Another Christian Being Offered On The PC Alter?

[seer]

There are a lot of things you're not getting apparently. Let me ask you this simple question: why is your god good? Answer that and you will begin to see your problems.

Why is your objective moral standard good? Answer that and you will begin to see your problems...

You've been asserting for weeks that objective morality is dependent on god, until I showed you that view is incoherent. I just wrote that the standard itself is not a moral claim, it's a meta-ethical claim that seeks to understand the nature of ethical properties, statements, attitudes, and judgments. When I said my standard has good-making properties, I didn't mean that in the moral sense of the word "good". It's good because it's coherent. Coherency is a good thing. Incoherency isn't. That's why your view, which is incoherent, has no good-making properties as far as I can tell.

Thinker, you do believe that there exists an objective moral standard or not? And good-making properties have nothing to do with the moral sense of good? So it doesn't have to do with the moral sense of good when applied to God either - correct?

[The Thinker]

It is necessarily true that if things are good only in virtue of something else, then you have infinite regress.
And your understanding of Koons here is terrible. He doesn't say to go until you get to something "intelligible". Every step of the way (e.g. "loving", "repaying a debt") is intelligible, or else you couldn't understand them or the step from one to the other. He doesn't say "intelligible," he says "intelligible as a stopping place". And he refers to Aristotle's eudaemonism. Aristotle is talking about happiness as an end in itself--that happiness is not good only because of some other thing. And Aristotle spends time arguing that. And so Koons too, in using that example, is talking about an end-in-itself. If it were not an end-in-itself, and were good because of something else, then that would mean it isn't the stopping point; you'd have to move on to that something else.

I'm aware that Koons is talking about an intelligible stopping place. The point is your stopping place is unintelligible.

It's just that Koons is raising the epistemological question of how can we know or have reasonable warrant for supposing that something is such a stopping point and thus an end-in-itself. In no way does Koons say that a good-in-itself is unintelligible. Koons is only disagreeing with Alston's choice of end-in-itself.

And the reason he brings up is that an intelligible one is a stopping point, and that's why your infinite regress argument fails. Once you have an intelligible stopping point, that's it - you stop. No need to go further. But your view forces to stop at god, who must be good logically prior to having any good-making properties, and that makes god's goodness unintelligible and meaningless.

I'd be curious what you think is the stopping point in your theory of objective morality.

I've already expounded on that several times. The only way to intelligibly describe why something is good or bad is to describe what it does.

I'm glad you stated this so explicitly. THIS is the core of our failure to understand each other.
And you are incorrect. The latter does not follow from the former. If you think it does, please explain how it does.

Sorry buddy, the burden of proof is on you to make an argument showing this that actually avoids the dilemma, not pretends to avoid it. This is your whole point. And so far, you have not made any coherent argument even coming close to showing goodness does not or cannot exist apart from god. You've just assumed it.

All I can do is guess what kind of reasoning you have in mind. Please clear up this mystery for me and explain clearly (preferably in clear syllogistic form) how you deduce this conclusion of yours from this premise of yours.

You already know my reasoning. It's based off of the euthyphro dilemma.

Firstly, this has nothing to do with my theory, because my theory has the opposite order of explanation.

Then outline a chronological order of explanation.

Secondly, that isn't exactly Alston's theory either. The meter bar (being the standard) confers meterness on whatever length it has. That is the order of explanation. Only in that sense is the bar's meterness prior to its length being a meter (prior only in the sense of a why-explanation). But that doesn't mean the bar exists as a standard of the meter prior to its having any physical length at all. That would be absurd. It's being the standard of the meter and its having whatever physical length it has are ontologically simultaneous. Far from that preventing it from being the ultimate standard, that is necessarily required of the ultimate standard.

The meter bar analogy is flawed. Koons writes:

......

Likewise for God, in Alston's theory. God (being the standard) confers goodness on whatever attributes God has. That is the order of explanation. Only in that sense is God's goodness prior to God's lovingness being good (prior only in the sense of a why-explanation). But that doesn't mean God exists as a standard of the goodness prior to God having any attributes at all. That would be absurd. God's being the standard of the meter and its having whatever attributes God has are ontologically simultaneous. Far from that preventing God from being the ultimate standard, that is necessarily required of the ultimate standard.

Saying, "God (being the standard) confers goodness on whatever attributes God has" is unintelligible, which is Koon's whole point. It does not explain to me what god you're referring to, why whatever god you're referring to has the properties it has, or why anything is good. The problem is here, you're making a lot of giant assumptions coming from your Christian background that you think are just self-evident and free from cultural bias. I don't see any coherent justification that X is good because god has it and only good because god has it. You need to define what "good" in the moral sense means to you. As far as I can tell, you define it as "whatever my God has." I see no reason to think that's a coherent model.


Correct, but it is arbitrarily made up by people, and is thus a problematic analogy. The meter bar was created to represent the length of a meter which is arbitrarily decided. But we can't expect analogies to be perfect. Anyway, if the meter bar is used correctly in a particularist example, then it would have to be the case that: (1) This particular length, L, is 1 meter because the Paris meter bar has this particular length.

As such Koons writes:


So if you're not defending the particularist model, then you are defending the view that god is good because

That would be true of Alston's theory, sure.

Which is the view you must hold in order to maintain your god's absolute sovereignty.

God, as the particularist standard, is the why-explanation of why those properties are good. Just as the meter bar confers meterness on whatever length it has.

It isn't an actual why or what explanation. If I was having a conversation with a member of ISIS, they would make the same exact argument, but be able to tell me that beheading infidels (like Christians) is good because god has the property of hating infidels. But you would protest this of course. But what would be your defense? From my perspective, all I see is two theists telling me X is either good or not good because their god has or doesn't have that property. That doesn't in any way explain to me why beheading infidels is good in any coherent, intelligible manner. So you need to work on making a case for this, per your ethical views.

Koons agrees on that. Koons' complaint is just that he doesn't see a reason to suppose that God is the ultimate stopping point.
But it is reasonable given Christian theological premises, where God is the ultimate source of everything, and God is, by definition (following Anselm), that than which nothing greater can be conceived. He is the ultimate stopping point of all why-explanations.

He's not the stopping point because such a stopping point is, for the 10th time, unintelligible. You cannot just assume Christian theological premises are justified, because -newsflash- most people are not Christians. And this relates to what I wrote before about how you're making a lot of giant assumptions coming from your Christian background that you think are just self-evidently true and free from cultural bias. That is not the case and this is why you are such a weak debater.

Firstly (again), this is not the theory I gave (my theory had the opposite order of explanation); it is Alston's.

You theory then makes goodness independent of god. You need to show how this is not the case with a logical argument that doesn't just assume Christian theological premises are justified.

Secondly, under Christian premises, God is ultimate of perfection and ultimate source of everything, and therefore logically can only be one of God. This definition cannot define "a god", only "God." People who believe in polytheism may have the problem as you suggest here. (Indeed in the original Euthyphro, Socrates is asking whether "the gods"--not God--confer goodness on piety.)

Doesn't matter. Many people can have different concepts of one "God."

Thirdly, Alston's particularism is not "unintelligible". Indeed, you are able to understand it enough to pose epistemic question about it. Koons doesn't argue that particularism is unintelligible. Koons only questions Alston's particular choice of the Particular.

Koons does argue that Alston's view here is unintelligible, whether or not that applies to all ethical particularism models, I think it does. I can only understand such a model because I have prior knowledge of things that are good because of my knowledge of what they do. Indeed Koons addresses this:

self-evident that God as so conceived is morally perfect, the ultimate standard of good? Intuition is not a magical power; it needs something to work with.

So you are wrong here. God is only "intelligible" because we think of him with the good-making properties he has, that the particularist view must strip from him in order to maintain that god is not good because of his properties, but that those properties are good because god possesses them.

Firstly, if God is the particularist standard, then the truth would arise from whatever attributes God actually has, rather than from varying opinions about God.

This highlights the massive epistemic problem you face. How do you know who or what is the real god that is objective, and free from your subjective personal and cultural biases and preferences? You can't, and so claiming we can know by whatever "attributes God actually has" is impractical. So you can never know, and be justifiably make any claim as to what is good or not because you have no way of actually knowing the real god to any more degree than anyone else who claims they know the real god. Not only that, the particularist model itself is the problem.

Secondly, if you have doubts about Alston's theory being true, that doesn't make it unintelligible. It only means you think it might not be true. You keep being fast and loose with the term "intelligible", and aren't using it the same sense as Koons or in any normal sense of the word.

Nonsense. I am using it in the same exact way Koons is using the term. You just don't understand the whole situation, as usual. So you're either going to make a logical argument showing why goodness cannot exist independently of god, that doesn't just make giant assumptions, or I'm going to stop chatting with you because you're wasting my time.

[Joel]

I'd be curious what you think is the stopping point in your theory of objective morality.

I've already expounded on that several times. The only way to intelligibly describe why something is good or bad is to describe what it does.

I may have not read your posts expounding this to others. It seems one example of this you gave is that a loving act is good because it does something like repay a debt. But that's true only if repaying a debt is good. And by what you've said here, repaying a debt can be intelligibly described as good only by describing what it does. But then that holds only if that is good, which requires describing what that does, and so on. So I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point.

Goodness existing independently of god's goodness is goodness existing independently of god.

I'm glad you stated this so explicitly. THIS is the core of our failure to understand each other.
And you are incorrect. The latter does not follow from the former. If you think it does, please explain how it does.

Sorry buddy, the burden of proof is on you to make an argument showing this that actually avoids the dilemma, not pretends to avoid it. This is your whole point. And so far, you have not made any coherent argument even coming close to showing goodness does not or cannot exist apart from god. You've just assumed it.

It is you making the unusual claim that:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.

implies

C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.

I literally do not know why you think that follows. And it doesn't syllogistically, because the lack of a proposition connecting the term "god's moral goodness" and "god". There is nothing more that can be done on my end besides point that out and wait for you to provide your reasoning. All you did in this post is say:

You already know my reasoning. It's based off of the euthyphro dilemma.

Please be more explicit. The euthyphro dilemma makes no reference to P or C. Please carefully explain how you get from P to C.


Below I respond to your comments on the Alston vs Koons stuff. I really want to hear from you on the above. I include the stuff below just to give a thorough reply. You can ignore the below if you wish.

Firstly, this has nothing to do with my theory, because my theory has the opposite order of explanation.

Then outline a chronological order of explanation.

(Chronological? )
In Alston's theory, the order of explanation is: God's lovingness is good because it's a property of God and God is the standard of good, so God confers goodness upon His lovingness.
In the theory I presented, the order of explanation is the opposite: God is good because God is loving and loving is good.

The meter bar analogy is flawed. Koons writes:

That's what I said: the history of the actual Paris meter bar makes in not an exact example. But Koons has no problem imagining a meter bar that is an exact particularist example.

Likewise for God, in Alston's theory. God (being the standard) confers goodness on whatever attributes God has. That is the order of explanation. Only in that sense is God's goodness prior to God's lovingness being good (prior only in the sense of a why-explanation). But that doesn't mean God exists as a standard of the goodness prior to God having any attributes at all. That would be absurd. God's being the standard of the meter and its having whatever attributes God has are ontologically simultaneous. Far from that preventing God from being the ultimate standard, that is necessarily required of the ultimate standard.

Saying, "God (being the standard) confers goodness on whatever attributes God has" is unintelligible, which is Koons' whole point.

Koons does try to argue that. But the very thing I wrote that you are replying to is me explaining why Koons' argument doesn't work. But instead of responding to my refutation of Koons argument right there, you simply restate Koons' claim.

Correct, but it is arbitrarily made up by people, and is thus a problematic analogy. The meter bar was created to represent the length of a meter which is arbitrarily decided. But we can't expect analogies to be perfect.

Sure, but one relevant way the Christian God differs from the meter bar is that (in the traditional Christian view) God is a necessary being.

So if you're not defending the particularist model, then you are defending the view that god is good because of his virtues, and "that locates the source of moral value outside of God."

Koons claims that without any argument. It is the same claim you are making that that P above implies C. I really have no idea how you or Koons get C from P.


As I've explained, yes in that "stripped" way, it makes no sense, but that Koons is wrong to try to view it in that stripped way. Just as it would be wrong to demand that the meter bar be a standard of length apart from its having any physical length. The fact that a meter bar standard necessarily requires the bar to have some physical length does not mean that meter bar standards are impossible or unintelligible.

Which is the view you must hold in order to maintain your god's absolute sovereignty.

whatever you mean by that.

If I was having a conversation with a member of ISIS, they would make the same exact argument, but be able to tell me that beheading infidels (like Christians) is good because god has the property of hating infidels. But you would protest this of course.

In Alston's theory, Alston would debate it as a factual question of whether God has that property or not. That poses no problem for Alston's theory itself.

You cannot just assume Christian theological premises are justified, because -newsflash- most people are not Christians.

Irrelevant. All I've been trying to do in this thread is argue that Christianity is internally consistent.
What is relevant is that within Christian theology, God is the reasonably understood as the stopping point.
If your argument is merely that we don't know if the Christian God exists, and therefore we don't know that that God is the stopping point, then that just reduces to the debate about whether Christianity is true, not whether it is internally consistent.

Doesn't matter. Many people can have different concepts of one "God."

Many people have lots of varying opinions about lots of things. That doesn't mean there isn't anything real or an actual fact of the matter.
If two people have contradictory opinions, it just means that at least one of them is wrong.

Koons doesn't argue that particularism is unintelligible. Koons only questions Alston's particular choice of the Particular.

Koons does argue that Alston's view here is unintelligible, whether or not that applies to all ethical particularism models, I think it does.

Koons' argument clearly does not apply to particularism in general. His argument is only questioning whether Alston's choice of stopping point (choice of particular) is reasonable (for which Koons uses the term "intelligible"). In fact, we can see why Koons' argument fails if we try making the same argument against the meter bar.

I've already explained exactly why Alston should not do that (and Koons insistence that Alston do that is absurd).

So you are wrong here. God is only "intelligible" because we think of him with the good-making properties he has,

Sure, just as a meter bar is intelligible as the standard only if we think of it with a physical length. But that wouldn't make it any less a particularist ultimate standard. It does not negate the fact that the bar confers meterness onto whatever length it has. (rather than the other way around)

This highlights the massive epistemic problem you face. How do you know who or what is the real god that is objective, and free from your subjective personal and cultural biases and preferences? You can't, and so claiming we can know by whatever "attributes God actually has" is impractical. So you can never know, and be justifiably make any claim as to what is good or not because you have no way of actually knowing the real god to any more degree than anyone else who claims they know the real god.

This epistemological question is different from the ontological question we are discussing. I'm not going to be derailed by this red herring.

So you're either going to make a logical argument showing why goodness cannot exist independently of god, that doesn't just make giant assumptions, or I'm going to stop chatting with you because you're wasting my time.

There's that same old sloppy thinking, shifting to a different question than the one we are discussing.

[Jichard]

The Thinker, Christians respond to the euthyphro dilemma by saying that 'moral goodness' is a part of God's nature.

First, Christians don't have to respond that way. For example, they can take the divine voluntarism route and just saying that something is morally good or morally right simply in virtue of according with God's commands. Or they can take the more plausible route of saying that God is morally good because God has certain good-making properties, such as being just (ex: Wes Morriston takes this latter path).

Second, your response just introduces a new dilemma, akin to one that the Christian philosopher Wes Morriston has pointed out (and which Koons himself notes):

""

What do Christians mean by that? We mean that there is no possible world in which God could exist where he lacks the property of 'moral goodness' or that God is 'essentially good'.

First, your response is trivial and could be done by any nonsensical position. You could do the same thing just by defining God as good. Any old nonsensical position can make a similar move. For example, a simple hedonistic utilitarian could simply define "causes pleasure" such that "causes pleasure" entails "being morally good". So on that position, pleasure would be essentially good. Does that mean the utilitarians position is plausible? Nope. It just shows that a utilitarian can define terms in a certain way. Same for your position


Second, your response doesn't address the Euthyphro dilemma, since you haven't told us why something is morally good or morally right; that is: you haven't told us in virtue of what is something morally good or morally right. Instead, all you've done is tell us that God is morally good ( and you've likely done so by simply defining God as morally good [unless you're using something like a synthetic, informative identity, which would introduce even more problems for your position]). That doesn't tell us what it takes for something to be morally good, anymore than telling me that "bachelors are males" tells me what it takes for something to be a male.


Third, if you try to adapt your response in a way that actually addresses the Euthyphro dilemma, your response is either implausible, or plausible in a way that forfeits the claim God's existence is required for moral properties to exist. Let me explain why:

Unless one opts for something like divine simplicity, then God has multiple, non-identical properties. For example, on one traditional definition of "God", God has the properties of being omnipotent, being omnipresent, being omniscient, and being omnibenevolent, amongst other properties. Now, you seem to be claiming that God has the property of being morally good. In response to this claim of your's, one can ask "in virtue of what does God have the property of being morally good?" You could answer this question in a number of ways. For example, you could claim that God's moral goodness supervenes on other properties God has. Or you could claim that God's moral goodness is identical to other properties God has. Or you could claim that it's simply a brute fact that God is morally good, and there's nothing more to say on that. Or... So let's survey some of those options:

1. You could say that God is morally good in virtue of other properties God has, such as God having certain character traits (ex: being fair, being merciful, etc.), God acting to promote the welfare of sentient life, etc. This is a very plausible option, and is the path taken by various Christian philosophers such as Wes Morriston. This option also makes sense of the following thought experiment:
   Imagine a vicious, psychopathic deity who was also omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, etc. This deity commands that people do vicious things (like rape and genocide), just because that deity enjoys watching the carnage. Is that deity morally good?
   The obvious right answer is "no". And option 1 explains why: it's because the deity lacks certain character traits, and acts in a way that willfully, needlessly harms sentient life. Option 1 also has the further benefit of making God's goodness intelligible. So instead of making vacuous statements like "God is morally good because God is like God" that rob "is morally good" of any meaningful moral semantic content, one can instead say that "God is morally good in virtue of God's mercy, justice, etc." That actually gives some content to God's goodness. Of course, this means forfeiting the claim that moral properties can exist only if God exists. After all, if non-God things have the features in virtue of which God was morally good (ex: having certain character traits), then those non-God things can be morally good, even if God does not exist.
2. You could say that God is morally good in virtue of other properties God has, properties which God alone has, such as God being omnipotent, being omniscient, etc. This move suffers from a number of problems. For example:
   A) It undermines moral arguments for God's existence and it leaves theists susceptible to the very claims they use to to support their moral argument. After all, theists normally try to get their moral arguments off the ground by noting the existence of moral properties instantiated by non-God things. For instance: claiming that saving someone in the Holocaust was morally good. However, option 2 undermines this move, since on option 2 that action does not count as morally good because only God counts as morally good and that action is not God. And that means anyone who things that action was morally good, will have a ready-made objection to option 2: point out the numerous examples of morally good things that are not God, including the action I just reference. Really, option 1 commits theists to position very close to moral nihilism, where they they deny the existence of moral properties such as being morally good, "being morally right, etc. except when those features are had by God.
   B) Saying that "God is morally good because God is omnipotent" implausible confuses might with right. And it makes no sense to claim that a being is morally good because that being is omniscient, or omnipresent, or... After all, as I noted when discussing option 1, a psychopathic, vicious deity could be omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, etc. yet it would make no sense to call such a deity morally good just because it had those features. Being knowledgeable, or being everywhere, or being powerful, or... doesn't make one morally good.
3. You could saying that "God is morally good" is a brute moral truth, and cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else. But this response also has it's own problems. For example:
   A) Option 3 makes God's goodness morally unintelligible. After all, on option 3, you can't specify what you mean by "is morally good" beyond just saying that it refers to one of God's properties. There's no moral content there.
   B) You've made claims like "God is morally good" largely empty, since on option 3, that statement boils down to saying something like "God has a property that God has". Such a statement would be true regardless of what God was. For example, it'd be true even if God was a vicious psychopath or a turkey BLT sandwich.
   C) Unless you want to indict yourself for special pleading, you'll be unable to object to an atheist's position simply by saying because the atheist appeal to brute moral truths. After all, you've just appealed to brute moral truths as well. For example, an atheist, hedonistic utilitarian might say that it's simply a brute, unexplainable moral truth "Pleasure is morally good". And if you say that hey, you can't to brute moral truths, since brute truths are not allowed, you'd be engaged in special pleading (Eric Wielenberg has made related point against William Lane Craig's position).
   D) Your brute moral truths introduce unneeded complexity, with little-to-no-compensating benefit (Wes Morriston has made this point before).

I'm curious about which option you'll take, or if you'll come up with some other way to get your "God's nature" reply to actually answer the question behind the Euthyphro Dilemma.

You might object and say that it makes moral goodness unintelligible, but that objection is irrelevant. This is to confuse moral ontology with moral semantics. Our concern is with moral ontology, that is to say, the foundation in reality of moral values. Our concern is not with moral semantics, that is to say, the meaning of moral terms.

You're simply repeating William Lane Craig's talking points, and thereby repeating his mistakes. Here are some of them.

First, discussions of moral semantics are relevant to discussions of moral ontology, insofar as moral terms refer to moral properties and getting clear on the meaning of moral terms will help one get clear on what properties those moral terms refer [meaning partially determines reference]. Of course, changing your semantics doesn't change what does or does not exist. However, if your semantics is way off, than you might not even be talking about the relevant properties anymore. For example, if radically change the meaning of the term "dog", than you won't be referring to canines anymore, but you might instead be referring to what other people call "mountains". Similarly, if your moral semantics is way off, you won't be referring to moral properties anymore.

Second, the unintelligibility point is still a sufficient criticism, even if it didn't deal with moral ontology. And that's because Christians typically want claims such as "God is morally good" to mean something; that is: they don't want the claims to be vacuous claims akin to saying that "God is like God in a certain way", since "is morally good" would be amount to "is like God in a certain way". Really, "is good" becomes devoid of any of the usual content assosciated with it. Yet the unintelligibility objection points out that this is just what happens on accounts like your's. If your moral semantics makes no sense, then that's a problem for your moral position.

[The Thinker]

The Thinker, Christians respond to the euthyphro dilemma by saying that 'moral goodness' is a part of God's nature. What do Christians mean by that? We mean that there is no possible world in which God could exist where he lacks the property of 'moral goodness' or that God is 'essentially good'. You might object and say that it makes moral goodness unintelligible, but that objection is irrelevant. This is to confuse moral ontology with moral semantics. Our concern is with moral ontology, that is to say, the foundation in reality of moral values. Our concern is not with moral semantics, that is to say, the meaning of moral terms.

Looks like you're a bit late to the conversation and I've responded to those points already. It still is not a refutation of the euthyphro dilemma and the logic behind it. And by the way, you sound just like a William Lane Craig clone.

[The Thinker]

I may have not read your posts expounding this to others. It seems one example of this you gave is that a loving act is good because it does something like repay a debt. But that's true only if repaying a debt is good. And by what you've said here, repaying a debt can be intelligibly described as good only by describing what it does. But then that holds only if that is good, which requires describing what that does, and so on. So I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point.

The stopping point must be something intelligible. There is no need for an infinite regress of explanations. Some moral questions may have more layers of explanation needed than others, but that doesn't require an infinite regress for any of them. Contrary to this, terminating in a god, stripped of his good-making properties, is totally unintelligible. And that's why most philosophers reject any theistic notions of ethics like divine command theory.

It is you making the unusual claim that:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.

implies

C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.

I literally do not know why you think that follows. And it doesn't syllogistically, because the lack of a proposition connecting the term "god's moral goodness" and "god". There is nothing more that can be done on my end besides point that out and wait for you to provide your reasoning. All you did in this post is say:


Please be more explicit. The euthyphro dilemma makes no reference to P or C. Please carefully explain how you get from P to C.

It does. Let me give you an analogy that can help. An essential property of fire is heat; there is no cold fire. But heat can exist independently of fire, like in friction, radiation, etc. If god being loving is an essential property of god, that in no way means lovingness cannot exist independently of god, just like heat with fire. So once again, the burden of proof is on you to show this is not so.

(Chronological? )
In Alston's theory, the order of explanation is: God's lovingness is good because it's a property of God and God is the standard of good, so God confers goodness upon His lovingness.
In the theory I presented, the order of explanation is the opposite: God is good because God is loving and loving is good.

OK. Then show me how loving would not be good absent god.

Koons does try to argue that. But the very thing I wrote that you are replying to is me explaining why Koons' argument doesn't work. But instead of responding to my refutation of Koons argument right there, you simply restate Koons' claim.

That's because you don't actually refute Koons and so we're still left with his argument.

Sure, but one relevant way the Christian God differs from the meter bar is that (in the traditional Christian view) God is a necessary being.

It is those very assumed Christian concepts that are being challenged. They don't make sense. This is your problem, you think Christian assumptions are self-evidently true.

Koons claims that without any argument. It is the same claim you are making that that P above implies C. I really have no idea how you or Koons get C from P.

That's because all philosophers recognize this to be true, so much so that theists like Alston, Craig, and many others explicitly deny god is good because of his good making properties - they know this would deny god's absolute autonomy. You're the only one holding this position and the burden of proof is on you to show it to be true.

As I've explained, yes in that "stripped" way, it makes no sense, but that Koons is wrong to try to view it in that stripped way. Just as it would be wrong to demand that the meter bar be a standard of length apart from its having any physical length. The fact that a meter bar standard necessarily requires the bar to have some physical length does not mean that meter bar standards are impossible or unintelligible.

Once you say "it makes no sense" the particularist view is falsified. The particularist must take the view that god's goodness somehow comes prior to his having good-making properties, which as you admit, "makes no sense." What you say about the meter bar actually shows how it "makes no sense" and thus further demonstrates my point. You're using an admittedly flawed analogy to try make a view that "makes no sense" try and make sense. This is what I got to deal with.

whatever you mean by that.

Apparently you don't.

In Alston's theory, Alston would debate it as a factual question of whether God has that property or not. That poses no problem for Alston's theory itself.

And what could he possibly say to refute the claim made by the ISIS member? What ever god has is be definition good according to Alston's view, but we've got thousands of different gods to choose from and no good way to discern them that don't involve assuming one god's standards is true. This is called the epistemic problem.

Irrelevant. All I've been trying to do in this thread is argue that Christianity is internally consistent.
What is relevant is that within Christian theology, God is the reasonably understood as the stopping point.
If your argument is merely that we don't know if the Christian God exists, and therefore we don't know that that God is the stopping point, then that just reduces to the debate about whether Christianity is true, not whether it is internally consistent.

But it isn't internally consistent for many reasons outside of morality too. It seems to me that you think that if Christian dogma is just assumed to be true, then it's internally consistent. That would make anything internally consistent. Assumptions have to be justified if there is reason to think they aren't. The euthyphro dilemma and the epistemic problem make Christian moral theories incoherent, even under the assumption that god exists.

Many people have lots of varying opinions about lots of things. That doesn't mean there isn't anything real or an actual fact of the matter.
If two people have contradictory opinions, it just means that at least one of them is wrong.

There is no way to know what god is correct as there is no epistemology available to discern such a thing. That is the point. Grounding morality in a god that you believe in makes for an unintelligible stopping point.

Koons' argument clearly does not apply to particularism in general. His argument is only questioning whether Alston's choice of stopping point (choice of particular) is reasonable (for which Koons uses the term "intelligible"). In fact, we can see why Koons' argument fails if we try making the same argument against the meter bar.

Name for me a theological particularist view that doesn't have the problems Koons outlines. And quote me the line where Koons says Alston's stopping point is "intelligible". I don't see it anywhere. He says over and over that it is unintelligible. And again, the meter bar analogy is flawed in itself, so it does not in any way show Koons' argument to fail. At this point you're just making crap up.

I've already explained exactly why Alston should not do that (and Koons insistence that Alston do that is absurd).

Koons is not insisting that Altson do that. He's not forcing Alston to do anything. Alston's particularism is forcing him to do that, and that is the view that Alston holds. So please stop misunderstanding the basics of the arguments because it shows that you don't understand it, or you are pretending because you know your ethical views make no sense.

Sure, just as a meter bar is intelligible as the standard only if we think of it with a physical length. But that wouldn't make it any less a particularist ultimate standard. It does not negate the fact that the bar confers meterness onto whatever length it has. (rather than the other way around)

So you basically agree with me that Alston's particularist view is unintelligible. Now the burden of proof is on you to defend your view that god is good because of X and that X is not good independently of god. Good luck.

This epistemological question is different from the ontological question we are discussing. I'm not going to be derailed by this red herring.

It's not a red herring, it is another component of the arguments against grounding morality in god. But what is the ontology of morality? And what meta-ethical view do you hold? You never mentioned it. Can you tell me what good is and give me an example of something objectively good, tell me why it is objectively good, and why it wouldn't be good absent god?

There's that same old sloppy thinking, shifting to a different question than the one we are discussing.

This has been the challenge for you from the get-go which you haven't met. You can change "cannot" to "is not" if you want. It makes no difference to me.

[The Thinker]

[QUOTE=seer;232346]Why is your objective moral standard good? Answer that and you will begin to see your problems...


I had a feeling you wouldn't be able to even try and answer it. What happened to your confidence? A few weeks ago you were as confident as Donald Trump in asserting your ethical views -- until of course I showed them to be incoherent. Now you're about as confident as Josh Duggar is about his marriage. Lol.

Thinker, you do believe that there exists an objective moral standard or not? And good-making properties have nothing to do with the moral sense of good? So it doesn't have to do with the moral sense of good when applied to God either - correct?

"Good" has a moral usage and a non-moral usage. Anything good about a meta-ethical view is not a moral usage of the word good, because the theory itself is attempting to explain what good is.

[seer]

"Good" has a moral usage and a non-moral usage. Anything good about a meta-ethical view is not a moral usage of the word good, because the theory itself is attempting to explain what good is.

Again Thinker, you have not offered a coherent stopping point for moral questions. Why it would be a stopping point or why it would be a foundation for ethics. You said to Joel: The stopping point must be something intelligible. Well what is yours and why is it intelligible? What has those "good-making" properties that you are going on about?

[Joel]

So I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point.

The stopping point must be something intelligible. There is no need for an infinite regress of explanations. Some moral questions may have more layers of explanation needed than others, but that doesn't require an infinite regress for any of them. Contrary to this, terminating in a god, stripped of his good-making properties, is totally unintelligible. And that's why most philosophers reject any theistic notions of ethics like divine command theory.

I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point. You completely dodged the question: what, specifically, is your stopping point?

It is you making the unusual claim that:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.

implies

C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.

I literally do not know why you think that follows. And it doesn't syllogistically, because the lack of a proposition connecting the term "god's moral goodness" and "god". There is nothing more that can be done on my end besides point that out and wait for you to provide your reasoning. All you did in this post is say:


Please be more explicit. The euthyphro dilemma makes no reference to P or C. Please carefully explain how you get from P to C.

It does. Let me give you an analogy that can help. An essential property of fire is heat; there is no cold fire. But heat can exist independently of fire, like in friction, radiation, etc. If god being loving is an essential property of god, that in no way means lovingness cannot exist independently of god, just like heat with fire. So once again, the burden of proof is on you to show this is not so.

Firstly, the fact that you dance around and try to give me an analogy instead of providing me with the requested syllogism (which would be the most clear and convincing thing you could do), suggests to me that you don't actually have any such syllogism.

Secondly, you are talking about lovingness which has to do with only one term of the above P and C. Nobody denies that lovingness exists other places. Humans can be loving too. (But that's different from the term "Loving is good".) Your discussing that one term doesn't connect the terms, which is what is needed to complete the syllogism. Whether lovingness can exist elsewhere does nothing to explain how something X being independent of God's lovingness implies that X is independent of God completely.

Please complete the syllogism to make it valid:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.
C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.

I really have no idea how you or Koons get C from P.

That's because all philosophers recognize this to be true.

If it's so obvious to you and everyone, then it should be easy for you to complete the syllogism. Why don't you?
I honestly have no idea how you or anyone gets C from P. I can't attempt to refute a line of reasoning that I don't even know and have been unable to guess.

As I've explained, yes in that "stripped" way, it makes no sense, but that Koons is wrong to try to view it in that stripped way.

Once you say "it makes no sense" the particularist view is falsified.

On the contrary, it implies that Koons' additional requirement of "stripping" is falsified. It's an absurd and unnecessary requirement for particularism.

The particularist must take the view that god's goodness somehow comes prior to his having good-making properties, which as you admit, "makes no sense."

"Prior" depends on which sequence you are talking about (e.g. temporal vs ontological). The only sequence for which the particularist "must take the view that god's goodness somehow comes prior to his having good-making properties" is the sequence of conferring goodness. It does not have to come prior temporally or ontologically. To insist that it must be prior in those other senses is not only unecessary to particularism. It makes no sense to impose that on particularism.

This is seen clearly in the example of the meter bar. The meter bar is prior to that length being a meter only in the sequence of the bar conferring meterhood to whatever length it has. But that does not imply that the bar exists as the standard prior it its having any physical length at all. On the contrary, it's being the standard of length must be ontologically simultaneous with its having some physical length.

(Likewise any particularist standard of morality must exist ontologically simultaneous to its having properties onto which it confers goodness.)

And what could he possibly say to refute the claim made by the ISIS member?

I already said I'm not going down that derail.

His argument is only questioning whether Alston's choice of stopping point (choice of particular) is reasonable (for which Koons uses the term "intelligible").

And quote me the line where Koons says Alston's stopping point is "intelligible".

You misread me. I said Koons questions whether Alston's choice of stopping point is reasonable/intelligible. That is, Koons thinks it isn't.

And again, the meter bar analogy is flawed in itself

No it's not. The hypothetical particularist meter bar (with the slight modification Koons makes from the actual Paris meter bar) is a great example, and Koons agrees.

Sure, just as a meter bar is intelligible as the standard only if we think of it with a physical length. But that wouldn't make it any less a particularist ultimate standard. It does not negate the fact that the bar confers meterness onto whatever length it has. (rather than the other way around)

So you basically agree with me that Alston's particularist view is unintelligible.

??

This has been the challenge for you from the get-go which you haven't met. You can change "cannot" to "is not" if you want. It makes no difference to me.

That's not the question we were discussing either. The question isn't "why goodness does not exist independently of god." The question is whether "Goodness is dependent on God" is self-contradictory.

[The Thinker]

I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point. You completely dodged the question: what, specifically, is your stopping point?

I've already explains that to you, and the stopping point is when you can show what the moral aspect in question does. The moral framework I work under, ethical naturalism, explains many of the further questions.

Firstly, the fact that you dance around and try to give me an analogy instead of providing me with the requested syllogism (which would be the most clear and convincing thing you could do), suggests to me that you don't actually have any such syllogism.

The burden of proof is on you Joel to show that you can defend your claim that morality cannot or does not exist apart from god. Still waiting on that.

Secondly, you are talking about lovingness which has to do with only one term of the above P and C. Nobody denies that lovingness exists other places. Humans can be loving too. (But that's different from the term "Loving is good".) Your discussing that one term doesn't connect the terms, which is what is needed to complete the syllogism. Whether lovingness can exist elsewhere does nothing to explain how something X being independent of God's lovingness implies that X is independent of God completely.

Well the burden of proof again is on you to show that lovingness cannot or does not exist independently of god, or that lovingness is only good because of god.

Please complete the syllogism to make it valid:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.
C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.



If it's so obvious to you and everyone, then it should be easy for you to complete the syllogism. Why don't you?
I honestly have no idea how you or anyone gets C from P. I can't attempt to refute a line of reasoning that I don't even know and have been unable to guess.

You have not been able to defend the claim that "Loving is good" does not exist independently of god's moral goodness. So if you can assert something without evidence, I can dismiss it without evidence. You still have not avoided the original dilemma at all. All you've done is try to assume there is no problem. That's not an argument.

On the contrary, it implies that Koons' additional requirement of "stripping" is falsified. It's an absurd and unnecessary requirement for particularism.

No, it's what the particularist has to do in order to remain a particularist by definition.

"Prior" depends on which sequence you are talking about (e.g. temporal vs ontological). The only sequence for which the particularist "must take the view that god's goodness somehow comes prior to his having good-making properties" is the sequence of conferring goodness. It does not have to come prior temporally or ontologically. To insist that it must be prior in those other senses is not only unecessary to particularism. It makes no sense to impose that on particularism.

The particularist's own view forces him to make this kind of reasoning. You show me how one can remain a particularist and not have to strip god of all his good-making properties.

T

his is seen clearly in the example of the meter bar. The meter bar is prior to that length being a meter only in the sequence of the bar conferring meterhood to whatever length it has. But that does not imply that the bar exists as the standard prior it its having any physical length at all. On the contrary, it's being the standard of length must be ontologically simultaneous with its having some physical length.

(Likewise any particularist standard of morality must exist ontologically simultaneous to its having properties onto which it confers goodness.)

The meter is an arbitrary measurement made up by people, it could have been anything, so this whole analogy is flawed.

I already said I'm not going down that derail.

Why not? It exposes the flaw in your ethical theory.

You misread me. I said Koons questions whether Alston's choice of stopping point is reasonable/intelligible. That is, Koons thinks it isn't.

I read you as you wrote. If you intended something else, no big deal. We all make mistakes. Not even Jesus is perfect.

No it's not. The hypothetical particularist meter bar (with the slight modification Koons makes from the actual Paris meter bar) is a great example, and Koons agrees.

You have to ignore the whole history of the meter in order to pretend this analogy works. Also it would have to be the case that (1) This particular length, L, is 1 meter because the Paris meter bar has this particular length, which would be the logical equivalent of, (3) These particular virtues (lovingness, mercy, etc.) are good because God possesses these particular virtues. How does that make any sense at all? Tell me why the particular virtues of (lovingness, mercy, etc.) are good because God possesses these particular virtues, in a logical, coherent fashion.

That's not the question we were discussing either. The question isn't "why goodness does not exist independently of god." The question is whether "Goodness is dependent on God" is self-contradictory.

We can entertain all these questions. You have justified neither one. You have to show morality does not exist independently of god. So far you haven't and I'm getting bored with you.

[The Thinker]

Again Thinker, you have not offered a coherent stopping point for moral questions. Why it would be a stopping point or why it would be a foundation for ethics. You said to Joel: The stopping point must be something intelligible. Well what is yours and why is it intelligible? What has those "good-making" properties that you are going on about?

Talk about hypocrisy. You sir have offered nothing other than what amounts to "God said so," as your "intelligent" stopping point, which is really "my god said so."

Why my view? Because things that are intelligible are better than things which are not intelligible, like your view. You accept plenty of things in other areas of your life because you reach the same kind of intelligent stopping point I do and yet you aren't asking an infinite series of "why" questions on every single thing you think is good in the practical sense of the term.



P.S. Since your view has been refuted, I better not catch you asserting on this thread that god is required for objective morality to other people anymore because if I see it, I will call you out on it immediately.

[seer]

Talk about hypocrisy. You sir have offered nothing other than what amounts to "God said so," as your "intelligent" stopping point, which is really "my god said so."

Why my view? Because things that are intelligible are better than things which are not intelligible, like your view. You accept plenty of things in other areas of your life because you reach the same kind of intelligent stopping point I do and yet you aren't asking an infinite series of "why" questions on every single thing you think is good in the practical sense of the term.

What are you talking about? What exactly is your stopping point? Your ethical opinion? You suggested that there was a problem with stopping with God and His moral nature because it lacked "good-making properties." So does your stopping point have "good-making properties?" Why, where? Talk about hypocritical! This is the bottom line Thinker - either a Moral Just Being governs this universe or there is no ethical governance. It is every man for himself - it is all reduced to red in tooth and claw.

P.S. Since your view has been refuted, I better not catch you asserting on this thread that god is required for objective morality to other people anymore because if I see it, I will call you out on it immediately.

Wait, of course God would be necessary for an objective moral source (objective to humankind) unless you can offer a real alternative - which you haven't.

[Joel]

I'm still not seeing what is your stopping point. You completely dodged the question: what, specifically, is your stopping point?

I've already explains that to you, and the stopping point is when you can show what the moral aspect in question does. The moral framework I work under, ethical naturalism, explains many of the further questions.

What you've explained to me is your general criteria for a stopping point. You haven't told me what is your particular stopping point (or one of your stopping points? do you have more than one?).

It's like I'm asking someone "Who is your wife?", and instead of pointing out the particular woman to me and naming her, the guy responds by trying to explain to me the (or his?) definition of "wife".

I know your definition. I want to know your concrete instance.

Firstly, the fact that you dance around and try to give me an analogy instead of providing me with the requested syllogism (which would be the most clear and convincing thing you could do), suggests to me that you don't actually have any such syllogism.

The burden of proof is on you Joel to show that you can defend your claim that morality cannot or does not exist apart from god. Still waiting on that.
...
You have not been able to defend the claim that "Loving is good" does not exist independently of god's moral goodness. So if you can assert something without evidence, I can dismiss it without evidence.

But my intent has never been to prove such a claim. This is you shifting again to a different question. Your attempt to change the subject further strengthens my suspicion that you don't actually have any such syllogism for the reasoning you claim.

Secondly, you are talking about lovingness which has to do with only one term of the above P and C. Nobody denies that lovingness exists other places. Humans can be loving too. (But that's different from the term "Loving is good".) Your discussing that one term doesn't connect the terms, which is what is needed to complete the syllogism. Whether lovingness can exist elsewhere does nothing to explain how something X being independent of God's lovingness implies that X is independent of God completely.

Well the burden of proof again is on you to show that lovingness cannot or does not exist independently of god, or that lovingness is only good because of god.

I just there agreed that "lovingness exists other places." And pointed out that: "Whether lovingness can exist elsewhere does nothing to explain how something X being independent of God's lovingness implies that X is independent of God completely."
Again you dodge the question.

For your convenience here it is again:
Please complete the syllogism to make it valid:

P) "Loving is good" exists independently of god's moral goodness.
C) "Loving is good" exists independently of god.

If it's so obvious to you and everyone, then it should be easy for you to complete the syllogism. Why don't you?
I honestly have no idea how you or anyone gets C from P. I can't attempt to refute a line of reasoning that I don't even know and have been unable to guess. (And without this, you have no dilemma.)

No, it's what the particularist has to do in order to remain a particularist by definition.

No, it's the opposite of what the particularist has to do in order to remain a particularist by definition. Far from needing to strip the particularist standard of its properties, it must have those properties. A meter bar standard does not require us to strip the bar of physical length. On the contrary, the particularist meter bar must have some length, by definition.

What don't you understand about that? And if you can't understand that, then you don't understand Alston's particularism.

[Joel]

1. You could say that God is morally good in virtue of other properties God has, such as God having certain character traits (ex: being fair, being merciful, etc.), God acting to promote the welfare of sentient life, etc. This is a very plausible option, and is the path taken by various Christian philosophers such as Wes Morriston. This option also makes sense of the following thought experiment:
   Imagine a vicious, psychopathic deity who was also omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, etc. This deity commands that people do vicious things (like rape and genocide), just because that deity enjoys watching the carnage. Is that deity morally good?
   The obvious right answer is "no". And option 1 explains why: it's because the deity lacks certain character traits, and acts in a way that willfully, needlessly harms sentient life. Option 1 also has the further benefit of making God's goodness intelligible. So instead of making vacuous statements like "God is morally good because God is like God" that rob "is morally good" of any meaningful moral semantic content, one can instead say that "God is morally good in virtue of God's mercy, justice, etc." That actually gives some content to God's goodness. Of course, this means forfeiting the claim that moral properties can exist only if God exists. After all, if non-God things have the features in virtue of which God was morally good (ex: having certain character traits), then those non-God things can be morally good, even if God does not exist.

The part I set in bold depends on what it is that causes those properties to be good. It might be the case that both the following are true:
A) God is morally good in virtue of other properties God has, such as God having certain character traits (ex: being fair, being merciful, etc.).
and
B) The cause of those properties being good is in God.

In previous posts I have made the point that we could imagine a "vicious" deity that both contains the objective moral Standard and fails to conform to that standard and thus is vicious. The standard (or cause of morality) may be an independent property from God's morally good properties.

3. You could saying that "God is morally good" is a brute moral truth, and cannot be accounted for in terms of anything else. But this response also has it's own problems. For example:

A) Option 3 makes God's goodness morally unintelligible. After all, on option 3, you can't specify what you mean by "is morally good" beyond just saying that it refers to one of God's properties. There's no moral content there.
B) You've made claims like "God is morally good" largely empty, since on option 3, that statement boils down to saying something like "God has a property that God has". Such a statement would be true regardless of what God was. For example, it'd be true even if God was a vicious psychopath or a turkey BLT sandwich.
C) Unless you want to indict yourself for special pleading, you'll be unable to object to an atheist's position simply by saying because the atheist appeal to brute moral truths. After all, you've just appealed to brute moral truths as well. For example, an atheist, hedonistic utilitarian might say that it's simply a brute, unexplainable moral truth "Pleasure is morally good". And if you say that hey, you can't to brute moral truths, since brute truths are not allowed, you'd be engaged in special pleading (Eric Wielenberg has made related point against William Lane Craig's position).
D) Your brute moral truths introduce unneeded complexity, with little-to-no-compensating benefit (Wes Morriston has made this point before).

I think the Craig/Alston view is not quite the same as this. I think the idea is a 4th option to add to your list: That God is the (particularist) standard of Good. That's not the same thing as saying that "God is morally good" is a brute moral truth. Rather, "God is morally good" is a conclusion that would follow from God being the standard. In this 4th option, God is the standard, and thus confers goodness onto things like lovingness (because God possesses lovingness). And then, in turn, it is reasonable to say that God's properties, such as lovingness is, what is meant by God's moral goodness, even though God's being the standard is the answer to why lovingness is good. (Thus God's moral goodness has content.) And it's not circular because you aren't starting with God's goodness, but with God being the Standard of good.

[The Thinker]

What are you talking about? What exactly is your stopping point? Your ethical opinion? You suggested that there was a problem with stopping with God and His moral nature because it lacked "good-making properties." So does your stopping point have "good-making properties?" Why, where? Talk about hypocritical!

So now we're just playing dumb again it seems. I already told you 10 times what my stopping point is. It's in showing what the moral action does and what it's intended to do - that's the only intelligent stopping point. Charity is good because it helps the poor, not because god likes it or commands it. As such of course my stopping point has good-making properties. Yours is "God said so." Which has nothing, not even intelligence.

This is the bottom line Thinker - either a Moral Just Being governs this universe or there is no ethical governance. It is every man for himself - it is all reduced to red in tooth and claw.

You keep reiterating this as if it hasn't been refuted over and over again by me and others. Your "morally just being" cannot logically be the foundation for morality, as I've show you with the euthyphro dilemma, which you have not refuted and admitted your basis is totally circular, and nonsensical. Ethical governance has nothing to do with a foundation for morality. Our universe could be ran by Adolph Hitler and you'd get "ethical governance." All you have is either a circular argument, or might makes right. And you have no coherent methodology for knowing who god is and what he wants. It's all based on your opinion on who you think god is and what you think god wants. That's why no theists agree on this. It is every [theist] for himself - it is all reduced to red in tooth and claw.

Wait, of course God would be necessary for an objective moral source (objective to humankind) unless you can offer a real alternative - which you haven't.

You can't make that argument without showing morality is arbitrarily decided by god, which would make it subjective, or making a circular argument (X is good because god commanded it, and god commanded it because he's good!) which is incoherent. So you have no actual basis to make your claim. I however have showed you that your basis for morality is unintelligible and incoherent (circular).