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Faith Without Reason (A Response to Richard Dawkins, et al)

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  • #16
    Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post


    I need something of substance if you expect a response.


    Physician, heal thyself.
    ...>>> Witty remark or snarky quote of another poster goes here <<<...

    Comment


    • #17
      Originally posted by MaxVel View Post
      Physician, heal thyself.
      I need something of substance if you expect a response.
      Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
      Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
      But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

      go with the flow the river knows . . .

      Frank

      I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

      Comment


      • #18
        Originally posted by MaxVel View Post
        That would be why he is a professional, well-qualified and widely published philosopher, and you're just some goofball on TWeb.
        Appealing to authority without a coherent argument. Dawkins is professional and widely published, and hundreds of atheist philosophers are well known professionals and philosophers like Jaakko Hintikka, John Earman, Robert Kane, and widely published, that does not mean I would follow their line hook line and sinker. I do not believe in their arguments nor am I an atheist, because of their impressive credentials.
        Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
        Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
        But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

        go with the flow the river knows . . .

        Frank

        I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

        Comment


        • #19
          Additionally, your OP's general point is pretty trivial. Basically, it involves making an epistemic point apart of your position, so that when people object to that epistemic point, they've made a de facto objection to your position. That's pretty trivial to do, and one can do that for any old position. For example, one could re-define positive atheism such that it includes the claim that positive atheism is rational. That way, if someone tried to object de jure (and not de facto) to positive atheism by saying that positive atheism was irrational, one could just turn around and claim that that is really a de facto objection.

          Of course, that trivial strategy has the problems I noted elsewhere. For example, if you do it for Christianity, it's a strawman and ad hoc definition of Christianity. Furthermore, it doesn't change the fact that one can make a de jure objection to a belief that the Christian God exists, without making de facto objection to it:
          "Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."
          Last edited by Jichard; 08-02-2015, 11:56 AM.
          "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

          Comment


          • #20
            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            Are you sure that this is the type of objection they offer? Because I think you might be strawmanning them. After all, one doesn't need to be completely sure that a religion is false in order to know it's false, anymore than I need to be 100% certain that the Earth is round to know that the Earth is round. Knowledge doesn't require epistemic certainty. I bring this up because I think you might be confusing some atheists saying that they are not 100% sure whether Christianity (or another religion) is false with those atheists saying that they do not know whether Christianity (or another religion) is false. And that might explain why you attributed the above claims to them.
            They offer many objections. This is one of them. Strawmanning or not I was using them as an example. I don't really care to harp on whether they do or not. I just was poking fun... Further, you actually do need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false. Otherwise, what are you talking about when you claim Christianity is false? That it might be false, therefore, it is??? Sounds ludicrous... If I know a fact that contradicts a truth-claim and that fact has epistemic warrant, then I know that truth-claim is false.

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            First, one can offer a more plausible criterion of "proper basicality", on which belief that God exists would not be properly basic. And one can do that without resorting to classical foundantialism. One could, for example, do so while advocating foundherentism or modest foundatioalism. Tyler Wunder defends such a criterion in the form of universal sanction.
            And what is the criterion you are suggesting??? Foundherentism is circular. Even though it tries to avoid the circularity of coherentism. Universal sanction is also a weak grounding for properly basic beliefs. Apart from the fact that the belief in God enjoys proper basicality under universal sanction (after-all a majority [>95%] of the world believes in some form of theism); universal sanction is not a truth criterion. Who defines 'normal' beliefs or 'normal' living conditions? Further, we can think of counterfactuals that would be obviously false. For instance, humans that hold beliefs that are not produced by cognitive faculties aimed at truth. If these were the only people left on earth, then universal sanction would not properly identify whether a belief is true or false.

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            Second, the Great Pumpkin objection nammers Plantinga's position, and leads him to resort to a form of epistemic relativism that makes no sense. Really, using Plantinga's methodology, you could argue that any number of absurd beliefs count as properly basic.
            This is where you are confused. Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true. Further, what absurd beliefs are you talking about? Plantinga handles the Great Pumpkin objection in his book. I would need more details on your objection to clarify...

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            Third, even if a belief is properly basic, that does not necessarily imply that one is rational in holding that belief. For example, one may be aware of large amounts of evidence that weigh against the belief and one might choose to evade addressing that countervailing evidence. Or one may inetionally avoid trying to see if belief in God best explains other information in the world. To put the point another way: one's belief that God exists may be irrational, if one fails to display various epistemic virtuessuch as avoiding wishful thinking, giving due consideration to available evidence, etc. [implying a link between epistemic virtues and being rational].
            Wrong, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. If the belief in God is produced in this way, then it would satisfy epistemic warrant.

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            Fourth, one can offer a naturalistic account of a properly functionaing cognitive system, and then present evidence that theistic belief isn't really the output of such a properly functioning system. Instead, it results from dysfunction in the system. This undermines Plantinga's argument, since Plantinga's argument depends theistic belief being the output of a properly functioning cognitive system. So how might one go about developing this objection? Well, "function" is already naturalized in biology in terms of natural selection. One can then use that to argue that the function of the human cognitive system (in large part) is to produce true beliefs and reason about them in truth-conducive ways. One then argues that theistic belief isn't the output of such a functioning system. For example, theistic belief results more from intuitive thinking and rationalizations of intuitive thinking, as opposed to more truth-conducive, analytic reasoning.[/INDENT]
            You think biological evolution is aimed at the production of true beliefs? Evolution is defined by random mutation and natural selection. Belief producing faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether they are true or not is not relevant to evolution.

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            This largely stems from Plantinga's slightly incorrect views on what qualifies as "knowledge". He thinks knowledge is "true belief + warrant", and thinks he's correctly analyzed "warrant" to be something like being produced by properly functioning cognitive system working in the environment it was designed for. But faith need not qualify as warrant, given some of the reasons I went over above. For example, faith doesn't qualify if faith involves failing with respect to the epistemic virtues, by doing things such as ignoring evidence against one's position, engaging in wishful thinking, and so on. Nor does faith qualify if it's the result of unreliable cognitive processes.
            I already answered this above, but Plantinga handles this clearly in his book. Again, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief.

            Originally posted by Jichard View Post
            Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists.

            And I disagree: there can be a de jure objection apart from a de facto objection, for the reasons I went over above. For example, one can claim that theistic belief results from unreliable cognitive processes / unreliable reasoning, without claiming that theistic belief is false.
            A few objections in here... 1) We must be clear that Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then his model (or something like his model) is true. An objection to the sensus divinitatus would be a de facto objection in the case of a person who accepts Plantinga's model. I don't really see how the bible commits you to a belief in the sensus divinitatus is relevant or not. If you accept Plantinga's model, then an objection to the sensus divinitatus is a de facto objection. 2) First, I have no idea what passages you are talking about. Second, I don't see how God 'befuddling' peoples cognitive processes is relevant. That would not remove the epistemic warrant of the sensus divinitatus. 3) Pretty similar to #1 - because an objection to what God does with peoples cognitive processes is not objectionable without objecting to Christian truth claims. I think this is a result of the misunderstandings I corrected in the other objections. Remember, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. Thanks

            Comment


            • #21
              Originally posted by Doug Shaver View Post
              Let me stipulate that for the sake of discussion. Am I therefore unjustified in doubting that Christianity is true?
              You are unjustified if you do not have a truth objection to Christianity.

              Comment


              • #22
                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                What makes you think their names are passing away?
                I haven't heard from them recently and any attack on religion is usually directed toward radical Muslims, which seems kind of desperate.

                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                Unlikely, I am pretty sure Marx realised Christianity pre-dated Capitalism.
                Read the communist manifesto...

                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                Why should we suppose this belief is true? It seems to me that this belief is informed by religion. You already think God exists and is responsible for the mountains, therefore when you see the beauty of the mountains, you get a sensus divinitatus. If you do not start from the assumption that God exists, you do not get this sensus divinitatus.
                It isn't a belief. It is a model through which believers can come to have knowledge of God.

                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                The argument, then is based on the assumption that God exists, and is therefore circular.
                It isn't based on the assumption that God exists...

                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                Can we really have confidence in such a belief in the same we can about what we had for breakfast?
                What kind of confidence do you have about what you had for breakfast?

                Originally posted by The Pixie View Post
                Any argument that starts from faith is really saying you have to assume the conclusion. Which brings us back to why some might suppose Christisanity is irrational.
                It is a model not an argument...

                Comment


                • #23
                  Originally posted by Jichard View Post
                  Additionally, your OP's general point is pretty trivial. Basically, it involves making an epistemic point apart of your position, so that when people object to that epistemic point, they've made a de facto objection to your position. That's pretty trivial to do, and one can do that for any old position. For example, one could re-define positive atheism such that it includes the claim that positive atheism is rational. That way, if someone tried to object de jure (and not de facto) to positive atheism by saying that positive atheism was irrational, one could just turn around and claim that that is really a de facto objection.

                  Of course, that trivial strategy has the problems I noted elsewhere. For example, if you do it for Christianity, it's a strawman and ad hoc definition of Christianity. Furthermore, it doesn't change the fact that one can make a de jure objection to a belief that the Christian God exists, without making de facto objection to it:
                  "Now, Plantinga might claim that what I wrote above represents a de facto objection to Christianity. After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."
                  The point of Plantinga's project with WCD is to make Christianity "intellectually acceptable". If it does that, then he has done his job.

                  Comment


                  • #24
                    Christianity and Islam are both ‘book’ religions. They get traction by claiming that the books contain revelation from a hidden super-being. There is nothing else to them. Believers need wishful thinking to do something useful with that basic construct because the claim itself is exceedingly dubious, if not provably false.
                    “I think God, in creating man, somewhat overestimated his ability.” ― Oscar Wilde
                    “And if there were a God, I think it very unlikely that He would have such an uneasy vanity as to be offended by those who doubt His existence” ― Bertrand Russell
                    “not all there” - you know who you are

                    Comment


                    • #25
                      Originally posted by firstfloor View Post
                      Christianity and Islam are both ‘book’ religions. They get traction by claiming that the books contain revelation from a hidden super-being. There is nothing else to them. Believers need wishful thinking to do something useful with that basic construct because the claim itself is exceedingly dubious, if not provably false.
                      Thanks for the great example, firstfloor. An objection like this is exactly what Plantinga shows is not viable. There is no objection to the truth of Christianity in firstfloor's post. It is a de jure objection.

                      Comment


                      • #26
                        Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View Post
                        They offer many objections. This is one of them. Strawmanning or not I was using them as an example. I don't really care to harp on whether they do or not. I just was poking fun... Further, you actually do need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false. Otherwise, what are you talking about when you claim Christianity is false? That it might be false, therefore, it is??? Sounds ludicrous... If I know a fact that contradicts a truth-claim and that fact has epistemic warrant, then I know that truth-claim is false.
                        First and foremost fallacy in the above is nothing in philosophy nor theology of the nature of belief can possibly be 100% either way. The same is true that the existence of a source some call God(s) can neither be proven to exist nor not exist. Truth-claims follow in the same vein. You cannot know 100% that a philosophical nor theological truth-claim is true nor false.


                        And what is the criterion you are suggesting??? Foundherentism is circular. Even though it tries to avoid the circularity of coherentism. Universal sanction is also a weak grounding for properly basic beliefs. Apart from the fact that the belief in God enjoys proper basicality under universal sanction (after-all a majority [>95%] of the world believes in some form of theism); universal sanction is not a truth criterion. Who defines 'normal' beliefs or 'normal' living conditions? Further, we can think of counterfactuals that would be obviously false. For instance, humans that hold beliefs that are not produced by cognitive faculties aimed at truth. If these were the only people left on earth, then universal sanction would not properly identify whether a belief is true or false.

                        This is where you are confused. Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true. Further, what absurd beliefs are you talking about? Plantinga handles the Great Pumpkin objection in his book. I would need more details on your objection to clarify...
                        Plantinga addresses the Great Pumpkin objection, but I do not believe his argument is convincing. The problem with the IF X is true than . . . is that this argument is just as likely true for many varied beliefs including atheism, which negates the value of the argument itself.

                        Wrong, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. If the belief in God is produced in this way, then it would satisfy epistemic warrant.
                        The problem is such beliefs are so highly anecdotal that, again, they can be used to justify any belief system. The highlighted above assumes the existence of a 'design plan,' which makes the arguments circular. The existence of a 'design plan' assumes the existence of designer, therefore a God or God(s) or maybe an alien.

                        [quote] You think biological evolution is aimed at the production of true beliefs? Evolution is defined by random mutation and natural selection. Belief producing faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether they are true or not is not relevant to evolution.

                        First, Randomness is not a part of the definition of evolution. In fact randomness has no causal relationship to evolution. True, true beliefs are not necessarily, and not likely relevant to the natural selection in evolution.

                        I already answered this above, but Plantinga handles this clearly in his book. Again, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief.
                        Again, this is assumption of the argument that a 'divine plan' would explain true belief, and this assumes the 'Designer' exist, which may not be true.

                        A few objections in here... 1) We must be clear that Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then his model (or something like his model) is true. An objection to the sensus divinitatus would be a de facto objection in the case of a person who accepts Plantinga's model. I don't really see how the bible commits you to a belief in the sensus divinitatus is relevant or not. If you accept Plantinga's model, then an objection to the sensus divinitatus is a de facto objection. 2) First, I have no idea what passages you are talking about. Second, I don't see how God 'befuddling' peoples cognitive processes is relevant. That would not remove the epistemic warrant of the sensus divinitatus. 3) Pretty similar to #1 - because an objection to what God does with peoples cognitive processes is not objectionable without objecting to Christian truth claims. I think this is a result of the misunderstandings I corrected in the other objections. Remember, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. Thanks
                        The problem is that IF 'Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model.' than his argument is of no more of value than any other argument of any other belief system including atheism using basically the same argument.
                        Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                        Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                        But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                        go with the flow the river knows . . .

                        Frank

                        I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                        Comment


                        • #27
                          Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View Post
                          Thanks for the great example, firstfloor. An objection like this is exactly what Plantinga shows is not viable. There is no objection to the truth of Christianity in firstfloor's post. It is a de jure objection.
                          The objection is that the recipe is capable of producing any number of ‘true’ religions none of which are guaranteed to be actually true. In other words the results are uninteresting except that they attract human beings like a moth to a flame. The truth of a religion is completely unnecessary for its function and there may even be an advantage in having absurd truth claims of the sort we see in Christianity; the man-god, the resurrection and so on.
                          “I think God, in creating man, somewhat overestimated his ability.” ― Oscar Wilde
                          “And if there were a God, I think it very unlikely that He would have such an uneasy vanity as to be offended by those who doubt His existence” ― Bertrand Russell
                          “not all there” - you know who you are

                          Comment


                          • #28
                            Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View Post
                            The point of Plantinga's project with WCD is to make Christianity "intellectually acceptable". If it does that, then he has done his job.
                            That doesn't address the objections in my post, though. In that post, I'm not commenting on the project on making Christianity "intellectually respectable", instead I'm pointing out how you're incorrect in claiming that Plantinga has shown that one cannot offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection. Here's a summary of some of the objections I made in that post:
                            First, Plantinga's defense is trivial, and can be employed in defense of almost any position.

                            Second, Plantinga's defense doesn't actually convert de jure objections to de facto objections, since it involves and ad hoc re-definition and strawmanof what Christianity is committed to. Someone can have a de jure objection (without a de facoto objection) to what Christianity is actually committed to, evne if they have a de facto objection to the strawman Plantinga erects.
                            "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

                            Comment


                            • #29
                              Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View Post
                              They offer many objections. This is one of them. Strawmanning or not I was using them as an example. I don't really care to harp on whether they do or not. I just was poking fun... Further, you actually do need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false. Otherwise, what are you talking about when you claim Christianity is false? That it might be false, therefore, it is??? Sounds ludicrous... If I know a fact that contradicts a truth-claim and that fact has epistemic warrant, then I know that truth-claim is false.
                              You don't need 100% certainty that a religion is false to know that it is false, since knowledge does not require certainty. For example, I know that HIV causes AIDS, even though I'm not 100% certain that it does. And there are plenty of other examples of knowledge, where 100% certainty is not required. Also, you're contradicting Plantinga himself, since on his account of knowledge, knowledge (that is "true belief + warrant") does not require certainty. If you doubt that, then feel free to checj his account of "warrant"; it makes no mention of a requirement of "certainty". And as an externalist, Plantinga would be the last person to claim that knowledge requires an internalistic notion like 100% certainty.

                              And what is the criterion you are suggesting???
                              Universal sanction, though other criteria are available

                              Foundherentism is circular. Even though it tries to avoid the circularity of coherentism.
                              You haven't shown that.

                              Universal sanction is also a weak grounding for properly basic beliefs. Apart from the fact that the belief in God enjoys proper basicality under universal sanction (after-all a majority [>95%] of the world believes in some form of theism);
                              First, it's false to claim that >95 of the world believes in some sort of theism. After all, there are at least half a billion atheists globally.

                              Second, universal sanction is not a poll of how many people accept a claim. See here for further discussion of what universal sanction is:
                              Wunder, Tyler. "Warrant and Religious Epistemology: A Critique of Alvin Plantinga's Warrant Phase."

                              Third, theistic belief doesn't meet the criterion of universal sanction, since skepticism about theistic belief (tout court) is pragmatically conceivable. After all, there are plenty of psychologically healthy people (who are skeptical about theistic) belief, and manage to get along just fine.

                              universal sanction is not a truth criterion.
                              Irrelevant. It doesn't need to be a truth criterion, since it isn't being offered as a truth criterion and the issue here isn't whether a claim is true or false. The issue is instead whether a belief is properly basic. So it's not a matter of a truth criterion, but a proper basicality criterion.

                              Who defines 'normal' beliefs or 'normal' living conditions?
                              People define it, as do people define all their terms. Anyway, what you just said isn't a meaningful objection; it'd be akin to objecting to evolutionary biology by saying who defines "evolution" or objecting to Christianity by saying who defined the "Christian God". It's not a meaningful objection, since asking who defines terms does nothing to undermine the support for a claim nor show it's false. And it's quite trivially easy to answer the sorts of questions, as I explained: people define terms. Furthermore, your point likely conflates terms with to what the terms refer. Yes, humans can define terms like "normal", "evolution", etc. That doesn't change the fact that the particulars/processes/properties/etc. to which those terms refer, exist or don't exist regardless of human's definitions of their terms. To say otherwise is to commit a use/mention mistake.

                              Further, we can think of counterfactuals that would be obviously false. For instance, humans that hold beliefs that are not produced by cognitive faculties aimed at truth. If these were the only people left on earth, then universal sanction would not properly identify whether a belief is true or false.
                              Again, universal sanction is not being offered as a criterion of truth, but as a criterion of proper basicality. So one can attach universal sanction to any number of other views on truth, such as correspondence views, coherentist views, or minimalist/deflationary views.

                              This is where you are confused. Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model.
                              The Great Pumpkin objection (which you were responding to) is not about whether Plantinga's model is false. It's instead meant to show Plantinga's defense of his model fails since the defense would work for positions we know are absurd, and thus something is wrong with his defense.

                              He is saying that if Christianity is true, then something like his model (or close to it) is true.
                              I explained the problem with that. For example, Christianity does not entail that his model is true:
                              "After all, he might claim that if the Christian God made us, then the Christian God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. So to deny that we have such a system is to deny that Christianity is true, which is a de facto objection to Christianity. However, this reply from Plantinga would fail. After all, Christianity doesn't actually commit one to the claim that God would have made us such that faith results from a reliable cognitive system that's in line with the epistemic virtues. For example, there are instances in the Bible where God seems to befuddle peope's cognitive systems for its own purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the Christians God exists is different from the question of what particular Christians claim that the Christian God did with respect human cognitive systems. One can offer a de facto objection to the latter, without giving a de facto objection to the former. And that would allow one to offer a de jure objection to Christianity, without offering a de facto objection the belief that the Christian God exists."

                              Further, what absurd beliefs are you talking about?
                              Belief in the Great Pumpkin from Charlie Brown, for example.

                              Plantinga handles the Great Pumpkin objection in his book.
                              And as I said, his defense leads him to a form of epistemic relativism, where a community of adherents who were committed to belief in the Great Pumpkin (or any other absurd belief) could use Plantinga's defense to claim that their absurd belief is properly basic.

                              Wrong, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief. If the belief in God is produced in this way, then it would satisfy epistemic warrant.
                              That doesn't actually address what I wrote in that section of my post. What you wrote above deals with the implications of a belief having warrant, while that section of my post was dealing with the implications of a belief having proper basicality.

                              You think biological evolution is aimed at the production of true beliefs?
                              No. Biological evolution can proceed even if no beliefs are produced, let alone true beliefs. The point isn't about what evolution "is aimed at", but instead which features are selected for/against once they are present and why they are selected for/against.

                              Evolution is defined by random mutation and natural selection.
                              No, it isn't. For example, it includes processes such as genetic drift and the various processes that result in speciation.

                              Belief producing faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether they are true or not is not relevant to evolution.
                              False. This is an issue dealt with by philosophers of biology like Paul Griffiths (though one need not accept Griffith's account of "truth" to accept the other aspects of his reply). To discuss it further, what you wrote makes as little sense as saying:
                              "Genetic/developmental processes would be aimed at producing wings that are conducive to the survival of the species. Whether those wings fly is not relevant to evolution."
                              The mistakes with such a claim are apparent. For example, it overlooks the fact that wings help the organism's survival, in large part, due to the wings being capable of flight. Parallel point for beliefs and cognitive processes: they tend to help the organisms survival, in large part, due to the beliefs being true and the cognitive processes resulting in largely true beliefs. To put the point another way: you're basically overlooking the features (such as being true) that help a trait realize the role of aiding in an organism's survival. Roles have realizers.

                              Now, of course, you can construct some logically possible scenario where false beliefs promote survival. But that doesn't undermine the point, anymore than does pointing out some logically possible scenario in which wings aid an organism's survival without that aid being due to flight. Logical possibility does not imply plausibility or being likely.

                              I already answered this above, but Plantinga handles this clearly in his book. Again, the beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis would be attributable to a cognitive faculty functionally properly in a congenial epistemic environment according to a design plan successfully aimed at the production of true belief.
                              How does that address the fact that Plantinga has an incorrect account what "warrant" was, and that I explained some ways in which can false short of what providing warrant? The sensus divinitatis might provide what Plantinga thinks "warrant" is, but that does not matter very much if Plantinga is wrong on what "warrant" is. And as I said, he's slightly incorrect on what knowledge (or more precisely: "warrant") is.

                              A few objections in here... 1) We must be clear that Plantinga is not arguing for the truth of his model. He is saying that if Christianity is true, then his model (or something like his model) is true. An objection to the sensus divinitatus would be a de facto objection in the case of a person who accepts Plantinga's model. I don't really see how the bible commits you to a belief in the sensus divinitatus is relevant or not. If you accept Plantinga's model, then an objection to the sensus divinitatus is a de facto objection.
                              What the Bible says is relevant since the Bible is the central doctrinal document of Christianity, and your defense hinges on the idea that Christianity implies a commitment to something like the A/C model. You even said:But if accepting the Bible does not imply accepting something like A/C, that provides evidence that one can accept the central tenets of Christianity without accepting something like A/C. And that undermines your claim.

                              Furthermore, as I explained in my post, since Christianity does not entail something like the A/C model, then giving a de facto objection to A/C does not entail giving a de facto objection to Christianity itself. Thus, one could offer a de jure objection to Christianity (without offering a de fato objection to Christianity), even if some theists decide to define their own personal form of Christianity in a way that incorporates A/C, such that one cannot offer a de jure objection to their position without offering a de facto one.

                              2) First, I have no idea what passages you are talking about.
                              You don't know about the passages where God hardens people's hearts? Or claims to have sent confusion amongst people (for example: by blocking their ability to communicate)?

                              Second, I don't see how God 'befuddling' peoples cognitive processes is relevant. That would not remove the epistemic warrant of the sensus divinitatus.
                              It's relevant since it shows that it's possible for one to accept that the Christian God exists, without accepting that the Christian God designed human beings in a way that accords with something like the A/C model. Instead, for example, God could have designed humans such that they are quite prone to being befuddled and confused by God, befuddled/confused by aspects of a fallen world, etc. And that further undermines the claim that Christianity entails something like the A/C model.

                              3) Pretty similar to #1 - because an objection to what God does with peoples cognitive processes is not objectionable without objecting to Christian truth claims.
                              Once again, it wouldn't since Christianity does not entail something like the A/C model, for some of the reasons I went over.
                              Last edited by Jichard; 08-03-2015, 11:34 PM.
                              "Instead, we argue, it is necessary to shift the debate from the subject under consideration, instead exposing to public scrutiny the tactics they [denialists] employ and identifying them publicly for what they are."

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                              • #30
                                Originally posted by ShrimpMaster View Post
                                I haven't heard from them recently and any attack on religion is usually directed toward radical Muslims, which seems kind of desperate.
                                Oh, well, if you have not heard from them recently, then that proves it.
                                Read the communist manifesto...
                                I found only two references to Christianity in it:

                                When the ancient world was in its last throes, the ancient religions were overcome by Christianity. When Christian ideas succumbed in the 18th century to rationalist ideas, feudal society fought its death battle with the then revolutionary bourgeoisie. The ideas of religious liberty and freedom of conscience merely gave expression to the sway of free competition within the domain of knowledge.

                                Nothing is easier than to give Christian asceticism a Socialist tinge. Has not Christianity declaimed against private property, against marriage, against the State? Has it not preached in the place of these, charity and poverty, celibacy and mortification of the flesh, monastic life and Mother Church? Christian Socialism is but the holy water with which the priest consecrates the heart-burnings of the aristocrat.


                                Neither of these suggest "Marx thought Christianity was a result of the deprivations of Capitalism". I am wondering where you got this idea from.
                                The sensus divinitatus specifically occasions the belief "these mountains were made by God". Why is this significant? In short, this provides a furnishing for the proper basicality of the belief in God.
                                Why should we suppose this belief is true? It seems to me that this belief is informed by religion. You already think God exists and is responsible for the mountains, therefore when you see the beauty of the mountains, you get a sensus divinitatus. If you do not start from the assumption that God exists, you do not get this sensus divinitatus.
                                It isn't a belief. It is a model through which believers can come to have knowledge of God.
                                So the belief "these mountains were made by God" is not a belief?

                                Interesting position to take, but not very convincing.

                                Are you saying that the belief that is not a belief that "these mountains were made by God" affords knowledge of God? Can you give an example of something you came to know about God after you got this sensus divinitatus? Something that you did not know before hand.
                                It isn't based on the assumption that God exists...
                                Sure, it is based on a belief that is not a belief.
                                Can we really have confidence in such a belief in the same we can about what we had for breakfast?
                                What kind of confidence do you have about what you had for breakfast?
                                High. I have the memory of the direct experience from only a few hours ago.

                                Comparing to a belief god exists based on a belief that is not a belief that some mountains were made by God, if we assume in advance that God made the mountains, I would say that is several orders of magnitude better.
                                It is a model not an argument...
                                We can certainly agreed that it is no argument!
                                My Blog: http://oncreationism.blogspot.co.uk/

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