Many theists claim that God caused the universe to exist. For example, the Christian apologist William Lane Craig claims (in his Kalaam cosmological argument) that the universe has a cause because the universe began to exist and everything that begins to exist has a cause. He then argues that God, or a transcendant/spaceless/timeless personal being, caused the universe to exist. I'm going to offer a brief critique of that reasoning. This critique starts with the following claim:
This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.
So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim. Additionally, one can make a conceptual argument in support of the claim. For example, one can note that the very notion of causation involves production or transition; that is: the cause produces an effect, involving a transition from a state where the effect is present to a state where the effect is present. If this were otherwise (for example, if the effect was already there without any action being done by X), then it makes no sense to claim that that X is causally responsible for the effect. But this very production involves a transition from a time when the effect is not present a time where the effect is present [as Craig himself notes, on his notion of change, change entail there being time]. And the cause needs to be present at that earlier time (where the effect is not present) in order to exert the influence that results in the effect.
Now, if theists want to still claim that God caused the universe to exist, then they have at least two options:
Option A just looks like special pleading. After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?
Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state. But that creates at least three problems:
1 : If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E
This is another way of saying that a cause occurs before its effect.
So how to support 1? Well, one can support it in the same way that Craig tries to support his claim that everything that begins to exist has a cause: by pointing out that there are no known counterexamples to the claim and that every example we have of causation confirms the claim. Additionally, one can make a conceptual argument in support of the claim. For example, one can note that the very notion of causation involves production or transition; that is: the cause produces an effect, involving a transition from a state where the effect is present to a state where the effect is present. If this were otherwise (for example, if the effect was already there without any action being done by X), then it makes no sense to claim that that X is causally responsible for the effect. But this very production involves a transition from a time when the effect is not present a time where the effect is present [as Craig himself notes, on his notion of change, change entail there being time]. And the cause needs to be present at that earlier time (where the effect is not present) in order to exert the influence that results in the effect.
Now, if theists want to still claim that God caused the universe to exist, then they have at least two options:
option A : don't accept 1
option B : accept 1
option B : accept 1
Option A just looks like special pleading. After all, why would theists reject a claim as well supported as 1, while accepting equally-supported (or less well-supported) claims they think help their theology, like the universe began to exist?
Option B has some interesting implications, only some of which I'll discuss. If theists take option B and those theists still want to claim that God caused the universe to exist, then that commits these theists to claim that God temporally preceded the universe; that is: God existed before the universe did and did so in a temporal state. But that creates at least three problems:
First, it creates problems for proponents of Craig's Kalaam argument, since they will have trouble accounting for God's temporal state. They can't say God's existence extends infinitely into the past, since defenders of Kalaam usually argue that it is impossible for something to extend infinitely into the past. Yet they also won't want to say that God existed for a finite amount of time into the past, since defenders of Kalaam normally argue that if X existed for a finite amount of time into the past then X must have a cause for it's existence, and they don't won't want to claim that God has a cause of it's existence. So they're stuck.
Second, theists can no longer object to multiverse theories, on the grounds that those theories unjustifiably posit a temporal framework outside of (or preceding) the universe's temporal framework. After all, the theist has done just that, when they claim that God existed temporally before the universe existed.
Third, if there is no time before the universe existed (ex: the universe existed for a finite amount of time and there is no temporal framework other than that of the universe), then, in conjunction with 1, this implies that the universe has no cause. And that means the God would not be the cause of the universe's existence. Parallel points for God not being the cause of the Big Bang; the Bing Bang simply would not have a cause. When this point is combined with the second point above regarding the multiverse, it introduces an interesting tension for theists who accept 1 yet reject the multiverse theory: those theists need to argue that there was time before the universe existed and that there a supernatural God existed during this pre-universe time, while arguing (without special pleading) that there was not a multiverse during this pre-universe time. I wonder how they'll pull that off.
Second, theists can no longer object to multiverse theories, on the grounds that those theories unjustifiably posit a temporal framework outside of (or preceding) the universe's temporal framework. After all, the theist has done just that, when they claim that God existed temporally before the universe existed.
Third, if there is no time before the universe existed (ex: the universe existed for a finite amount of time and there is no temporal framework other than that of the universe), then, in conjunction with 1, this implies that the universe has no cause. And that means the God would not be the cause of the universe's existence. Parallel points for God not being the cause of the Big Bang; the Bing Bang simply would not have a cause. When this point is combined with the second point above regarding the multiverse, it introduces an interesting tension for theists who accept 1 yet reject the multiverse theory: those theists need to argue that there was time before the universe existed and that there a supernatural God existed during this pre-universe time, while arguing (without special pleading) that there was not a multiverse during this pre-universe time. I wonder how they'll pull that off.
Comment