Faith Without Reason (A Response to Richard Dawkins, et al)

[ShrimpMaster]

Hello all,

The time of the champions of atheism is slowly passing away. Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet, Samuel Harris, Laurence Krauss, etc, etc... These names are the popularizers of atheism for the previous 10+ years. A common theme among these individuals is an objection of this sort; I may not know whether Christianity (or another religion) is true, but I do know that it is irrational, or stupid, or silly, or just plain 'wrong-headed' to believe. This was put forth best by Freud and Marx. Freud would equate Christian belief as "wishful thinking" and Marx thought Christianity was a result of the deprivations of Capitalism. Is there any weight in this type of argument? Some see it as a more modest claim, because it does not deal with the de facto (truth) objections regarding Christianity, but it is a de jure objection to Christian belief. My question and the question Alvin Plantinga raises in his book Warranted Christian Belief (2000) is whether this type of objection holds water.

Here are some notes before you start pounding on your keyboard: 1) A majority of my reference material will come from Alvin Plantinga's book Warranted Christian Belief (2000) 2) I would say Alvin Plantinga is the leading epistemologist that is alive today among secular and non-secular epistemologists. I would just ask to have some respect as you critique his thoughts or at least my representation of his thoughts. 3) I am most interested in Christianity, so any remarks regarding other religions I probably won't respond to unless relevant to the discussion

Onto the good stuff. My claim (and the claim of Alvin Plantinga's book) is that there is no de jure objection to Christianity a part from a de facto objection. That is to say that you cannot say Christianity is stupid, or silly, or irrational to believe, without also objecting to the truth of Christianity. No longer can an educated individual say they do not know whether Christianity is true, but they do know it is irrational, without also objecting to the truth of Christianity.

How do we arrive at this conclusion? Well, Alvin Plantinga puts forth a model through which humanity can come to have knowledge regarding Christianity that defeats defeaters (yes I meant that twice) put forth by modern atheism (a defeater-defeater). Take the following example, an individual living under the Atheist/Communist party of China or North Korea that does not have Christian material available to him. If he is a Christian, but has no material to support his conclusion (like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, or Teleological Argument, etc...) is he rationally obliged to forgo his belief in Christianity because he cannot rebut his opponents view? The model provided by Plantinga supports such a case.

Plantinga calls it the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model). Aquinas and Calvin both made reference to a sensus divinitatus in their work or a 'sense of the divine'. This is a sense much like the way in which your nose can tell the difference between food and vomit. How exactly does it function? Imagine you are walking through the woods and come upon a beautiful vista of the Cascade Mountains. The sensus divinitatus would then occasion the belief that God made these mountains. Clarification: this is not an inference from another belief like, the mountains are super beautiful, therefore, God exists. The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God. In the school of thought called classical foundationalism there is a set of beliefs considered 'properly basic'. This would include beliefs like 'the external world exists', 'my friend has a mind and is not a robot', 'I ate a pancake for breakfast', etc... Why is this important? Because beliefs concerning the past or the external world are axiomatic. In Plantinga's reformed epistemology he goes to include the belief in God as a properly basic belief.

Skip some details regarding the book...

Alright, so how do we get from the belief in God as properly basic to full-blooded Christian belief? We have the instigation of the Holy Spirit. In Plantinga's book the Holy Spirit provides the knowledge concerning Christian belief (i.e. Jesus is divine, Jesus died for my sins, Jesus is the second member of the Trinity, etc..). How does the Holy Spirit do this? Through faith. According to Plantinga the Holy Spirit provides the faith by which a believer comes to not only have the appropriate knowledge concerning Christianity, but they also (and importantly) obtain the appropriate affections toward God (i.e. God loves me, God cares for my life, God desires to know me, etc...). [Off topic remark: faith has actually always been considered a type of knowledge throughout the ages. It is only recently that it has taken on the poor rhetoric of modern atheism by reference of "blind faith", "leap of faith", etc...]

We now have the material to answer our first question. On Plantinga's model there is no de jure objection a part from a de facto objection regarding Christianity because the Holy Spirit furnishes the believer with the faith (or knowledge) to defeat the defeaters of the objectors. Thanks for your time and I look forward to your questions.

[shunyadragon]

How do we arrive at this conclusion? Well, Alvin Plantinga puts forth a model through which humanity can come to have knowledge regarding Christianity that defeats defeaters (yes I meant that twice) put forth by modern atheism (a defeater-defeater). Take the following example, an individual living under the Atheist/Communist party of China or North Korea that does not have Christian material available to him. If he is a Christian, but has no material to support his conclusion (like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, or Teleological Argument, etc...) is he rationally obliged to forgo his belief in Christianity because he cannot rebut his opponents view? The model provided by Plantinga supports such a case.

Plantinga calls it the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model). Aquinas and Calvin both made reference to a sensus divinitatus in their work or a 'sense of the divine'. This is a sense much like the way in which your nose can tell the difference between food and vomit. How exactly does it function? Imagine you are walking through the woods and come upon a beautiful vista of the Cascade Mountains. The sensus divinitatus would then occasion the belief that God made these mountains. Clarification: this is not an inference from another belief like, the mountains are super beautiful, therefore, God exists. The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God. In the school of thought called classical foundationalism there is a set of beliefs considered 'properly basic'. This would include beliefs like 'the external world exists', 'my friend has a mind and is not a robot', 'I ate a pancake for breakfast', etc... Why is this important? Because beliefs concerning the past or the external world are axiomatic. In Plantinga's reformed epistemology he goes to include the belief in God as a properly basic belief.

Skip some details regarding the book...

Alright, so how do we get from the belief in God as properly basic to full-blooded Christian belief? We have the instigation of the Holy Spirit. In Plantinga's book the Holy Spirit provides the knowledge concerning Christian belief (i.e. Jesus is divine, Jesus died for my sins, Jesus is the second member of the Trinity, etc..). How does the Holy Spirit do this? Through faith. According to Plantinga the Holy Spirit provides the faith by which a believer comes to not only have the appropriate knowledge concerning Christianity, but they also (and importantly) obtain the appropriate affections toward God (i.e. God loves me, God cares for my life, God desires to know me, etc...). [Off topic remark: faith has actually always been considered a type of knowledge throughout the ages. It is only recently that it has taken on the poor rhetoric of modern atheism by reference of "blind faith", "leap of faith", etc...]

We now have the material to answer our first question. On Plantinga's model there is no de jure objection a part from a de facto objection regarding Christianity because the Holy Spirit furnishes the believer with the faith (or knowledge) to defeat the defeaters of the objectors. Thanks for your time and I look forward to your questions.

I will comment further, but for now I do not believe that Plantinga's arguments defeat any other belief system particularly atheism. Virtually any one of the many varied religions may be argued that they are properly basic.

Most atheist today believe there is no reason to believe in God, and no evidence for God other than anecdotal claims of belief. They are right, and Plantinga's argument do not counter these arguments.

[seer]

Hello all

Welcome ShrimpMaster...

[seer]

I will comment further, but for now I do not believe that Plantinga's arguments defeat any other belief system particularly atheism. Virtually any one of the many varied religions may be argued that they are properly basic.

Most atheist today believe there is no reason to believe in God, and no evidence for God other than anecdotal claims of belief. They are right, and Plantinga's argument do not counter these arguments.

I don't think you understand what Plantinga is saying at all. He is not claiming that his argument defeats atheism or other beliefs.

[shunyadragon]

I don't think you understand what Plantinga is saying at all. He is not claiming that his argument defeats atheism or other beliefs.

Then why bother. Is all he doing is making believers comfortable with their Christian belief because it is 'properly basic.'

[seer]

The why bother. Is all he doing is making believers comfortable with their Christian belief because it is 'properly basic.'

Really? That is that what you got out of it?

[shunyadragon]

Really? That is that what you got out of it?

You said . . . "He is not claiming that his argument defeats atheism or other beliefs."

What is he claiming in your view?

[shunyadragon]

Plantinga did argue . . .

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alvin_Plantinga#Evolutionary_argument_against_naturalism

In Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism, he argues that the truth of evolution is an epistemic defeater for naturalism (i.e. if evolution is true, it undermines naturalism). His basic argument is that if evolution and naturalism are both true, human cognitive faculties evolved to produce beliefs that have survival value (maximizing one's success at the four F's: "feeding, fleeing, fighting, and reproducing"), not necessarily to produce beliefs that are true. Thus, since human cognitive faculties are tuned to survival rather than truth in the naturalism-evolution model, there is reason to doubt the veracity of the products of those same faculties, including naturalism and evolution themselves. On the other hand, if God created man "in his image" by way of an evolutionary process (or any other means), then Plantinga argues our faculties would probably be reliable.

The argument does not assume any necessary correlation (or uncorrelation) between true beliefs and survival. Making the contrary assumption—that there is in fact a relatively strong correlation between truth and survival—if human belief-forming apparatus evolved giving a survival advantage, then it ought to yield truth since true beliefs confer a survival advantage. Plantinga counters that, while there may be overlap between true beliefs and beliefs that contribute to survival, the two kinds of beliefs are not the same, and he gives the following example with a man named Paul:

“ Perhaps Paul very much likes the idea of being eaten, but when he sees a tiger, always runs off looking for a better prospect, because he thinks it unlikely the tiger he sees will eat him. This will get his body parts in the right place so far as survival is concerned, without involving much by way of true belief... Or perhaps he thinks the tiger is a large, friendly, cuddly pussycat and wants to pet it; but he also believes that the best way to pet it is to run away from it... Clearly there are any number of belief-desire systems that equally fit a given bit of behavior.

© Copyright Original Source

I really do not believe Plantinga's arguments are effective nor useful for anything.

[seer]

What is he claiming in your view?

That it not irrational to take belief in God as properly basic. So when atheists dismiss theism as an irrational or stupid they are not on solid logical ground. Hence the theist need not be intimidated by that groundless objection, and is well with in his rational rights.

[Jichard]

Hello all,

The time of the champions of atheism is slowly passing away. Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet, Samuel Harris, Laurence Krauss, etc, etc... These names are the popularizers of atheism for the previous 10+ years. A common theme among these individuals is an objection of this sort; I may not know whether Christianity (or another religion) is true, but I do know that it is irrational, or stupid, or silly, or just plain 'wrong-headed' to believe.

Are you sure that this is the type of objection they offer? Because I think you might be strawmanning them. After all, one doesn't need to be completely sure that a religion is false in order to know it's false, anymore than I need to be 100% certain that the Earth is round to know that the Earth is round. Knowledge doesn't require epistemic certainty. I bring this up because I think you might be confusing some atheists saying that they are not 100% sure whether Christianity (or another religion) is false with those atheists saying that they do not know whether Christianity (or another religion) is false. And that might explain why you attributed the above claims to them.

This was put forth best by Freud and Marx. Freud would equate Christian belief as "wishful thinking" and Marx thought Christianity was a result of the deprivations of Capitalism. Is there any weight in this type of argument? Some see it as a more modest claim, because it does not deal with the de facto (truth) objections regarding Christianity, but it is a de jure objection to Christian belief. My question and the question Alvin Plantinga raises in his book Warranted Christian Belief (2000) is whether this type of objection holds water.

Here are some notes before you start pounding on your keyboard: 1) A majority of my reference material will come from Alvin Plantinga's book Warranted Christian Belief (2000)

Which I own and am familiar with.

2) I would say Alvin Plantinga is the leading epistemologist that is alive today among secular and non-secular epistemologists. I would just ask to have some respect as you critique his thoughts or at least my representation of his thoughts.

Plantinga is one of my favorite philosophers and is a large figure in the field. However, I disagree with the claim that he "is the leading epistemologist that is alive today among secular and non-secular epistemologists". He's retired, after all. And in any event, people like Alvin Goldman, Laurence Bonjour, and Ernest Sosa are arguably bigger.

Onto the good stuff. My claim (and the claim of Alvin Plantinga's book) is that there is no de jure objection to Christianity a part from a de facto objection. That is to say that you cannot say Christianity is stupid, or silly, or irrational to believe, without also objecting to the truth of Christianity. No longer can an educated individual say they do not know whether Christianity is true, but they do know it is irrational, without also objecting to the truth of Christianity.

How do we arrive at this conclusion? Well, Alvin Plantinga puts forth a model through which humanity can come to have knowledge regarding Christianity that defeats defeaters (yes I meant that twice) put forth by modern atheism (a defeater-defeater). Take the following example, an individual living under the Atheist/Communist party of China or North Korea that does not have Christian material available to him. If he is a Christian, but has no material to support his conclusion (like the Kalam Cosmological Argument, or Teleological Argument, etc...) is he rationally obliged to forgo his belief in Christianity because he cannot rebut his opponents view? The model provided by Plantinga supports such a case.

Plantinga calls it the Aquinas/Calvin model (A/C model). Aquinas and Calvin both made reference to a sensus divinitatus in their work or a 'sense of the divine'. This is a sense much like the way in which your nose can tell the difference between food and vomit. How exactly does it function? Imagine you are walking through the woods and come upon a beautiful vista of the Cascade Mountains. The sensus divinitatus would then occasion the belief that God made these mountains. Clarification: this is not an inference from another belief like, the mountains are super beautiful, therefore, God exists. The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God. In the school of thought called classical foundationalism there is a set of beliefs considered 'properly basic'. This would include beliefs like 'the external world exists', 'my friend has a mind and is not a robot', 'I ate a pancake for breakfast', etc... Why is this important? Because beliefs concerning the past or the external world are axiomatic. In Plantinga's reformed epistemology he goes to include the belief in God as a properly basic belief.

I'm familiar with Plantinga's reasoning here. It doesn't work for a number of reasons. Here are a few:

First, one can offer a more plausible criterion of "proper basicality", on which belief that God exists would not be properly basic. And one can do that without resorting to classical foundantialism. One could, for example, do so while advocating foundherentism or modest foundatioalism. Tyler Wunder defends such a criterion in the form of universal sanction.

Second, the Great Pumpkin objection nammers Plantinga's position, and leads him to resort to a form of epistemic relativism that makes no sense. Really, using Plantinga's methodology, you could argue that any number of absurd beliefs count as properly basic.

Third, even if a belief is properly basic, that does not necessarily imply that one is rational in holding that belief. For example, one may be aware of large amounts of evidence that weigh against the belief and one might choose to evade addressing that countervailing evidence. Or one may inetionally avoid trying to see if belief in God best explains other information in the world. To put the point another way: one's belief that God exists may be irrational, if one fails to display various epistemic virtuessuch as avoiding wishful thinking, giving due consideration to available evidence, etc. [implying a link between epistemic virtues and being rational].

Fourth, one can offer a naturalistic account of a properly functionaing cognitive system, and then present evidence that theistic belief isn't really the output of such a properly functioning system. Instead, it results from dysfunction in the system. This undermines Plantinga's argument, since Plantinga's argument depends theistic belief being the output of a properly functioning cognitive system. So how might one go about developing this objection? Well, "function" is already naturalized in biology in terms of natural selection. One can then use that to argue that the function of the human cognitive system (in large part) is to produce true beliefs and reason about them in truth-conducive ways. One then argues that theistic belief isn't the output of such a functioning system. For example, theistic belief results more from intuitive thinking and rationalizations of intuitive thinking, as opposed to more truth-conducive, analytic reasoning.

Skip some details regarding the book...

Alright, so how do we get from the belief in God as properly basic to full-blooded Christian belief? We have the instigation of the Holy Spirit. In Plantinga's book the Holy Spirit provides the knowledge concerning Christian belief (i.e. Jesus is divine, Jesus died for my sins, Jesus is the second member of the Trinity, etc..). How does the Holy Spirit do this? Through faith. According to Plantinga the Holy Spirit provides the faith by which a believer comes to not only have the appropriate knowledge concerning Christianity, but they also (and importantly) obtain the appropriate affections toward God (i.e. God loves me, God cares for my life, God desires to know me, etc...). [Off topic remark: faith has actually always been considered a type of knowledge throughout the ages. It is only recently that it has taken on the poor rhetoric of modern atheism by reference of "blind faith", "leap of faith", etc...]

This largely stems from Plantinga's slightly incorrect views on what qualifies as "knowledge". He thinks knowledge is "true belief + warrant", and thinks he's correctly analyzed "warrant" to be something like being produced by properly functioning cognitive system working in the environment it was designed for. But faith need not qualify as warrant, given some of the reasons I went over above. For example, faith doesn't qualify if faith involves failing with respect to the epistemic virtues, by doing things such as ignoring evidence against one's position, engaging in wishful thinking, and so on. Nor does faith qualify if it's the result of unreliable cognitive processes.

Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists.

We now have the material to answer our first question. On Plantinga's model there is no de jure objection a part from a de facto objection regarding Christianity because the Holy Spirit furnishes the believer with the faith (or knowledge) to defeat the defeaters of the objectors. Thanks for your time and I look forward to your questions.

And I disagree: there can be a de jure objection apart from a de facto objection, for the reasons I went over above. For example, one can claim that theistic belief results from unreliable cognitive processes / unreliable reasoning, without claiming that theistic belief is false.

[Doug Shaver]

On Plantinga's model there is no de jure objection a part from a de facto objection regarding Christianity.

Let me stipulate that for the sake of discussion. Am I therefore unjustified in doubting that Christianity is true?

[The Pixie]

The time of the champions of atheism is slowly passing away. Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennet, Samuel Harris, Laurence Krauss, etc, etc... These names are the popularizers of atheism for the previous 10+ years.

What makes you think their names are passing away?

Marx thought Christianity was a result of the deprivations of Capitalism.

Unlikely, I am pretty sure Marx realised Christianity pre-dated Capitalism.

That is to say that you cannot say Christianity is stupid, or silly, or irrational to believe, without also objecting to the truth of Christianity.

You think?

A quick heads-up for you: atheists do object to the truth of Christianity.

The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God.

Why should we suppose this belief is true? It seems to me that this belief is informed by religion. You already think God exists and is responsible for the mountains, therefore when you see the beauty of the mountains, you get a sensus divinitatus. If you do not start from the assumption that God exists, you do not get this sensus divinitatus.

The argument, then is based on the assumption that God exists, and is therefore circular.

In Plantinga's reformed epistemology he goes to include the belief in God as a properly basic belief.

Can we really have confidence in such a belief in the same we can about what we had for breakfast?

How does the Holy Spirit do this? Through faith.

Again, this seems ciircular. If you have faith Christianity is right, then the Holy Spirit will provide you with the knowledge that Christianity is right.

Any argument that starts from faith is really saying you have to assume the conclusion. Which brings us back to why some might suppose Christisanity is irrational.

[MaxVel]

I really do not believe Plantinga's arguments are effective nor useful for anything.

That would be why he is a professional, well-qualified and widely published philosopher, and you're just some goofball on TWeb.

[shunyadragon]

That would be why he is a professional, well-qualified and widely published philosopher, and you're just some goofball on TWeb.

I need something of substance if you expect a response.

[shunyadragon]

That it not irrational to take belief in God as properly basic. So when atheists dismiss theism as an irrational or stupid they are not on solid logical ground. Hence the theist need not be intimidated by that groundless objection, and is well with in his rational rights.

Some atheists may say this, but this is not the argument for atheism. This does not say anything different than what I previously said. "Is all he doing is making believers comfortable with their Christian belief because it is 'properly basic?"

The previous post I posted indicated that Plantinga actually proposed an argument that philosophical naturalism is false. I believe he attempted more positive arguments than you are indicated that philosophical naturalism is indeed defeated by his arguments.