Problems with Thomas Aquinas aguments for the existence of God

[seer]

Seer, no we do not agree. You are antagonistic and negative toward science. I consider Natural Law as the attributes of God. This is where any possible agreement ends. I consider science extremely accurate and reliable in understanding the physical world, unfortunately you do not. Any perceived conflict between the Bible and science, you reject science. You selectively misuse science to support your agenda.

What are you taking about? Did nature create and order this universe without the aid and direction of God - yes or no?

[shunyadragon]

What are you taking about? Did nature create and order this universe without the aid and direction of God - yes or no?

The question has been answered completely many times.

[seer]

The question has been answered completely many times.

No it hasn't, let me try again: Did nature create and order this universe without the aid and direction of God - yes or no? Its a simple yes or no Shuny.

[shunyadragon]

No it hasn't, let me try again: Did nature create and order this universe without the aid and direction of God - yes or no? Its a simple yes or no Shuny.

ditto

[robrecht]

Get a life! . . . and move on. I gave two clear definitions. The Aquinas argument is clearly circular by both definitions.

Then you should be able to provide a substantive response to my Post #69.

[shunyadragon]

Then you should be able to provide a substantive response to my Post #69.

I did. The argument is circular by both definitions.

[robrecht]

I did. The argument is circular by both definitions.

No. Merely saying it is circular does not demonstrate that it is circular. In fact, that is itself exactly the kind of circularity that Eric Rabkin illustrates with his example from Alice in Wonderland. You cannot just proclaim it is circular because you perceive it to be such, but attempt to show how it fits the definition you offered from Eric Rabkin. Do you need me to quote for you the part of my analysis from my Post #69 that you have heretofore avoided?

[shunyadragon]

No. Merely saying it is circular does not demonstrate that it is circular. In fact, that is itself exactly the kind of circularity that Eric Rabkin illustrates with his example from Alice in Wonderland. You cannot just proclaim it is circular because you perceive it to be such, but attempt to show how it fits the definition you offered from Eric Rabkin. Do you need me to quote for you the part of my analysis from my Post #69 that you have heretofore avoided?

I did not use the Alice in Wonderland example. Again I gave two definitions, and the argument is circular by both definitions.

[robrecht]

I did not use the Alice in Wonderland example. Again I gave two definitions, and the argument is circular by both definitions.

You did indeed quote from Rabkin's Alice in Wonderland example, but out of context. If you look at the context of Rabkin's remarks, you should be able to see that it does not fit Thomas' fifth way. I tried to show you in my Post #69 that it does not fit Rabkin's defintion, but you have not responded. You just keep asserting that its circular like the bird to Alice proclaiming to her that she is a serpent. You need to show how it fits Rabkin's definition of circular, not merely your own assertion of such.

Here is what you quoted from Rabkin, unattributed:

In circular reasoning, "The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, but it is invalid nonetheless. ... It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many."

Here is Rabkin's fuller description. I have underlined the minimal sections you quoted, without understanding the larger context, which invalidates your application to Thomas' fifth way:

"4) Circular reasoning is a common logical fallacy. An example comes near the end of chapter 5 of Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland in which Alice has a debate with a bird. At this point, because of the fantastic workings of Wonderland, Alice has grown so tall and her neck so long that her head pops up in the tree tops. The bird believes Alice is a serpent seeking the bird's eggs and tries to drive her away. Alice refuses this rejection because, after all, she's not a serpent but a little girl. The bird asserts that Alice is not little. Well, not now Alice admits (but of course without meaning to surrender her own sense of identity as a little girl). And Alice does go in tree tops, the bird declares. Well, now I seem to, Alice admits, but not usually. Well, if you're not a serpent, then you don't eat eggs. Oh, yes, Alice says, I eat eggs. Then, the bird concludes, you're long, in tree tops, and eat eggs, so you're a serpent. What's going on here? Carroll is demonstrating that the meanings of words vary from user to user and different viewpoints may have practical utility even without logical validity. Obviously Alice and the bird have not agreed on the meanings of serpent or girl. From the bird's viewpoint, Alice is a serpent because she has three characteristics that are necessary and sufficient to define a serpent. From Alice's viewpoint, those characteristics are neither true of her (she isn't usually tall) nor sufficient to define a serpent (serpents, for example, don't have legs but Alice does, even if the serpent hasn't noticed them because the foliage obscures the bird's view of Alice below her neck). As Alice sees the debate, the bird has asserted a definition of serpent (which Alice happens to reject) and then scolds Alice for fulfilling that definition. Where did the bird get that definition of serpent? She got it from her understanding of what matters in the world as she sees it. In other words, the bird's conclusion that Alice is a serpent is based on premises that the bird wants to impose on Alice's understanding. To put this more generally and in terms of literary argument, the bird reads the world as providing a certain definition of serpent and from that reading the bird concludes that Alice is a serpent. The problem is, the bird's inference of the definition is wrong and her understanding of Alice is limited. The bird's definition is, in fact, itself an assertion that requires logical support, but there is no logical support for the definition. The definition is merely the bird's inadequate reading of the narrative world, her imposition on that world of her own understanding. The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, as it does to the bird, but it is invalid nonetheless. It is invalid not because the definition of serpent is false (which it is to humans) but because the structure of the reasoning is basically this: I see the following; therefore the following is what I am seeing. That is circular reasoning. It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many or because we may have the feeling that there are suppressed premises that are nonetheless pleasant and clinch the connections. But once we notice circular reasoning, we need to repair it because circular reasoning is always invalid. Even if its conclusions, like the conclusion that Socrates the cat is mortal or that the bird sees what she considers to be a serpent, is true."

[shunyadragon]

You did indeed quote from Rabkin's Alice in Wonderland example, but out of context. If you look at the context of Rabkin's remarks, you should be able to see that it does not fit Thomas' fifth way. I tried to show you in my Post #69 that it does not fit Rabkin's defintion, but you have not responded. You just keep asserting that its circular like the bird to Alice proclaiming to her that she is a serpent. You need to show how it fits Rabkin's definition of circular, not merely your own assertion of such.

Here is what you quoted from Rabkin, unattributed:

In circular reasoning, "The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, but it is invalid nonetheless. ... It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many."

Here is Rabkin's fuller description. I have underlined the minimal sections you quoted, without understanding the larger context, which invalidates your application to Thomas' fifth way:

"4) Circular reasoning is a common logical fallacy. An example comes near the end of chapter 5 of Lewis Carroll's Alice in Wonderland in which Alice has a debate with a bird. At this point, because of the fantastic workings of Wonderland, Alice has grown so tall and her neck so long that her head pops up in the tree tops. The bird believes Alice is a serpent seeking the bird's eggs and tries to drive her away. Alice refuses this rejection because, after all, she's not a serpent but a little girl. The bird asserts that Alice is not little. Well, not now Alice admits (but of course without meaning to surrender her own sense of identity as a little girl). And Alice does go in tree tops, the bird declares. Well, now I seem to, Alice admits, but not usually. Well, if you're not a serpent, then you don't eat eggs. Oh, yes, Alice says, I eat eggs. Then, the bird concludes, you're long, in tree tops, and eat eggs, so you're a serpent. What's going on here? Carroll is demonstrating that the meanings of words vary from user to user and different viewpoints may have practical utility even without logical validity. Obviously Alice and the bird have not agreed on the meanings of serpent or girl. From the bird's viewpoint, Alice is a serpent because she has three characteristics that are necessary and sufficient to define a serpent. From Alice's viewpoint, those characteristics are neither true of her (she isn't usually tall) nor sufficient to define a serpent (serpents, for example, don't have legs but Alice does, even if the serpent hasn't noticed them because the foliage obscures the bird's view of Alice below her neck). As Alice sees the debate, the bird has asserted a definition of serpent (which Alice happens to reject) and then scolds Alice for fulfilling that definition. Where did the bird get that definition of serpent? She got it from her understanding of what matters in the world as she sees it. In other words, the bird's conclusion that Alice is a serpent is based on premises that the bird wants to impose on Alice's understanding. To put this more generally and in terms of literary argument, the bird reads the world as providing a certain definition of serpent and from that reading the bird concludes that Alice is a serpent. The problem is, the bird's inference of the definition is wrong and her understanding of Alice is limited. The bird's definition is, in fact, itself an assertion that requires logical support, but there is no logical support for the definition. The definition is merely the bird's inadequate reading of the narrative world, her imposition on that world of her own understanding. The definition comes first and then the supposed proof is based on that definition. This is proving something (at the end) by making logical deductions from premises that themselves contain the conclusion. Looping from the end to the beginning that way is called circular reasoning. Circular reasoning often sounds right, as it does to the bird, but it is invalid nonetheless. It is invalid not because the definition of serpent is false (which it is to humans) but because the structure of the reasoning is basically this: I see the following; therefore the following is what I am seeing. That is circular reasoning. It is often hard to recognize reasoning as circular because the steps between the first and last may be many or because we may have the feeling that there are suppressed premises that are nonetheless pleasant and clinch the connections. But once we notice circular reasoning, we need to repair it because circular reasoning is always invalid. Even if its conclusions, like the conclusion that Socrates the cat is mortal or that the bird sees what she considers to be a serpent, is true."

Your underlining is ok. It still remains that Aquina's argument is circular regardless of which definition you used.

[robrecht]

Your underlining is ok. It still remains that Aquina's argument is circular regardless of which definition you used.

Still just assertion, without any substantive response to my Post #69:

As you should know, I already agree with the broad characterization of circularity with respect to metaphysics in general so there is no certainly no effort on my part to move goal posts. Now it seems you agree with me and your own source that your first definition of circularity is indeed a broad one.

If you want to discuss the more narrow definition, you should do that. In other words, you should show where in Thomas' premise appears the assertion, implicit or otherwise, that God exists. Your analysis is "those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions" (#60). But you overstating the premise. It is not that such an intelligent being exists, ie, God (that would indeed be circular in the narrow sense of the term), but merely that 'whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence'. That is a general statement about any being that is able to use objects without intelligence for intelligent ends, not necessarily God or a supreme being, just an intelligent being. But, if indeed all of nature seems to be generally active with purpose and culminating in higher ends, that which is guiding the natural processes, whether it is called Natural Law or God, it is considered by Thomas to necessarily possess some kind of intelligence. That is just standard Aristotelian teleology, not a proof for the existence of a personal God nor a proof relying on the assumption of the existence of a personal or impersonal God. It is dependent upon premises or observations that unintelligent beings cannot act with evident purpose and that all of nature generally seems to act with purpose. Whatever explains that perceived purposefulness may be called God. Or Natural Law. In any deductive proof, if one does not agree with the premises, they also will not thereby agree with the conclusion, but that does not render the proof circular, just based on false or suspect and not universally accepted premises. If the premises or observations are perceived as true, the conclusion will follow deductively, but that is not circularity in the narrow sense of the term.

If you look more carefully at Rabin's description of circular reasoning it has to do with the problem of definitions given from different perspectives (illustrated by an scene from Alice in Wonderland where Alice and a bird have differing definitions of 'girl'): "I see the following; therefore the following is what I am seeing. That is circular reasoning." Such an example does not apply to Thomas' fifth way. He does not give a definition of God. He does not believe that God can be defined. Rather he attributes what he sees in nature, rightly or wrongly, to God. From his perspective, and that of Aristotle, any being able to act upon all nature with purposefulness, would indeed be considered God by most people of his time. He does not say, 'I see God acting in nature, therefore God is acting in nature.' Rather he says, 'I see purposefulness in all nature, that could not come from nature which lacks intelligence, therefore it must be coming from a purposeful being, and one which could act upon all nature would be called God.' Obviously, such an argument can no longer be seen as valid apart from modern scientific observations informing one's observations of the natural world.

[shunyadragon]

Still just assertion, without any substantive response to my Post #69:

As you should know, I already agree with the broad characterization of circularity with respect to metaphysics in general so there is no certainly no effort on my part to move goal posts. Now it seems you agree with me and your own source that your first definition of circularity is indeed a broad one.

If you want to discuss the more narrow definition, you should do that. In other words, you should show where in Thomas' premise appears the assertion, implicit or otherwise, that God exists. Your analysis is "those who do not believe such an 'intelligent being exists' would not accept these assumptions" (#60). But you overstating the premise. It is not that such an intelligent being exists, ie, God (that would indeed be circular in the narrow sense of the term), but merely that 'whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence'. That is a general statement about any being that is able to use objects without intelligence for intelligent ends, not necessarily God or a supreme being, just an intelligent being. But, if indeed all of nature seems to be generally active with purpose and culminating in higher ends, that which is guiding the natural processes, whether it is called Natural Law or God, it is considered by Thomas to necessarily possess some kind of intelligence. That is just standard Aristotelian teleology, not a proof for the existence of a personal God nor a proof relying on the assumption of the existence of a personal or impersonal God. It is dependent upon premises or observations that unintelligent beings cannot act with evident purpose and that all of nature generally seems to act with purpose. Whatever explains that perceived purposefulness may be called God. Or Natural Law. In any deductive proof, if one does not agree with the premises, they also will not thereby agree with the conclusion, but that does not render the proof circular, just based on false or suspect and not universally accepted premises. If the premises or observations are perceived as true, the conclusion will follow deductively, but that is not circularity in the narrow sense of the term.

If you look more carefully at Rabin's description of circular reasoning it has to do with the problem of definitions given from different perspectives (illustrated by an scene from Alice in Wonderland where Alice and a bird have differing definitions of 'girl'): "I see the following; therefore the following is what I am seeing. That is circular reasoning." Such an example does not apply to Thomas' fifth way. He does not give a definition of God. He does not believe that God can be defined. Rather he attributes what he sees in nature, rightly or wrongly, to God. From his perspective, and that of Aristotle, any being able to act upon all nature with purposefulness, would indeed be considered God by most people of his time. He does not say, 'I see God acting in nature, therefore God is acting in nature.' Rather he says, 'I see purposefulness in all nature, that could not come from nature which lacks intelligence, therefore it must be coming from a purposeful being, and one which could act upon all nature would be called God.' Obviously, such an argument can no longer be seen as valid apart from modern scientific observations informing one's observations of the natural world.

Presuppositions for the necessity of design and intelligence for an unintelligent physical existence to move forward is circular regardless. Obviously?!?!? The modern Intelligent Design arguments make similar circular presuppositions as did Aquinas, but tries in vain to use science to demonstrate their agenda. The modern arguments also bring up such 'arguments from ignorance' in there claims of 'complexity' and 'fine tuning.'

'I see purposefulness in all nature, that could not come from nature which lacks intelligence, therefore it must be coming from a purposeful being, and one which could act upon all nature would be called God.' remains circular despite gerrymandering language to make it sound different.

[robrecht]

Presuppositions for the necessity of design and intelligence for an unintelligent physical existence to move forward is circular regardless. Obviously?!?!? The modern Intelligent Design arguments make similar circular presuppositions as did Aquinas, but tries in vain to use science to demonstrate their agenda. The modern arguments also bring up such 'arguments from ignorance' in there [their] claims of 'complexity' and 'fine tuning.'

'I see purposefulness in all nature, that could not come from nature which lacks intelligence, therefore it must be coming from a purposeful being, and one which could act upon all nature would be called God.' remains circular despite gerrymandering language to make it sound different.

But you are the one who actually gerrymandered Thomas' language to render it circular in the narrow sense. It is not Thomas' premise and conclusion here that 'such an intelligent being exists', 'though, of course, he believes this, but his conclusion is rather that the existing being responsible for purposefulness in nature is whom we all call God. It is an exercise in nomenclature, showing the exceedingly limited way in which the human mind can become aware of God through his effects upon creation, ‘though he is unknown both in his essence and even in his very act of existence. Thus, for Thomas, the existence of God is not capable of being demonstrated in the strict sense. All of this is clear in the immediate context of Thomas presentation of the five ways (Ia, Q 1-2). Aquinas cannot be understood in as an anachronistic post-Cartesian rationalist or modern apologist misusing science. With specific reference to his fifth way, this cannot be equated to modern arguments from design, despite your reliance upon the mistranslation, designedly. It is also notable that Aquinas did not include the ancient and contemporary (to him) argument from design (Kenneth Schmitz, Recovery of Wonder, p 45 n 53). Thomas is speaking of Aristotelian final causality. A more literal translation should reference ‘intentionality’, not design. This is not about design, but Aristotelian teleology, which is why I equate the God of the Fifth Way with your usage of Natural Law. There is no such thing as a ‘circular presupposition’, but there is a huge presupposition, nonetheless, and the presupposition here is merely the Aristotelian teleology that Thomas has appropriated as a way of speaking and knowing about God from the very limited perspective of his effects upon creation.

[shunyadragon]

But you are the one who actually gerrymandered Thomas' language to render it circular in the narrow sense. It is not Thomas' premise and conclusion here that 'such an intelligent being exists', 'though, of course, he believes this, but his conclusion is rather that the existing being responsible for purposefulness in nature is whom we all call God. It is an exercise in nomenclature, showing the exceedingly limited way in which the human mind can become aware of God through his effects upon creation, ‘though he is unknown both in his essence and even in his very act of existence. Thus, for Thomas, the existence of God is not capable of being demonstrated in the strict sense. All of this is clear in the immediate context of Thomas presentation of the five ways (Ia, Q 1-2). Aquinas cannot be understood in as an anachronistic post-Cartesian rationalist or modern apologist misusing science. With specific reference to his fifth way, this cannot be equated to modern arguments from design, despite your reliance upon the mistranslation, designedly. It is also notable that Aquinas did not include the ancient and contemporary (to him) argument from design (Kenneth Schmitz, Recovery of Wonder, p 45 n 53). Thomas is speaking of Aristotelian final causality. A more literal translation should reference ‘intentionality’, not design. This is not about design, but Aristotelian teleology, which is why I equate the God of the Fifth Way with your usage of Natural Law. There is no such thing as a ‘circular presupposition’, but there is a huge presupposition, nonetheless, and the presupposition here is merely the Aristotelian teleology that Thomas has appropriated as a way of speaking and knowing about God from the very limited perspective of his effects upon creation.

No, in every sense Aguinas' argument is circular whether broad or specific. Appealing to Aristotelian teleology, an archaic logic, does not help your case.

The only way you can describe Aquinas' arguments as not circular is to describe them as not arguments for the existence of God, but as anecdotal expressions of what Aquinas believes, ie 'I see,' which is not historically how theologians have predominately used his arguments.

[robrecht]

No, in every sense Aguinas' argument is circular whether broad or specific. Appealing to Aristotelian teleology, an archaic logic, does not help your case.

The only way you can describe Aquinas' arguments as not circular is to describe them as not arguments for the existence of God, but as anecdotal expressions of what Aquinas believes, ie 'I see,' which is not historically how theologians have predominately used his arguments.

Neither modern proofs nor anecdotal observations, but rather, as I have already explained, the Medieval appropriation of Aristotelian philosophy within a fundamentally apophatic theology.