Why think God caused the universe to exist?

[JimL]

For one thing Craig assumes in this argument that the cause of the universe is eternally timeless and inactive. Completely unjustified in my opinion. Just because time for the universe begins with its inception doesn't mean that time itself didn't exist prior to the universe. Not to mention thefact that the idea of an eternally existing free will cause doing nothing for eternity suddenly deciding to act seems to be a bit of a ludicrous rationalization.

[seer]

I want to understand those questions, not some kind of esoteric metaphysics.

What makes you think that we ever will? Perhaps these questions we remain forever in the realm of "esoteric metaphysics."

[37818]

Doesn't answer any problems in cosmology at all. What is the inflaton fields nature if inflation is correct? What does dark matter consist of? Is string theory correct and if it is, what are the extra dimensions and their nature? What is the true fate of the universe? What is beyond the Standard Models of particle physics and cosmology?

I want to understand those questions, not some kind of esoteric metaphysics.

Well, While I personally am persuaded regarding the origin of our universe. Two questions you pose. I have not answers but two questions which just might be an answer.

Question one: What if what we think we see as the "big bang" is really our observing this universe coming to an end as we see it in the distant past? What is it we observe which must disallow this?

The second question: Involves an existing, yet not satisfactorily proven theory. That the dark matter is really the effect of gravitational relativity. The wording of the question on this, I'm not sure how to word this into a proper question in this regard.

[Sea of red]

Well, While I personally am persuaded regarding the origin of our universe. Two questions you pose. I have not answers but two questions which just might be an answer.

Alright.

Question one: What if what we think we see as the "big bang" is really our observing this universe coming to an end as we see it in the distant past? What is it we observe which must disallow this?

The short answer is that gravitational waves in the early universe would disprove cyclic cosmology in the conformal sense of Turok or Penrose.

The second question: Involves an existing, yet not satisfactorily proven theory. That the dark matter is really the effect of gravitational relativity. The wording of the question on this, I'm not sure how to word this into a proper question in this regard.

It's proven. The way galaxies interact with other galaxies and the kinetic energy predicted via the virial theorem, cannot be explained with only "visible" matter. We don't know what dark matter is made up of, or why it doesn't interact with the electrical force to emit light, but it's hoped that perhaps supersymmetry can provide more robust answers to this.

[Jichard]

No, I didn't. I neatly refuted your flimsy justification.

You didn't refute it; you ignored it, and you did so but cutting it out of your quote-mine of my post.

Except there is no a priori reason for thinking that a timeless cause cannot causally precede a temporal effect. You're simply begging the question.

False. I gave one in the OP. You ignored it.

A fallacy of composition and another example of begging the question. I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but two fallacious arguments don't make a sound one.

First, you never showed it begged the question.

Second, your special pleading. You're more than willing to apply science to things within the universe to the entire universe when you think it suits your position, yet you cry fallacy of composition when it doesn't suit your purposes. Pure special pleading on your part.

Aside from being a massive non sequitur, this is simply an unjustifiable bare assertion,

Not a bare assertion at all, as it was supported in the paper linked to. You might want to read scientific papers, before acting as if science supports religious arguments and acting as if science is "bare assertion."

and one that patently begs the question against the possibility of a timeless cause causally preceding a temporal effect.

Again, you haven't shown it's begging the question. Just because you don't like a conclusion, doesn't mean it's begging the question. It just means you don't like the conclusion.

[shunyadragon]

Even though science confirms Kalam.

Still waiting! How does science confirm Kalam?

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Except it isn't. Because there is no justification for the claim that some thing x can only cause some thing y if and only if x is temporally prior to y. For we can conceive of things existing timelessly causally prior but not temporally prior to something. So, your claim "If C causes E, then C temporally precedes E" patently begs the question.

Can you give an example of something which is causally prior but not temporally prior to its effect?

[Adrift]

Can you give an example of something which is causally prior but not temporally prior to its effect?

The trajectory of tachyons? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/

[Boxing Pythagoras]

The trajectory of tachyons? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-backwards/

The Kalam Cosmological Argument (at least as it is presented by Dr. William Lane Craig) presumes that retro-causality is not valid, due to its reliance on the A-Theory of Time, so I don't think this is a very good example if intended to support the premises of the KCA.

[Adrift]

The Kalam Cosmological Argument (at least as it is presented by Dr. William Lane Craig) presumes that retro-causality is not valid, due to its reliance on the A-Theory of Time, so I don't think this is a very good example if intended to support the premises of the KCA.

I wasn't intending to support the premises of the KCA, I was attempting to answer your question. But that said, it does demonstrate that we can justifiably conceive of something causally prior but not temporally prior.

[seer]

Can you give an example of something which is causally prior but not temporally prior to its effect?

Wouldn't this qualify?

"Even on a mundane level, we regularly experience simultaneous causation; to borrow an example from Kant, a heavy ball's resting on a cushion being the cause of a depression in that cushion."

http://www.reasonablefaith.org/creat...#ixzz3iPpnoDf4

[Boxing Pythagoras]

Wouldn't this qualify?

I do not agree with Dr. Craig that it does. At least, not in the Aristotelian sense of causation which Dr. Craig promotes. Aristotelian causation is a description of temporal change, and loses coherence when this temporality is removed. The heavy ball can only be said to have been the Aristotelian cause of the depression, in this scenario, if there was first a time in which the cushion had no depression, followed by a time in which placing the ball on the cushion led to a depression forming. If the cushion and ball had existed together, for all time, with the depression always present, then the depression was not caused.

If we were to take the looser, relational sense of causality which Kant describes, then Dr. Craig's assertions that the "cause" of the universe needs to be timeless and immaterial do not follow, and the KCA still fails to lead where Dr. Craig intends.

[seer]

I do not agree with Dr. Craig that it does. At least, not in the Aristotelian sense of causation which Dr. Craig promotes. Aristotelian causation is a description of temporal change, and loses coherence when this temporality is removed. The heavy ball can only be said to have been the Aristotelian cause of the depression, in this scenario, if there was first a time in which the cushion had no depression, followed by a time in which placing the ball on the cushion led to a depression forming. If the cushion and ball had existed together, for all time, with the depression always present, then the depression was not caused.

I'm not sure about that. Even if the depression existed for eternity past, the cause would still be the heavy ball. No ball no depression. The depression is still dependent on the ball. The ball is not dependent on the depression.

If we were to take the looser, relational sense of causality which Kant describes, then Dr. Craig's assertions that the "cause" of the universe needs to be timeless and immaterial do not follow, and the KCA still fails to lead where Dr. Craig intends.

I'm not sure about that, he does give more reasons in the link for his views.

[Boxing Pythagoras]

I'm not sure about that. Even if the depression existed for eternity past, the cause would still be the heavy ball. No ball no depression. The depression is still dependent on the ball. The ball is not dependent on the depression.

The depression did not come into existence because of the ball, in such a scenario. Whether the depression is dependent upon the ball is irrelevant to whether the ball is the Aristotelian cause of the depression.

I'm not sure about that, he does give more reasons in the link for his views.

I must not be seeing what you are seeing. To which reasons are you referring?

[seer]

The depression did not come into existence because of the ball, in such a scenario. Whether the depression is dependent upon the ball is irrelevant to whether the ball is the Aristotelian cause of the depression.

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Wouldn't it be obvious that the ball is causing the depression? That if the cushion existed eternally without the ball, there would be no depression? So the ball is causing something that would not have happened otherwise.

I must not be seeing what you are seeing. To which reasons are you referring?

For instance:

But why think that such a cause exists at all? Very simply, the causal inference is based in the metaphysical intuition that something cannot come out of absolutely nothing. A pure potentiality cannot actualize itself. In the case of the universe (including any boundary points), there was not anything physically prior to the initial singularity.4 The potentiality for the existence of the universe could not therefore have lain in itself, since it did not exist prior to the singularity. On the theistic hypothesis, the potentiality of the universe's existence lay in the power of God to create it. On the atheistic hypothesis, there did not even exist the potentiality for the existence of the universe. But then it seems inconceivable that the universe should become actual if there did not exist any potentiality for its existence. It seems to me therefore that a little reflection leads us to the conclusion that the origin of the universe had a cause.