Why does God saying something make it objective?

[NormATive]

So if you think "God's law" just amounts to "God's commands", and you think that morality just amounts to God's law, then congrulations: you're a moral subjectivist, and on your position morality is subjective.

Given this, why should I accept the above poster's claim otherwise?

You will be hard-pressed to prevail in this argument.

Those who "know their Bible" will know ultimate Truth.

Seer can do this - he saw a floating leaf.

SOMA is a powerful drug.

NORM

[The Pixie]

Consider and compare the commandment to observe the Sabbath and the commandment not to murder. Are they objective commands or subjective commands?

I would say that the moral imperative not to murder is objective imperative. Murder is something that philosophers of ethics will (usually?) agree is morally wrong, and societies across history and across the globe have also concluded murder is wrong.

On the other hand, the command to keep the sabbath would seem to be subjective. It is something God has chosen to impose, and the length of the week and his choice of which day is arbitrary (I appreciate they relate to the supposed creation week, but only because God chose to do so).

[Jichard]

Consider and compare the commandment to observe the Sabbath and the commandment not to murder. Are they objective commands or subjective commands?

I don't think any commands can be objective, regardless of who makes them, since commands are expressions of emotion, as opposed to statements that are true or false in virtue of something other than a mind's view.

I would say that the moral imperative not to murder is objective imperative. Murder is something that philosophers of ethics will (usually?) agree is morally wrong, and societies across history and across the globe have also concluded murder is wrong.

Murder, by definition, is morally wrong (it's literally in the definition of the term, as it's usedin moral philosophy), but I think I get what you're saying. Fair point.

But the issue is: I don't think moral imperatives are commands. So, for example, I don't think that "You morally ought not murder" means the same thing as "Do not murder". This is for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that the formr statement is capable of being true or false, while the latter statement isn't. And once one recognizes that morality doesn't just boil down to a bunch of commands, then it doesn't really make sense to claim that it boils down to a bunch of commands from God.

On the other hand, the command to keep the sabbath would seem to be subjective. It is something God has chosen to impose, and the length of the week and his choice of which day is arbitrary (I appreciate they relate to the supposed creation week, but only because God chose to do so).

You seem to be inferring that something is objective if it's non-aribitrary. I don't, for reasons I went over here:

"I know the difference between them. "arbitrary" means (roughly) "lacking a good reason". So "subjective" would not entail "arbitrary" since there could be subjectively true claims which one has good reason to accept, and subjective commands (really, all commands are subjective) that one has good reason to accept. For example, one could be a moral subjectivist in the form of accepting ideal observer theory, and think that moral statements are true or false in virtue of what hypothetical ideal observers would recommend one do. So moral statements would be subjectively true or false. However, one could still have a good reason for following hypothetical recommendations made by these hypothetical observers, since the observers can be defined as being perfectly rational, omnibenevolent, have all true beliefs, etc., and thus their recommendations would be rational, fully-informed, compassionate, and so on."

[Jichard]

Quick point - qualitative difference. I read your responses the first time through - there is no qualitative difference for an omniscient, and according to your own response, God does create objective laws (gravity, et al).

I'm willing to grant that, in principle, a deity could cause a state of affairs, such that objective scientific laws were true. But that's not the same as objective scientific laws being true in virtue of God, and so it doesn't undermine the OP's. An example might illustrate the point.

Suppose a bat strikes a ball, causing the ball to move at speed of 50mph. So the statement "the ball is moving at 50mph" is true. But even though the bat caused the ball's movement, and thus helped cause the state of affairs that makes that statement true, the statement is not true in virtue of of the bat. Instead, it's true in virtue of the ball and the ball's properties; in particular: the ball's motion. To see this, note that the statement "the ball is moving at 50mph" could be true even if the ball never existed (for example: if the ball's motion was caused by hand, as opposed to a bat). To put it another way: the ball's properties, not the bat, are what make the statement true and thus serve as the truth-makers for the statement. The state refers to (or is about) the ball and its properties, not the bat.

Now, you can extend the same point to objective scientific laws and God: even if God caused the natural state of affairs in virtue of which objective scientific laws are true, that would not mean those laws are tue in virtue of God. Instead, they are true in virtue of the natural state of affairs. And to see that, note that the laws would still be true if God never existed, as long as the natural state of affairs were so (unless one is some sort of Berkeleyan idealist, who thinks that natural world is just an aspect of God's mind). The laws refer to (or are about) the natural state of affairs and its properties, not God. The natural world serves as the truth-maker, not God.

And (this is the point relevant for the OP's discussion of moral subjectivism), the same point can be extended to moral statements, including moral statements in the form of moral laws. To make moral laws about the attitudes God's expresses in commands, is to make that the truth-maker for moral laws and to make moral laws true in virtue of said commands. And that's a form of moral subjectivism as noted in the OP:

"Ethical subjectivism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

Ethical sentences express propositions.
Some such propositions are true.
Those propositions are about [emphasis added] the attitudes of people.[1]

[...]

However there are also universalist forms of subjectivism such as ideal observer theory (which claims that moral propositions are about what attitudes a hypothetical ideal observer would hold) and divine command theory (which claims that moral propositions are about [emphasis added] what attitudes God holds)."

However, given the distinction between in virtue of / about / refers to vs. caused that I mentioned above, one could avoid the above subjectivism by claiming that God causes whatever it is that serves as the truth-maker for moral laws, without those moral laws being true in virtue of God's attitudes, commands, etc. For example: a version of Christian version welfare utilitarianism, where God causes a state of affairs where various factors promote or harm the welfare of sentient life, and these state of affairs serve as the truth-makers for moral laws. Of course, the price one pays for that is (as Christians like Wes Morriston have noted, and, arguably, Richard Swinburne) that moral statements can be or false regardless of whether or not God exists. So God would not be required for moral laws to be true. But that's a small price to pay for a position that actually makes more sense that a Christian version of moral subjectivism.

Sorry, I gotta go - I will get back to you with a better response in a day or two. I probably won't have time before then.

Later.

OK. Looking forward to your response.

[Doug Shaver]

Why does God saying something make it objective?

I don't much care. I'll stipulate that if God says something then it is true. Any difference, in this case, between subjective truth and objective truth looks pretty irrelevant to me.

But, no one has given me a good reason yet to believe that God has ever said anything to anyone.

[shunyadragon]

You can regard God's laws as subjective in the limited sense of 'having originated in a mind' with no issue. HOWEVER, the big problem is that you cannot apply the qualitative sense of 'subjective' to God, and that would also mean it cannot be applied to His laws. The qualitative issues with subjectivity - which is almost always what is meant when the term is used in this context, do not apply to an omniscient - that's irrational.

The problem with the concepts of 'objective and subjective' as Thomas Aquinas proposed in his arguments for the existence of God, as many apologist have following in his footsteps have been a communication problem for many years on Tweb, and for centuries in philosophy and theology.

"What we have here is a failure to communicate!" - Cool Hand Luke

The above statement is a good example of this problem. The argument proposed by Aquinas is more a statement of belief concerning the relationship between God and humans, and not an effective argument for the existence of God for those who do not believe, because the concepts of objective and subjective only apply for those who believe, and therefore 'irrational' to those who do not believe.

Edward Feser addresses the problem well:

Source: http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2012/09/objective-and-subjective.html

One of the barriers to understanding Scholastic writers like Aquinas is their technical terminology, which was once the common coin of Western thought but is alien to most contemporary academic philosophers. Sometimes the wording is unfamiliar even though the concepts are not. For example, few contemporary analytic philosophers speak of act and potency, but you will find quite a few recent metaphysicians making a distinction between categorical and dispositional features of reality, which is at least similar to the former, Scholastic distinction.
. . .
And then there are “objective” and “subjective,” which are sometimes used by Scholastic writers to convey more or less the opposite of what contemporary philosophers mean by these terms.

Hence, contemporary philosophers of mind like Thomas Nagel and John Searle describe as “subjective” those aspects of reality which are accessible only from the “first-person” point of view of conscious experience, and as “objective” those aspects that are equally accessible to any observer, from the “third-person” point of view. So, bodily sensations, mental images, and consciously entertained thoughts would in this sense be “subjective” while tables, chairs, rocks, trees, muscles, bones, and neurons would be “objective.” What is “subjective” on this usage is what is within the mind, what is part of the “inner” realm of consciousness; what is “objective” is what is without the mind, what is part of the “outer” world of extra-mental reality.

This is, in any event, what Searle characterizes as the ontological sense of the subjective versus objective distinction. There is also an epistemological sense, in which to be “subjective” is to be unduly influenced by emotion, prejudice, and the like, whereas to be “objective” is to be guided by reason and the facts. As Searle rightly emphasizes, to be “objective” in the epistemological sense is fully compatible with recognizing the existence of what is “subjective” in the ontological sense.

Now Scholastic writers would certainly agree that we should be objective in the epistemological sense and that there are both subjective and objective aspects of reality in Searle and Nagel’s ontological sense. But they also sometimes use the words “objective” and “subjective” in a very different way -- indeed, as I have indicated, in a way that very nearly reverses the meanings attached to them by writers like Searle and Nagel.

Hence, in Scholastic literature, something is sometimes described as “objective” when it exists only as an object of thought, but as “subjective” when it exists in a real subject outside the mind. So, for example, that unicorns have horns might in this sense be described as an “objective” fact, because (since there are no unicorns in reality) what is true of a unicorn is true only qua object of thought. By contrast, that a certain horse can run very fast is “subjective” in the sense that its capacity for speed can be predicated of a real subject outside the mind.

To be sure, Scholastic writers also sometimes use “objective” and “subjective” in the senses that are more familiar from current philosophical usage. But when they do not, confusion can sometimes result. Hence modern readers of Descartes’ “trademark argument” for God’s existence are sometimes baffled by his talk of the “objective reality” of an idea, since given current usage an idea seems paradigmatically “subjective.” But Descartes was making use of Scholastic jargon that would have been familiar to the readers of his day.

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[MaxVel]

Whaa...

I don't even...

Shunya posted a citation that is relevant to the topic, and from an authoritative source??

[Jichard]

I don't much care. I'll stipulate that if God says something then it is true. Any difference, in this case, between subjective truth and objective truth looks pretty irrelevant to me.

But, no one has given me a good reason yet to believe that God has ever said anything to anyone.

Well, it seems pretty relevant to some of the Christian on here, since they think without God it's all subjective or relative or something. For example:

Except without God there no fundamental moral truth, just moral opinion - subjective and relative.

[The Pixie]

You seem to be inferring that something is objective if it's non-aribitrary.

Not quite. I am saying it is subjective if it is arbitrary. God's command to observe the Sabbath appears to be arbitrary, and therefore subjective. If one of the Ten Commandments is subjective, we cannot assume that any of God's commands are objective (or that they are not either).

[JimL]

I don't much care. I'll stipulate that if God says something then it is true. Any difference, in this case, between subjective truth and objective truth looks pretty irrelevant to me.

God may say something that is true, but it isn't objectively true just because God says it. I think that is the point that is being made. That 2+2=4 is objectively true is because it is true in itself, independently of any mind. God can't say that 2+2 =7 thus making it objectively true, because 2+2=4 whether God likes it or not. Unless murder is wrong is a truism in itself, in the same sense that 2+2=4 is true, then it isn't objectively true. The wrongness of murder is determined to be an objective truth only with respect to human beings, not with respect to itself.

But, no one has given me a good reason yet to believe that God has ever said anything to anyone.

Amen to that.

[Jichard]

Not quite. I am saying it is subjective if it is arbitrary. God's command to observe the Sabbath appears to be arbitrary, and therefore subjective. If one of the Ten Commandments is subjective, we cannot assume that any of God's commands are objective (or that they are not either).

Well, we'd probably still end up disagreeing then, since I think one could make an arbitrary claim that was objectively true. For example, someone from 2,000 years ago could have claimed that there was water on one of Jupiter's moons. Now, as it turns out, that claim is objectively true. However, that person had no good reason for making that claim (ex: they had no evidence that claim was true) and so there claim was arbitrary. So one can lack good reason for making a statement (which would be an epistemic point), even if one's claims were objectively true (which would be a metaphysical point).

[shunyadragon]

Whaa...

I don't even...

Shunya posted a citation that is relevant to the topic, and from an authoritative source??

Yes

[The Pixie]

Well, we'd probably still end up disagreeing then, since I think one could make an arbitrary claim that was objectively true. For example, someone from 2,000 years ago could have claimed that there was water on one of Jupiter's moons. Now, as it turns out, that claim is objectively true. However, that person had no good reason for making that claim (ex: they had no evidence that claim was true) and so there claim was arbitrary. So one can lack good reason for making a statement (which would be an epistemic point), even if one's claims were objectively true (which would be a metaphysical point).

I am talking about an arbitrary decision that is then taken as being morally true, which is different to a factual claim that is coincidentally true it seems to me.

[Jichard]

I am talking about an arbitrary decision that is then taken as being morally true, which is different to a factual claim that is coincidentally true it seems to me.

I take moral statements to be a variety of factual claim insofar as factual claims are true statements.

And I don't see how decisions can be true (in contrast to beliefs, statements, etc., which can be true). So I'm guessing you meant something else "morally true".

[The Pixie]

I take moral statements to be a variety of factual claim insofar as factual claims are true statements.

And I don't see how decisions can be true (in contrast to beliefs, statements, etc., which can be true). So I'm guessing you meant something else "morally true".

That is what I am saying. God decided the Sabbath was a Saturday, so observing the Sabbath is not "morally true", despite being one of the big ten.