Yaweh, Anubis, Ra, Apollo, Zues, or the invisible pink unicorn that raised Jesus from the dead?

How do you know that the phenomena that we observe in particle chambers is not the result of tricky microscopic gremlins rather than the properties of quarks? The same arguments that you give here against discriminating between supernatural hypotheses work equally well against discriminating between hypotheses concerning the hidden entities of science. In the quark case, the answer is simple enough. First, the hypothesis that it's quarks is simpler than the hypothesis that its gremlins, and simpler hypotheses have higher intrinsic probabilities. Second, the hypothesis that its quarks and not gremlins has a higher explanatory value. On the gremlins hypothesis, we have to postulate not only gremlin properties, but we also have to postulate that these gremlins, for what ever reason, are prone to imitate quark behavior rather than non-quark behavior. On the quark hypothesis, all we need is the properties of quarks and we're off.

Likewise, on the hypothesis that, say, some alien decided to raise Jesus from the dead, we have to explain, arbitrarily, why the alien decided to do that rather than something else, in addition to positing whatever properties the alien might have. Given Jesus religious context, however, there is a perfectly simple and natural explanation for Jesus' resurrection – namely that the God of Israel, for whom Jesus claimed to speak, acted to vindicate His messenger. Couple that with any independent reasons we might have for believing that the God of Israel exists or for finding the Christian redemption story plausible, and this explanation becomes even more likely.

The same goes for supposed miracle healings. How do you know it was God that did it? Could it not have been some other deity or supernatural being just messing with you? How could you know that it wasn't?

Again, how do you know it was quarks and not gremlins. How do you know that there really is a computer in front of you and the Cartesian demon isn't messing with you. How do you know that the Earth really is round and it's not all just a big government conspiracy to make you think so? I suspect any plausible answers you can give to these questions will suggest plausible answers to the above as well.

Because the supernatural, by definition, is beyond human ability to understand and is undefinable.

I don't define it that way. Why should I?

For instance, define God

An eternal, necessarily existing, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent and omnibenevolent personal being; than which none greater than can be conceived; the one who created the Heavens and the Earth; the referent of the term 'God' in the Judeo-Christian faith – there are plenty of other ways to go about it, but these will do.

or tell me exactly what He is made of

Spirit.

Tell me what tables and chairs are made out of. Matter? What's that? Oh, I see, you have a list of matter's dispositional properties – how it tends to behave under various circumstances. Thanks, but that's not what I asked. I want to know what it is, not what it does. Stymied? Well, no more or less than I am when you ask me what God is made out of.

or how He creates

By an act of will.

How exactly does matter curve space time? Yes, yes, I know it does so in such and such a way under such and such circumstances – that's what it does, but I asked you how it does it.

There you have it. Belief in the supernatural is inherently irrational.

If you're right (at least if you are right for the reasons you have given), then so is belief in the hidden entities of science. If you think it is rational to believe in quarks, then its back to the drawing board.