If you thought the Planned Parenthood scandal couldn't get worse - it just did.

[Christianbookworm]

"I know what you are, but what am I!"

8 year old's everywhere are impressed by your rhetorical abilities. So got anymore sentences you care to rip off from wiki articles, so you can keep pretending you're smarter than all of those nasty people who dare to disagree with you?

Not me when I was 8! I was pro life even then! I read about abortion in a medical encyclopedia and was appalled that such a thing would occur, especially since I had a 2-year old sister at the time.

[Sam]

You are discriminating against a human fetus because it is unable to do what other humans can do. As far as I'm concerned that sounds like ableism to me. not to mention there is no reason for a human fetus to be able to do what other humans can do.

That's not ableism and that concept is already foggy enough without putting it places that it definitely doesn't belong. A person arguing that a fetus is a human being bearing the full set of human rights wouldn't even be arguing on an ableist platform, since the fetus is supposedly in its proper stage of development.

Making a thrill ride inaccessible to folks in a wheelchair is ableist. Restricting it to persons 54" or taller isn't. Your argument here would be like saying such rides are ableist against toddlers. Gotta let that one go.

A rock is not a life to begin with.

I would say humanity. It needs to be as you can't use any other basis for it.

Rocks are not life hence why they are not morally relevant. Animals do not count as morally relevant because THEY ARE A DIFFERENT SPECIES who conduct different actions from humans like I mentioned earlier. A female spider eats her mate and that is in no way relevant to what humans do to each other unless you want to argue that a human female should be able to eat her mate.

Go on then. Lets hear your argument for moral relevance for animals. lets hear how when a male lion kills it's predecessors cubs how that is in any way morally relevant to us. Go on, do it. I would love to see this because I know that all you have is baloney.

Human's are animals So if a human acts immorally towards you then by your own words "that doesn't show whether we are justified in not acting morally toward them". However you missed the point as always as it goes flying over your head. Other animals and humans DO NOT share a morality with each other. So how does that lead to "moral relevance"? How are they morally relevant to us? It's your claim that consciousness leads to morally relevance and yet you have no definitive answer to what that moral relevance is. Apparently when a spider eats it's mate it is being wicked and immoral to you. I don't understand on what basis you judge this to be considering it is something that spiders naturally do. I'm pretty sure that ALL FEMALE spiders have the instinct to eat their mate, it's just that some spiders like tarantulas have figured out a way to avoid it.

What I believe was Starlight's point (it seemed clear to me) was that "moral relevancy" refers to our moral obligations toward other persons, animals, or objects. Generally speaking, a person has no moral obligations toward a rock: it has no properties that would "trigger" moral obligations and so actions toward a rock are not morally relevant. On the other end of the spectrum, a person has great moral obligations toward other persons, who do possess the properties that trigger these obligations, such as the ability to suffer, to feel pain, to remember, to think. Starlight's argument, which I share, is that there is a large middle ground between a rock and a person: we have slightly more moral duty toward bacteria than a rock and we have somewhat less moral duty toward a house cat than a toddler. Whether human fetuses fit in this middle ground or in the set "persons" is the contentious issue, obviously, but what he's arguing about moral relevancy toward the rest of the world and to the biosphere is pretty commonly understood and accepted as true.

The whole idea of Christian stewardship pretty much assumes what he's saying about moral relevancy, in fact.

[Darth Ovious]

That's not ableism and that concept is already foggy enough without putting it places that it definitely doesn't belong. A person arguing that a fetus is a human being bearing the full set of human rights wouldn't even be arguing on an ableist platform, since the fetus is supposedly in its proper stage of development.

Making a thrill ride inaccessible to folks in a wheelchair is ableist. Restricting it to persons 54" or taller isn't. Your argument here would be like saying such rides are ableist against toddlers. Gotta let that one go.

Well, what I described is still the case even if you don't want to use the word ableism. They are still discriminating against a human fetus because it is unable to do what other humans can do. I don't really care how you want to define it because that there are certainly doing that.

What I believe was Starlight's point (it seemed clear to me) was that "moral relevancy" refers to our moral obligations toward other persons, animals, or objects. Generally speaking, a person has no moral obligations toward a rock: it has no properties that would "trigger" moral obligations and so actions toward a rock are not morally relevant. On the other end of the spectrum, a person has great moral obligations toward other persons, who do possess the properties that trigger these obligations, such as the ability to suffer, to feel pain, to remember, to think. Starlight's argument, which I share, is that there is a large middle ground between a rock and a person: we have slightly more moral duty toward bacteria than a rock and we have somewhat less moral duty toward a house cat than a toddler. Whether human fetuses fit in this middle ground or in the set "persons" is the contentious issue, obviously, but what he's arguing about moral relevancy toward the rest of the world and to the biosphere is pretty commonly understood and accepted as true.

The whole idea of Christian stewardship pretty much assumes what he's saying about moral relevancy, in fact.

I'm not entirely sure why a "trigger" is needed. You make it sound like something can only be immoral if someone else is hurt by it. Are you sure you want to take this position?

[Starlight]

They are still discriminating against a human fetus because it is unable to do what other humans can do.

Discriminating between two things that are different in relevant ways seems sensible.

You make it sound like something can only be immoral if someone else is hurt by it.

That is generally the standard view, yes. Something is immoral, by definition, if and only if it causes harm to persons capable of experiencing that harm.

[Sam]

Well, what I described is still the case even if you don't want to use the word ableism. They are still discriminating against a human fetus because it is unable to do what other humans can do. I don't really care how you want to define it because that there are certainly doing that.

Discrimination, in this sense, assumes that the party being discriminated against has an equal right as others to something but is not receiving it. However, the rights of the fetus are exactly the point of contention so you're assuming the conclusion by claiming discrimination.

If someone is "discriminating" against a fetus because it lacks sentience, you'd have to say we're discriminating against cats, dogs, and rocks by treating them differently than persons. Which is a technically acceptable use of the term but renders it useless in this sort of discussion.

I'm not entirely sure why a "trigger" is needed. You make it sound like something can only be immoral if someone else is hurt by it. Are you sure you want to take this position?

₂ concentration.

Regardless, if you agree that our moral obligations toward humans is different than our moral obligations toward rocks, you're agreeing that something triggers that increased moral obligation. Whether it's an intrinsic property or external to the thing in question is a worthwhile question but the triggering is not, I think, really a contested point.

[Sparko]

Discriminating between two things that are different in relevant ways seems sensible.

That depends on your definition of "relevant" doesn't it? Sounds completely arbitrary.

That is generally the standard view, yes. Something is immoral, by definition, if and only if it causes harm to persons capable of experiencing that harm.

So killing someone while asleep, in a coma, or under anesthesia is perfectly fine, eh?

PS why do you think that killing those whales is immoral? They are not "persons"

[Teallaura]

Which, IIRC, they didn't do a particularly good job of, since the mortality rate in nunneries was far higher than elsewhere.

Ironically, from the science of the era which thought getting sick people together where you could care for them was a good idea - which it would have been had they any idea of germ theory and taken precautions accordingly.

As for orphans, the immediate question would be who were the wet nurses? Scaling up infant nurseries would have been extremely problematic and could easily account for the stats - presuming their accuracy, which is always an open question with rebuilt data (not a dig - it's a valid concern and would have to be addressed if we were going much further with this).