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Problems with Thomas Aquinas aguments for the existence of God

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  • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
    I read the underlined in your posts. You are dodging my clear and concise references that the existence of God is indeed claimed to be proven by Aquinas, and self-evident, and he must exist from the human perspective.
    Have you read the immediately preceding article, the first article of this Quaestio yet?
    βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
    ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

    אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

    Comment


    • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
      Just read the immediately preceding article, the initial article, of this same Quaestio, where Thomas clearly argues that the existence of God is not self-evident to us. It only appears slippery to you because you have not read Thomas in context and tried to cite a small part of my post and ignore the much larger, preceding initial point of my post.
      I did, cite specifically the passage or part you are referring to the fact that the existence of God is not self-evident.
      Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
      Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
      But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

      go with the flow the river knows . . .

      Frank

      I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

      Comment


      • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
        I did, cite specifically the passage or part you are referring to the fact that the existence of God is not self-evident.
        Prima Pars, Quaestio 2

        Article 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?

        Objection 1. It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

        Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

        Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

        On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

        I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.

        Reply to Objection 1. To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

        Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

        Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
        βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
        ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

        אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

        Comment


        • Robrecht

          You are correct, but this does not address the problems with the five ways Aquinas proposes, which is the subject of the thread. As proposed God is self-evident only to God's self. The question is how can God be demonstrated, or God's existence her after be shown. This where Aquinas proposes his 'five ways' to prove the existence where he proposes God must exist. The subject of this thread is the problems with Aquinas's attempt to 'prove God's existence from the human existence. The problem with the 'five ways' is that the are indeed circular and fail to do what Aquinas proposes.

          " Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects."
          Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
          Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
          But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

          go with the flow the river knows . . .

          Frank

          I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

          Comment


          • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
            Robrecht

            You are correct, but this does not address the problems with the five ways Aquinas proposes, which is the subject of the thread. As proposed God is self-evident only to God's self. The question is how can God be demonstrated, or God's existence her after be shown. This where Aquinas proposes his 'five ways' to prove the existence where he proposes God must exist. The subject of this thread is the problems with Aquinas's attempt to 'prove God's existence from the human existence. The problem with the 'five ways' is that the are indeed circular and fail to do what Aquinas proposes.

            " Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects."
            The quotation you bold above should be understood in context as Thomas noting a necessary weakness of the way in which others have proceeded to speak of God, ie, they speak and reason about God while only knowing, and only to a certain degree, about God's effects in this world. It follows that as we develop a better understanding of the natural world, our way of speaking of God will change.

            I do address the subject of this thread. The very first of the problems with the five ways Aquinas proposes is that they are too often presented and misunderstood out of context. You previously argued that these ways may be circular (Post #1) because it relied upon an a priori assumption of an uncaused being, and you astoundingly claimed to see no distinction between the assumption of the idea of an uncaused being and the assumption of the existence of an uncaused being (3). You next tried to claim that reasonable inferences actually become assumptions (10). Next you quoted “a broader definition of circularity” to try and make your point with reference to this definition as applied to the fifth way (60):
            "Elliott Sober gives a "broader definition of circularity" — "An argument is circular if it couldn't possibly convince someone that the conclusion is true if they didn't believe the conclusion already." {from Core Questions in Philosophy, 1st Edition, p. 183} …

            "Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence"

            Assumptions: ". . . whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence."

            Those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions."

            Unless you misspoke rather dramatically, all you’ve actually said here is that those who do not accept this Aristotelian metaphysical presupposition will not accept this Aristotelian metaphysical presupposition. Yes, Thomas in fact accepts the presupposition that ‘whatever lacks intelligence cannot move toward an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence’ If it were Thomas’ objective was to prove this statement and instead he assumed it, it would indeed be circular in the strict sense. But it is not Thomas intent to prove this statement. It is merely a metaphysical presupposition. We will look at his actual conclusions in a moment.

            After a few more missteps on your part wherein you repeated claimed that Thomas’ ways were intended as self-evident demonstrations, attempted to characterize me as going off the deep end or being slippery, and SHOUTING AT ME WITH ALL CAPS A COUPLE OF TIMES, you now seem to accept that Thomas’ five ways are neither a priori nor intended as self-evident. Progress.

            Nonetheless you are still claiming that that Thomas’ five ways are circular. But you have yet to show where Thomas assumes his own conclusion, at least not without changing Thomas’ language. The conclusion of each of the five ways is that each of these ways of speaking and reasoning discuss what is, in fact, what is commonly called God:
            … hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.
            ... quam omnes Deum nominant.
            ... quod omnes dicunt Deum.
            … et hoc dicimus Deum.
            … et hoc dicimus Deum.

            Nowhere does he presume this conclusion. He accepts some of the ways in which others think and speak of the natural world and considers their way of thinking to result in a being that is properly referred to as God. Thomas' intent here is more an exercise in philosophical nomenclature and only a 'proof' in a rather limited sense (a limited sense allowed by Thomas’ Latin), and the key limitations are spelled out very clearly by Thomas himself, namely that he must rely on a verbal description of God and on our limited understanding of the natural world.

            Assumptions that Aristotle and others, including Thomas himself, of course, can no longer be considered correct or convincing, but he does not attempt to prove that God exists by assuming that God exists. He does present ways in which others before him have proceeded to speak and reason about the natural world, culminating in a prime mover, cause, necessity, goodness, and finality, that do in fact correspond to what may be considered God in Thomas’ theological view, a view which accepts pagan Aristotelian physics, ethics, and metaphysics more than any of his theological colleagues. This is what was controversial about Thomas’ writings in historical context. Like Paul in his letter to Romans, whom Thomas quotes, he would not deny that others have indeed known God through natural reason. Thomas has no need to prove the existence of God against modern atheists or others with differing metaphysical or even ametaphysical presuppositions. He is content to adopt the science and the emergent metaphysics of his time and show how it can be made congruent with his theology.

            Some Thomist apologists do not accept this view of Thomas’ intent (eg, Feser), but rather try to rehabilitate his basic logical and metaphysical reasoning as still relevant and valid today, but my own view is that the science and metaphysics of Aristotle’s day are hopelessly out-dated. My own hermeneutic recognizes the potential validity of various metaphysical presuppositions within an appreciation of metaphysical relativism. We all have metaphysical presuppositions whether we recognize them as presuppositions or not.
            βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
            ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

            אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

            Comment


            • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
              The quotation you bold above should be understood in context as Thomas noting a necessary weakness of the way in which others have proceeded to speak of God, ie, they speak and reason about God while only knowing, and only to a certain degree, about God's effects in this world. It follows that as we develop a better understanding of the natural world, our way of speaking of God will change.

              I do address the subject of this thread. The very first of the problems with the five ways Aquinas proposes is that they are too often presented and misunderstood out of context. You previously argued that these ways may be circular (Post #1) because it relied upon an a priori assumption of an uncaused being, and you astoundingly claimed to see no distinction between the assumption of the idea of an uncaused being and the assumption of the existence of an uncaused being (3).
              Quote me, do not interpret what I say. I never said that the assumptions were that the 'uncaused being existed.' The assumption lead to no other possible conclusion but that an uncaused being exists.


              You next tried to claim that reasonable inferences actually become assumptions (10). Next you quoted “a broader definition of circularity” to try and make your point with reference to this definition as applied to the fifth way (60):
              You misrepresent me again I quoted two definitions, and you only acknowledged the first. your playing slippery again.

              "Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence"

              Assumptions: ". . . whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence."
              Yes, these assumption led to the necessity of an Intelligent Designer, God

              Those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions."[/indent]
              Of course, those who do not accept the assumption of the necessity of an unintelligent universe requires an Intelligent Design, will not accept the conclusion that there exists an Intelligent Designer.

              Nonetheless you are still claiming that that Thomas’ five ways are circular. But you have yet to show where Thomas assumes his own conclusion, at least not without changing Thomas’ language. The conclusion of each of the five ways is that each of these ways of speaking and reasoning discuss what is, in fact, what is commonly called God:
              yes

              Assumptions that Aristotle and others, including Thomas himself, of course, can no longer be considered correct or convincing, but he does not attempt to prove that God exists by assuming that God exists. He does present ways in which others before him have proceeded to speak and reason about the natural world, culminating in a prime mover, cause, necessity, goodness, and finality, that do in fact correspond to what may be considered God in Thomas’ theological view, a view which accepts pagan Aristotelian physics, ethics, and metaphysics more than any of his theological colleagues. This is what was controversial about Thomas’ writings in historical context. Like Paul in his letter to Romans, whom Thomas quotes, he would not deny that others have indeed known God through natural reason. Thomas has no need to prove the existence of God against modern atheists or others with differing metaphysical or even ametaphysical presuppositions. He is content to adopt the science and the emergent metaphysics of his time and show how it can be made congruent with his theology.
              I never said the assumptions assume God exists. These assumptions led to no other conclusion that an uncaused cause exists and that is what they call God.

              Some Thomist apologists do not accept this view of Thomas’ intent (eg, Feser), but rather try to rehabilitate his basic logical and metaphysical reasoning as still relevant and valid today, but my own view is that the science and metaphysics of Aristotle’s day are hopelessly out-dated. My own hermeneutic recognizes the potential validity of various metaphysical presuppositions within an appreciation of metaphysical relativism. We all have metaphysical presuppositions whether we recognize them as presuppositions or not.
              I am not present rehabilitation and reworking old arguments with a box of theological bandaids. I am considering the substance of Aquinas's intent.
              Last edited by shunyadragon; 08-30-2015, 07:14 PM.
              Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
              Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
              But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

              go with the flow the river knows . . .

              Frank

              I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

              Comment


              • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                Quote me, do not interpret what I say. I never said that the assumptions were that the 'uncaused being existed.' The assumption lead to no other possible conclusion but that an uncaused being exists.
                I am the one who made the distinction between assuming the existence of of an uncaused being and assuming the idea of an uncaused being, to which you responded that you did not see such a distinction: "I see no difference between the assumption of the 'existence' of such a being and the 'idea' of such a being, namely an 'uncaused being.' The priori assumption must be made either way for the argument to work." Because you were trying to support the idea that his argument was circular, I gave you the benefit of the doubt (always a mistake) that you meant he assumed his conclusion, ie, that an uncaused being existed.

                The bottom line is that he does not make an a priori assumptions at all, but rather follows the science of the day and metaphysical presuppositions abstracted from the science of his day. And if he does not make an a priori assumption that the uncaused being existed', which you now admit, or at least you clarify that you never said this, then his reasoning that such an uncaused being exists is not circular in the strict sense.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                You misrepresent me again I quoted two definitions, and you only acknowledged the first. your playing slippery again.
                No, I did not think it necessary to rehash our most recent part of the discussion in which I showed that since Thomas is not preceding from self-evident but false definitions, the example of definitional circularity from Rabkin does not apply. Regardless, when you first gave the 'two definitions' of Sober and Rabkin, you did not apply the definition of Rabkin, but only the one of Sober, which I underline below:
                "Elliott Sober gives a "broader definition of circularity" — "An argument is circular if it couldn't possibly convince someone that the conclusion is true if they didn't believe the conclusion already." {from Core Questions in Philosophy, 1st Edition, p. 183}

                In circular reasoning, "The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, but it is invalid nonetheless. ... It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many."

                "Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence"

                Assumptions: ". . . whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence."
                Yes, these assumption led to the necessity of an Intelligent Designer, God

                Those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions."

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                Yes, these assumption led to the necessity of an Intelligent Designer, God
                But not in a manner that is strictly speaking circular. He did not merely assume the existence of an intelligent designer. He believed it was an observation of nature that nature usually acted toward optimal ends in a seemingly intentional manner, and since he also observed that nature in and of itself did not possess such intelligence, he reasoned that this intelligence must be coming from something other than nature. Some of his observations were wrong, obviously, but this is not circular reasoning.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                Of course, those who do not accept the assumption of the necessity of an unintelligent universe requires an Intelligent Design, will not accept the conclusion that there exists an Intelligent Designer.
                Again, for Aristotle and Thomas, this is a reasoned conclusion based upon faulty observations, but not circular reasoning.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                yes
                If you do in fact realize that these were in fact his conclusions, then you must admit that he did not assume these conclusions. Nowhere does he merely assume that God exists.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                I never said the assumptions assume God exists.
                Then his reasoning is not circular in the strict sense. QED.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                These assumptions led to no other conclusion that an uncaused cause exists and that is what they call God.
                Strictly speaking this would not be circular reasoning. Add to that the fact that although these 'assumptions' may correctly appear to us today as little more than assumptions, for Aristotle and Thomas they were abstracted from natural observations of their day and not merely assumed.

                Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                I am not present rehabilitation and reworking old arguments with a box of theological bandaids. I am considering the substance of Aquinas's intent.
                You are nonetheless adopting the same view of Aquinas' intent as Feser. Thus your critique has more merit against Feser than against Thomas as he is interpreted by other historico-critical scholars who do not share Feser's apologetic interests.
                Last edited by robrecht; 08-30-2015, 08:28 PM.
                βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
                ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

                אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

                Comment


                • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
                  The bottom line is that he does not make an a priori assumptions at all, but rather follows the science of the day and metaphysical presuppositions abstracted from the science of his day. And if he does not make an a priori assumption that the uncaused being existed', which you now admit, or at least you clarify that you never said this, then his reasoning that such an uncaused being exists is not circular in the strict sense.

                  No, I did not think it necessary to rehash our most recent part of the discussion in which I showed that since Thomas is not preceding from self-evident but false definitions, the example of definitional circularity from Rabkin does not apply. Regardless, when you first gave the 'two definitions' of Sober and Rabkin, you did not apply the definition of Rabkin, but only the one of Sober, which I underline below:
                  "Elliott Sober gives a "broader definition of circularity" — "An argument is circular if it couldn't possibly convince someone that the conclusion is true if they didn't believe the conclusion already." {from Core Questions in Philosophy, 1st Edition, p. 183}

                  In circular reasoning, "The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, but it is invalid nonetheless. ... It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many."

                  "Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence"

                  Assumptions: ". . . whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence."
                  Yes, these assumption led to the necessity of an Intelligent Designer, God

                  Those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions."

                  But not in a manner that is strictly speaking circular. He did not merely assume the existence of an intelligent designer. He believed it was an observation of nature that nature usually acted toward optimal ends in a seemingly intentional manner, and since he also observed that nature in and of itself did not possess such intelligence, he reasoned that this intelligence must be coming from something other than nature. Some of his observations were wrong, obviously, but this is not circular reasoning.

                  Again, for Aristotle and Thomas, this is a reasoned conclusion based upon faulty observations, but not circular reasoning.

                  If you do in fact realize that these were in fact his conclusions, then you must admit that he did not assume these conclusions. Nowhere does he merely assume that God exists.

                  Then his reasoning is not circular in the strict sense. QED.

                  Strictly speaking this would not be circular reasoning. Add to that the fact that although these 'assumptions' may correctly appear to us today as little more than assumptions, for Aristotle and Thomas they were abstracted from natural observations of their day and not merely assumed.
                  We may have to agree to disagree here. Actually the circular reasoning is not based on faulty observations, because some of his observations are indeed true, such as our physical existence is 'unintelligent.' Aquinas has not observed many of the presuppositions he makes concerning what he assumes as attributes, 'effects,' of an uncaused cause, God. Your drawing a circuitous course in restricting 'circular reasoning' to a limited context to suit your agenda. No, circular reasoning is not limited to suit ones own agenda of 'strictly speaking.' Aquinas's arguments are circular reasoning, because presuppositions lead only to the necessary conclusion. In other words the presuppositions 'define' the conclusion.

                  As far as the fifth way, modern knowledge of science does not seem to help for the arguments of ID, because the argument remains circular in that the argument proposes that an intelligence is required to create an unintelligent physical existence to justify the need for fine tuning, and explain the complexity of life.
                  Last edited by shunyadragon; 08-31-2015, 08:32 AM.
                  Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                  Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                  But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                  go with the flow the river knows . . .

                  Frank

                  I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                  Comment


                  • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                    We may have to agree to disagree here. Actually the circular reasoning is not based on faulty observations, because some of his observations are indeed true, such as our physical existence is 'unintelligent.' Aquinas has not observed many of the presuppositions he makes concerning what he assumes as attributes, 'effects,' of an uncaused cause, God. Your drawing circuitous course in restricting 'circular reasoning' to a limited context to suit your agenda. No, circular reasoning is not limited to suit ones own agenda of 'strictly speaking.' Aquinas's arguments are circular reasoning, because presuppositions lead only to the necessary conclusion. In other words the presuppositions 'define' the conclusion.
                    I did not say all of Aristotle or Thomas' observations are faulty. But as a whole they are faulty in the general sense that science has moved on substantially and metaphysics should as well. Nor did I say or imply that the whole of Aquinas' reasoning was based on direct observation, rather it was reasoning and abstractions based on natural observations. For more detail, have fun looking at Aristotle's Posterior Analytics and the commentaries by Albert Magnus and Thomas. Your ad hominem that I am defining circular reasoning to suit my agenda is false. With respect to my agenda, I have already clarified for you several times that I have no difficulty criticizing and disagreeing with Aristotle and Thomas with respect to their reasoning and positions and am happy to describe their metaphysics as circular in the sense that I consider all metaphysics to be fundamentally circular, in a good way, and with specific reference to Thomas, his metaphysical view point is also influenced by his Christian faith. Because I do admit to these more general senses of circular, I have focused my discussion with you on the stricter definition of circular reasoning as it is normally applied in logic and normal life. Once again, I will remind you of Thomas' actual conclusions, which are not presumed, nor do they necessarily follow:
                    … hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.
                    ... quam omnes Deum nominant.
                    ... quod omnes dicunt Deum.
                    … et hoc dicimus Deum.
                    … et hoc dicimus Deum.

                    This is why some describe Aquinas intent along the lines of what I have called an exercise in philosophical nomenclature, whereby he seeks to describe and systematize the manner in which humans have natural knowledge of God. The use of Thomas' five ways out of context by apologists or anti-apologists as the foundation for modern proofs about the existence of God, especially in a post-Cartesian context that includes philosophical arguments in favor of atheism or in critique of theism is hopelessly anachronistic.
                    βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
                    ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

                    אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

                    Comment


                    • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
                      This is why some describe Aquinas intent along the lines of what I have called an exercise in philosophical nomenclature, whereby he seeks to describe and systematize the manner in which humans have natural knowledge of God. The use of Thomas' five ways out of context by apologists or anti-apologists as the foundation for modern proofs about the existence of God, especially in a post-Cartesian context that includes philosophical arguments in favor of atheism or in critique of theism is hopelessly anachronistic.
                      This I disagree with this, because many apologist arguments today follow distinctly the same lines of logic as the arguments by Aquinas, and many indeed draw their inspiration and logical reason from Aquinas. Many add subtle differences and reworking of the arguments, but they most often make the same assumptions, like the following . . .

                      As far as the fifth way, modern knowledge of science does not seem to help for the arguments of ID, because the argument remains circular in that it proposes that an intelligence is required to create an unintelligent physical existence to justify the need for fine tuning, and explain the complexity of life.

                      I believe some of William Craig's arguments still follow the same line of logic as Thomas Aquinas.
                      Last edited by shunyadragon; 08-31-2015, 10:33 AM.
                      Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                      Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                      But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                      go with the flow the river knows . . .

                      Frank

                      I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                      Comment


                      • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                        This I disagree with this, because many apologist arguments today follow distinctly the same lines of logic as the arguments by Aquinas, and many indeed draw their inspiration and logical reason from Aquinas. Many add subtle differences and reworking of the arguments, but they most often make the same assumptions, like the following . . .
                        I do not see anything in the above statement that disagrees with what I have said. Did you intend to replace your ellipses with some additional text?

                        Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                        As far as the fifth way, modern knowledge of science does not seem to help for the arguments of ID, because the argument remains circular in that it proposes that an intelligence is required to create an unintelligent physical existence to justify the need for fine tuning, and explain the complexity of life.
                        I have nowhere argued for the validity of modern arguments for ID. If they assume an intelligent designer, they would obviously be circular. As for Thomas' fifth way, we've already seen that his actual conclusion is not assumed and it does not even necessarily follow from his observations, abstractions, reasoning process, or presuppositions.
                        Last edited by robrecht; 08-31-2015, 10:46 AM.
                        βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
                        ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

                        אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

                        Comment


                        • Originally posted by shunyadragon View Post
                          I believe some of William Craig's arguments still follow the same line of logic as Thomas Aquinas.
                          I have not engaged the work of William Craig since the early 90s in my first public lecture, and I see no reason to, for a couple of reasons. One, I consider his use of modern science to be apologetic and therefore not open-minded inquiry; Two, I doubt that his use of Thomas Aquinas is any better than his use of modern science. Three, I consider him a pompous blowhard. Yes, that last reason is very much an ad hominem!
                          βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
                          ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

                          אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

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                          • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
                            Three, I consider him a pompous blowhard. Yes, that last reason is very much an ad hominem!
                            I'm always surprised to hear people say this. I've been listening to his podcasts, watching his debates, and reading his books for near 15 years now, and I find him incredibly irenic, patient, and gracious. I mean, there are a number of pompous blowhards in Christian apologetics, but William Lane Craig certainly isn't at the top of that list.

                            Comment


                            • Originally posted by robrecht View Post
                              I have nowhere argued for the validity of modern arguments for ID. If they assume an intelligent designer, they would obviously be circular. As for Thomas' fifth way, we've already seen that his actual conclusion is not assumed and it does not even necessarily follow from his observations, abstractions, reasoning process, or presuppositions.
                              I did not say you did. My point was that many still use the same assumptions and logical arguments as Aquinas, despite the advance in science and philosophy in response to your claim.

                              The use of Thomas' five ways out of context by apologists or anti-apologists as the foundation for modern proofs about the existence of God, especially in a post-Cartesian context that includes philosophical arguments in favor of atheism or in critique of theism is hopelessly anachronistic.
                              Glendower: I can call spirits from the vasty deep.
                              Hotspur: Why, so can I, or so can any man;
                              But will they come when you do call for them? Shakespeare’s Henry IV, Part 1, Act III:

                              go with the flow the river knows . . .

                              Frank

                              I do not know, therefore everything is in pencil.

                              Comment


                              • Originally posted by Adrift View Post
                                I'm always surprised to hear people say this. I've been listening to his podcasts, watching his debates, and reading his books for near 15 years now, and I find him incredibly irenic, patient, and gracious. I mean, there are a number of pompous blowhards in Christian apologetics, but William Lane Craig certainly isn't at the top of that list.
                                Perhaps I've misjudged him then. He is one of the few academic apologists, perhaps even the only one, that I have any familiarity with so my impression is by no means intended as a comparison to others. Personally, I do not think that apologetics belongs in academia so that might explain some of my bias.
                                βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι᾿ ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, τότε δὲ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον·
                                ἄρτι γινώσκω ἐκ μέρους, τότε δὲ ἐπιγνώσομαι καθὼς καὶ ἐπεγνώσθην.

                                אָכֵ֕ן אַתָּ֖ה אֵ֣ל מִסְתַּתֵּ֑ר אֱלֹהֵ֥י יִשְׂרָאֵ֖ל מוֹשִֽׁיעַ׃

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