Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

. . . concerning my knowledge of physics and cosmology. It is apparent you lack the background to make this judgment.

That's not really apparent, in the least. You made it clear that you thought the expansion of the universe was a reference to matter within the universe rather than to space-time, itself, being in a state of expansion. This, of course, stands in direct opposition to the mainstream consensus on cosmology. When cosmologists say that the universe is expanding, they don't simply mean that all the individual stuff inside the universe is getting farther away from each other. They mean that space, itself, is literally getting bigger.

In addition to that misconception, you seem to rather enjoy slinging around terms like "Natural Law" and "Quantum World," despite the fact that it is pretty clear your understanding of these terms is quite far removed from that of mainstream physics.

. . . and attack B-Theory of time, based on the personal perspective of Newtonian A-Theory of time.

No, those philosophers tend to attack the B-Theory based on an array of other arguments which I do not find very convincing, but not on a Newtonian view of Time. Even William Lane Craig will readily admit that the Newtonian idea of absolute time is woefully inadequate.

[JimL]

Which assertion was that?

To be fair, as Adrift has pointed out, intuition regarding the phenomenological experience of time is one of the major sticking points for those philosophers who still attempt to defend the A-Theory.

And are there other major sticking points. If so, it would be interesting to know what they are.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

And are there other major sticking points. If so, it would be interesting to know what they are.

For William Lane Craig and a few others, the remaining sticking points are theological rather than being based on physical evidence. I'm not aware of any decent arguments against the B-Theory from physical evidence besides the phenomenological experience-- which is a large part of the reason that the vast majority of Philosophers of Science are B-Theorists.

[JimL]

For William Lane Craig and a few others, the remaining sticking points are theological rather than being based on physical evidence. I'm not aware of any decent arguments against the B-Theory from physical evidence besides the phenomenological experience-- which is a large part of the reason that the vast majority of Philosophers of Science are B-Theorists.

I am not a b-theorist myself, though i don't know the subject well enough to dismiss it out of hand. I have believed though for a long time now that the problem with the block universe, and now b-theory as well, which apparently goes hand in hand with it, or should I say the reason it is more widely accepted than eternalism and A-theory, is because of the idea that eternalism and motion are incompatibile. In other words if eternalism and motion are incompatible then you wind up with either a prime mover, a distinct creator of time and motion, or the uncreated, tenseless, and eternal block universe. But I imagine a universe that is eternal in both time and motion, one in which there is no distinction between the cause and the effects. Such a universe would be compatible with a-theory as well as being in comformity with what we actually experience. Are you aware of any problem with this idea, i.e. the idea of eternal motion and change with regards to the laws of physics?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

But I imagine a universe that is eternal in both time and motion

By "eternal in time," do you mean to say infinite in time? "Eternal" can be a bit ambiguous, as philosophers tend to use the word to mean two completely opposite things, and these two definitions can be easy to conflate or equivocate. "Eternal" can mean "for an infinite amount of time" or it can mean "entirely absent of time," depending upon its intention.

Such a universe would be compatible with a-theory as well as being in comformity with what we actually experience. Are you aware of any problem with this idea, i.e. the idea of eternal motion and change with regards to the laws of physics?

Assuming that "eternal" is a reference to the finitude of time, the primary problem that I would see with this idea is that it seems entirely plausible, on modern cosmology, that the universe may have had a first moment, and that it may not be past-infinite. There just does not seem to be a good reason, at this point, to conclude that the universe is past-infinite on the basis of physical evidence. So, just as I object to Dr. Craig's premise that the universe must be past-finite, in the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I would similarly object to the premise that the universe is past-infinite, which underlies the view which you have presented here.

Another problem for this view is tangential, but very important. Modern physics, particularly Relativity, has shown that the measure of elapsed time for any single event can and does vary depending upon the observer making that measurement. Three different observers in three different inertial reference frames can measure the time which elapses for the same event, and all three can yield measurements which are different from one another's, with absolutely no way of distinguishing whether one of these measurements is "correct" or "incorrect." Indeed, in modern physics, the view is that all three measurements are equally correct. This poses a major problem for the A-Theory, as events which are still in the future for one observer may have already occurred for another observer. How can it be said that temporal progression is real if this progression is observer-dependent? William Lane Craig attempts to resolve this problem by the ad hoc assertion that there exists one correct inertial frame of reference (which I will call the "Aether Frame") and that all other reference frames are illusory. I've explained why I think this is a particularly poor assertion, here.

So, whether you hold to the A-Theory or the B-Theory, it remains that there must be something about the phenomenological experience of time which is entirely illusory. Neither understanding of Time can stay true to modern physics while perfectly matching our intuitive perceptions of how time works.

[37818]

This is actually not true, at all, from the view of modern physics. Electromagnetic fields certainly maintain their properties in the absence of matter-- it was this revelation which led to the abandonment of the concept of a Luminiferous Aether, and which paved the way for modern Relativity Theory. Nor is space-time at all dependent upon the existence of matter. Quite the reverse, really.

What is the frequency or wavelength of a photon where there is no rest mass to reference it from? Zero frequency infinite length. Magnetic strength? Meaningless, there being no matter.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

What is the frequency or wavelength of a photon where there is no rest mass to reference it from? Zero frequency infinite length. Magnetic strength? Meaningless, there being no matter.

I'm not sure if you realize this, but a photon is a massless particle. Its wavelength and frequency is entirely independent of the presence of matter or mass.

So, for example, light with a wavelength of 700 nanometers has that wavelength in a complete spatial vacuum, entirely absent of any mass.

[37818]

I'm not sure if you realize this, but a photon is a massless particle. Its wavelength and frequency is entirely independent of the presence of matter or mass.

Photons have mass, a non-rest mass ralative to some rest mass. You do know about relativity and red and blue shifts?

So, for example, light with a wavelength of 700 nanometers has that wavelength in a complete spatial vacuum, entirely absent of any mass.

To some rest mass. Two objects moving to each other, for example, only to one could the photon have the wavelength of 700 nanometers. To the other object it would be a deferent wavelangth!

[shunyadragon]

Photons have mass, a non-rest mass ralative to some rest mass. You do know about relativity and red and blue shifts?

To some rest mass. Two objects moving to each other, for example, only to one could the photon have the wavelength of 700 nanometers. To the other object it would be a deferent wavelangth!

The issue of whether photons have mass is an interesting one. The following reference explains it better than I.

Source: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physics/ParticleAndNuclear/photon_mass.html

Photons are traditionally said to be massless. This is a figure of speech that physicists use to describe something about how a photon's particle-like properties are described by the language of special relativity.

The logic can be constructed in many ways, and the following is one such. Take an isolated system (called a "particle") and accelerate it to some velocity v (a vector). Newton defined the "momentum" p of this particle (also a vector), such that p behaves in a simple way when the particle is accelerated, or when it's involved in a collision. For this simple behaviour to hold, it turns out that p must be proportional to v. The proportionality constant is called the particle's "mass" m, so that p = mv.

In special relativity, it turns out that we are still able to define a particle's momentum p such that it behaves in well-defined ways that are an extension of the newtonian case. Although p and v still point in the same direction, it turns out that they are no longer proportional; the best we can do is relate them via the particle's "relativistic mass" mrel. Thus
p = mrelv .
When the particle is at rest, its relativistic mass has a minimum value called the "rest mass" mrest. The rest mass is always the same for the same type of particle. For example, all protons have identical rest masses, and so do all electrons, and so do all neutrons; these masses can be looked up in a table. As the particle is accelerated to ever higher speeds, its relativistic mass increases without limit.

It also turns out that in special relativity, we are able to define the concept of "energy" E, such that E has simple and well-defined properties just like those it has in newtonian mechanics. When a particle has been accelerated so that it has some momentum p (the length of the vector p) and relativistic mass mrel, then its energy E turns out to be given by
E = mrelc2 , and also E2 = p2c2 + m2restc4 . (1)
There are two interesting cases of this last equation:
1. If the particle is at rest, then p = 0, and E = mrestc2.
2. If we set the rest mass equal to zero (regardless of whether or not that's a reasonable thing to do), then E = pc.


In classical electromagnetic theory, light turns out to have energy E and momentum p, and these happen to be related by E = pc. Quantum mechanics introduces the idea that light can be viewed as a collection of "particles": photons. Even though these photons cannot be brought to rest, and so the idea of rest mass doesn't really apply to them, we can certainly bring these "particles" of light into the fold of equation (1) by just considering them to have no rest mass. That way, equation (1) gives the correct expression for light, E = pc, and no harm has been done. Equation (1) is now able to be applied to particles of matter and "particles" of light. It can now be used as a fully general equation, and that makes it very useful.
. . .
read the rest it is worth while. http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/physic...oton_mass.html

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[Mountain Man]

Many theists claim that God caused the universe to exist. For example, the Christian apologist William Lane Craig claims (in his Kalaam cosmological argument) that the universe has a cause because the universe began to exist and everything that begins to exist has a cause. He then argues that God, or a transcendant/spaceless/timeless personal being, caused the universe to exist. I'm going to offer a brief critique of that reasoning. This critique starts with the following claim:

1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E

This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.

So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim. Additionally, one can make a conceptual argument in support of the claim. For example, one can note that the very notion of causation involves production or transition; that is: the cause produces an effect, involving a transition from a state where the effect is present to a state where the effect is present. If this were otherwise (for example, if the effect was already there without any action being done by X), then it makes no sense to claim that that X is causally responsible for the effect. But this very production involves a transition from a time when the effect is not present a time where the effect is present [as Craig himself notes, on his notion of change, change entail there being time]. And the cause needs to be present at that earlier time (where the effect is not present) in order to exert the influence that results in the effect.

Now, if theists want to still claim that God caused the universe to exist, then they have at least two options:

option A : don't accept 1
option B : accept 1

Option A just looks like special pleading. After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?

Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state. But that creates at least three problems:

First, it creates problems for proponents of Craig's Kalaam argument, since they will have trouble accounting for God's temporal state. They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past. Yet they also won't want to say that God existed for a finite amount of time into the past, since defenders of Kalaam normally argue that if X existed for a finite amount of time into the past then X must have a cause for it's existence, and they don't won't want to claim that God has a cause of it's existence. So they're stuck.

Second, theists can no longer object to multiverse theories, on the grounds that those theories unjustifiably posit a temporal framework outside of (or preceding) the universe's temporal framework. After all, the theist has done just that, when they claim that God existed temporally before the universe existed.

Third, if there is no time before the universe existed (ex: the universe existed for a finite amount of time and there is no temporal framework other than that of the universe), then, in conjunction with 1, this implies that the universe has no cause. And that means the God would not be the cause of the universe's existence. Parallel points for God not being the cause of the Big Bang; the Bing Bang simply would not have a cause. When this point is combined with the second point above regarding the multiverse, it introduces an interesting tension for theists who accept 1 yet reject the multiverse theory: those theists need to argue that there was time before the universe existed and that there a supernatural God existed during this pre-universe time, while arguing (without special pleading) that there was not a multiverse during this pre-universe time. I wonder how they'll pull that off.

You've apparently misunderstood Craig's argument because what he objects to is an infinite number of causes and not the concept that something could eternally exist without a cause. This is why the multiverse theory fails, because it requires an infinite number of causes.

Source: New Atheism And Five Arguments For God

So what properties must such a cause of the universe possess? As the cause of space and time, it must transcend space and time and therefore exist timelessly and non-spatially (at least without the universe). This transcendent cause must therefore be changeless and immaterial because (1) anything that is timeless must also be unchanging and (2) anything that is changeless must be non-physical and immaterial since material things are constantly changing at the molecular and atomic levels. Such a cause must be without a beginning and uncaused, at least in the sense of lacking any prior causal conditions, since there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. Ockham’s Razor (the principle that states that we should not multiply causes beyond necessity) will shave away any other causes since only one cause is required to explain the effect. This entity must be unimaginably powerful, if not omnipotent, since it created the universe without any material cause.

Finally, and most remarkably, such a transcendent first cause is plausibly personal. We’ve already seen in our discussion of the argument from contingency that the personhood of the first cause of the universe is implied by its timelessness and immateriality. The only entities that can possess such properties are either minds or abstract objects like numbers. But abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. Therefore, the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe must be an unembodied mind.



Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/the-n...#ixzz3jlbGKj6l

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So no comment on the fact that the OP misrepresented Craig's argument?

[Jichard]

So no comment on the fact that the OP misrepresented Craig's argument?

Some of us have lives, you know? It's no as if going a week without responding to you is some sort of crime.

[Jichard]

You've apparently misunderstood Craig's argument because what he objects to is an infinite number of causes and not the concept that something could eternally exist without a cause. This is why the multiverse theory fails, because it requires an infinite number of causes.

First, quote where I said:

Craig objects to an infinite number of causes

Because that's not what I said. What I actually said was:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Second, Craig objects to the idea that something can extend infinitely into the past. That's one reason why he employs the Hilbert's hotel thought experiment, for example.

Third, a multiverse is compatible with the multiverse being past-finite.

[cite=New Atheism And Five Arguments For God]So what properties must such a cause of the universe possess? As the cause of space and time, it must transcend space and time and therefore exist timelessly and non-spatially (at least without the universe). This transcendent cause must therefore be changeless and immaterial because (1) anything that is timeless must also be unchanging and (2) anything that is changeless must be non-physical and immaterial since material things are constantly changing at the molecular and atomic levels. Such a cause must be without a beginning and uncaused, at least in the sense of lacking any prior causal conditions, since there cannot be an infinite regress of causes. Ockham’s Razor (the principle that states that we should not multiply causes beyond necessity) will shave away any other causes since only one cause is required to explain the effect. This entity must be unimaginably powerful, if not omnipotent, since it created the universe without any material cause.

Finally, and most remarkably, such a transcendent first cause is plausibly personal. We’ve already seen in our discussion of the argument from contingency that the personhood of the first cause of the universe is implied by its timelessness and immateriality. The only entities that can possess such properties are either minds or abstract objects like numbers. But abstract objects don’t stand in causal relations. Therefore, the transcendent cause of the origin of the universe must be an unembodied mind.

Already familiar with this. None of it rebuts what I wrote in the OP.

But since you like quoting Craig, here's a quote from Craig for you:

"The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe"
http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html

"2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist."

Which supports what I said above:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Photons have mass, a non-rest mass ralative to some rest mass.

Photons do not have mass. They can be shown to be energetically equivalent to certain massive particles, but that does not imply that they have mass.

You do know about relativity and red and blue shifts?

Quite familiar. The fact that a wavelength can be measured differently in different inertial frames does not imply that the wavelength is nonexistent in the absence of mass.

[Jichard]

This is vary much a part of the discussion. Do you agree with Craig or not?



Not accurate nor obvious at all. The ball responds to forces of nature that cause gravity. The ball is not a cause.



So you don't believe that the universe has a cause? There is no reason why it exists?

Go away...

It's not your thread for you to tell people to leave it. I'd much rather have shunydragon here than you, given your penchant for dishonesty.

Shuny, I said please - now please leave my thread. Thank you...

[Mountain Man]

But since you like quoting Craig, here's a quote from Craig for you:

"The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe"
http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html

"2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist."

Which supports what I said above:

"They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past."

Your problem here is that you don't seem to know what an actual infinite is.

Source: William Lane Craig

...the mathematical notion of an actual infinite is a quantitative concept. It concerns a collection of definite and discrete elements that are members of the collection. But when theologians speak of the infinity of God, they are not using the word in a mathematical sense to refer to an aggregate of an infinite number of elements. God's infinity is, as it were, qualitative, not quantitative. It means that God is metaphysically necessary, morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal, and so on.

Read more: http://www.reasonablefaith.org/is-go...#ixzz3kj1oMoVQ

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In other words, while God is eternal, he is not an actual infinite, and so there is no conflict with the Kalam Cosmological argument.