Nuclear Deal With Iran

[Jesse]

Are you familiar with Libya's nuclear program and disarmament? Iraq's?

Yes. And their disarmament had nothing to do with the IAEA. Of course neither did Iraq's. Do you have any more examples of IAEA successes in stopping rogue states trying to acquire nuclear weapons?

[rogue06]

People have been claiming that Iran has been close to developing nuclear weapons since the early 90s. In 1992, the House Republican Research Committee said that there was a 98% certainty that Iran already had all the components necessary for two or three nuclear weapons. That same year Benjamin Netanyahu claimed that Iran was 3 to 5 years from being able to produce a nuclear weapon and that the threat had to be "uprooted by an international front headed by the US." That same year, Shimon Peres claimed that Iran was set to have nuclear warheads by 1999. "Iran is the greatest threat and greatest problem in the Middle East," Peres warned, "because it seeks the nuclear option while holding a highly dangerous stance of extreme religious militancy." It's just baseless fearmongering and propaganda, and let's not forget that the reason why there was an Islamic revolution in 1979 was because the US backed, funded, and supplied a corrupt Shah. The West also funded and supplied: Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, Muammar Gaddafi, and the Syrian rebels who went onto become ISIS. In other words, constantly meddling in the affairs of foreign nations tends to backfire spectacularly, as does constantly going to war with said nations whom we have meddled with.

There have been several instances of sabotage and even assassinations that have leaked out in the press that have dealt significant set-backs to Iran's nuclear program at key stages over the years.

[Sam]

Yes. And their disarmament had nothing to do with the IAEA. Of course neither did Iraq's. Do you have any more examples of IAEA successes in stopping rogue states trying to acquire nuclear weapons?

[Jesse]

I guess you are not understanding me. The IAEA has not been able to enforce much of anything. Their job is to inspect these facilities to see whether there is any clandestine labs being run. And as I showed, Libya and Iraq were both still trying to acquire and create nuclear material even after they accepted deals from the IAEA. The IAEA's presence was so insignificant, both states completely ignored them.

But you think that Iran isn't smart enough to run rings around the IAEA like Libya and Iraq did for years? Come on, man.

[Sam]

I guess you are not understanding me. The IAEA has not been able to enforce much of anything. Their job is to inspect these facilities to see whether there is any clandestine labs being run. And as I showed, Libya and Iraq were both still trying to acquire and create nuclear material even after they accepted deals from the IAEA. The IAEA's presence was so insignificant, both states completely ignored them.

But you think that Iran isn't smart enough to run rings around the IAEA like Libya and Iraq did for years? Come on, man.

The IAEA does the inspections and reports; if there are violations, the IAEA doesn't send in troops, it goes to the UN Security Council. Both Libya and Iraq didno nuclear weapons program after disarmament, as has been extensively detailed.

Neither country "ran rings" around the IAEA and neither had anything like a functional nuclear weapons program after disarmament began.

[Jesse]

The IAEA does the inspections and reports; if there are violations, the IAEA doesn't send in troops, it goes to the UN Security Council. Both Libya and Iraq didno nuclear weapons program after disarmament, as has been extensively detailed.

Neither country "ran rings" around the IAEA and neither had anything like a functional nuclear weapons program after disarmament began.

Yes Libya and Iraq did disarm, but again, it had absolutely nothing to do with the IAEA. Libya disarmed because Qaddafi wanted too, not because of any international pressure. Libya was part of the IAEA since 1963. And that stopped them from doing what exactly? After Libya disarmed in 2003, we found out how far they went right under the IAEA noses. You know, like getting yellow cake in Nigeria.

As for Iraq, remember the fun that was had when Saddam kicked the IAEA out of the country? He sure did seem threatened by what the international community thought, right? And Iraq was part of the NPT since 1969. And of course let's not forget those that knew the IAEA were being lapdogs of Saddam's.

So yes, both countries ran rings around the IAEA. But I won't try to dissuade you into thinking this useless bureaucracy is going to do anything different with Iran. We will be back here talking about the uselessness of this deal when Iran decides to ignore it.

[Sam]

Yes Libya and Iraq did disarm, but again, it had absolutely nothing to do with the IAEA. Libya disarmed because Qaddafi wanted too, not because of any international pressure. Libya was part of the IAEA since 1963. And that stopped them from doing what exactly? After Libya disarmed in 2003, we found out how far they went right under the IAEA noses. You know, like getting yellow cake in Nigeria.

As for Iraq, remember the fun that was had when Saddam kicked the IAEA out of the country? He sure did seem threatened by what the international community thought, right? And Iraq was part of the NPT since 1969. And of course let's not forget those that knew the IAEA were being lapdogs of Saddam's.

So yes, both countries ran rings around the IAEA. But I won't try to dissuade you into thinking this useless bureaucracy is going to do anything different with Iran. We will be back here talking about the uselessness of this deal when Iran decides to ignore it.

Libya was part of the nuclear proliferation treaty and did still pursue a nuclear weapons program but the involvement of the IAEA was much less than what we're talking about with Iran or Iraq or even Libya after 2003. If you're judging the merits of the current deal, you've got to look at Libya post-2003, when it allowed significant IAEA inspections, rather than back in the 70's or 80's, when it didn't.

Hussein didn't restart a nuclear weapons program after expelling the IAEA in the late 90's, as (again) has been clearly detailed in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Under the IAEA's inspections program, Iraq's nuclear disarmament was entirely sufficient.

You're arguing now that Libya disarmed not because of international pressure but because "Qaddafi wanted to." But Qaddafi wanted to end the illicit nuclear weapons program precisely because of international pressure, specifically long-acting sanctions. Similarly, the Iranian leadership wants

[Jesse]

Libya was part of the nuclear proliferation treaty and did still pursue a nuclear weapons program but the involvement of the IAEA was much less than what we're talking about with Iran or Iraq or even Libya after 2003. If you're judging the merits of the current deal, you've got to look at Libya post-2003, when it allowed significant IAEA inspections, rather than back in the 70's or 80's, when it didn't.

Right. And so what is the point? Qaddafi allowed inspections post-2003 after he gave up pursuing his nuclear ambitions. This had nothing to do with the IAEA.

Hussein didn't restart a nuclear weapons program after expelling the IAEA in the late 90's, as (again) has been clearly detailed in the aftermath of the Iraq War. Under the IAEA's inspections program, Iraq's nuclear disarmament was entirely sufficient.

I didn't say he restarted it back up. I said the IAEA had nothing to do with stopping his pursuits. While the IAEA was inspecting Saddam's facilities, it became so apparent that the IAEA was lying about Iraq cooperating, we had UNSCOM intervene. That really sounds like an agency you can trust.

Not true. Libya was under international pressure to disarm since 1963. You are telling me that only after 40 years had passed, he decided that the pressure was too much to bear? Qaddafi has been contradictory on his stance for years. We know for a fact he was signing Nuclear NonProliferation Treaties and claiming he didn't want nuclear material while he was doing the exact opposite. His acquiring of yellow cake in 1978 is proof of that. But you want me to believe that Iran's leader (who is saying the exact same thing) is to be trusted? History has shown that you can't trust a tyrant. But you go ahead.

You're mish-mashing all sorts of different histories and motivations together and cherry-picking pieces of each to come to a conclusion that's opposite of what we've learned from previous disarmament efforts. We know that disarmament, supervised by the IAEA, can and has worked. To say that this deal "won't do anything" ignores the unprecedented level of inspection and monitoring inherent in the deal and the success of previous efforts with less stringent inspection and monitoring.

Sorry, but there is no mish-mashing here. The history of the IAEA in these instances is no secret. I am still waiting to see the successes of supervised disarmament's by the IAEA. It's funny how all of these were called "unprecedented level of inspection and monitoring" in the past too. And we now know they were far from that. Here are you two success stories:

Libya: Only after Qaddafi no longer wanted to pursue nukes did he dismantle them.

Iraq: Only after Saddam died were they allowed back in to monitor the dismantling by the new Iraqi government.

So what is different about Iran from these other two? Qaddafi and Saddam were not able to create the nuclear facilities they were so desperately seeking because of their own incompetence. They didn't have the scientists, infrastructure, or the resources to make it happen. The IAEA had nothing to do with any of it. Iran however, has all of those things. And just like Iraq, when Iran decides the game is over, the IAEA will be kicked out and ignored.

Most of this thread has been talk about the specifics of this deal. But the deal itself does not matter. Iran doesn't need loopholes when they can just ignore the deal entirely at their leisure. What is the IAEA going to do? Report back that Iran stopped cooperating and is now going to make a bomb? That's useful information. And when Iran ignores this deal, what will happen? More sanctions? Because those seem to work well to stop rogue states from getting what they want, right? The entire thing is a useless exercise for an administration trying to act like it's doing something important.

[Sam]

Right. And so what is the point? Qaddafi allowed inspections post-2003 after he gave up pursuing his nuclear ambitions. This had nothing to do with the IAEA.



I didn't say he restarted it back up. I said the IAEA had nothing to do with stopping his pursuits. While the IAEA was inspecting Saddam's facilities, it became so apparent that the IAEA was lying about Iraq cooperating, we had UNSCOM intervene. That really sounds like an agency you can trust.



Not true. Libya was under international pressure to disarm since 1963. You are telling me that only after 40 years had passed, he decided that the pressure was too much to bear? Qaddafi has been contradictory on his stance for years. We know for a fact he was signing Nuclear NonProliferation Treaties and claiming he didn't want nuclear material while he was doing the exact opposite. His acquiring of yellow cake in 1978 is proof of that. But you want me to believe that Iran's leader (who is saying the exact same thing) is to be trusted? History has shown that you can't trust a tyrant. But you go ahead.



Sorry, but there is no mish-mashing here. The history of the IAEA in these instances is no secret. I am still waiting to see the successes of supervised disarmament's by the IAEA. It's funny how all of these were called "unprecedented level of inspection and monitoring" in the past too. And we now know they were far from that. Here are you two success stories:

Libya: Only after Qaddafi no longer wanted to pursue nukes did he dismantle them.

Iraq: Only after Saddam died were they allowed back in to monitor the dismantling by the new Iraqi government.

So what is different about Iran from these other two? Qaddafi and Saddam were not able to create the nuclear facilities they were so desperately seeking because of their own incompetence. They didn't have the scientists, infrastructure, or the resources to make it happen. The IAEA had nothing to do with any of it. Iran however, has all of those things. And just like Iraq, when Iran decides the game is over, the IAEA will be kicked out and ignored.

Most of this thread has been talk about the specifics of this deal. But the deal itself does not matter. Iran doesn't need loopholes when they can just ignore the deal entirely at their leisure. What is the IAEA going to do? Report back that Iran stopped cooperating and is now going to make a bomb? That's useful information. And when Iran ignores this deal, what will happen? More sanctions? Because those seem to work well to stop rogue states from getting what they want, right? The entire thing is a useless exercise for an administration trying to act like it's doing something important.

You are maintaining that Qaddafi simply "wanted to" end the nuclear weapons program without providing any motivation for that desire. Why did Qaddafi want to end the weapons program? International pressure:



You're likewise imagining that the Iran deal consists of Iran, the IAEA and no one else. Saying that nuclear disarmament of Libya and Iraq have nothing to do with the IAEA is non-sensible and at odds with the point you're trying to argue, that the Iran deal will "do nothing." You're basing that on the apparent toothlessness of the IAEA while dismissing successful disarmament as not being related to IAEA inspections. But, of course, we're arguing about the Iran nuclear agreement in totalwas allowed back into Iraq prior to the 2003 war and Hussein's death and, second, that comprehensive inspections after the war proved that Iraq had not restarted its nuclear program after expelling the IAEA. So disarmament worked, regardless of later developments.

You belittle sanctions as being ineffective at preventing countries from developing nuclear weapons but in the case of Libya, Iraq, and Iran, sanctions have been effective. Iran has the ability right now to build a nuclear bomb in a matter of months and has apparently had that capability for years. So what's been stopping it? You have to either argue that Iran simply hasn't wanted to build a nuclear weapon or you have to acknowledge that international pressure has been a successful deterrent. If you accept the latter (and, really, there isn't a better explanation) then you have to accept that the IAEA's ability to inspect and report on Iran's compliance is a very big factor: if the Iranian leadership cheats and the IAEA reports non-compliance then that international pressure "snaps back" and Iran is set to face even worse sanctions and repercussions.

[Jesse]

You are maintaining that Qaddafi simply "wanted to" end the nuclear weapons program without providing any motivation for that desire. Why did Qaddafi want to end the weapons program? International pressure:

You seemed to have ignored the reason why I said that Qaddafi decided to end his nuclear program. So let's try it again:


Again, he stopped his program because he was incompetent and didn't have the resources to continue. Not to mention his alienation of western contacts which could have helped. This had nothing to do with IAEA.

If there was any international pressure, it was from the United States specifically. Gaddafi wanted normalizing relations with us and were involved in negotiations with the Clinton/Bush administrations:

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2004/01/23middleeast-leverett

The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990's to seek normalized relations with the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.

These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations sanctions against Libya.

Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a "script" indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case.

We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted permanently. This script became the basis for three-party negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue.

By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted responsibility for its officials' actions.

But during these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of United Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction.

This is the context in which Libyan officials approached the United States and Britain last spring to discuss dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead the removal our own sanctions, perhaps by the end of this year.

© Copyright Original Source

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/how-we-dodged-libyas-nucl_b_829669.html

Gaddafi's acceptance of responsibility for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 led to the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, but it became clear that he would also have to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons before Washington would lift its sanctions. As Blair noted, Gaddafi came to Britain with a proposal to do just that in March, just before the Iraq War began.

In March 2003, shortly before the Iraq War began, Musa Kussa, Gaddafi's chief of intelligence, approached British M16 officials seeking to conclude negotiations for the end of its unconventional weapon programs in exchange for normalization of ties. Some officials and experts link Libya's decision to President Bush's national security strategy and the invasion of Iraq. The presence of 250,000 U.S. forces in the region undoubtedly had an impact, but it does not seem that Gaddafi feared a U.S. invasion of Tripoli.

More likely, Gaddafi had concluded that he needed Western contracts and markets more than he needed chemical or nuclear weapons. Efforts to end Libya's weapon programs spanned four presidential administrations.

The UN had imposed sanctions in 1992 in response to the downing of an airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988. Some U.S. sanctions were already in place by then, having been imposed in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan. More U.S. sanctions followed in 1992 and 1996. In the late 1990s Libya approached the second Clinton administration with hopes of ending international isolation. The Clinton administration made Libyan cooperation in the Lockerbie bombing case a prerequisite to normalizing U.S.-Libya relations. Even after the United Nations suspended its sanctions in 1999, U.S. sanctions remained in place. U.S. officials made clear that Libya would have to address concerns over its weapons programs before U.S. sanctions would be lifted. These discussions continued in the Bush administration.

© Copyright Original Source

To say that the IAEA or global pressure had anything to do with it is nonsense.


I don't think it matters how many countries are involved in the deal. None of these other deals were just between IAEA and the rogue states either. You are still using the term "successful" when speaking of the IAEA. You have yet to show anything they have done that has been a success however. Repeating it doesn't make it true.

I don't know why you keep talking about Iraq restarting their program. No one here said that they did. The IAEA inspection in 2003 said that they found no "smoking guns" in Iraq. The whole point of the 2003 inspections was because Saddam violated Resolution 1441. That fact that the IAEA didn't uncover Saddam's "crash program" and the facilities being dismantled after his death should tell you how useless the IAEA is. But it's different this time right?

I belittle the sanctions because they still have not been shown to work. They didn't work in Libya or Iraq. I have no idea why you would place Iran in there. I have no idea if Iran is right now capable of making a nuke. For all we know they might have one already. My point has always been, so what? Whether they have one now or later isn't the point. This deal will not stop them from getting one if they so desire to have one. No amount of finger wagging from the IAEA will do anything to stop that.

If you believe that sanctions work, why hasn't it with Iran? You said they have the capability to make one now, so why haven't all those wonderful sanctions over the years made it impossible or even hard for them too? Because maybe they don't work?

[Sam]

You seemed to have ignored the reason why I said that Qaddafi decided to end his nuclear program. So let's try it again:


Again, he stopped his program because he was incompetent and didn't have the resources to continue. Not to mention his alienation of western contacts which could have helped. This had nothing to do with IAEA.

If there was any international pressure, it was from the United States specifically. Gaddafi wanted normalizing relations with us and were involved in negotiations with the Clinton/Bush administrations:

Source: http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2004/01/23middleeast-leverett

The roots of the recent progress with Libya go back not to the eve of the Iraq war, but to the Bush administration's first year in office. Indeed, to be fair, some credit should even be given to the second Clinton administration. Tired of international isolation and economic sanctions, the Libyans decided in the late 1990's to seek normalized relations with the United States, and held secret discussions with Clinton administration officials to convey that message. The Clinton White House made clear that no movement toward better relations was possible until Libya met its responsibilities stemming from the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988.

These discussions, along with mediation by the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, produced a breakthrough: Libya turned over two intelligence officers implicated in the Pan Am 103 attack to the Netherlands for trial by a Scottish court, and in 1999 Washington acquiesced to the suspension of United Nations sanctions against Libya.

Then, in the spring of 2001, when I was a member of the State Department's policy planning staff, the Bush administration picked up on those discussions and induced the Libyans to meet their remaining Lockerbie obligations. With our British colleagues, we presented the Libyans with a "script" indicating what they needed to do and say to satisfy our requirements on compensating the families of the Pan Am 103 victims and accepting responsibility for the actions of the Libyan intelligence officers implicated in the case.

We also put an explicit quid pro quo on the table: if Libya met the conditions we laid out, the United States and Britain would allow United Nations sanctions to be lifted permanently. This script became the basis for three-party negotiations to resolve the Lockerbie issue.

By early 2003, after a Scottish appeals court upheld the conviction of one of the Libyan intelligence officers, it was evident that our approach would bear fruit. Indeed, Washington allowed the United Nations sanctions against Libya to be removed last summer after Libya reached a compensation agreement with the Pan Am 103 families and accepted responsibility for its officials' actions.

But during these two years of talks, American negotiators consistently told the Libyans that resolving the Lockerbie situation would lead to no more than elimination of United Nations sanctions. To get out from under the separate United States sanctions, Libya would have to address other concerns, particularly regarding its programs in weapons of mass destruction.

This is the context in which Libyan officials approached the United States and Britain last spring to discuss dismantling Libya's weapons program. The Iraq war, which had not yet started, was not the driving force behind Libya's move. Rather, Libya was willing to deal because of credible diplomatic representations by the United States over the years, which convinced the Libyans that doing so was critical to achieving their strategic and domestic goals. Just as with Lockerbie, an explicit quid pro quo was offered: American officials indicated that a verifiable dismantling of Libya's weapons projects would lead the removal our own sanctions, perhaps by the end of this year.

© Copyright Original Source

Source: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-cirincione/how-we-dodged-libyas-nucl_b_829669.html

Gaddafi's acceptance of responsibility for the destruction of Pan Am Flight 103 led to the suspension of UN sanctions in 1999, but it became clear that he would also have to end his pursuit of nuclear and chemical weapons before Washington would lift its sanctions. As Blair noted, Gaddafi came to Britain with a proposal to do just that in March, just before the Iraq War began.

In March 2003, shortly before the Iraq War began, Musa Kussa, Gaddafi's chief of intelligence, approached British M16 officials seeking to conclude negotiations for the end of its unconventional weapon programs in exchange for normalization of ties. Some officials and experts link Libya's decision to President Bush's national security strategy and the invasion of Iraq. The presence of 250,000 U.S. forces in the region undoubtedly had an impact, but it does not seem that Gaddafi feared a U.S. invasion of Tripoli.

More likely, Gaddafi had concluded that he needed Western contracts and markets more than he needed chemical or nuclear weapons. Efforts to end Libya's weapon programs spanned four presidential administrations.

The UN had imposed sanctions in 1992 in response to the downing of an airliner over Lockerbie in Scotland in 1988. Some U.S. sanctions were already in place by then, having been imposed in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan. More U.S. sanctions followed in 1992 and 1996. In the late 1990s Libya approached the second Clinton administration with hopes of ending international isolation. The Clinton administration made Libyan cooperation in the Lockerbie bombing case a prerequisite to normalizing U.S.-Libya relations. Even after the United Nations suspended its sanctions in 1999, U.S. sanctions remained in place. U.S. officials made clear that Libya would have to address concerns over its weapons programs before U.S. sanctions would be lifted. These discussions continued in the Bush administration.

© Copyright Original Source

To say that the IAEA or global pressure/sanctions had anything to do with it is nonsense.

Oh, good heavens. Your first citation deals with Libya's failure at developing a nuclear weapon, not its motivations for giving up the program. Even if the government was incompetent in this regard, there would have be some incentive for giving it up. In your next citations, we see what that motivation was: normalization of diplomatic ties between the USA and other countries and reprieve from the U.N. sanctions. In other words, [i]international pressure[i] and specifically sanctions relief motivated the Libyan government to give up its nuclear program and cooperate with the IAEA.

Your citations refute your argument.

I don't think it matters how many countries are involved in the deal. None of these other deals were just between IAEA and the rogue states either. You are still using the term "successful" when speaking of the IAEA. You have yet to show anything they have done that has been a success however. Repeating it doesn't make it true.

The IAEA is a necessary part of nuclear non-proliferation deals. You're treating it as a completely separate entity instead of a necessary part of a comprehensive system. So, yes, it absolutely does matter that this isn't just a matter between Iran and the IAEA.

I don't know why you keep talking about Iraq restarting their program. No one here said that they did. The IAEA inspection in 2003 said that they found no "smoking guns" in Iraq. The whole point of the 2003 inspections was because Saddam violated Resolution 1441. That fact that the IAEA didn't uncover Saddam's "crash program" and the facilities being dismantled after his death should tell you how useless the IAEA is. But it's different this time right?

Iraq's "crash program" occurred prior to IAEA inspections in the country so I'm not sure why it's brought up here. You'll have to be more specific about facilities dismantled after the death of Hussein ... I don't know what you're referring to and I find it difficult to see Iraq leaders doing much nuclear clean-up in the immediate aftermath of Hussein's death.

And a key difference between Iraq and Iran lies in the specific details of this agreement that you're convinced won't do anything. Unlike inspections in Iraq, refusal to cooperate with IAEA inspections (which are continuous at the mines and productions facilities) will result in immediate "snapback" of sanctions. So, yeah, there are numerous relevant differences this time that you're overlooking.

I belittle the sanctions because they still have not been shown to work. They didn't work in Libya or Iraq. I have no idea why you would place Iran in there. I have no idea if Iran is right now capable of making a nuke. For all we know they might have one already. My point has always been, so what? Whether they have one now or later isn't the point. This deal will not stop them from getting one if they so desire to have one. No amount of finger wagging from the IAEA will do anything to stop that.

If you believe that sanctions work, why hasn't it with Iran? You said they have the capability to make one now, so why haven't all those wonderful sanctions over the years made it impossible or even hard for them too? Because maybe they don't work?

Sanctions did work with Libya and Iraq and they have worked with Iran. I don't know how on earth you can claim that sanctions haven't worked when Iran just agreed to an enormously intensive and comprehensive decade-long nuclear deal as a direct result of the sanctions placed upon it. Just ludicrous, at this point.

[Sam]

I misread one of the above citations, which details that the U.N. sanctions were to be lifted as part of the Lockerbie issue and were not tied to dismantling of the weapons program. My apologies.

The point still stands, however, that Qaddafi's motivation for dismantling the nuclear program was relief from sanctions (from the USA and Britain, here) and international pressure from the U.N. and its member states. If you're arguing that sanctions don't work, you have to explain why you're citing a source that explicitly references sanctions as a motivating factor for Libya giving up its nuclear weapons program.

[Cow Poke]

If you're arguing that Iran will not honor any diplomatic agreement sufficient to prevent it becoming a nuclear state and if Iran has the capacity to build a nuclear weapon in under a year, what other option are you advancing?

I get really tired of this argument - it's dumb. "We have a plan, and even though it's a jackass plan, you come up with a better one". There was no reason for the US to be tied to an arbitrary deadline, settling for a jackass deal because a proper one couldn't be made. It's like the idiots who negotiated an Army deserter for five top terrorists. This is the same administration that called ISIS the Junior Varsity team.

Increasing sanctions will not prevent Iran from being able (and more willing) to build a nuclear weapon. So what's left?

You're right Sam - we suck at negotiating so we just need to give them the farm.

[Cow Poke]

Under the terms of the deal, Iran has to give up 97% of its uranium stockpile and its remaining supply can only be enriched to ~4%. Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90%. The IAEA will continuously monitor Iran's uranium mines and processing plants. So the deal absolutely does slow down, if not outright stop, Iran's ability to create a nuclear weapon.

Yeah, like "if they cross this red line, there will be hell to pay". Obama's team is the JV team, and the Iranians are playing them like a fine fiddle.

[Jesse]

I misread one of the above citations, which details that the U.N. sanctions were to be lifted as part of the Lockerbie issue and were not tied to dismantling of the weapons program. My apologies.

The point still stands, however, that Qaddafi's motivation for dismantling the nuclear program was relief from sanctions (from the USA and Britain, here) and international pressure from the U.N. and its member states. If you're arguing that sanctions don't work, you have to explain why you're citing a source that explicitly references sanctions as a motivating factor for Libya giving up its nuclear weapons program.

Not a problem. No need to apologize.

My first citation is a long, detailed read and I didn't want to post the whole thing so I only posted the conclusion. If you read it, it goes into the reasons why Qaddafi was unable to create a nuclear program. After all of those years trying and failing to create one, is it no wonder that he would stop and try to normalize relations? If he had succeeded, we wouldn't be talking about his disarmament right now. Qaddafi's main focus was to have the U.S. sanctions lifted because he needed a relationship with us more than anyone else. I highly doubt he cared about the rest of the U.N. So to a point U.S. sanctions worked, but only after he decided to give up his nuclear ambitions, not because of them.

So you really think that Iran is going to live up to this deal? You don't think they will create secret facilities (if they don't have them already) that inspectors don't know about (like that hasn't happened before) to create their bombs? That is to say they don't already have the bomb.